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INTRODUCTION 
 THE MYTH OF SOREL 
Despite his relative marginality in the history of European ideas, Georges Sorel is not an 
author that a reader approaches devoid of preconceptions. Every attempt to deal with him 
must thus start by acknowledging an important fact, namely that he is a thinker whose 
reputation as an irrationalist and as a theorist of political extremism overshadows more sober 
and accurate evaluations of his thought. Though most readers are barely acquainted with the 
complexity and the circumstances of Sorel’s writings, few will fail to recognize Sorel in 
G.D.H. Cole’s portrait of a ‘pessimist moaning for blood’1 outlining a theory of revolution for 
revolutions’ sake coated in irrationalism and pseudo-mystical reveries whose central concept 
is that people are mobilized by ‘a faith that [is] in essence non-rational’.2 The fact that even as 
perceptive a commentator as Leszek Kolakowski partially falls into the caricatural trap – he 
writes that Sorel’s ‘unfulfilled ambition was to be the Luther of the Marxist movement’3 – 
gives an idea of the force and pervasiveness of this dark legend. Still today, almost a century 
after the death of the Norman engineer and after the development of an important body of 
scholarship about his work, the definition of Sorel as ‘un méconnu célébre’4 is the most 
accurate one: a famously misunderstood thinker, much talked about in passing references but 
more rarely the object of in-depth studies.  
It is thus necessary to begin this introduction by addressing in some depth this legend:  this 
will make the reader aware of the limitations of the received wisdom about Sorel and pave the 
way for the arguments developed in the thesis. What is, then, Sorel’s standard caricature? 
John Burrow provides us with an excellent starting point: 
‘Revolution, which he deals with in the Reflections, in the form of the 
revolutionary General Strike, or perhaps more the myth of revolution, was 
important to Sorel not for anything specific it might achieve (to speculate on 
which was a form of pedantry) but for the moral rebirth, the revival of collective, 
fanatical zeal, beyond any rational intention, which bringing it about might 
kindle; he compared the revolutionary spirit sometimes to the fanaticism of the 
early Christians, sometimes to that of the armies of the French republic in the 
1790s. Cherishing heroic values, usually in what he thought of as their rugged, 
                                                 
1
 George Douglas Howard Cole, A History of Socialist Thought. Volume III, part I: The Second International, 
1889-1914  (London, Macmillan: 1956), p. 387. 
2
 Ibid., p. 385. 
3
 Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism. Volume II: the Golden Age, trans. by P.S. Falla (Oxford, 
Clarendon: 1978), p. 149. 
4
 Michel Charzat, ‘Avant-propos’ in Michel Charzat (ed.), Cahiers de l’Herne : Georges Sorel (Paris, Éditions 
de l’Herne : 1986), p. 9. 
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peasant or proletarian forms, Sorel contemplated the contemporary world with 
the distaste of a moral aesthete: it was dead, grey, spiritless, tame, rotted with 
humanitarianism and pedantry…’5 
The picture is a common one. Sorel is cast as a critic of a vaguely defined political rationality, 
to which he is said to prefer the emotional appeal of an equally vaguely defined myth. The 
non-rational appeal to myth, in turn, is put to the service of a revolutionary project devoid of 
any content but concerned with some sort of moral rebirth, which Sorel is said to crave in 
order to sate his frustration and anger against bourgeois civilisation and its values. The 
explanatory work, it should be pointed out, is done almost entirely by psychological 
assumptions: Sorel, the apocalyptic prophet of doom, is moved by ‘the distaste of a moral 
aesthete’.  
There are precise reasons for the consolidation of this standard image of Sorel, and it is worth 
noting that this portrait is not a recent invention. A few weeks after his death, an obituary in a 
popular Parisian publication already described him as a ‘very dangerous man… as are those in 
which the passion for the absolute has killed the sense of the relative.’6 In his review of the 
Reflections on violence, for example, a T.S. Eliot writing during the Great War elaborates a 
portrait substantially akin to that sketched by Burrow: 
‘He hates the middle classes, he hates middle-class democracy and middle-class 
socialism; but he does not hate these things as a champion of the rights of the 
people, he hates them as a middle-class intellectual hates… At the back of his 
mind is a scepticism which springs from Renan, but which is much more terrible 
that Renan’s. For with Renan and Sainte-Beuve scepticism was still a satisfying 
point of view, almost an esthetic [sic] pose… But the scepticism of the present, 
the scepticism of Sorel, is a torturing vacuity which has developed the craving 
for belief… He is representative of the present generation, sick with its own 
knowledge of history, with the dissolving outlines of liberal thought, with 
humanitarianism. He longs for a narrow, intolerant, creative society with sharp 
divisions. He longs for the pessimistic, classical view. And this longing is 
healthy. But to realize his desire he must betake himself to very devious ways.’7 
Once again, the image that emerges is that of a moralist disgusted with modernity and craving 
for a return to a barbarous but morally virtuous past: a romantic shouting abuse at the modern 
                                                 
5
 John Burrow, The crisis of reason. European thought 1848-1914 (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press: 
2000), p. 142. 
6
 Charles De Saint-Cyr, ‘Quelques mots sur Georges Sorel’,  La Semaine Parisienne, 41, 1922, p. 1. ‘homme fort 
dangereux... comme le sont souvent ceux en qui la passion de l’absolu a tué le sens du relatif.’ 
7
 τ [Thomas Stearns Eliot],’Review of Reflections on Violence’, The Monist 27, 1917, pp. 478-9. For the 
attribution of the review see Manju Jain, T.S. Eliot  and American Philosophy, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press: 1992), p. 310n. 
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world. Before outlining why ‘it is too easy to characterize Sorel’s tone and attitude as 
romantic’8, it is useful to reflect on the reasons of the persistence of this characterization.  
HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONFLATIONS 
There is a virtually endless gallery of portraits of Sorel along these lines, all mostly due to the 
disproportionate editorial success of Sorel’s Reflections on violence, a complex and 
provocative text in which Sorel makes his most articulate case for revolutionary syndicalism 
and that, still today, enjoys the status as the standard Sorelian work. One of the unfortunate 
consequences of this success is that Sorel’s thought is often reduced to the ideas – or, in the 
worst but painfully common case, to the tone and prose – of a book whose arguments are 
taken in isolation both from the historical context and from Sorel’s wider intellectual 
trajectory. This leads to a number of rather serious interpretative mistakes. As Jacques Julliard 
correctly remarked in his 1990 preface to the Reflections, ‘Sorel and the Reflections constitute 
a unity… [Sorel] is condemned to be forever associated with a book which his best 
commentators do not necessarily consider to be his most noteworthy.’ 9 
On the one hand, the Reflections is a text that should be understood in the light of its context 
and of Sorel’s previous philosophical and political trajectory. On the other hand, it is an 
uncompromising condemnation of parliamentary socialism and bourgeois democracy, a text 
that laments the absence in the bourgeois world of a ‘courage which Renan compared with 
that of a soldier at the moment of attack’10 and that ends with the remarkable claim that ‘It is 
to violence that socialism owes those high ethical ideals by means of which it brings salvation 
to the modern world’.11 The key to making sense of the Sorelian legend lies in understanding 
the effect of this often incendiary text not so much on Sorel’s peers, but on a younger interwar 
generation living in conditions much more unstable and open than Sorel’s own. The standard 
view of Sorel as an irrationalist theorist of violence derives from a number of interwar 
readings of the Reflections, and its origins can be traced to people such as Carl Schmitt, 
Edouard Berth, Benito Mussolini, and Thomas Hulme. Eliot’s review is, from this 
perspective, rather illuminating. Though the theme of a scepticism generating ‘a torturing 
                                                 
8
 Natalino Sapegno, ‘Sorel e la disperazione eroica’, La rivoluzione liberale 37, 1922, p. 3. ‘È troppo facile 
definire romantici l’atteggiamento e il tono di Sorel.’ 
9
 Jacques Julliard, ‘Au risque de penser’ in Georges Sorel, Réflexions sur la violence (Paris, Seuil: 1990), p. i. 
‘Sorel et les Réflexions c’est un tout un...[Sorel] semble pour toujours identifié à l’un des ses livres, que ses 
meilleurs connaisseurs ne tiennent pas toujours pour son plus remarquable.’ 
10
 Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, ed. by Jeremy Jennings (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 
1999), p. 229. 
11
 Ibid., p. 251. 
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vacuity which has developed the craving for belief’ does somehow, partially, capture an 
aspect of Sorel’s thought, anyone acquainted with Eliot will recognize in it a fundamental 
aspect of the poet’s own religious trajectory. In the conclusion of his review Eliot revealingly 
presents Sorel as belonging to ‘the present generation’, forgetting however that this is not the 
case: Sorel was born in 1847, Eliot in 1888. This trans-generational appropriation of Sorel’s 
concerns is indicative of a wider trend that is of fundamental importance in making sense of 
Sorel’s legend.  
The wider point being made here is that Sorel is a writer of the fin de siècle whose immediate 
reception and, arguably, canonization occurred at the hands of a younger generation that had 
experienced the Great War and that came of age in the tumultuous interwar years. 12 The 
salient aspects of Sorel’s dark legend – for example his characterization as an enemy of the 
bourgeoisie more than as a socialist, or his supposed appreciation of violence as something 
good in itself – originate in these interwar readings, and the persistency of this legend results 
from the subsequent tendency to examine Sorel’s ideas through the distortive filter of his first 
reception. There are two claims here: the first is that a specific Sorel – irrationalist, 
ideologically transversal, moralist, supporter of revolutionary activism for its own sake – 
emerged from a number of interwar readings. The second is that this interwar Sorel has been 
the point of reference for a surprisingly large number of subsequent readings. This inability to 
separate Sorel from his immediate legacy implies that Sorel has often been read, doubtlessly 
unconsciously, against a background and historical context that was profoundly different from 
the one in which he was writing.13   Sorel’s fierce criticism of parliamentary democracy, to 
name but one salient aspect, was developed in the post-Dreyfus context of a triumphant 
French third republic, but came to prominence in, and has generally been read in the light of, 
interwar years characterized by a Europe-wide crisis of parliamentary regimes.  
It is in this latter context that Sorelian tropes found a welcome reception amongst a number of 
younger intellectuals and activists for whom the overthrow of the established order, whether 
political or cultural, was both a more urgent and, crucially, a more realistic possibility than it 
ever was for Sorel. In Great Britain, for example, Sorel’s Reflections on violence were 
translated in 1915 by T.E. Hulme, who, in his introduction to the text, immediately enlisted 
                                                 
12
 I owe this point about the significance of Sorel’s immediate reception to Eric Brandom. See his Georges Sorel, 
Autonomy and Violence in the Third Republic (PhD thesis, Duke University: 2012), available at 
http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/handle/10161/6126, last accessed 1/1/2014, pp. 456-7. 
13
 Hence the frequent use of the term ‘prophet’, to suggest that Sorel had in some way foreseen, and in some way 
belonged to, an interwar era that, as a matter of historical record, did not shape his thought in the slightest. 
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Sorel in his own intellectual battle against the optimistic philosophy of ‘democratic 
romanticism’. 14  Predictably, it was Sorel’s moral pessimism, his disdain for the facile 
progressivism of the French bourgeoisie, and the critique of parliamentary democracy which 
were at the centre of Hulme’s introduction: it is significant that Sorel’s Marxism is mentioned 
only to be dismissed as ‘the part of his thesis that is concerned with facts, and it would be 
impertinent on my part to offer any commentary on it.’15 In this way, a Marxist is transformed 
into a politically neutral critic of modernity. In Weimar Germany experimenting with 
parliamentarism and shaken by communist revolutionary attempts, Sorel’s Reflections caught 
the attention of both Walter Benjamin, who engaged with Sorel’s book in his 1921 ‘Critique 
of violence’ 16 , and Carl Schmitt. 17  The emphasis of Schmitt’s reading fell on the 
revolutionary potential of the ‘irrationalist theories of the use of force’ that he took Sorel to 
represent.18 The political myth, for Schmitt, has the advantage of never entering into the 
discursive frame that characterizes bourgeois parliamentarism, and thus its insurrectionary 
potential is greater, because it is the expression not of a specific understanding of historical 
development but of ‘the depths of a genuine life instinct’: it is capable of unleashing against 
the parliamentary order nothing less than ‘a new storm of historical life.’ 19 Despite a number 
                                                 
14
 Thomas Ernest Hulme, ‘Reflections on violence’ [1915] in his Speculations, ed. by Herbert Read (London, 
Kegan Paul: 1936), p. 255. 
15
 Ibid., p. 259. Another interesting aspect of Hulme’s introduction is the recurring dichotomy between romantic 
modernity and what he refers to as ‘the classical attitidue’ (p. 259). The distinction, for Hulme, can be defined as 
the difference between the belief in man’s natural goodness and the belief in original sin. It is a safe bet to 
identify in Hulme’s introduction the origin of Eliot’s reference to ‘the pessimistic, classical view’ in the poet’s 
review of the Reflections. Furthermore, it is an equally safe bet to see in Hulme’s Sorel the real target of Cole’s 
attacks. 
16
 See Walter Benjamin, ‘Critique of violence’ [1921] in Marcus Bullock and Michael Jennings (eds), Walter 
Benjamin: selected writings, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press: 1996), pp. 236-52. Benjamin’s 
highly obscure text failed to have a substantial impact in shaping  Sorel’s reception, despite the tendentially 
sympathetic stance taken vis à vis Sorel’s ‘deep, moral, and genuinely revolutionary conception’ (p. 246). The 
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Benjamin, the story of a friendship, trans. by Harry Zohn (New York, New York Review Books: 2001), p. 114. 
For a more detailed account of Benjamin’s reading, see Chryssoula Kambas, ‘Walter Benjamin lecteur des 
« Réflexions sur la violence »’, Cahiers Georges Sorel  2, 1984, pp. 71-89. 
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of important caveats that temper this ‘irrationalist’ and, in essence, politically blind reading20, 
the emphases of Schmitt’s analysis are indicative of the interwar concerns that animated him: 
cast essentially as a critic of parliamentarianism, Sorel is portrayed as a theorist whose force 
lies in his political blindness and insistence on the absolute, almost moral, necessity of action.  
If in Germany and the United Kingdom Sorel’s immediate reception was thus predominantly 
intellectual and focussed either on the cultural critique of the bourgeoisie, or on the 
antiparliamentarian potential of a ‘theory of the use of force’, in Latin countries such as 
France and Italy the impact was more evidently political, and, importantly, ideologically 
transversal, appealing to both the left and the right. An indicative example of Sorel’s 
ambivalent political legacy in France is constituted by the writings of the ephemeral Cercle 
Proudhon, a group animated, amongst others, by two disciples of Sorel – Edouard Berth and 
Georges Valois 21 – and characterized by the attempt to refashion a number of important 
Sorelian ideas in a nationalist and proto-fascist key.22 In Italy, if we leave aside Gramsci’s 
references in the Quaderni, the Fascist regime openly claimed Sorel as one of its intellectual 
fathers, making a strong contribution to the idea that Sorel’s texts were, after all, neutral with 
regards to political distinctions between right and left. 23 
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 Despite the overwhelming emphasis given to the instinctiveness and blindness of the political and social 
energies released by myth, Schmitt’s reading is perceptive enough to understand that this in not the whole story. 
He cannot avoid, for example, but noticing that Sorel’s proletarians are defined in economic terms, and that this 
presupposes a commitment to what Schmitt calls ‘the economic-technical rationalism of the bourgeois economy’ 
(p. 73). Schmitt, moreover, has an intuitive understanding of the circumstantial role of myth in Sorel’s theory, 
revealed as he writes that ‘should this economic order develop even further, should production intensify even 
more, which Sorel also obviously wants, then the proletariat must renounce its myth.’ (p. 73). The fact that, 
despite this important caveat, Schmitt sees in Sorel essentially an irrationalist theorist of blind activism is a good 
indication of the importance of the distortive effects of interwar concerns in his interpretation of the French 
thinker. 
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Divenire Sociale.’ The syndicalist Divenire Sociale was one of the principal journals through which Sorelian 
ideas arrived in Italy – it is in this publication that the first drafts of the Reflections on violence were published. 
It is worth adding that in September of the same year Mussolini, in an interview to the French magazine 
L’Illustration, declared Sorel to have been his inspiration: ‘Georges Sorel a été mon maitre. J’estime avec lui 
qu’à un moment donné la violence est nécessaire. La violence est morale. Toutefois, elle ne doit pas dépasser 
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When the Reflections on violence are read through the filter of their immediate interwar 
reception, and when they are taken in isolation from the rest of Sorel’s work, they may indeed 
convey the impression of radicalism for radicalism’s sake and of a revolutionary urge more 
concerned with the destruction of the bourgeois order than with the realization of socialism. 
But this conflation of Sorel’s ideas with their interwar understanding produces, 
unsurprisingly, an historically distorted understanding of Sorel, not only because it is an 
understanding based almost exclusively on the Reflections, but mostly because it gives an 
historically problematic prominence to those aspects of the text that most resonated with its 
younger readers, such as the critique of parliamentarism, or the tone with which Sorel calls 
for uncompromising political militancy. It is, in other words, a conflation that is based on the 
inability to bring out the fact that Europe before and after the Great War were profoundly 
different. 
To go against the tendency to read Sorel against the background of the European interwar and 
of the ensuing dictatorships, it is necessary to recognize the difference between the context in 
which Sorel’s ideas were elaborated and the one in which they were first received, that is, the 
difference between Sorel’s third republic and the traumatized and revolutionary Europe of the 
interwar years. What Sorel and his generation had witnessed were developments – such as the 
increasing need for the organization of exceedingly complex productive systems, the growth 
of the role of the state in economic and social life, the incorporation of the working classes 
and their organizations into increasingly solid national frameworks – that were to reveal their 
full consequences not only, or even principally, in the First World War, but also in the large 
organized economies characteristic of advanced capitalist and socialist countries of the 1930s 
and 1940s. The world in which Sorel lived and about which Sorel wrote was not the one in 
which these developments had fully come to their maturity. It is significant that Sorel himself 
seemed to have been aware of the historical break constituted by the war. Writing to 
Benedetto Croce at the beginning of the hostilities, he admitted that the latest developments 
were ‘weighing me down’ and that ‘we enter an era newer than the one of the Revolution’. ‘I 
                                                                                                                                                        
une certaine mesure. Pour ma part, je ne donnerais pas la ciguë au philosophe… Beaucoup de livres qui sont 
contraires à la doctrine fasciste circulent librement en Italie.’ Gramsci might have had something to object to the 
sentence about hemlock and philosophers, and I would suggest to take the Sorelian references with the same care 
with which one should welcome this public display of tolerance by a dictator.  The original version of the 
Encyclopaedia article on Fascism is available at 
http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/fascismo_(Enciclopedia_Italiana)/ (last accessed 4/7/2014). For the 
interview see Émile Schreiber, ‘Entretien avec Mussolini’, L’Illustration no 4672, 17 September 1932, p. 82. 
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am’ he continued ‘a man of the past, I have nothing more to say to men who will be able to 
loudly affirm their Jacobin principles…’24 
The failure to separate Sorel from various interwar readings of the Reflections has continued 
to characterize interpretations of his work even after the Second World War. In the 
Anglophone world, this conflation gave birth to the view of Sorel as a precursor of 
totalitarianism. Taking as its starting point Sorel’s ambiguous political legacy and connecting 
it to the supposed ‘irrationalism’ of his wider philosophical stance, a number of commentators 
read Sorel as a thinker responsible for paving the way for the totalitarian systems of the 
twentieth century. An excellent example is provided by Edward Shils’ introduction to a 1950 
American edition of the Reflections: 
‘In France and Germany [in the late 1920s] there was an upsurge of those forces 
which Sorel had regarded as the signs of a moral renascense. Both Fascism and 
Communism were separatist, they both believed in the need for internal 
purification and in the unredeemability of the outer world by the use of reason or 
through gradual modification. Both believed it could be saved only by 
conversion or conquest; both believed in the violent refusal to compromise and 
in the violent disruption of the institutions of compromise; both expected a total 
apocalyptic transformation and both proclaimed the guidance or manipulation of 
this transformation by an elite of consecrated warriors bound together in tense 
solidarity. (They differed in their explicit judgments of the intrinsic moral worth 
of violence and here the Fascists were closer to Sorel’s own position). The fact 
that both were highly bureaucratic and that both schemed and pulled wires and 
used the whole bag of demagogic tricks compounded with the techniques of 
mass communications showed that in practice Sorel’s politics, when brought into 
the presence of the actual problems of acquiring and exercising power, became, 
despite his devotion to absolute values, the politics of an intellectual dilettante. 
Sorel’s type of apocalyptic utopianism ends more corruptly and diverges further 
from the right end of politics than the politics of piecemeal increments.’25 
This extremely dense passage contains examples of virtually all the shortcomings of the 
received opinion on Sorel. It begins with the mistaken assumption that Sorel’s understanding 
of the revolution is an insurrectionist one, capable of being carried through by a militant 
minority. Consequently, and just as mistakenly, it accuses Sorel of political dilettantism, 
arguing that the capture of the state by a militant minority will lead to the reproduction of the 
oppressive statist practices. It is ironical that Sorel should be accused of ignoring a dynamic 
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 Georges Sorel, letter to Benedetto Croce on 22/9/1914 in Georges Sorel, ‘Lettere di Georges Sorel a Benedetto 
Croce’, La Critica 27, 1929, p. 51. ‘Les événements m’accablent ; je sens que nous entrons dans une ère plus 
nouvelle que n’a été celle de la Révolution… Je suis un homme du passé, je n’ai plus rien à dire à des hommes 
qui vont pouvoir affirmer hautement leurs principes jacobins…’ 
25
 Edward Shils, ‘Georges Sorel: Introduction to the American Edition’ in Georges Sorel, Reflections on 
violence, trans. by Thomas Ernest Hulme (Glencoe, IL, Dover Publications: 1950), p. 23. 
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that he gave so much thought to. Equally problematic is the connection with ‘Fascism and 
Communism’. By 1950, Sorel’s legacy as an ambiguous figure able to be reclaimed by both 
the right and the left had been established by the impact of his first, ideologically transversal, 
reception. In America, it was the German reception of Sorel that exerted a decisive influence. 
Ten years before the publication of his introduction to the Reflections, Shils had translated 
into English Ernst Fraenkel’s The Dual State, an analysis of the National Socialist juridical 
system in which Sorel is cast as an anticipator of German Fascism. The picture painted of 
Sorel is the usual one:  
‘Sorel stripped the class struggle of its visionary goal and approved it as a 
movement for its own sake. He transformed it into a myth because, to him, the 
movement was everything and the goal was nothing. Thus Sorel became the 
prophet of politics without ultimate goal – the advocate of action for the sake of 
action.’26  
The consequence of this supposed renunciation to political rationality is a kind of political 
existentialism that will lead its practitioners to embracing whatever historical movement 
appears the strongest at a given moment. Fraenkel continues: 
‘Whoever believes that political action is nothing more than acquiescence in the 
laws of social development will share the fate of Sorel. Like Sorel, he will pass 
from Syndicalism to l’Action Française; like Mussolini, a disciple of Sorel, he 
will shift from Socialism to Fascism; like Carl Schmitt, an admirer of Sorel, he 
will desert Political Catholicism for National-Socialism, as soon as he is 
convinced that integral nationalism is the order of the day.’27 
The references to Schmitt, to Mussolini, and to the Action Française reveal the mistake 
highlighted above, namely the failure to separate Sorel from his interwar reception and 
appropriation. Fraenkel’s situation, that of a German-Jewish émigré to the United States, may 
explain and excuse his urgency to find intellectual ancestors to the German tragedy from 
which he had fled.28 With these premises, it should be no surprise that in in early Cold War 
America Sorel was brought up again and used as a warning against the dreadful consequences 
of departing too much from the principles of liberal democracy. If Shils’ treatment of 
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 Ernst Fraenkel, The Dual State. A contribution to the theory of dictatorship [1941], trans. by Edward Shils 
(New York, Octagon Books: 1969), p. 130. The sentence about  preferring the movement to the goal, in fact, is 
Eduard Bernstein’s, not Sorel’s. 
27
 Ibid. Sorel never ‘switched’ to l’Action Française; Mussolini, as we have seen, once in power claimed Sorel 
as his intellectual master, but disagreed with him quite a bit in his socialist years. This whole passage thus 
appears to be almost entirely based on the reference to Schmitt who had, indeed, suggested, by using Mussolini’s 
example, that Sorel’s theory of myth could be cleansed of its proletarian integument and readapted in a 
nationalist key. See Crisis of parliamentary democracy, pp. 74-6. 
28
 Machiavelli and Hegel are described, together with Sorel, as ‘spiritual ancestors of National-Socialism’. Ibid. 
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‘Fascism and Communism’ as kindred political forms, both in opposition to ‘the free society’, 
already signals this ideological use of Sorel, the educational and almost admonishing tone 
constitutes its best indicator. In justifying the republication of the text, Shils argues that 
Reflections is a text worth reading insofar as ‘it makes us more aware of the many ways in 
which the present political attitudes and actions of those who place themselves on the side of 
the free society are corrupted by the apocalyptic view of history and society.’29  
NEW CURRENTS IN SORELIAN SCHOLARSHIP 
Despite the decline in popularity of the notion of totalitarianism, the toxic blend of 
philosophical irrationalism, aestheticizing but politically empty revolutionism and, above all, 
ideological ambiguity continued – and continues – to constitute the frame of reference for a 
large number of twentieth century readings of Sorel. Nonetheless, in spite of the persistence 
of these interpretative categories in the 1950s and 1960s, the increasing historical distance 
between Sorel’s writings and new generations of commentators allowed, somewhat 
subterraneously, a significant widening of the caricatural image, allowing the emergence of 
new elements capable, eventually and potentially, of subverting the consensus. Generally 
speaking then, the most important fact of those decades is the appearance of a number of 
works on Sorel that, without openly challenging the established interpretation, begin to probe 
more deeply Sorel’s writings, and not that rarely develop analyses whose consequences allow 
quite new conclusions. 
Even in the Anglophone world, where the irrationalist and totalitarian interpretation of Sorel 
flourished and became canonical, we see already in the 1950s a number of works that, beyond 
the lip service paid to the established opinion, manage to do justice to the vastness and 
complexity of Sorel’s production and, in so doing, begin to highlight the limits of the Sorelian 
legend. Richard Humphrey’s 1951 Prophet without honour in spite of a title that obviously 
reflects the ideas that constitute Sorel’s dark legend, develops a sophisticated interpretation of 
Sorel’s thought on the basis of the epistemological opposition between artificial rationality 
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 Ibid., p. 25. For a chronologically wider analysis of the development of and of some issues raised by this 
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Though the treatment of Jacob Talmon’s writings on Sorel is fascinating and rather convincing, the inclusion of 
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traits of Sorel’s thought, anti-rationalism most saliently, to which Berlin was unambiguously sympathetic. 
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and natural chaos.30 In the same year, James Meisel published his Genesis of Georges Sorel, a 
work that, in dealing with Sorel’s work in its entirety from the first writings of the late 1880s 
until the posthumous interwar appropriations, is probably the first serious scholarly attempt in 
English to go beyond interpretations based on snippets from the Reflections.31 Meisel brought 
up the important question of Sorel’s political liberalism, tempered the Bergsonian influence 
and the irrationalist reading and, even more surprisingly, began to highlight the difference 
between Sorel and Sorelianism. But established ideas functional to ideological discourses are 
difficult to eradicate, as a surreal review of Meisel’s work in Political Science Quarterly 
demonstrates. Though the reviewer enthusiastically agrees with every point made in the book, 
he refuses to accept the consequence of Meisel’s arguments, and insists that, in spite of every 
point he has conceded, Sorel’s argument in the Reflections remains at least partly 
‘revolutionary, increasingly authoritarian, and irrationalist’.32 
It is the curious coexistence of such contrasting tendencies that characterizes the Sorelian 
scholarship of the 1950s and 1960s. On the one hand, there is an established reading that is 
never openly or polemically challenged; on the other, thanks to the use of new sources and 
material, a deeper understanding of Sorel’s complexity arises that makes such a reading more 
problematic. Even a book like Michael’s Curtis’ Three against the Third Republic, in which 
Sorel is presented as essentially a proto-totalitarian critic of liberal democracy, represented, in 
its awareness of the vastness of Sorel’s oeuvre and in its avoidance of a reading based 
predominantly on the Reflections, progress in terms of scholarship.33 Henry Stuart Hughes’ 
treatment of Sorel in his Consciousness and society is exemplary of this bipolarity. Hughes 
produces a contextually precise reading which allows him to do justice to Sorel’s 
epistemology and to his concern for the possibility of social sciences; and yet, perhaps 
because the focus of the book is not on Sorel, it ends up by giving a reading that, though 
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much more nuanced and kinder to Sorel, is still reconcilable with the established consensus of 
Sorel as an irrationalist and politically dangerous thinker. 34  
In Sorel’s own country, in those same years, the discourse on totalitarianism was nowhere as 
developed as it was in Cold War America. Nonetheless, the experience of Vichy remained 
powerful, and Sorel’s very real rightist legacy did not work to his advantage in such a context: 
he remained associated on the one hand, to an image of theoretical confusion leading to 
political mistakes, and on the other, to that of a critic of the third republic. Sorel’s Marxism 
did not appear as worthy of examination. In 1965, Louis Althusser famously complained, in 
his introduction to Pour Marx, that while Italy could boast Labriola and Gramsci, Russia 
Plekhanov and Lenin, and Germany Marx and Engels, France’s only Marxist theorist was 
Sorel. It was not meant as a compliment.35 With such premises, it is unsurprising that, for 
different reasons, two major works on Sorel of the time failed to produce the consequences 
that they could have produced. Georges Goriely’s excellent Le pluralisme dramatique de 
Georges Sorel – a philosophically-oriented work that remains an important reference for 
contemporary scholars, stresses the ‘concrete rationalism’ of Sorel and begins to give 
prominence to his liberal-conservative ideological roots – fell on deaf ears.36 As for Pierre 
Andreu’s Notre Maitre, M. Sorel, the reasons for its inability to reopen the question of Sorel’s 
interpretation have to do with the fact that, as the title suggests, Andreu was a Sorelian 
himself, and a right-wing one too. Despite its clear though never excessive partiality, the book 
remains the most thorough biographical work on Sorel, and contains a number of important 
sources that have failed to find other ways to the printed and mass distributed page. 37 
The real turn in Sorel scholarship occurred, both in the Francophone and the Anglophone 
worlds, in the late 1970s and the 1980s. If, on the one hand, it is in those years that, thanks to 
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a number of French and Anglophone scholars, there is for the first time an open challenge to 
the orthodox interpretation, on the other hand this is counterbalanced by the rejuvenation of 
the canon at the hands of the Israeli historian Zeev Sternhell and his disciples. In France 
interest in Sorel’s socialism and in his relationship with Marxism began to arise in the late 
1970s: studies such as Daniel Lindenberg’s Marxisme Introuvable or Michel Charzat’s 
Georges Sorel et la révolution au XXème siècle highlighted the originality and importance of 
Sorel’s engagement with Marxism and sparked a new interest in his work.38 As a result of 
these readings, a new generation of historians began working on Sorel and marked the 
beginning of a new phase of Sorelian studies.39 In 1982, an international conference on Sorel 
was held at the École Normale, and in the following year the journal of the newly established 
Société d’Études Soréliennes, the Cahiers Georges Sorel, was launched.40   Despite their 
initial tendency to focus on Sorel’s understanding of socialism and of Marxism, what 
characterized most profoundly this ‘new school’ of Sorelian scholars was not a choice of 
primary issues or themes but, instead, the awareness of the limitations of the existing 
historiography on Sorel. 41 This brought not only the enthusiasm that accompanies those who 
see themselves as scholarly innovators, but also a patient work of critical exchange with the 
representatives of the established opinion. 
Whilst this Sorelian renaissance of the 1980s found its institutional base in France, it was not 
an exclusively French phenomenon. The new current could draw on a number of works that, 
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even beyond France, had begun to abandon or, at least, to set aside, the old interpretative 
categories of irrationalism, violence, and totalitarianism. The two main Anglophone 
representatives of this tendency are Jeremy Jennings and John Stanley, two historians who 
worked in association with the French group of the Société Sorélienne and, consequently, 
whose work on Sorel was characterized by the awareness of the shortcomings of the Sorelian 
legend. In order to overcome the legend, Colette Chambelland had argued that it was 
fundamental to ‘read Sorel and to make people read him’42: this is what John Stanley had 
been doing since the 1970s. For over 20 years, he worked to make accessible to the English 
reader a large number of Sorel’s writings, and his work culminated in the publication of two 
volumes of collected Sorelian works in 1976 and 1990.43 In between these two volumes, 
Stanley published his own monograph on Sorel, in which he presented an extremely nuanced 
and source-rich examination of Sorel’s thought as a sociologist of morality.44 In contrast to 
Stanley’s book, Jeremy Jennings’ Sorel is a much shorter work that does an excellent task of 
synthesizing the wealth of material in order to produce a portrait of Sorel centred on his 
pluralism.45 
This insistence on pluralism is revealing of an important trait of the new Sorelian scholarship 
of the 1980s, especially its Anglophone version, namely the tendency to produce vast 
overviews of Sorel’s thought. We shall come back to this point later, but here we shall merely 
highlight that if, on the one hand, this approach has the merit of doing justice to the 
complexity of Sorel’s thought, on the other it runs the risk, especially if – as Jennings does –
the emphasis is placed on pluralism, of being misunderstood and taken as an indication of 
Sorel’s, so to speak, systematic incoherence. If Jennings’ 1985 book, then, is still one of the 
two main sources for contemporary work in English on Sorel, this has only partially to do 
with its synthetic style and readable prose. It also has quite a bit to do with the fact that the 
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insistence on pluralism can easily be understood as an indication of Sorelian incoherence, and 
consequently can be used within the framework of the Sorelian legend. 46 
The other main contemporary Anglophone sources of ideas about Sorel are the works of the 
Israeli historian Zeev Sternhell and his school. Sternhell largely accepts the standard image of 
Sorel, and his reading is substantially a variation on the usual themes of irrationalism, 
political ambiguity, and heroic violence. What allowed his work to emerge from, and 
consequently renew, the aging consensus in the 1980s, is that this standard reading of Sorel 
was woven into an important and sophisticated intellectual genealogy of Fascism that cannot 
be dismissed as easily as the mistaken reading of Sorel.47 For Sternhell, Sorel is responsible 
for transforming, through his irrationalist revision, the Enlightenment ideology of Marxism 
into ‘a neutral weapon of war that could be used against the bourgeois order not only by the 
proletariat but by society as a whole.’48 Sorel’s revisionism essentially breaks the Marxian 
necessity of the link between proletariat and revolution, opening the space for the possibility 
of a ‘Marxism’ that sees the undivided national community as the agent of revolutionary 
change. This thesis, as already noted, is not devoid of value and most definitively captures 
important aspects of Sorel’s legacy. However, when reading Sternhell, one is often under the 
impression that the overall narrative is so important that the individual protagonists of the 
story being told are forced in the role in which they need to be. This is certainly the case of 
Sorel, whose interpretation is misleading and substantially incorrect. 
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But the overall value of Sternhell’s thesis on the ‘revolutionary right’ and on the French 
origins of Fascism, his ability to create ‘a coherent historical object by connecting previously 
scattered data’, shielded a mistaken reading of Sorel from excessively damaging critique.49 
The historians grouped around the Société d’études Soréliennes represented the only 
exception. The simultaneous presence of two conflicting readings of Sorel – both developed 
between the late 1970s and the 1980s – could not but generate skirmishes. Thus, if in the first 
numbers of the Cahiers Georges Sorel, Michel Charzat defined Sorel’s association with 
Fascism as a ‘coriaceous legend’, and John Stanley, reviewing Sternhell’s Naissance de 
l’idéologie fasciste, spoke of the Israeli’s ‘arbitrary method’, Sternhell, on his part, described 
the new tendencies in Sorelian scholarship as expressions of ‘a clique of loyal followers, with 
one or two unbelievers’ casting doubt on the novelty of their findings.50 But Sternhell’s thesis, 
because of its wider ambitions, essentially remained untouched, and its international success 
popularised a reading of Sorel that had important shortcomings. The result was a powerful 
rejuvenation of the Sorelian legend of the interwar, just at the time when this standard view of 
Sorel was being openly challenged.  
It is thus still not uncommon to find a caricature of Sorel in – mostly Anglophone, it has to be 
said – perplexing genealogies of the dark and disruptive forces of unreason and, still to this 
day, totalitarianism.51 But if we can amply excuse not only Fraenkel’s search for the spiritual 
fathers of National Socialism, but also Edward Shils’ eagerness to defend the ‘free society’ in 
1950s America, Richard Wolin’s more recent Sorel, who is claimed to view ‘the regenerative 
potential of revolutionary violence as a sacrosanct end in itself’52, or Mark Antliff’s thinker 
who is believed to see Bergson as ‘the harbinger of a spiritual revolution opposed to the 
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rationalist and materialist premises undergirding democratic ideology’53 have no historical 
excuses. Whilst historical circumstances might explain why and how Fraenkel and Shils 
wrote about Sorel, more recent versions of the Sorelian legend would be unthinkable without 
Sternhell’s work of the 1980s. A quick glance at the bibliographical references confirms it. 
With the exception of Versluis, Sternhell is central in virtually all of these readings of Sorel – 
from Antliff to Shorten, from Wolin to Jan Werner Mueller’s pages on Sorel in his recent 
Contesting Democracy.54 Sorel’s legend, in other words, is still very much alive and well. It is 
thus necessary to highlight some of its shortcomings and, in doing so, to outline the two main 
argumentative lines of the thesis. 
TWO CORE CONCEPTS OF THE SORELIAN LEGEND:  VIOLENCE AND MYTH 
Despite their limits, it would be mistaken to suggest the caricature of Sorel is completely off 
the mark and based on a complete falsification of his thought. This is not the case. As with 
any caricature, this one too identifies important aspects of Sorel’s oeuvre but, through the 
combination of decontextualisation and overreliance on the Reflections outlined above, 
misinterprets them and ends up with a severely distorted historical understanding of Sorel’s 
ideas. Historical error, in this case, is not so much a question of factual inaccuracy, but of the 
misinterpretation of elements that are substantially correct. Even if, in other words, the 
individual traits are representative, the overall portrait is deceiving. It is thus pivotal to 
highlight what the standard understanding ignores, and to show how an historically accurate 
reading of Sorel diverges rather substantially from the historiographical legend. Rectification, 
in this case, is principally then a question of historicization: it must proceed by juxtaposing 
the caricatural and the historical Sorel and show that the divergence between the two warrants 
a substantially different reading, bearing in mind Skinner’s maxim that no historical account 
of a thinker can ‘survive the demonstration that it was based on criteria of description and 
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classification not available to the agent’.55 In doing so, we shall also begin to outline the main 
claims of the thesis. 
Even a superficial juxtaposition of the historical Sorel with the legendary figure created by 
decades of historiographical approximations leads to surprising results. Let us confront, for 
example, the idea of Sorel as a precursor of totalitarianism with Sorel’s own views on the role 
of the state in political society. As noted, at the outbreak of the Great War Sorel lamented the 
dawning of an era that he thought would be dominated by ‘Jacobin principles’. In Sorel’s 
vocabulary, Jacobinism always refers to the excesses of a statist power that he characterizes 
as particularly perverse because it is informed by a substantial vision of the good. This state, 
which Sorel is fond of comparing not only to the Jacobins, but also to the Jesuits and whose 
intellectual genealogy he traces as far back as to Plato and his dangerous philosophical 
monism, is a recurrent target of Sorel’s attacks, and, after 1902, becomes the ever-present 
enemy of the proletariat.  The terms in which Sorel condemns statist power, in fact, remind 
one of twentieth century libertarianism and are highly surprising denunciations for a thinker 
of his generation. With this in mind, it is only by appealing to the very particular 
circumstances of Sorel’s reception that it is possible to make sense of the fact that he has been 
cast as an anticipator of an all-embracing statist doctrine. 
But if the totalitarian association can be dismissed relatively easily, other features of the 
received interpretation require a more careful treatment, precisely because they do, however 
unsatisfactorily, capture important aspects of Sorel’s thought. Two elements deserve 
particular attention: Sorel’s alleged irrationalism and his supposed belief that mobilization 
and violence are intrinsically valuable. Both of these claims are, as we stated, overwhelmingly 
based on readings of the Reflections and, at a superficial glance, they seem to be validated by 
Sorel’s text. Does not Sorel argue that proletarian violence is based on myths, which he is 
careful to describe as devoid of indications regarding the transformation of society? Does he 
not claim that, precisely because proletarian violence is based on myth it cannot establish a 
new society but merely ‘tends to the destruction of that [the bourgeois] order’? 56 Does he not 
suggest that the problem with bourgeois force is precisely that it is instrumental, i.e. that it is 
based on utopias, which are detailed plans of social transformation? Does he not, moreover, 
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speak with outrage of bourgeois timidity, and hope for a frontal clash between capital and 
labour? Indeed, he does. Does this not amount to a glorification of violence for its own sake 
and to a refusal to think of social evolution through rational categories? It does not. 
The problem with this reading lies in its lack of historicity and in the fact that it downplays or 
completely ignores the key contexts and background arguments that inform the reasoning 
outlined in the Reflections. The first substantial shortcoming consists in the absence of a 
proper understanding of Sorelian epistemology, which leads to excessively facile 
interpretations of Sorel’s attacks on a specific type of rationality as commitments to scientific 
nihilism tout court. Myth, in particular, is taken as the clearest indication of Sorel’s scientific 
nihilism. But this is mistaken. Epistemological reflection on the natural and the social 
sciences is a central and constant aspect of Sorel’s thought, and his highly sophisticated 
epistemology is not that of an irrationalist. In the Reflections Sorel attacks a certain kind of 
social science – he mockingly labels it ‘la petite science’ – that, set on the path of error by its 
belief in social determinism, attempts to predict the future. But since, for Sorel, the social 
world is not regulated by causal relations but is, instead, an historical product of free human 
agency, the future is not a legitimate object of social science. ‘Marxism’ as Sorel repeatedly 
underlines in the Reflections, ‘condemns every hypothesis about the future’.57  To understand 
why Sorel thinks this, however, it is necessary to stop reading his passages on social science 
in the Reflections as self-standing arguments and, instead, to start weaving them into a longer 
narrative describing Sorel’s epistemological thought. What this enquiry uncovers is a 
sophisticated epistemology characterized most profoundly by activism and historicism and a 
temperament that, though conscious of the limitations placed by such an epistemology on 
what social and natural sciences can claim and know, unambiguously refuses to proclaim the 
bankruptcy of rationality. Thus, whereas ‘utopias’ are bad social science, myths are aspects of 
the historical agency of human actors that shape history: they are not Platonic noble lies 
whose emotive appeal is necessary to mobilize masses that cannot be activated by scientific 
arguments. 58 
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The second substantial shortcoming of the received interpretation is the minimization or total 
absence of Sorel’s Marxism. At a general level, as suggested above, the misreading of Sorel’s 
epistemological thought generates a misunderstanding of his Marxism, which tends to be seen 
as sufficiently heterodox not to be called Marxism at all. Cole, for example, tells us that Sorel 
‘fancied himself a Marxist, which he neither was nor could have been.’59 The reason for this, 
argues Cole, is that, though Sorel liked the idea of social conflict ‘it was quite alien to his 
attitude to regard the proletariat as being carried onwards to inevitable victory by the advance 
of the powers of production.’60 This is quite simply, and spectacularly, mistaken, just as much 
as the idea that Sorel’s engagement with Marx’s doctrines ‘expunged materialism and even 
economics almost entirely from Marxism’. 61  When this mistaken general conviction is 
applied to the analysis of the Reflections, it produces interpretative disasters. If we abandon 
the idea of Sorel as a moralistic prophet of action we can begin to open our eyes to how 
steeped in Marxism is the argument of the Reflections. The opening of the book, in fact, is 
dedicated to a defence of a Marxian understanding of the proletariat as a social class defined 
in economic terms: Sorel laments the fact that present conditions lead to a loss of this class 
specificity, with the result that ‘the term “proletariat” becomes synonymous with the 
oppressed; and there are oppressed in all classes’.62  
This already should put in serious doubt that violence, and the combative spirit that it 
generates in those that practice it, are the goals pursued by Sorel. Instead, as a Marxist, 
Sorel’s goal is the realization of what he calls the ‘civilization of producers’, i.e. the society 
resulting from the historical triumph of a social class which he is careful to define in very 
precise Marxian terms. The great problem that animates the Reflections is how to deal with 
social, political, and economic conditions that actively prevent the development of working 
class institutions. In other words, Sorel’s central concern in the book is not, as has mistakenly 
been argued, the moral rejuvenation of France or Europe, but the reinstatement of conditions 
in which the proletariat and its institutions can flourish. It is for this purpose that violence is 
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required. And what are these conditions that proletarian violence can bring about? In spite of 
the much-emphasized heterodoxy of his Marxism, Sorel gives a standard Marxian answer:  
‘The Marxist theory of revolution assumes that capitalism will be struck to the 
heart while it is still full of vitality, when it achieves its historical mission of 
complete industrial efficiency and whilst the economy is still advancing’63 
This, it should be underlined, constitutes a rather clear formulation of the belief in the 
connection between socialism and the ‘advance of the powers of production’, which Cole had 
insisted was absent in Sorel’s thought. Pace Cole, this belief is not only present, but 
absolutely central in the argument of the Reflections. The point is, however, more complex. 
Though Sorel believes, following Marx’s sketch of the ‘historical tendency of capitalist 
accumulation’, that only a vital capitalism can generate the historical conditions for socialism, 
he is also aware of living in an historical context in which the Marxian scheme of productive 
expansion and social polarization has become problematic and questionable. A number of 
economic and social developments have brought Marxism, for Sorel, to face what he calls the 
‘new and very unforeseen fact’ 64  of a bourgeoisie that, for the sake of social peace, is 
prepared to abandon, or, at least, temper and moderate, the capitalist logic of competition and 
productive expansion. Under these conditions, however, no proletarian institution that would 
be a genuinely alternative to bourgeois civilisation can hope to flourish. It is here that 
violence becomes important: 
‘Must we believe that the Marxist conception is dead? By no means, because 
proletarian violence comes upon the scene at the very moment when the 
conception of social peace claims to moderate disputes; proletarian violence 
confines employers to their role as producers and tends to restore the class 
structure just when they seemed on the point of intermingling in the democratic 
morass.’65 
The point here is not to examine in depth the arguments of the Reflections, but to show how, 
by taking Sorel’s Marxist credentials even slightly more seriously than is generally done, the 
conventional interpretation of Sorel as a theorist of heroic violence becomes much less 
convincing. Violence has a precise role, which is that of bringing about the economic 
conditions required for the development of proletarian institutions. 
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AIMS AND OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
Partly because of the enduring vitality of the Sorelian legend, this dissertation aims to build 
up on the new Sorelian scholarship of the 1980s in order to present a synthetic case for a 
reassessment of Sorel’s thought. In order to do this, I try to situate Sorel and his work in two 
kinds of contexts, which are essential for the historical study of his thought and, consequently, 
necessary for overcoming the Sorelian legend. The first one is philosophical and 
epistemological, whereas the second is economic and political.  
The importance of a recurring and protracted epistemological reflection in Sorel’s thought 
prevents us from hastily classifying his philosophy in terms of the usual categories of 
‘irrationalism’, ‘vitalism’, and ‘Bergsonism’. 66 Such a hasty dismissal would imply not only 
letting go much of what is valuable in Sorel’s writings, but would also mean, given the 
centrality of the epistemological thread, forfeiting the possibility of understanding most of 
what animates Sorel’s Marxism. To do justice to Sorel’s epistemology, it is necessary to 
examine the philosophical circumstances in which it developed in more detail than is 
generally done. This examination will show how problems of determinism, freedom, and 
scientific truth were crucial in putting human agency and its historicity at the centre of Sorel’s 
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epistemology and how this concern for agency made its way into Sorel’s understanding of 
historical materialism and contributed to shaping his vision of the socialist transformation as a 
longue durée process of proletarian institutional development. In order to understand how this 
concern for proletarian institutions became the syndicalism articulated in the Reflections it is 
necessary, on the other hand, to read Sorel’s works, especially after 1898, in the light of a 
process of economic and social organization that, by incorporating various European working 
classes into increasingly organized national capitalisms, invalidated the Marxian scheme of 
capitalist development in terms of social polarization, thereby generating the first serious 
crisis of Marxism. When situated in this context, Sorel’s syndicalism does not appear as a 
politically neutral call to heroic action, but instead as an attempt to provide a revolutionary 
and Marxist answer to the challenges posed by the new economic and social conditions.  
It is these two contexts and the interpretative stances that they imply for the study of Sorel’s 
thought that will be central to the thesis. Against the irrationalist and critic of the 
Enlightenment, we shall allow Sorel the epistemologist and philosopher of human freedom to 
emerge; to the moralistic prophet of action, we shall oppose Sorel the Marxist in a period of 
capitalist transformation. 
The first four chapters of the thesis are dedicated to showing that there is a fundamental 
connection between Sorel’s revision of Marxism and the epistemological problems with 
which he had struggled in his pre-Marxist years, and that this connection can be best 
understood in terms of a growing importance that agency assumes in Sorel’s historical and 
social scientific thought. As is shown in the first chapter, Sorel, like many French 
philosophers of the 1880s and 1890s, was confronted by a choice between science and 
freedom: the commonly held assumption that the truth of scientific propositions depended on 
the existence of a deterministic world made it difficult to reconcile human freedom with 
substantial standards of scientific rationality. To vindicate the epistemic ambitions of science, 
one had to commit to an ageing determinism, whereas a defence of human freedom generally 
implied a relativisation of the claims of science. Unwilling to go in either of these two 
directions, Sorel elaborated a sophisticated epistemology that allowed him to square this 
difficult circle. In order to preserve a natural determinism to which he still subscribed, and 
which he needed in order to preserve the ability of science to make claims about the natural 
world, he rejected the idea of freedom as indetermination – i.e. as a state of exception to the 
laws of nature – and reconceptualised it in terms of agency, of the human capacity to create 
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tools and concepts. Evidence of this agency, and hence of human freedom, could be observed, 
Sorel argued, by examining the activity of scientists, who, far from being passive observers of 
experimental data, need a vast range of collectively crafted and historically changing tools – 
which he labelled ‘expressive supports’ – in order to conduct scientific activity. Science thus 
became a social and historical activity, a set of plural research practices and traditions whose 
existence testified the capacity of humans to act creatively. In spite of its historicity, however, 
science remained objective insofar as it dealt with deterministic and unchanging phenomena. 
Although it allowed Sorel to vindicate freedom without compromising the ability of science 
to make claims about the natural world, this reconceptualization of human freedom in terms 
of agency created a dualism in Sorel’s epistemology: on the one hand there was the historical 
world of mankind, the ‘milieu artificiel’, characterized by historically changing human 
creations, whereas on the other lay the ‘milieu cosmique’, a deterministic and ahistorical 
world of nature. The necessity of this dualism derived from the assumption that only 
deterministic phenomena were capable of being understood scientifically, because only 
deterministic phenomena could be explained in terms of unchanging laws. But if science – as 
opposed to mere systematized knowledge that Sorel called ‘empirisme’ – requires 
determinism, how is a social science possible? How can the human environment, 
characterized by creative agency, be explained in terms of laws and causal connections? It is 
revealing of the importance of the connection between science and determinism that Sorel’s 
initial attempts to conceptualize social science are based on the removal of agency from social 
phenomena. These early attempts were defined most strikingly by the search for structural and 
unchanging features of the social world, capable of being explained in terms of laws and 
without having to examine the problematic fact of agency. But eventually, the fact of agency 
proved too important and Sorel began to move in the opposite direction, i.e. towards an 
understanding of the social world as the product of human agency and in search of a 
conception of social science capable of making sense of this non-deterministic phenomenon. 
It is crucial to stress that, as Shlomo Sand has argued, ‘what brings Sorel to Marxism is… 
science, and not politics.’67 In other words, Sorel’s engagement with historical materialism 
was that of an intellectual animated by the necessity of finding a suitable manner of 
conceptualizing and studying a social world that he saw as characterized most profoundly by 
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human creative agency. As I show in the third chapter, moreover, the marginality of Marxism 
in the France of the 1890s provided both the opportunity for and the necessity of an in-depth 
work of conceptual clarification and creative redescription of orthodox understandings of 
Marxism. A number of standard objections concerning historical and economic determinism 
needed to be addressed if Marxism was to become an intellectual force in France; at the same 
time, its marginality made this work of re-elaboration permeable to foreign influences which, 
in Sorel’s case, were to prove decisive.  
From a philosophical and epistemological perspective, Sorel’s revision of Marxism, first 
sketched in an 1898 article and developed in the following years, consisted in a radicalization 
of the historicist and activist tendencies that had characterized his early epistemological 
thought. The freedom of human agency becomes the starting assumption of Sorel’s reasoning, 
leading him to dismiss the idea of Marxism as a general, ahistorical, sociology valid for all 
times in order to replace it with a view of Marxism as the theoretical and ideological product 
of a precise historical agent, i.e. the modern industrial proletariat. Social scientific knowledge, 
more generally, is not the knowledge of deterministic causal relations but, following Vico’s 
principle of verum ipsum factum, the understanding that a creator has of his own work. It is 
thus essentially a retrospective, historical knowledge, which implies the impossibility of 
general sociologies since the future cannot be a legitimate object of social scientific enquiry. 
There are, moreover, no general sociological rules regulating the interactions of various 
spheres of human historical activity, no structures and no superstructures. Spheres as different 
as economics, ethics, law, and politics continuously influence each other, and these 
interactions have to be examined empirically, on a case-by-case basis. Having abandoned the 
ideas of general laws regulating either the course of history or the structure of the social 
world, the fulcrum of Sorel’s understanding of Marxism thus became the collective historical 
agent, i.e. the proletariat. 
This refusal to see the deployment of human agency through history as an expression of 
general laws regulating interactions between deterministic phenomena gave to Sorel a specific 
understanding of the historical transition to socialism. It is through institutions that, according 
to Sorel, human agency deploys itself through history. Despite the vagueness with which he 
defines them, institutions are the environment in which human activities develop, and thus 
historical transformations are a question of institutional development. Only in new institutions 
can new economic, juridical, social, and political relations develop and grow. Borrowing from 
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the two great historical examples of Christianity in the Roman Empire and of the French 
Revolution, Sorel came to see the socialist transformation as a longue durée process of 
institutional development. Proletarian institutions are where the experiments that will generate 
the new society will take place: it is in proletarian institutions that new forms of economic 
ownership will develop, that new juridical and ethical views will arise, and, in short, that the 
socialist society will grow. The revolutionary upheaval thus becomes the sanctification of 
what is essentially a fait accompli: an historical detail, something that is merely an accessory 
to the long-term historical process through which a new society has come to exist. The role of 
violence is equally marginal. As early as 1896, Sorel had suggested that violence functions 
essentially as a negative indicator: when great amounts of violence are required, it means that 
the old society is still strong and the new one still weak. 
The second part of the thesis is concerned with the question of how this understanding of 
Marxism, which stressed the gradual, slow, longue durée character of the socialist 
transformation, could give birth to the revolutionary syndicalism articulated in the Reflections 
on Violence. I argue that Sorel’s syndicalism should not be seen as a theoretical departure 
from the Marxism outlined in the first part of the thesis, but instead as a response to a number 
of new economic and social phenomena that radically transformed the circumstances in which 
existing proletarian institutions operated. The imperative that had emerged, around 1898, as 
the result of Sorel’s revision of Marxism was that of allowing existing proletarian institutions, 
most notably unions, to develop and gradually extend their sphere of influence. This 
imperative remained unchanged; what did change was the context in which proletarian 
institutions found themselves, as well as Sorel’s awareness of it. Between 1898 and the 
writing of the Reflections, Sorel’s highly theoretical Marxism was subjected to a particularly 
probing test of history, and the syndicalism that emerged from it can only be understood as a 
result of Sorel’s new-found awareness of the difficult and unexpected conditions that 
confronted the workers’ movement in France and elsewhere. What was becoming 
increasingly clear to many Marxists was that there was no necessary connection between the 
growth in complexity and productive capacity of capitalism and class struggle. Instead, to the 
increase in complexity of productive forms corresponded a process of integration, both 
political and social, of the working classes into capitalist economies set up along national 
lines. National states, through protectionist trade policies and social legislation, greatly 
moderated the class conflicts that accompanied the second industrial revolution and created a 
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number of national capitalisms capable of accommodating at least some of the demands of the 
working class, effectively dealing a severe blow to the revolutionary force of Marxism.  
The emergence of this new managerial, welfarist, national capitalism is of crucial importance 
in examining Sorel’s turn to syndicalism. This extremely complex historical transition 
constitutes the background against which Sorel’s political transformations of the early 
twentieth century can be understood. The fact that, between 1898 and 1905, Sorel gave 
different answers to the question of how to further the progress of proletarian institutions 
should not be seen as a mere inconsistency, but, instead, as a sign of his progressive 
understanding of the new circumstances. It follows that, in order to make sense of the 
syndicalism of the Reflections, it is necessary to shift from intellectual to social, economic, 
and political history. If syndicalism is a response to a radically different context, it is 
necessary to examine, however partially 68 , the relevant political, economic, and social 
transformations in order to understand it.  
For example, Sorel’s advocacy of parliamentarism and reformism, as I show in chapter five, 
was based on the assumption that greater involvement in parliamentary politics would be 
conducive to reforms capable of accelerating the growth of proletarian institutions capable of 
eventually asserting their independence from bourgeois society. Sorel’s belief in the 
compatibility between parliamentary reformism and the long-term revolutionary goal betrays 
a fundamental misunderstanding of the process of working class assimilation outlined above. 
A study of Sorel’s engagement with the Bernstein controversy is illuminating from this 
perspective, because it shows how Sorel misread, or ignored, issues as central as the question 
of capitalist development and social polarization, and how, instead, he exploited the polemical 
space of the controversy to make a number of highly theoretical points that characterized his 
own Marxism. Sorel’s inability to see reformism as part of a wider trend towards national 
capitalism can partially be partially explained by pointing out France’s backwardness vis à vis 
Germany in terms of industrial development, class structure, and political socialism. The fact 
that Sorel could, while advocating reformism, still pour venomous criticism over the party 
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structure of the SPD shows that he saw politics as a means, a mere instrument, even if he was 
to later realize that it was an instrument unfit for the task that he had conceived for it.  
 
The political consequences of the Dreyfus affair opened Sorel’s eyes to the fact that the 
evolution of advanced European capitalist societies was not conducive to the development of 
autonomous proletarian institutions capable of giving birth to a new society. It is in chapter 
six that I examine this emerging awareness, highlighting how, despite the fact that it was 
caused by political developments, it took the form of an economic and social analysis. I show 
how Sorel paid increasing attention to interactions between the state, the bourgeoisie, and the 
proletariat on questions of industrial concentration, social legislation, and the politicization 
and parliamentarization of socialism. The conclusion to which he arrived was that the agency 
of the state was exerting a mitigating influence upon the pace of capitalist development, and 
that this was enormously damaging, not only for the institutional development of the 
proletariat, but for the general development of civilization. Protectionism and parliamentary 
socialism were the ideologies that were bound to arise in a context of productive decadence; 
laissez-faire and Marxism were those that characterized periods of economic expansion, and 
it was the former that were replacing the latter ones. If these analyses, expressed most 
eloquently in the Insegnamenti sociali dell’economia contemporanea, constitute Sorel’s 
diagnosis of the problems of socialism in the new century, the prescription and cure – 
proletarian violence – is to be found in the Reflections on violence, to which the last chapter is 
dedicated. After an opening philological section that highlights the proximity between the 
analyses of the Insegnamenti and the argument of the Reflections, I try to show that the 
necessity of violence is dictated for Sorel by the exceptional and unexpected circumstances of 
a protectionist and statist capitalism, and how what can be expected from violence is not 
socialism but, instead, its historical precondition, i.e. the restoration of a healthy capitalism 
system.  
As can be noticed, we are very distant from the Sorelian legend outlined in the opening of this 
introduction. The Sorel examined in this work is very different from the countless 
approximate portraits of an earlier incarnation of Ernst Jünger we have illustrated. We have 
shown before where exactly the problems with the Sorelian legend lie, and, consequently, on 
which points this work departs from these: on the facile relegation of Sorel’s epistemology to 
the categories of ‘irrationalism’ and ‘Bergsonism’ and on the mistaken, though more 
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understandable, reading of the Reflections as an hymn to the cleansing virtues of heroic 
violence. Much like he was no Jünger, Sorel was no Marinetti.69 But if the relationship of this 
thesis to that scholarship is a straightforward one of opposition, its relationship to the new 
scholarship of the 1980s is more complex. An obvious point of contact is the desire to go 
beyond the Sorelian legend and to show its shortcomings. More importantly, this thesis is 
heavily indebted to some of the innovations of the 1980s: a piece of work like the present one, 
for example, would be unthinkable had Sorel’s Marxism not been rescued from obscurity by 
historians such as Lindenberg or Sand. Moreover, a number of issues treated in this work had 
been already highlighted by the two main Anglophone works emerging from the 1980s, those 
of Jennings and Stanley. Both Jennings and Stanley understood the importance of 
epistemology in Sorel’s thought, with Stanley dedicating an entire chapter to Sorel’s 
philosophy of science, and Jennings underlining with great insight the fact that the importance 
of Vico for Sorel was mainly an epistemological one.70 Equally, the fact that Sorel, after 
1898, embarked on a complex path that brought him from theoretical revisionism, through 
political reformism, to syndicalism, is well known and much discussed. 
The recurrence of certain important issues, however, does not imply an identity of 
interpretation. There are, in other words, a number of both small and large differences 
between my readings of some aspects of Sorel’s thought and those of, say, Jennings, Sand, or 
other historians. Most evidently, it seems to me that even the new school has generally 
neglected the economic analyses that constitute the background to the Reflections, with the 
consequence that the Marxist framework of the Reflections is given less importance than it 
should enjoy, and that Sorel’s path to syndicalism is explained in excessively French terms, as 
a story of revulsion against the triumphant post-Dreyfus republic. 
These differences, nonetheless, will be duly highlighted and explained as they occur 
throughout the thesis. Here, it is necessary to focus on what differentiates most evidently the 
present work from the Anglophone scholarship of the 1980s, namely the fact that it is not an 
overview of Sorel’s oeuvre. As we have suggested above, this approach was particularly 
popular in the Anglophone scholarship of the 1980s, with Jennings and Stanley being the two 
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most obvious cases. There were, to be sure, excellent reasons for preferring scope to analysis. 
Emerging after decades of substantial historiographical confusion, the new generation of 
scholars faced the need to illustrate Sorel’s thought beyond the Reflections and at the same 
time to make sense of the truly exceptional multiplicity characterizing it. As a result, both 
Stanley and Jennings opted for extensive and mostly descriptive presentations of Sorel’s work 
that tried to capture the multiplicity of his interests and writings. This approach has great 
merits: not only does it constitute the best antidote, in the short term, to the common 
stereotype of Sorel71, but also, in the longer run, allows new generations to have an alternative 
base from which to start. 
But precisely because this work has already been conducted, it is now necessary to become 
more selective and, I believe, consequently, also broader in scope. This thesis, to start with, is 
more selective: it chooses to focus on an interpretation of Sorelian epistemology and to show 
how it gave rise to a specific understanding of Marxism which, when subjected to the 
constraints of the period, became the revolutionary syndicalism for which Sorel is known. 
This choice, as any choice, implies renunciations: to make but the most obvious example, 
Sorel’s writings on the history of Christianity are never addressed in what is to follow. One 
clear advantage of being selective however is that it allows for greater analytical precision, 
especially when it comes to dealing with the Sorelian texts. What an overview, however wide, 
cannot but do with great difficulty becomes a necessity in a work that makes choices as to 
what is more important. Once this choice is done, Sorel’s relevant texts become important not 
as evidence of his interests, but as evidence of his thought, of his way of framing issues and 
developing arguments. Consequently, close textual analysis will be a defining feature of this 
thesis. 
But the greatest advantage of being selective consists in the ability to bring to bear much 
wider contexts and much larger fields of historiography on the examination of Sorel: the 
choice of a number of central issues in Sorel’s thought allows, in other words, for a better 
contextualisation. For example, to understand Sorel’s epistemology it is necessary to enquire 
upon the limits of Kantianism in late 19th century French philosophy, it is necessary to bring 
back that philosophical world. Equally, an understanding of Sorel’s turn to syndicalism 
requires analyses of the social consequences of the second industrial revolution, of the 
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emergence of welfare state measures and economic organization before the Great War, and of 
the history of French and German socialist parties in those years. These analyses, in turn, 
require the use of historiography that is not traditionally associated with Sorel: it should be 
clear that this work of wider contextualisation is only possible if we abandon the ambition of 
exhaustiveness. Moreover, it follows that although this work focuses on an individual figure, 
it believes that its intellectual trajectory cannot be satisfactorily accounted for without a 
substantial detour into a number of wider fields: after all, who would describe a journey 
without mentioning the landscape?72 Weaving the figure of Sorel into wider historical and 
intellectual transformations not only allows for a better understanding of Sorel; arguably, it 
also allows a better understanding of these transformations. From this perspective, this work 
should be of interest not only to students of Sorel, but also to anyone keen on having a clearer 
view of late 19th century French philosophy and on some, admittedly minor, aspects of the 
historical processes that led to the Great War. 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH UNTIL 1892 
Georges Sorel was born in Cherbourg, Normandy, in the autumn of 1847. The town was 
undergoing a transformation from a small provincial centre to a military port of medium 
importance: its large fortified harbour was completed only in 1853, despite works having 
begun under Louis XVI. What we know of his familial background is fragmentary, and what 
survives of his early years is largely anecdotal. He was the son of Pierre Gustave Sorel, an 
unsuccessful businessman, and Marie Nathalie Sulley, the daughter of the mayor of nearby 
Barfleur. His cousin, Albert Sorel, was to become a historian and president of the Senate.73 
Despite the fact that some of his writings seem to betray a protestant, almost Lutheran, 
sensibility – he is often benevolent towards the heritage of Jansenism – his religious 
background is solidly Catholic: one of his oldest letters unearthed shows that at least until 
1872 he spoke and wrote as a person inside the Roman Church. 74 As his father switched from 
commercial storage to room renting, business took a turn for the worse, with apparently 
serious consequences for the family’s finances.75 Nonetheless, he studied at the Collège de 
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Cherbourg, obtaining a number of prizes for his mathematical talent as well as both scientific 
and literary baccalauréats.76 At an unknown date, his family moved to Paris, and in 1864 we 
find Sorel undertaking his cours préparatoires at the Collège Imperial Rollin, the same school 
his cousin Albert had attended, in order to prepare his concours for the admission to one of 
France’s top scientific and technical institutions, the École Polytechnique. 77 
Admission to the Polytechnique was neither an uncomplicated nor an inexpensive business. 
Preparation for the entrance exam generally involved further years of study, and required, 
amongst other things, a certificate proving that the candidate had not previously engaged in 
subversive political activity. The yearly fees for this highly selective military school 
amounted to the not entirely negligible sum of 1600 francs annually,78 and though some 
financial aid was available to those who needed it, Sorel did not receive any.79 If we consider 
that not only Georges, but also his two brothers Anatole and Ernest attended the EP, we are 
brought to question the severity of the Sorels’ financial troubles. The school, founded in 1794 
and, after 1830, again under the control of the Defence Ministry, was a military institution 
whose mission was the training of military engineers. The atmosphere and traditions of the 
school were martial: pupils wore army uniforms and, having passed the two years, formally 
became army officers.80 But this military dimension only gives half of the story, and not even 
the most important one: the Polytechnique gave to its pupils a first rate education that, despite 
the obvious prominence given to subjects relating to engineering, was in fact quite wide 
ranging. It was an institution, in other words, also capable of producing intellectual 
excellence: the mathematician Henri Poincaré and the economist Fréderic Le Play, for 
example, were two former polytechniciens.  
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During their first and second years (respectively the ‘deuxième’ and ‘première division’) 
students were examined through a combination of regular oral examinations, wider termly 
ones, exams and, for some disciplines, practical exercises. 81  Beyond the predictable 
disciplines of physics, chemistry, analysis, algebra, mechanics, technical drawing, and so on, 
Sorel also followed courses of French literature, German, history, and architecture – the latter 
subject becoming one of his lifelong interests.82 His marks were very good, almost always 
above 15/20, with the exception of a 6 in German in his second year (he managed a still 
modest 12 in the exam), and a 9,75 and a 13,75 in the French literature essays of, respectively, 
his first and second year.83 These results meant he was ranked 5th out of 114 pupils in his first 
year, and to exit the school 10th out of 133 the following year.84 Classements were important, 
because they determined the kind of career that a polytechnicien could aspire to: the best 
students chose a specialization of their liking, while the worst ones had to choose amongst 
what was left, with some actually enrolling in the army.85 With his tenth position, Sorel could 
choose to specialize at the prestigious École des Ponts et Chaussées, which he entered in 
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1867. The offer of the Ponts et Chaussées was similar, though naturally more specialized, to 
that of the Polytechnique: a core of scientific and technical subjects accompanied by 
languages and, more importantly, courses of law and economics. It is significant that the 
liberal economist Joseph Garnier taught the course on political economy: Sorel’s economic 
education at the Ponts et Chaussées was based on the liberal doctrine popular during the 
Second Empire.  
In 1869, Sorel left the Ponts et Chaussées and began his career as a an engineer at the service 
of the French state. He was first posted to Corsica, where he remained until June 1871, then to 
various places in the south of France (Albi, Gap, Draguignan). He spent the years from 1876 
until 1879 in Mostaganem in colonial Algeria: from there, he was assigned to Perpignan, 
where he settled down, remaining in the town until his retirement in 1892. Possibly because 
of his permanence outside of the hexagon, very little is known about Sorel’s reactions to the 
events around 1870. We do not know, and can only guess, how he reacted to the French 
defeat, to the Paris Commune, and to the establishment of the third republic.86 We do know 
that it was during his stay in Draguignan that, having fallen ill in a trip to Lyon, he got to 
know Marie David, a former factory worker turned hotel maid, who was to become his 
partner until her death in 1897. Though they were together for more than twenty years – 
Andreu dates the beginning of their relationship in 1875 – they never married, possibly 
because of the opposition of Sorel’s family to what would have doubtlessly appeared to them 
as ‘un horrible déclassement’.87 
The years in Perpignan however do provide us with some initial hints regarding Sorel’s 
intellectual activity. It was during his last years in the town that he began to publish his work: 
amongst the Perpignan writings we find not only some of his first epistemological attempts, 
but also no less than two books, one on Socrates’ trial and one on the Bible.88 Both are 
historical studies with quite a few present-centred concerns. The striking opening lines of the 
Contribution à l’étude profane de la Bible are illustrative of how far Sorel eventually 
departed from his conservative origins: in this early volume, the Bible had been described by 
Sorel as the perfect book for popular education since it could ‘teach the heroic life, fight 
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against nefarious utilitarian tendencies and stop the spreading of the revolutionary ideal’.89 
The purpose of the book is not that of assessing the historical credentials of the Biblical story, 
a typical nineteenth century project attempted amongst other by Michelet, Renan and, of 
course David Friedrich Strauss. Sorel stresses clearly that the intended audience of his volume 
was the university, the ‘teacher of the people’, rather than the ‘small church of liberal 
protestants’: the purpose is neither religious nor exegetical, but historical and educational. 90 
Similar considerations apply to the Procès de Socrate, a book in which Sorel, despite 
occasional favourable remarks on Socrates’ qualities, essentially condemns the philosopher 
for having subverted the moral environment of the polis. Based on an in-depth reading of 
Fustel de Coulanges’ La Cité Antique,91 the Procès de Socrate is an interesting work that 
displays a number of important anticipations of later Sorelian ideas; most notably, it is in this 
book that we first read of Sorel’s fear of the state, particularly when ruled by philosopher 
kings. 
Pierre Andreu managed to obtain a list of Sorel’s borrowings from Perpignan’s library during 
the period between 1884 and 1891. It is from this list that we can begin to understand Sorel’s 
intellectual world. If we leave aside materials which have to be considered as mandatory 
preparation for the writing of the two books mentioned above, what is most striking is the 
philosophical scope of the retiring engineer’s readings. 92  A regular reader of the Revue 
Philosophique, the key French forum for scientific and epistemological debate, Sorel sought 
to complement this regular reading with a number of philosophical classics: Descartes’ 
Discours de la méthode, Principia Philosophiae and Le Monde, as well as a large selection of 
his letters, the natural philosophy of Aristotle - the Metaphysics, complemented by a 
commentary by Ravaisson, and sections of the Physics - and the works of Thomas Aquinas.93 
Engagement with positivism and nineteenth century philosophical classics was equally 
important: Comte’s Cours de Philosophie Positive was borrowed four times between 
December 1886 and April 1887, after having borrowed what appears to be a collection of 
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Spencer’s writings. 94 As we shall see in the first chapter, these readings will constitute part of 
the references for Sorel’s initial epistemological attempts. 
In 1892, as soon as this could be done ‘honourably’95, Sorel quit his job at the Ponts et 
Chaussées. Instead of opting for an extended leave, a choice that would have granted him a 
solid pension, he resigned. He moved to Paris and, after a few months, to 25 rue Denfert-
Rochereau, Boulogne sur Seine, where he remained for much of the rest of his life. Marie 
followed him. Free from professional obligations of any kind, he could now dedicate all his 
time and energies to his intellectual work. 
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CHAPTER ONE: SOREL’S EARLY EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
 
 ‘Si jamais il nous est donné de pénétrer au sein des choses, ce sera, on peut en 
être sûr, par une autre voie que la science, et par une autre faculté que 
l’entendement. C’est pour cela que le déterminisme philosophique ou 
scientifique… rapetissant la nature afin de l’enserrer s’il se pouvait dans les 
cadres étroits et tout unis de nos catégories… est une doctrine qu’il est permis de 
trouver pauvre et stérile, et qui même devrait faire horreur à quiconque  est tant 
soit peu pénétré de la présence de l’infini dans la nature et dans l’homme.’ 
Charles Dunan, 1886.1 
‘C’est de quoi les Kantiens et même leurs adversaires ne paraissent pas d’être 
aperçus : dans ce prétendu monde phénoménal, fait par la science, tous les 
rapports qui ne se peuvent traduire en simultanéité, c’est-à-dire en espace, sont 
scientifiquement inconnaissables… Kant a mieux aimé placer la liberté en dehors 
du temps, et élever une barrière infranchissable entre le monde des phénomènes, 
qu’il livre tout entier à notre entendement, et celui des choses en soi, dont il nous 
interdit l’entrée. ’ 
Henri Bergson, 1889.2 
‘Nous pensons que, pour étudier à fond la thèse de la causalité, il faut procéder 
comme nous l’avons fait : interroger les sciences et leur demander par quelle 
méthode elles arrivent à la connaissance… Si nous ne nous trompons, la solution 
du problème du déterminisme dépend tout entière de ce genre de recherches.’ 
Georges Sorel, 1888.3 
 
  
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this chapter will be on Sorel’s writings on epistemology and the philosophy of 
science in the first period of his intellectual activity. It covers the period from 1886, the year 
in which he publishes his first article in an academic journal4, until 1894, the year in which 
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his most important early epistemological text, the ‘Ancienne et Nouvelle Métaphysique’, 
appears in the newly established Ère Nouvelle. 
The importance of these early epistemological attempts is not just that they are Sorel’s first 
productions of note but, more importantly, that they constitute, as it were, an intellectual 
apprenticeship. The writings we are going to examine are full of arguments and intellectual 
moves that recur abundantly in Sorel’s future output, and it is here that we find most of the 
issues that will characterize Sorel’s intellectual trajectory. The reason for this is that these are, 
for him, intellectually formative debates; that is, they are the debates that provide him with 
some of the fundamental questions around which his later writings will revolve. It is in these 
discussions on science that Sorel encounters one of the central problems of his career – the 
problem of determinism and human freedom – and formulates an answer – the idea that 
freedom ought to be conceptualized as production – that goes a long way to explain the 
peculiarities of Sorel’s later engagement with Marx. Thus, despite the fact that Sorel remains 
relatively marginal to these debates5, the debates are quite the opposite of marginal to Sorel’s 
thought. Their study reveals the way in which Sorel engaged with the central philosophical 
issue of his generation, the question of freedom and determinism, and thus, given the 
formative nature of this engagement with the problem, can illuminate the course of his 
thought. 
The conceptual problem with which Sorel engages emerges, in the first instance, from a 
perplexity regarding the validity of scientific assertions. The urge to discuss critically upon 
the validity of scientific assertions is a widespread activity in the Europe of the late nineteenth 
century. What one witnesses throughout the continent is a tendency to problematize the 
previously easily accepted claims of science. Those voicing concerns about science are not 
only professional philosophers, but also, more significantly, scientists themselves, beginning 
to reflect critically on their disciplines and the foundations of their claims, thus giving birth to 
the philosophy of science in its contemporary form. For example, an important part of this 
current of scientific self-reflexion surfaces in the German-speaking world where, moving 
within a broadly speaking Kantian paradigm, Richard Avenarius’ and Ernst Mach’s 
epistemological works seek to purge scientific assertions from their metaphysical, and hence 
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epistemologically illegitimate, aspects, attempting to ground the claims of science in nothing 
but experience. 6 And yet, irrespective of the specific problems detected and the solutions 
suggested by any given thinker, noteworthy is the general willingness to problematize claims 
that only a generation before would have seemed unproblematic.  
We find, in Sorel’s France, an excellent example of this mood of scientific uncertainty in 
Henri Poincaré. In his introduction to his courses on thermodynamics, he writes that the two 
principles of this branch of physics seem to promise a stable foundation for the future. And 
yet, he asks ‘What is it that gives us the right to attribute to the principle more generality and 
precision than the experiences which allowed us to demonstrate it?’ 7 The question concerns 
the legitimacy of inductive generalisation, and Poincaré states that he will not engage with 
this problem, but adds that, if induction were to be ruled out as epistemologically illegitimate, 
‘science could not exist or, at least, would be reduced to an inventory, the affirmation of 
isolated facts, and would have no value for us, for it could not give satisfaction to our need for 
order and harmony…’8 It is, in short, the idea of science as a straightforward representation of 
reality that comes under heavy attack: the reflection on what scientists actually do gained 
momentum, and shattered the idea that scientific laws emerge unproblematically from the 
observation of empirical data. The challenge then becomes that of providing a more realistic 
and hence complex understanding of the activity of scientists. 
This epistemological question about science could not, at least in France, be discussed in 
isolation from another, much weightier and closely connected, philosophical problem: that of 
freedom and determinism. The scientific worldview was thought to necessitate a mechanistic 
and deterministic world in which the space for human freedom was reduced to virtually 
naught. If the claims of science were correct descriptions of a reality of things, then they 
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implied a rather strong determinism that left no place for spontaneous human action. Let us 
not forget that this is the climate in which Henri Bergson’s philosophical star rose and shone 
for decades. Indeed, a citation from Bergson’s doctoral thesis – the text that was to become 
the Essai sur les données immediates de la conscience – can give us a good idea of the 
centrality of the problem to the French philosophical scene.  
 ‘We have chosen, amongst various problems, one common to both metaphysics 
and psychology, the problem of freedom. We try to establish that all discussion 
between determinists and their opponents implies a confusion of duration with 
extension, of quality with quantity: once this confusion has been dealt with, we 
shall, perhaps, see the disappearance of the objections against freedom’.9 
The debate that Sorel enters then, very broadly put, is one on the epistemic status of scientific 
assertions as representations of nature. The truth of these assertions would ensure the validity 
and prestige of science; at the same time, this same truth would configure a deterministic 
world with no space left for human freedom. The alternative presented to Sorel is, bluntly put, 
one between science and freedom: either we live in a world whose determinism is described 
by science or we live in a world where freedom is possible. If the latter is correct, it follows 
that the scientific worldview is not true, at least in the traditional, strong sense. Either we 
understand the world, but cannot act in it, or we can act, but give up on the possibility of 
understanding the world. The writings with which we are going to deal here are attempts to 
square this circle, attempts to reconcile a vindication of science with the possibility of 
freedom.  
On the epistemological issue, Sorel fully shares the idea that a more complex 
conceptualization of science is needed. Science is not, for him, the banal observation of 
empirical data, but an activity to whose complexity epistemology must do justice. And yet, 
this complexity cannot ensue in a reduction of the epistemic ambitions of science. In other 
words, science must be able to make claims about the world, and cannot be reduced to, say, a 
system of useful conventions. The picture is further complicated by the fact that Sorel wished 
to reconcile all of this with the possibility of freedom. The problem thus is as follows: to 
come up with a new conceptualization of science that safeguards its status of rational enquiry 
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upon the natural world and at the same time does not shatter the possibility of human 
freedom. 
In order to even sketch Sorel’s attempted solution, it is important to point out that the 
epistemological problems with which he is faced are typically representationalist and Kantian 
ones. The epistemological model is one in which the key problem is that of justifying 
objectively the validity of what are essentially subjective impressions, and thus the big 
question concerns the possibility of science: i.e. how can we claim to know? How neutral are 
our instruments for grasping the object of our enquiry? Might we be able to understand only 
through the distorting medium of these instruments? If so, are we faced with a structural 
inability to grasp reality, to reach the things in themselves, and are we condemned to see them 
merely as they are for us? Might we be trapped in a system of arbitrary scientific 
conventions? This, of course, is one of the recurring problems of modern philosophy. In the 
words of Juergen Habermas, 
‘The concept of subjectivity introduced a dualism between inner and outer that 
seemed to confront the human mind with the precarious task of bridging a chasm. 
With this, the way was cleared for scepticism in its modern form. The private 
character of my particular subjective experiences, on which my absolute certainty 
is based, simultaneously provides reason to doubt whether the world as it appears 
to us is not in fact an illusion’.10 
Very much in line with Habermas’ analysis, the response of an important part of the French 
philosophical community of the time moved in a sceptical direction. In other words, the 
immense epistemological problems engendered by the representationalist led many 
philosophers to give up on science’s ambition to fully describe the world. But crucially, this 
sceptical move allowed such philosophers to safeguard the possibility of human freedom. The 
epistemic limits of science generated a sphere of the unknowable, free from scientific 
determinism and capable of protecting the possibility of freedom. 
Dissatisfied on both counts by this solution, Sorel gives to the problem of science and 
freedom what we could call, with the due philosophical proportions, Hegelian answers. In 
extreme synthesis, his answer consists in abandoning the question on the possibility of science 
and replacing it with question about the practice of science. Instead of wondering whether 
knowledge is possible, we start from the fact that it is possible. Thus, the question becomes 
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not whether we can know, but how we know: the emphasis is not on the possibility of 
knowledge, but on its practice. The actual way in which scientists operate, conceptually and 
experimentally, and the way in which scientific practice has developed – i.e. the history of 
science – thus become central elements of Sorel’s epistemology.  The epistemology 
developed in these early writings, an epistemology to which Sorel will largely remain faithful, 
can be described as both activist and historicist. It is activist insofar as Sorel insists that the 
mind is active in its enquiring activity, elaborating instruments and concepts – what he calls 
‘expressive supports’ – which are indispensable to science. It is historicist insofar as Sorel 
ascribes a temporal, changing character to these conceptual toolboxes required by science. 
The concepts, experimental abilities, traditions of enquiry, elaborated by scientists through 
the ages are subjected to the same changing historical conditions to which any human activity 
is subjected. But though expressive supports and scientific traditions are man-made, and 
hence historical, natural phenomena are not, because they function in a deterministic world in 
which things do not alter. The timeless laws that regulate natural phenomena, moreover, are 
discoverable experimentally by scientists. Experimental conditions, though the necessitate 
expressive supports that arise from the historical activity of scientists, constitute a real 
moment of contact with the deterministic world of nature, and thus are what guarantees the 
objectivity of scientific assertions, i.e. their ability to rise above the historical circumstances 
out of which they arise. 
This dualistic epistemology, divided between a non-deterministic historical world and a 
deterministic natural one, allows Sorel to give an answer to the problem of freedom without 
endangering the objectivity of science. The artificial, man-made, character of expressive 
supports gives evidence of the freedom of human agency, a freedom not understood as a state 
of exception from natural determinism, but as the capacity to produce ‘sequences whose 
ordering is our decision’. 11  Expressive supports, in turn, through experimental practice, 
guarantee an access to the deterministic world of nature, and thus allow science to understand 
the natural world and to express this understanding in terms of laws. Though Sorel will 
eventually abandon the idea of science as the description of deterministic phenomena, both 
the historicist and activist aspects of his early epistemology are important. The concern for 
human agency and the activist theory of freedom force Sorel to enquire on how human 
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agency deploys itself through history. It is, consequently, in the enquiries into the history of 
science elaborated by Sorel in these early writings that we can begin to see how Sorel thinks 
as an historian. At a more abstract level, the insistence on agency, seen by Sorel as an instance 
of human freedom, will profoundly and decisively influence his thinking on Marxism as a 
social scientific method, and hence constitute the lasting legacy of Sorel’s early engagement 
with epistemology. 
1.2 A DISCUSSION ON CAUSATION 
 
As we have seen in the introductory chapter, the beginning of Sorel’s life as an intellectual 
can be dated to his last years in Perpignan. Quite possibly already taking seriously the idea of 
early retirement, he dedicated, from the mid-1880s, considerable amounts of time to his self-
education. If we look at the list of his borrowings from the Perpignan library, as well as at the 
corpus of his early production, we can see a great variety of fields to which he dedicated 
himself: from Biblical criticism to the history of the French revolution, from psychophysics to 
the philosophy of science. Despite this typically Sorelian tendency to work on many fronts, 
beyond two historical works, the Contribution and the Procès de Socrate, questions of 
epistemology and of science clearly dominate the earliest Sorelian production. 
Sorel’s first published article appeared in 1886 in the Revue Philosophique de le France et de 
l’étranger. For a previously unpublished writer, this constituted an important debut in one of 
France’s rising academic journals. Founded in 1876 by Théodule Ribot, who was later 
appointed in 1888 to the Collège de France’s newly established chair in experimental 
psychology, the Revue Philosophique could boast, despite its young age, contributors of the 
calibre of John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Hyppolite Taine, as well as a young Henri 
Bergson. As is shown by the borrowing list from the Perpignan library, Sorel was, at least 
since 1885, a regular reader of the review. 12 The main intellectual interest of the review, since 
its first years under the direction of Ribot, is psychology, and its pages are evenly split 
between empirical studies by eminent European psychologists such as Wundt, Binet, or 
Ribot13, a number of theoretical texts in which the tenets of experimental psychology are 
subjected to philosophical critique, and general philosophical essays only loosely connected 
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to psychology and dealing with general questions of epistemology and the philosophy of 
science.14 
In line with the Revue’s editorial policy, Sorel’s first article is on psychophysics, i.e. the 
empirical and quantitative study of sensations.15 But it is not long before he is drawn towards 
more abstract territory and grander conclusions. In 1888 he publishes, still in the Revue 
Philosophique, what can be described as his first important article: ‘De la cause en 
physique’.16 Inaugurating what we can call a Sorelian tradition, the text deals with much more 
than the theory of causation in physics, and amounts to a general reflection on the 
defensibility of scientific claims. It is in this text that some interesting epistemological 
tendencies and inclinations – it would be premature to speak of positions – begin to emerge. 
The discussion on causation is a classic of modern philosophical thinking, insofar as it gives, 
or takes away, philosophical legitimacy to natural science. This is as true of the late 
nineteenth century as it was of the late eighteenth. The debate, and Sorel’s participation in it, 
ought to be seen as part of a wider discussion on the purpose and limits of science. What is, 
however, peculiar to the late nineteenth century is the intensity with which this discussion is 
felt to have bearing on the issue of human freedom. The article then is the first episode of 
Sorel’s engagement with a key problem, one with which he will address for most of his life, 
that of determinism and freedom: if the world as described by science is a correct picture of 
the world as it really is, it seems that the space for human freedom is reduced to zero.  
1.2.1 ‘PAR UNE AUTRE VOIE QUE LA SCIENCE’: DUNAN IN THE REVUE 
PHILOSOPHIQUE 
In order to get a richer picture of this debate, it will be useful to examine an article cited by 
Sorel in his own piece. Written by Charles Dunan and published in a previous issue of the 
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Revue Philosophique, the piece does more than deal with the same issues as Sorel’s ‘De la 
cause en physique’, for it allows us to get a clear view of the issues at stake in the debate. 17  
In the article, Dunan had arrived at some bold epistemological conclusions, arguing against 
the possibility of subjecting to rational analysis the web of causes that determine any given 
effect. The theory of causation attacked by Dunan is one in which an effect can be connected 
either to a single cause or to a determinate group of causes, what Dunan calls ‘antécedents’. 
Against this conception, Dunan stresses that each effect is caused or determined by an 
unquantifiable number of ‘antécedents’. Given the impossibility of enumerating the 
‘antécedents’, the standard theory of causation falls apart. What matters here are the 
conclusions drawn from this by Dunan. After writing that induction, by which he means the 
correlation of phenomena in terms of cause and effect, is ‘science itself’, he continues:  
‘Induction consists in erecting to the status of law, i.e., universalizing in time and 
space, a relationship observed between two phenomena. If, then, every 
phenomenon depends not on a single precedent [antécédent], and not even on a 
determinate number of precedents, but on an endless, and hence uncountable, 
series of chronologically prior and spatially concomitant conditions, it follows that 
no phenomenon, and no group of phenomena can suffice to determine a 
consequent one [un conséquent]; but then, what is of induction, what is of 
science? On the other hand, it is incontestable that induction works and that 
science is done; and so, what is of theory?’18 
The passage is clear: if we accept Dunan’s theory of causation, we are no longer allowed to 
use words such as ‘determines’ or ‘causes’ in the traditional, strong sense. This, as 
highlighted by Dunan himself, appears problematic for our conception of science, which 
seems to require precisely this strong concept of causation. The way out of the dilemma 
consists in a redescription of the purposes and role of science. One must abandon, Dunan 
argues, the idea of being able to understand the causal generation of phenomena with ‘ideal 
precision’: if induction were to be a ‘rigorous and total determination of phenomena… on the 
basis of their relationship to their antecedents, induction would be impossible.’ 19 We must 
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l’espace, aucun phénomène ni aucun groupe de phénomènes ne peuvent suffire à déterminer un conséquent, et 
alors que devient l’induction, que devient la science ? D’un autre côté, il est incontestable que l’induction réussit, 
que la science se fait, et alors que devient la théorie ?’. 
19
 Ibid. Original passage : ‘…si l’induction devait être quelque chose d’absolu, s’il fallait qu’elle consistât dans 
une détermination rigoureuse  et totale des phénomènes… en vertu du rapport qui le lie à leurs 
antécédents…l’induction serait impossible’. 
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then accept that we can only establish the causes of phenomena with an unavoidable degree of 
approximation. We must be happy with a more pragmatic understanding of science, which, 
incapable of describing completely the endless pattern of causes leading to an effect, finds in 
model-making its defining activity. 
On this view, scientific activity is characterized by the constant use of models and schemes 
whose purpose is that of simplifying the unmanageable complexity of nature, so that our 
practical needs may be satisfied. In accounting for the fact that most phenomena seem, as a 
matter of fact, to be subordinated to relatively simple and straightforward causal patterns, 
Dunan eagerly points out that this is ‘a favour done to us by nature, not a necessity of 
things.20 The truly significant conclusion, however, is stated in the following page: since it is 
in the very nature of scientific activity to reduce the infinite complexity of causes to workable 
schemes capable of satisfying practical purposes, it follows that ‘science does not have the 
right of presenting itself as an adequate and total expression of reality’, since it is 
‘constrained, if it is to exist at all, to reduce, in a somewhat artificial way, this complexity [of 
nature] to unity’.21 The epistemic status of science is then that of a human construction, 
reflective of reality only as long as this reflection, incapable of ever being completely 
accurate, is of some practical use: science, in other words, is ‘a projection of reality, with its 
depths and contours, on the flat surface of abstract thought.’ 22 Before examining the wider 
conclusions that Dunan draws from this, it is worth underlining how the epistemological 
paradigm at work here is representationalist. There is a reality out there, and the task of 
science is that of securing a safe access to this reality so that we might represent it correctly. 
The problem is one of subjective access to an external reality: Dunan argues that we cannot 
aspire to a perfect representation, but he still moves within a representationalist paradigm. 
Towards the end of the article he ventures into more general conclusions. Lamenting the fact 
that the nineteenth century has pushed ‘love of science to the point of idolatry’23, he draws a 
distinction between the artificial and pragmatic domain of science and the ‘real infinity of 
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 Ibid., p. 521. ‘Heureusement pour nous, les choses se passent d’une manière analogue dans une multitude de 
cas, et la plupart des phénomènes dépendant d’une façon extrêmement étroite d’un petit nombre d’antécédents 
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 Ibid., p. 522. ‘…la science n’a pas le droit de se donner comme l’expression adéquate et totale de la réalité. 
Dans la réalité, la complexité des causes va jusqu’à l’infini ; la science, sous peine de ne pas être, est contrainte 
de ramener, d’une façon quelque peu factice, cette complexité à l’unité.’ 
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 Ibid. ‘une projection de la réalité avec son relief et sa profondeur sur le plan uniforme de la pensée abstraite’. 
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 Ibid. 
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nature’24 In a tone reminiscent of a caricatural Bergson he warns the reader that, if a contact 
with this real infinity is at all possible, it will be established by ‘another way than science, and 
through another faculty than understanding.’ 25 Given this unbridgeable separation between 
the world of scientific models dominated by a fictitious necessity and the ‘real infinity’ of 
nature, it follows, for Dunan, that determinism can be dismissed as a ‘poor and sterile 
doctrine’.26 Though our intellect must give up its ambition of coming up with a complete 
description of reality as it is, some other, as yet unnamed and undefined faculty might be able 
to solve what Dunan calls the ‘universal problem’: it would be a mistake to exclude what lies 
beyond the intellect and, by so doing, ‘mistake the limits of a system for the pillars of 
Hercules of truth.’27 
Not every step of Dunan’s argument is impeccably argued: we might, for example, wonder 
whether his account of causation really does rule out determinism in the way that his 
conclusion seems to require. 28 The general picture, however, is sufficiently clear: nature is 
constituted by an infinite complexity which science reduces, artificially, to manageable cause 
and effect relationships in order to fulfil its eminently pragmatic purposes. The activities that 
define science are thus abstraction, model-making and above all simplification: science, 
incapable of providing a perfect representation of reality, aspires only to a sufficiently 
functional one. Contact with the actual stuff of nature, with ‘real infinity’, is consequently the 
purpose of philosophy rather than science. This goal can only be reached by abandoning 
altogether the intellect and science, and by relying on some other as yet undefined means. 
On the one hand, this frankly irrationalist conclusion is a good witness to the climate of 
intellectual oppression that the dominance of positivism generated in the philosophical minds 
of the late nineteenth century. That this is the case can be grasped by leaving aside Dunan’s 
argument and concentrating on his polemical targets: these are determinism, materialism, and, 
above all, science’s ambition to describe the world accurately and completely. On the other 
hand, the problem is not just with the love of science pushed to the point of idolatry, but it is a 
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 The argument on the infinite complexity of causal patterns is, in fact, perfectly compatible with determinism: 
all it does is render invalid any claim to have discovered what actually determines a given phenomenon. It is, in 
other words a purely epistemological argument, compatible with an ontological determinism without however 
necessarily implying it. Again, the argument is typically Kantian, for it reduces the sphere of the knowable and 
leaves questions about things in themselves unanswerable, at least rationally. Epistemology replaces ontology. 
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more fundamental one. It must be appreciated how much Dunan’s arguments move within a 
Kantian and representationalist paradigm, how, in other words, the problem he is trying to 
solve is the classically difficult one about the objective validation of subjective impressions. 
The whole first part of Dunan’s text is, from this perspective, illuminating. It consists in a 
recap of the Hume-Kant discussion of causality, resolved by Dunan through a cautious 
acceptance of Kant’s argument that causality is a necessary condition of experience, i.e. that it 
is impossible to experience anything in non-causal terms. The terms in which the problem of 
causation is stated are revealing. In commenting on the strength of the Humean position29, he 
writes, for example, that it poses the question of ‘how to move, without petition of principle, 
from the subjective to the objective and erect the laws of our spirit [i.e. of our subjectivity] 
into laws regulating interactions between things themselves [i.e. objective laws]…’.30  
As we have mentioned, he opts for a Kantian solution, and concludes the section by 
apologising for having insisted so much on this point, but adding that ‘it is the pivot on which 
rests the entirety of the arguments which are to follow.’31 What must be underlined are the 
terms in which the problem of causality is examined: as a problem of subjective access to an 
objective reality: what in philosophy is known as the subject-object dichotomy. This difficult 
problem generates, in Dunan’s article, the classical symptoms. On the one hand, it spells the 
impossibility of bridging this chasm between impressions and reality, and thus of grasping the 
objective, for science only produces useful simplifications and cannot represent reality fully. 
On the other, a yearning for this connection with reality that is satisfied through non-rational 
ways, ‘par une autre voie que la science, et par une autre faculté que l’entendement.’32 
If we look at Sorel’s own piece on causation, partially formulated as a response to Dunan, we 
find that this first epistemological attempt happens in the same context of general opposition 
to determinism and materialism. But there is an important difference, namely, that Sorel, 
though willing to grant an important role to schemes and artificially constructed models in 
scientific practice, is not prepared to accept the modest and purely practical role that Dunan 
assigns to science. A superficial glance to Sorel’s 1888 ‘De la cause en physique’ could make 
us believe that he moves towards the same conclusions as Dunan. Quite apart from the fact 
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 That is, that the necessity of the connection between cause and effect is a purely psychological, i.e. subjective, 
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 Ibid., p. 505. ‘Comment en effet passer sans pétition de principe du subjectif à l’objectif, et ériger les lois de 
notre esprit en lois des choses mêmes?’ 
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 Ibid., p. 507. 
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 Ibid., p. 523. 
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that he praises Dunan’s treatment of the issue as full of ‘boldness and originality’33, the article 
seems to underline the same points made by Dunan: an insistence on the role of schemes and 
models and a strong dismissal of the simplistic positivist connection between experience and 
scientific proposition. And yet, things are not quite this simple. 
1.2.2 THE PRIORITY OF PRACTICE: SOREL ON CAUSATION 
In the opening of his own article, Dunan had written that the standard understanding of 
causation is generally challenged by ‘dissidents, most of whom refer to the scholastic 
tradition or to Maine de Biran.’ 34 Though he is no scholastic, Sorel, in this first period of his 
career, is an Aristotelian, or at least makes, as we are about to see, open use of Aristotelian 
references. This element already signals a fundamental difference with Dunan. Straight from 
the beginning of the article, Sorel attempts what we must call a radical displacement of the 
problem of causation. He begins by saying that the two most common understandings of 
causation must be rejected because they are either anthropomorphic, modelling their notion of 
cause on the experience of purposive action, or atomistic and materialist, basing it on the 
paradigm of physical contact and the transmission of movement. The Aristotelian alternative 
proposed by Sorel is the following. Using a somewhat obscure example from the realm of 
probability theory, he suggests that the problem of causation ought to be seen as a problem of 
the correct definition of the phenomenon with which we are dealing: ‘in all purely scientific 
research, the problem of causation is identical to that of classification by genres.’ He clarifies, 
adding that ‘the modern problem of scientific causation is nothing else but the one which 
Aristotle articulated under the name of search for an essential (or formal) cause.’ 35  The 
notion of formal – or ideal – causation is a difficult concept in the Aristotelian system. 
Without going into too much detail, we can say that Aristotle uses this notion to prevent 
science from becoming the mere study of individual empirical realities. In the Aristotelian 
view, science must culminate in the rational knowledge of unchanging universals: formal 
causation serves to connect single empirical elements to what we might call their universal 
aspect: their kind, idea, or form – hence formal causation. The Greek word used by Aristotle – 
eidos – betrays the Platonic roots of the idea and hopefully sheds some light on its meaning 
and function.  
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 Sorel, ‘Cause en physique’, p. 478. ‘M. Dunan a traité cette question avec beaucoup de hardiesse et 
d’originalité’. 
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 Dunan, ‘Concept de cause’, p. 497. 
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 Sorel, ‘Cause en physique’, pp. 467-8. 
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It is already worth noting how the problem is displaced, from one about the representational 
value of subjective impressions to one about the function of a concept in the practice of an 
activity. But what would an explanation in terms of formal causation amount to? Sorel tries to 
give an answer to this question for most of the article, and though his attempts are at times 
unclear or unconvincing, they nevertheless shed some light on the general direction of his 
thinking.  
The first example he provides concerns opium inducing sleep in medical patients. The best 
way to approach this issue, for Sorel, is that of avoiding the why question. The problem is 
better dealt with by isolating the chemical elements causing sleep and identifying their 
essential trait as that of inducing sleep. The modern doctor proceeds then by separation and 
experimentation until he finds what it is in opium that causes sleep, ignoring the why 
question: ‘old medicine’ remarks Sorel ‘would object that he hasn’t done anything, since he 
has not stated why opium makes us sleep.’36 Now, what this implies is that the quintessential 
scientific activity, i.e. that activity which marks the difference between the mere collection of 
experimental results and science, is classification: the definition of categories and schemes 
through which we can explain a given phenomenon. One might be tempted here to draw 
unwise parallels between Dunan and Sorel, in that they both insist on the great importance of 
the non-empirical elements of scientific activity. However, for the former, schemes are 
essentially functional simplifications of more complex realities, while for Sorel they are that 
which connects empirical data to rational categories.  
To understand the distance between Dunan and Sorel, it is worth pointing out that Sorel 
outlines a difference between science and what he calls empiricism, a category under which 
would fall much of what Dunan calls science. This emerges most clearly in Sorel’s short 
critical analysis of the role of experimental knowledge in science. Like Dunan, he attacks the 
idea that law-like correlations emerge unproblematically from the data of experimentation. 
His critical target is Auguste Comte commenting on the phenomenon of the fall of bodies:  
‘Even the person most alien to mathematical conceptions recognises on the field 
that the two quantities which it [the fall] presents [i.e. the height of the fall and the 
time employed by the object to hit the ground] are necessarily connected to each 
other.’ 37 
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 Auguste Comte, quoted in Sorel, ‘Cause en physique’, p. 468. 
 63 
For Sorel, this is far from being the case: the actual results of experimental activity, be it 
because of errors of measurement or the technical impossibility of isolating the relevant 
forces, never conform to a mathematical law. For Sorel, we are, nevertheless, allowed to 
simplify and slightly adjust our results, à la Dunan. This is a fully legitimate operation, 
provided that we know that what we will get are ‘empirical formulas, useful, perhaps, for 
certain applications, but without scientific value.’ 38  In an emphatic reaffirmation of his 
dissatisfaction with excessively pragmatic understandings of science, Sorel writes that science 
‘…does not work on the phenomena and the quantities measured by the experimenter, it 
works on other things, on schemes. Its field of action is outside of any possible material 
realization.’39 The point Sorel is making, of course, is not that experimentation is a negligible 
aspect of scientific activity. The question he is addressing is that of how one can distinguish 
science from a mere generalization of empirical tendencies, and his answer is that science 
connects empirical results to general categories or schemes, i.e. that science classifies. 
The precise epistemic status of these schemes remains unclear for most of the article: Sorel 
oscillates between considering them the grammar of any scientific discourse, and simple 
heuristic devices. But it is important to stress that, unlike Dunan’s schemes, they are not 
representations of reality in any meaningful sense. Indeed, the distinction between schemes 
and reality is always ‘very difficult to the human spirit’40 and their confusion is an error which 
Aristotle himself committed in his treatment of the movement of celestial bodies: he 
mistakenly saw in their apparently regular movements the ‘realisation of pure schemes.’ 41 
Belief in the actual physical existence of atoms is another, less excusable, instance of 
confusion between schemes and reality. Sorel is not blind to the difficulties created by his 
own conception of science, and tries to accommodate the problems that arise by presenting his 
own conception as an ideal capable of describing the full maturity of a science, an ambitious 
end-point to aim at. This is followed, naturally enough, by a modest-sounding rejoinder: 
‘In most cases (and in physics itself) one cannot reach this high level of 
knowledge. One must abide by a less exact (when not doubtful) classification 
and be less precise in one’s definition. The human spirit has no other path to 
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knowledge than the analysis of genres. When it cannot grasp absolute truth, it 
constructs more or less artificial classifications.’ 42 
The distinction here introduced between natural and artificial classifications is important, for 
it confirms the distance between Sorel and Dunan’s positions. Artificial classifications, for 
Sorel, given their ‘work-in-progress’ nature, contain a larger empirical element. These 
artificial classifications, drawing on experience, are never arbitrary as they always borrow 
some elements from the ‘observation of phenomena’. 43 They are of great utility in the natural 
sciences, since, thanks to experimentation, we are always in a position to correct our guesses 
were they to be proven wrong. It is even permissible, for Sorel, to express these artificial 
classifications through mathematical formulas, and proceed to further work on this basis. All 
this is well and good, provided that we respect a fundamental condition, namely, that we be 
conscious of the fact that ‘one is doing empiricism, not science.’ 44 
It is at this point that Sorel finally provides a clear answer on what defines natural 
classifications, the schemes of rational science. It is a particular form of explanatory power: 
natural classifications allow the scientist to arrive at the description of conceptually 
autonomous causal chains. The idea is tricky, but clarified by Sorel through an example with 
the Newtonian law of attraction applied to the planet Venus. Given that law, a difficulty arises 
immediately as we try to apply it to any celestial body, since every planet is subject to the 
attraction of every other planet. But, and here lies the strength of a natural classification, we 
are able to isolate each causal nexus: we can first deal with the problem of the solar attraction 
on Venus and then, separately and autonomously, with that of the terrestrial gravitational pull 
on the same planet. We solve the problem of movement by integrating these different causal 
relationships through infinitesimal calculus. The mark of a natural classification, or a truly 
scientific scheme, is that it allows us to independently and autonomously examine each single 
causal relationship.45 
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If we now move to the question of what this early piece tells us about Sorel’s epistemology 
we can see a number of interesting tendencies already at work here. We can see quite clearly, 
for example, Sorel’s desire to distance himself from both the naïve scientistic position 
according to which scientific laws emerge unproblematically from the data of experimentation 
and, at the same time and more interestingly, from Dunan’s position according to which the 
epistemic status of scientific assertions is that of human constructions, coherent and rational 
precisely because they are artificial. Against the naïve position, we have seen that he attacks 
Comte for suggesting that mathematical laws appear evident to the eye of the experimenter; 
against the conventionalist position, against Dunan, he develops the distinction between 
empiricism and science. His insistence on classification and his use of Aristotelian references 
are indicative of his uneasiness vis-à-vis the idea of science as a schematic simplification of 
the complexity of nature designed to satisfy our practical needs. As we shall see in the 
remainder of the chapter, this is an essential feature of Sorel’s early epistemological attempts: 
he wants to safeguard the prestige of science while at the same time problematizing the 
simplistic assumption on which this prestige rested, i.e. the notion that scientific propositions, 
thanks to the experimental method, mirror straightforwardly the structure of reality. 
But there is another, more important, indication emerging from this article. Let us remember 
how Dunan had approached the problem and to what conclusions he had arrived. He had 
begun with a preliminary discussion of Hume and Kant, he had dealt with the problem as one 
about the fit between our scientific assertions and objective reality and had concluded to the 
impossibility of this fit, relegating science to a purely pragmatic role. As an important 
rejoinder to this argument, he had castigated scientistic pretentions to get rid of metaphysics, 
and argued that complete contact with the stuff of nature was perhaps possible through non-
scientific and non-rational means. If we look at Sorel’s text we find virtually no reference to 
this problem of representation, of how we can ensure that our scientific assertions mirror 
correctly things as they actually are, in themselves, in nature. We are witnessing, in other 
words, a fairly significant displacement of the problem. This is important, especially as we 
know, through the reference cited above, that Sorel had read Dunan’s piece. Sorel does not 
start from the question of how it is possible that science correctly describes reality. Instead, he 
begins from the fact that science does describe reality and proceeds to examine how it does it. 
                                                                                                                                                        
insufficiency of mathematical instruments in dealing with complex equations cannot be considered a valid 
objection to the scientific method. The problem would become conceptually insoluble, however, if the number 
of forces at stake were to be infinite, and it is because of this that he argues for a finite universe and writes that 
‘there are good reasons to think that the ancient conception of the limitation of space is required by modern 
physics.’ Sorel, ‘Cause en physique’, p. 478-9. 
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Epistemology is not the preliminary philosophical interrogation upon the possibility of 
science, but, instead, the investigation upon the practice of science: 
‘Science must not prove its possibility; this is the very starting point of all 
reasoning; it must say under what conditions it is possible. In our work we have 
followed rigorously the critical method. We have interrogated science, we have 
asked it what its methods are…’ 46 
On the one hand, this amounts to a bold redescription of what epistemology consists in, as we 
have pointed out before the citation. The only correct epistemological methodology resides in 
a direct interrogation of the sciences. Scientific practices – what scientists actually do in 
laboratories – become the objects of epistemological enquiry and, fundamentally, the 
conceptually prior element. The only way to do philosophy of science is to fall back on 
scientific practice itself and articulate its reasons more thoroughly: ‘in order to avoid getting 
stuck in the realm of pure imagination, one has to base the critique of knowledge on the study 
of the procedures utilised for knowing.’ 47 This principle, which we may call that of the 
priority of practice is, as we shall see, one of Sorel’s most fundamental ideas: it is the idea 
that reflection, systematization and philosophical thought are chronologically and 
conceptually secondary to practice. It is a philosophical intuition to whose articulation, we 
shall argue, Sorel dedicated most of his intellectual energies. 
And it is an intuition that is first put at work in this 1888 article on causation, as what Sorel 
tries essentially to do is articulate the reasons that he sees embedded in the practice of actual 
scientists. Natural classifications, despite their misleading name, are, from this perspective, 
regulative conceptual elements: they allow us to conduct scientific activity according to 
certain criteria which we repute essential to our conception of science, such as, for example, 
the ability to isolate autonomous causal chains. What Sorel is saying is that scientists – 
physicists in our case – have a certain understanding of their activity, a conceptual apparatus 
which defines it and which we can call a conception of science. In this case, the conception of 
science places the isolation of autonomous causal chains at the centre of scientific activity. 
Now, given that this is a description of scientific practice, this element is essentially beyond 
the reach of epistemological critique, since the purpose of epistemological critique is merely 
that of articulating more thoroughly, and thus elucidating, the reasons embedded in various 
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forms of scientific practice. Whether a particular scientific conception is incorrect cannot be 
shown by epistemology, but only by scientific practice itself. The necessary and essentially 
unquestionable starting point then is what we may call the fact of science: the existence of a 
form of human activity called science, concerned with the investigation of nature and carried 
on through a conceptual apparatus informing its practice, an apparatus that cannot be changed 
through epistemological critique but merely by the experience of its own shortcomings in the 
field of scientific practice.  
The idea that scientific practices are conceptually prior to epistemological critique – the 
principle we have called the priority of practice – is a key Sorelian idea. It is important, here, 
to stress how it arises out of an attempt to solve a tricky conceptual problem concerning 
freedom. Like Dunan, Sorel rejects the view of a deterministic world entailing the loss of 
human freedom. Moreover, he finds the conception of science associated with determinism 
unappealing due to its excessive simplicity, knowing full well that scientific laws do not 
emerge self-evidently from the data of experimentation. Unlike Dunan however, he does not 
want to safeguard freedom by lowering the epistemic ambitions of science. A purely 
pragmatic science, Sorel tells us, is empiricism, not science. And so, he displaces the problem, 
arguing that the point of epistemology is not to wonder whether science is possible but to shed 
light on how it is possible. The question of freedom remains, as yet, unaddressed, but the 
defence of science as a practice is, as we are about to see, a first crucial step towards giving an 
answer to this question. 
1.3 A PLURAL PRACTICE 
The principle of the priority of practice, however summarily sketched in the article on 
causation, is fundamental in Sorel’s epistemology, and in the following writings Sorel begins 
to develop some of its consequences. One such consequence is epistemological pluralism. If 
the philosophical question of how we can assume that our individual and subjective 
impressions fit the state of affairs that actually exist is abandoned in favour of a conception of 
epistemology as an articulation of the reasons implicit in scientific practice, then the very 
concrete activities of actual scientists become the conceptually central element. From this to 
epistemological pluralism the step is indeed very small. It is a matter of fact that various 
sciences have different explanatory mechanisms, different techniques, different concerns and 
different ways of proceeding. What we shall highlight in this section is how Sorel turns this de 
facto plurality into an epistemological principle of pluralism. We shall also examine some of 
the political ramifications of this commitment to pluralism, showing how Sorel tends to 
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connect philosophical monism to political centralism and statism, and how he opposes to this 
political and philosophical tradition a liberalism based on pluralism and on limited 
government. 
1.3.1 PLURALISM AND FRENCH LIBERALISM 
Towards the end of ‘De la cause en physique’, Sorel warns against the illegitimate extension 
of the conclusions he has reached: such conclusions pertain to the domain of physics and 
should be considered valid only there. The temptation of unifying all different types of human 
enquiry under a single conceptual apparatus or explanatory mode is for Sorel a dangerous one, 
and amounts to, he writes, ‘certainly a very coarse error.’ 48 Determinism is a good example of 
the folly of this attempt at unification. The theory would be unassailable if everything could 
be reduced to space, time and mass. But since these concepts are insufficient even in the 
domain of physics, how can one justify their extension to other fields of enquiry such as 
biology or morality? The unification suggested by the determinists would do damage, for 
Sorel, both to the natural sciences, since it would reduce the precision of their language, and 
to the moral ones. Now, it is true that the moral sciences have been slower to develop than the 
natural ones: ‘for a long time the human spirit has been left without guidance on this issue: 
one thought it possible to formulate, in the philosophy of history or of right, classifications of 
an absolute character.’ 49 Auguste Comte’s law of the three stages of history is given by Sorel 
as an example of these arbitrary and unscientific categories of the moral sciences. And yet, ‘as 
the moral sciences progress, they tend to affirm their independence. The more rigorous their 
methods become, the more they move away from physics’.50 
The illusion of unification, an error propagated by people ‘not well versed in the critique of 
knowledge’51, supposes mistakenly that a few concepts are capable of explaining the near 
totality of observable phenomena. This, for Sorel, is the opposite of the truth: the scientific 
world is constituted by a plurality of explanatory modes and this makes unification, as well as 
any type of reductionism to a single explanatory principle, impossible. Of course, what Sorel 
has in mind as his target is, much like Dunan, determinism. More precisely, the mechanistic 
worldview according to which all phenomena, if duly analysed, will eventually be explainable 
in terms of matter and motion. Nevertheless, this pluralist epistemology is not a mere ad hoc 
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argument against determinism but, as we are about to see, an important aspect of Sorel’s 
epistemological outlook. 
In the year after the publication of ‘De la cause en physique’ Sorel gives to the press his first 
two book-length studies, the Contribution and the Procès de Socrate. As we have stated in our 
introduction, both are historical works animated by present-centred concerns about popular 
education and, in the case of the Procès, the dangers of certain types of public thinking.  If we 
take this latter book, these concerns are evident from the beginning. Sorel makes a striking, 
and very interesting, comparison between the Socratic political ideal and the first protestant 
communities, Calvinists in particular: both mask their political impotence with appeals to 
freedom of expression, but, when given the chance to govern, they prove to be ruthless in the 
repression of dissent. Why is this the case? Because the ‘Socratic state’ writes Sorel ‘ is 
ecclesiastical… The citizen can only aspire to one type of liberty, the liberty of the good.’52 
For Sorel, the Socratic – though one might wonder whether Platonic is not a better adjective – 
political ideal consists in ‘the state transformed into a church, public force at the disposal of 
sects… with such an organisation everything in the cities would tend towards the good, as 
understood by the leaders. “Fraternity or death!” shouted the madmen [les hallucinés] of 
[17]93.’ 53  
It is not unwise to label political thinkers in terms of their fears, and such a strong fear of the 
state gives us an image of Sorel as a French liberal, worried by the development of a strong 
centralized authority. Sorel’s worry for the totalitarian tendencies of the ‘Socratic’ state in 
which the purpose of public authority is a perfectionist pursuit of the good is partly 
occasioned by current political affairs. A few years before the publication of the Procès, in 
1881 and 1882, Jules Ferry had developed his laws on public education, effectively instituting 
a free, compulsory and secular system of national education. ‘The country’ comments Sorel 
drawing unsubtle parallels between Ferry and Socrates ‘launches itself into a risky 
[redoutable] experience.’54 Sorel expresses concerns and reservations on the outcome of this 
educational programme, hoping only that the natural instability of democratic government 
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will prevent the state from oppressing individual consciences: if this were to happen, ‘France 
would become a branch of the old missions in Paraguay, a truly Socratic state.’ 55 
Sorel’s hostility towards Socrates and his characterization of the Socratic state are of some 
interest. They are the first noteworthy expressions of a typical Sorelian attitude directed 
against the illusory certainties of philosophical schools and the dangerous consequences they 
produce when politically armed. This argumentative strategy, often hastily classified as mere 
anti-intellectualism, will recur when a more famous Sorel, in the opening years of the new 
century, will attack the theoretical bases of parliamentary socialism, and thus deserves some 
attention. What needs to be highlighted is the connection between the philosophical, 
speculative level and the political one: what makes an ‘ecclesiastical’ state possible are the 
certainties offered by a certain kind of philosophical thought. Sorel’s critique then moves at 
two levels: a political one, in which the risks of this style of government are highlighted, and a 
philosophical one, in which the impossibility of a comprehensive grasp of reality is shown.  
1.3.2 THE THEORY OF THE AUTONOMY OF CAUSES 
It is this second line of reasoning, given the epistemological focus of the chapter that interests 
us here. At the end of the Procès, Sorel adds a short but important appendix, entitled ‘The 
theory of causes’, in which he comes back, after ‘De la cause en physique’, to the issue of 
scientific method. In a letter to Paul Tannery, reviewer of the book for the Revue 
Philosophique, Sorel mentions the appendix by admitting implicitly that the ideas voiced in 
the short text are his own ones: ‘I am not sure whether I lent to Socrates too many of my own 
ideas, but I believe they are Socratic, since it was Aristotle and Socrates who suggested them 
to me.’ 56 As in the article on causation, Sorel displays an equal distaste for deterministic 
accounts of nature and from the opposing errors: in this case, teleological cosmologies, i.e. 
explanations of the universe in terms of final causation. Commenting on a passage by Paul 
Janet in which the author praises the cunning of nature explaining that ‘having created the 
eyes, it proceeded to create light, having created ears, it created sound’57, Sorel writes: ‘Mr 
Janet thinks his readers to be people of the middle ages.’58 He proceeds to categorically state 
that, whereas for Socrates teleology was ‘a natural error’, ‘all modern teleological theories are 
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based on confusions which, in this day and age, are inadmissible.’59 Given Sorel’s reputation 
as an irrationalist preoccupied with articulating the reasons of the heart against the coldness of 
reason, it is important to emphasize the tone with which he condemns teleology, which he 
clearly sees as a consolatory strategy against the soullessness of determinism: 
‘Teleologists allow themselves to be guided by feeling, but we don’t admit feeling 
neither in the natural sciences, nor in morality, nor in law. Sentimentalism is a 
product of frenzy, a fantasy, the mover of anaemic and enervated souls. There still 
are intelligent people who imagine that the heart can suggest solutions to the jaded 
rationalist… We will never tire of protesting against such dangerous doctrines that 
reveal in their supporters either a profound hypocrisy or brain damage. And yet, 
we must ask ourselves what is the origin and cause of the vitality of these 
mythological conceptions.’ 60 
Beyond the scathing, but noteworthy, tone, the crucial point comes with the last sentence. For 
all the outlandishness of teleological cosmologies and their roots in sentimentalism, there is a 
rationale to their success, which Sorel identifies with the unappealing materialist alternative to 
teleology. People embrace teleological cosmologies for ‘fear of falling into materialism, as 
they imagine there can only be two types of causality, a first one according to the principles of 
mechanics, and a second one based on the model of a free agent.’ 61  The repulsion felt 
towards the mechanistic paradigm, he adds, is understandable. But, and here is the crucial 
step, there are many types of causality: one proper to the study of biological phenomena, one 
suited to the study of moral ones, and so on: ‘Teleologists clumsily confuse all these different 
causes; science must distinguish and define them rigorously.’ 62 
We had seen how Sorel had concluded ‘De la cause en physique’ warning against the 
extension of his conclusions to fields of enquiry other than physics. Here, he is developing the 
same point. Sorel’s attack, it is worth spelling it out, is not directed against final or efficient 
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causation in themselves. Instead, his targets are the cosmologies, i.e. total explanations of the 
universe, erected uniquely on these explanatory modes, that is to say teleology and 
mechanicism. What Sorel is arguing against is, in other words, what we may call 
epistemological monism, and the attempt to ground the whole of science in a single 
explanatory principle, a single ‘type of causality’ to use Sorel’s vocabulary. By contrast, 
Sorel’s stance is a pluralist one in which different explanatory principles, different ‘causes’ fit 
to different types of phenomena and scientific fields. 
To explain the universe in terms of final causation is mistaken and inappropriate: but this does 
not destroy the explanatory power of final causation. Its true domain, tells us Sorel, lies in the 
field of human production, for ‘it is in the works of human industry that final causation 
appears in all its clarity.’63 The explanation, for example, of a work of art or architecture must 
take into account the way in which the author reached or failed to read his goals. No account 
of a human production can be complete without a reference to the author and his intentions, 
and thus the study of human production ought to adopt the language of final causation and 
purposive action. The emphasis put on this question of production is important, not only 
because it helps in accounting Sorel’s later embracement of socialism, but also because, as we 
shall see in the next chapter, it is an important anticipation of his reflection on social 
science. 64  At any rate, the point to keep in mind here concerns pluralism: to different 
phenomena correspond different explanatory modes.  
This pluralist principle, which Sorel baptizes the principle of the ‘autonomy of causes’ is 
central to his conception of scientific activity.65 This centrality derives from the fact that 
pluralism follows naturally from the desire to put scientific practice at the centre of 
epistemology. By looking at the practice of science, we realize its plurality, and thus must 
enshrine this plurality in our epistemology. As he unambiguously writes: 
‘We believe that the study of different methods brings us to recognize that causes 
are divided in as many classes as there are scientific classes, and that they cannot be 
brought back to a common principle. Without this great law, all science would 
become impossible… The platonic method is anti-scientific. Ancient philosophy, 
with its fixation for unity and deduction, did great damage to the progress of human 
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knowledge [in the plural in French, connaissances humaines]. To create science, 
one must break up the monist conception and establish the distinction of causes’66 
 
1.4 HISTORY AS EPISTEMOLOGICAL ARGUMENTATION: SOREL IN THE 
ANNALES DE PHILOSOPHIE CHRÉTIENNE 
 
A second and more important consequence of the principle of the priority of practice is the 
historicization of science that it implies. It is in 1892, in a series of three articles published in 
the Catholic Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne, that Sorel begins to develop the historicist 
implications of his epistemological preferences. The articles consist in a series of attacks on 
what are, given both Sorel’s previous writings and the editorial line of the publication, 
predictable enemies: mechanicism, atomism, and Cartesianism, all intellectual strongholds of 
the determinist worldview. What is most interesting about the articles in the Annales de 
Philosophie Chrétienne is however the argumentative strategy employed by Sorel. Rather 
than attacking the tenets of atomism or Cartesianism, Sorel argues historically, showing their 
scientific sterility and their marginality in past and contemporary scientific practice. The 
history of science, in other words, is used as a legitimate form of epistemological 
argumentation. 
This reflection on the history of science is of course connected to Sorel’s choice to 
reconceptualise the epistemological problem: if science is a practice, the history of this 
practice becomes a relevant argumentation for or against a given position. It is in the last of 
the three articles in the Annales that Sorel develops this point more thoroughly and illustrates 
it most clearly, in the context of a discussion on non-Euclidean geometries. Arguing against 
conventionalism, Sorel develops an embryonic conception of science as an historical activity 
in which the role of tradition is paramount, and in which nobody ever starts from scratch, but, 
through successive generations, contributes to the intellectual enterprise. Once more, Sorel 
shies away from addressing directly the question of freedom. Nevertheless, this exploration of 
the historicist implications of his epistemology of practice represents an important maturation 
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of Sorel’s thought, because it helps him in focusing on the human, artificial element of 
scientific activity. Arguing that the conceptual apparatus of any given science is essentially 
historical is a step in the direction of saying that it is something essentially different from a 
natural phenomenon. 
Sorel contributing to a Catholic publication the year before his public conversion to Marxism 
might seem odd, and could appear as revealing of a personality whose path through life 
proceeds by ruptures. This impression is strengthened by pointing out that in the early 1890s 
the Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne were not the modernist publication that they became 
when, in 1905, Lucien Laberthonnière took over their direction. When Sorel wrote in the 
Annales, the editorial line consisted in a more canonical Thomism, the review was directed by 
the Abbé Joseph Guieu, Parisian tutor of a young Charles Maurras and, according to Philippe 
Boutry, an ‘intransigent priest’.67 A number of elements can however help us in tempering 
this judgement. Sorel’s social extraction, let us not forget, is Catholic and bourgeois, and, 
equally importantly, in the early 1890s he is a newcomer to Paris. He had, of course, studied 
in the French capital while at the École Polytechnique, but, in 1892, he had abandoned the 
military world in which he had made his career. Thus, it is not surprising to see him – a new 
arrival in Paris – in contact with people from the Catholic milieu. Moreover, intellectually,  
Sorel’s proximity to the thinking of the Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne is less puzzling 
than might seem. Sorel’s attempt to argue against the mechanistic cosmology could only earn 
him the sympathy of the clerical intelligentsia, and his choice to do this through the use of an 
Aristotelian language could not but find a good reception amongst the Thomists of the 
Annales. The presence of common intellectual enemies makes the short but important 
collaboration between Sorel and the journal less of an enigma than at first might appear. 
1.4.1 AGAINST ATOMISM 
Sorel’s first article in the Annales is, indeed, dedicated to an attack on one of these common 
enemies: atomism. The hostility towards atomism is dictated by the importance of this theory 
to any mechanistic cosmology, i.e. the attempt of explaining the universe in terms of 
interaction of particles. We see here at work the same dynamic animating the article on 
causation. Atomism and the mechanistic cosmology are attacked not because of their 
disenchanting features, not because they cheapen and distort what Dunan called the ‘real 
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infinity of nature’, but in virtue of their small scientific value. Coherently with his principle of 
the priority of practice, Sorel argues that the poverty of atomism can only be shown by 
demonstrating the redundancy, or sterility, of its presuppositions to the actual practice of 
science. In Sorel’s words, ‘we want to know whether the materialist hypothesis is on a par 
with modern science. We hope to show that it is not…that, far from being a result of scientific 
enquiry, it is but old baggage, and that it is high time that we got rid of these impedimenta.’ 68 
Thus, arguing against atomism – or any scientific theory – means showing how its ideas are 
unnecessary in contemporary scientific practice. Epistemological critique can only consist in 
an examination of scientific practice. 
The argument against atomism develops amongst the following general lines. The advantage 
of atomism is that it appears to promise a completely mechanical explanation of phenomena: 
if atomism is correct, and is applied thoroughly, it should allow us to reduce all science to 
kinetics, the interaction of physical particles, as well as to proceed to a redescription of all 
phenomena in terms of these particles. It is, however, one thing to postulate a general 
hypothesis, another one to base on it a properly scientific study of phenomena. The second 
instance is, in the case of atomism, rare for Sorel, suggesting that atomism in fact displays a 
certain scientific sterility. The crux of the argument comes when we look at scientific theories 
based on the atomist hypothesis, such as Clausius’ atomic theory of gases. If, argues Sorel, we 
look at what his theory actually consists in, we shall see that instead of a mechanistic 
explanation, we end up with a probabilistic one. The impossibility of calculating the 
trajectories of atomic particles forces us to recur to probabilistic averages. ‘Atomism 
promised to reveal to us the secret of the mechanism through which a body changes from A to 
B; it doesn’t keep its promise: it throws a cloth on the object at the moment of transformation; 
when the cloth is taken away, by a sleight of hand, B appears.’69 
In the article on causation Sorel had greatly insisted on the importance of concepts in the 
practice of science, placing Aristotelian ‘schemes’ at the centre of scientific activity. He 
returns to this question in the article on atomism, refining his thought on the issue. He 
                                                 
68 Georges Sorel, ‘Les fondements scientifiques de l’atomisme (1)’, Annales de philosophie chrétienne, XXV, 
1892, p. 584. ‘…nous voulons savoir si l’hypothèse matérialiste est à la hauteur de la connaissance moderne. 
Nous espérons démontrer qu’il n’en est pas ainsi…. Que, loin d’être le résultat de la science, elle n’est qu’un 
vieux bagage, et qu’il est grand temps de se débarrasser de ces impedimenta.’  
69
 Georges Sorel, ‘Les fondements scientifiques de l’atomisme (2)’, Annales de philosophie chrétienne XXVI, 
1892, p. 21. ‘L’atomisme nous promettait de nous livrer le secret du mécanisme par lequel un corps passe de A 
en B ; il ne tient pas sa promesse : on jette un voile sur le corps au moment de la transformation ; quand on retire 
le voile, il s’est fait un tour de passe-passe, et B apparaît.’ 
 76 
abandons the unitary Aristotelian concept of ‘scheme’ and replaces it with a distinction 
between two types of concepts through which we conduce scientific research, representations 
and hypotheses. Representations are characterized in the following way. They are, naturally 
enough, systematizations of empirical observations. Yet, in spite of their somewhat 
misleading name their purpose is not that of mirroring, of presenting in a faithful way, said 
observations. Instead, their purpose is that of systematizing them in such a way that they can 
be connected to other observations in a mathematical, geometrical, or other kind of model. 
Thus, when Coulomb conceptualizes electricity in terms of fluids, ‘no one considers this 
construction as having the appearance of reality.’70 Representations are put in the service of 
‘practical needs’71 Sorel tells us. But these practical needs are, in fact, intellectual ones typical 
of scientists. Representations ‘allow the discovery of relations… which would have been 
difficult to discover through direct observations, in virtue of their complexity.’72 Thus, the 
‘practical’ criterion by which scientists judge the worth of representations is their scientific 
fertility, the possibilities they open up for the discovery of new facts and relations. They are 
thus artificial, non-empirical, non-representational elements of scientific thinking: ‘a purely 
logical artefact, without any pretension to explain anything, a linguistic device… without 
which it would be impossible to pursue our mathematical investigations.’73 
Hypotheses, such as that of atomism, too have a certain practical value: they classify, choose 
which forces are to be considered as fundamental, and so on. Unlike representations however, 
they are of greater generality, as they aim at encompassing a larger number of elements. More 
importantly however, they possess greater epistemological ambitions, as they aim at 
representing some actual aspect of reality: though science might arrive at their verification 
only after decades and decades of work, they are, unlike representations, susceptible of being 
proclaimed true or false in the traditional sense. An hypothesis is given, writes Sorel, ‘as 
having a real value’.74 Or, in the words of J.S. Mill, quoted in Sorel’s article, it is ‘a condition 
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of a genuinely scientific hypothesis, that it be not destined always to remain an hypothesis, 
but be of such a nature as to be either proved or disproved…’ 75 
It is worth underlining this distinction between hypotheses and representations not only 
because it shows Sorel’s continued concern for the problem of the conceptual apparatus of 
any scientific discipline, but also because it shows his commitment to believing that sciences 
ultimately must make substantial claims about the natural world. We shall, at the end of this 
section, have a further and stronger confirmation of this. But for now, the fact that Sorel 
writes about hypotheses as falsifiable claims should serve as a reminder that despite his 
interest in the non-empirical elements of scientific activity, he is far from being a 
conventionalist. Beyond this, the article brings little innovation and shows, on the contrary, 
great adherence to the epistemological positions previously developed. The argumentative 
strategy is straightforward: given that scientific practice precedes epistemological critique, the 
only argument against atomism can be to show its futility in actual scientific research.76  
1.4.2 AGAINST CARTESIANISM 
This strategy is pursued further in the second article published in the Annales. ‘La physique 
de Descartes’ is an historical demolition of the Descartes’ importance to modern physics. 
Much in the same way in which the attack on atomism was an attack on a mechanistic 
cosmology, the attack on Descartes has as its real target the triumphalist interpretations of 
Descartes as the herald of scientific and philosophical modernity given by contemporary 
commentators. The reference, moreover, is explicit. Through the whole article Sorel refers to 
a little introductory book on Descartes written by the philosopher Alfred Fouillée. 77 
According to Fouillée, Descartes is to praise for having liberated scientific thinking from 
scholastic and Aristotelian categories, from the ‘logic of “quality” and “essence”, rather than 
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that of quantity and phenomena’, the former being for Fouillée an obsolete logic to which 
‘classification appeared as the highest degree of science’.78  
Given Sorel’s Aristotelianism, and given that his understanding of physical causation drew on 
Aristotle’s ideas on formal causation, it is unsurprising that he devotes energy to attacking the 
idea of scientific modernity as based on a complete Cartesian break with old Aristotelian 
categories. As with the previous article, the strategy is that of showing how Cartesian 
assumptions, far from being the bases of modern science are unnecessary and, in fact, 
burdensome to scientific activity. He opens sarcastically: ‘Physicists have long stopped 
reading Descartes… One would think that admirers of Descartes would have accepted this 
situation; in all the classical volumes, in fact, there is a careful work of omission of all that 
could give a correct idea of the famous revolution that the master is supposed to have 
accomplished.’79 In other words, Cartesians should be glad that no one remembers Descartes’ 
physics anymore, for it is this oblivion that ensures the enduring reputation of their master. 
Thus, he begins to rescue Descartes’s physics from oblivion in order to attack him. According 
to Fouillée, Descartes had anticipated the wave theory of light. But Sorel, quoting from the 
French physicist Emile Verdet, suggests that Descartes’ conception of light was of an 
incredible scientific sterility, insofar as it considered light as a movement transmitted 
instantly, rather than through successive waves. Did, asks Sorel, Descartes anticipate the 
mechanical theory of heat? Only in a very general and, consequently, virtually meaningless 
way: ‘it is easy to find, in old books, passages in which heat and light are considered and 
movements; this is not a good reason to deny the merits of Huyghens, Young and Fresnel.’80 
Newtonian gravitation ‘is a scandal to Cartesians’81, and the principle of mutual attraction of 
bodies is, suggests Sorel, closer to Aristotelianism and Thomism than to Cartesianism. 
Fouillée praises Descartes for having expelled final causation in terms of divinity from the 
system of physics: ‘As for final causes, Descartes banishes them forever from the temple of 
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physics and natural history.’82 It is easy for Sorel to quote Descartes’ Traité de la lumiére in 
which Descartes writes, in Aristotelian fashion, that ‘Dieu… comme chacun doit savoir, est 
immutable’83 and the Principes de Philosophie in which, justifying the laws of motion, he 
asserts that ‘Dieu ne change jamais sa façon d’agir et… il conserve le monde avec la mesme 
action qu’il l’a créee.’.84 Descartes, points out Sorel, is also an atomist, and atomism is a 
theory deeply at odds with modern science. The list of errors continues for a bit, until Sorel 
suggests that the success of Cartesianism, despite these problems, is due to the fact that 
Descartes ‘writes for society people, and he knows that they prefer approximation to the 
difficult truth of science.’85 
A particularly interesting section of the article appears as Sorel examines Descartes’ opinion 
of Galileo Galilei. Descartes’ judgement on the Italian scientist is critical insofar as, for the 
French, Galilei limits himself to explaining a few experiments: ‘sans avoir consideré les 
premieres causes de la nature, il a seulement cherché les raisons de quelques effets 
particuliers, & ainsy, qu’il a basti sans fondements.’86 Both Sorel and Fouillée judge this 
opinion excessive 87  but Fouilléee, writes Sorel, does not emphasize sufficiently ‘the 
dangerous sophism contained in this sentence.’ 88  Stressing the importance of scientific 
practice, he writes: ‘The history of science offers us too many examples of wide ranging but 
useless and cumbersome systems. They will always find some support, for it is easier to 
speculate generally on the nature of things than to carry on a few good experiments.’89 Sorel’s 
dismissal of the notion of first causes, in a Thomist journal, is interesting. On the one hand, a 
glance at the argument shows that Sorel, rather coherently, is arguing against 
foundationalism: it is problematic for science to enquire upon first causes because, as seen 
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above, it cannot have an unproblematic grounding in reality. Taking an example from a 
contemporary, he cites Henri Poincaré’s ambition of grounding the whole ‘building of 
mathematical physics’ on thermodynamics, and insists that the building metaphor is just that, 
a figure of speech, and that thermodynamics is ‘a cunning interpretation of certain particular 
and well grouped phenomena’ without any ambition of shedding light upon the ‘first causes 
of nature’.90 On the other hand, the rejection of the notion of first causes shows that Sorel 
engages very creatively with the Aristotelian tradition, accepting something and rejecting 
other things. Much in the same way with which he will approach Marxism and pragmatism, 
Sorel essentially utilizes the conceptual apparatus of the Aristotelian tradition to give voice to 
his own intuitions. Put otherwise, Sorel is no Aristotelian nostalgic, but utilizes Aristotelian 
concepts to present new ideas. 
1.4.3 AGAINST CONVENTIONALISM: SOREL AND THE IMPORTANCE OF SCIENTIFIC 
TRADITION 
The final and most important article published by Sorel in the Annales is ‘Deux sophismes sur 
les temps’.91 Despite the title, the article deals only marginally with the philosophical issue of 
time; instead, it tackles issues of philosophy of science in the traditional sense. The starting 
point of Sorel’s reasoning are the implications for physics, and for science in general, of the 
problem of the measurement of time. The first part of the text is dedicated to the examination 
of the ideas of Auguste Calinon92 and Georges Lechalas: both argue, generally speaking, in 
favour of a relative conception of time as a variable necessary to our physical theories, but not  
susceptible of being measured in an absolute manner. Thus there are, in theory, as many times 
as there are relevant movements.93 We might use a Newtonian time for some branches of 
physics and an electric one, i.e. one based on the movement of electricity, for others. ‘The 
measurement of time’ writes Sorel, disapprovingly, of Lechalas’ theory ‘is only an operation 
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carried on for the simplification of human work, an operation with no foundation in the true 
nature of things and that can be modified at will, following the convenience of the moment.’94 
For Sorel, one of the problematic consequences of this relative conception of time is that it 
implies a relativity of force. He also suggests an ideal experiment that would realize a 
completely uniform motion, and thus give us theoretical justification for speaking of an 
absolute time. Despite the difference of opinion, however, he takes Calinon’s – though not 
Lechalas’ – arguments very seriously and accepts that the measurement of time is a 
problematic issue. Nevertheless, as Sorel himself states at the beginning, the interest in ideas 
about time resides not in themselves, but in what they say about current approaches to 
science. The important points are not the arguments, but ‘the study of the reasons that gave 
birth to them.’95 
In the first part of the article Sorel insists on the fact that the relativity of time points towards 
a conventionalist conception of science,96 which sees science as a coherent set of propositions 
without reference to reality. The poignancy of these conceptions owed a lot to the discussion 
of non-Euclidean geometries, a much-debated topic at the time.97 The possibility of a coherent 
non-Euclidean geometry created a number of important philosophical and scientific questions: 
essentially, if such geometries are possible, then Euclidean postulates and axioms appear as 
conventional, though useful and practical, starting points, with no greater grounding in reality 
than their non-Euclidean alternatives. The intuitive preference one accords to the Euclidean 
variant is to be explained in terms of its efficiency in dealing with problems of physics, but its 
epistemic status as descriptive of reality is to be abandoned. In this debate, Sorel has a strong 
opinion to express: science is not a system of useful conventions, but rather the study of 
reality. What interests us, and what makes this article important, is that in his attack on 
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conventionalism he draws the historicist consequences implicit in his principle of the priority 
of practice. 
He observes, to begin with, that conventionalist understandings of geometry and science all 
display a distrust of the epistemic credentials of experience and experiments. As an example, 
Sorel takes the work of François Saléta, an older colleague of Sorel at the Ponts et Chaussées 
and author of works on geometry and the philosophy of science. According to Saléta, 
empirical elements are a necessary evil in science, whose true rational core consists in a 
system of linguistic rules. We may have to rely on experience, conceived in terms of 
subjective impressions, but we enter the realm of science when we understand the importance 
of linguistic rules and their application. 
‘All consideration relative to real things is absolutely to be ruled out. The question 
becomes one of being able to discern and distinguish between judgements, that is, 
combinations of words, in accordance with certain conventional rules from 
judgements incompatible with such rules. This is the whole edifice of deductive 
reasoning.’98 
The conception of geometry championed here ought to be spelt out: postulates are given by 
convention, and the remaining geometrical propositions are simply deduced from these 
conventional givens. Against this view, Sorel comments that ‘those who see in geometry only 
a neat group of propositions, each deduced from the other ones, cannot but accept this 
prodigiously simplifying system.’ 99  If geometrical postulates were purely linguistic 
conventions, i.e. definitions, scientific progress, remarks Sorel, would be impossible. 
Definitions ‘add nothing to everyday knowledge, they only limit the meaning of specific 
words’. 100 In other words, logical games are, by definition one might say, tautological and 
hence, crucially, sterile. They cannot enlarge a body of knowledge. 
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If conventionalism, in its rigorous deductive form, were true, ‘it would be very difficult to 
make [scientific] progress; successive generations would cover the same ground, busy taking 
up the same studies again and again.’101 Instead, ‘geometry can carry on its enterprise only by 
introducing propositions it does not demonstrate, propositions resuming what one learns about 
[geometrical] figures through experience: these propositions are what we call [geometrical] 
postulates.’102 
But, and here comes the decisive point, this experimental origin of geometrical postulates 
does not come from an unproblematic appeal to a universal and unchanging experience, à la 
Comte, but has an historical dimension. The situation of Greek geometry, Sorel tells us, is 
radically different from the one in which modern science finds itself: whereas Greek 
geometers had to recur to their everyday experience of things, when modern science appeals 
to experience it must do this through a scientific tradition, i.e. a series of experimental rules 
and conceptual schemes. To use the classical expression, modern science stands on the 
shoulder of giants. The first Greek scientists ‘saw each science as having its own existence, 
working on determinate data, borrowed from the general knowledge of real things.’103 Thus, 
the concepts which, say, Euclid utilizes, ‘have a reality known to all of his readers and possess 
properties which are easy to grasp…’104 The situation of modern science is radically different: 
its starting points are not rooted in an everyday experience of things, but are the points of 
arrival of the scientific activity of previous generations. The result of a slow and laborious 
process of research is presented to the new generations under the guise of postulates: ‘students 
understand rapidly, thanks to well-chosen examples, the notions taught to them, and 
postulates are accepted unproblematically if one shows clearly their precise meaning through 
some of their most basic applications.’105 It is in this way that science progresses, and ‘it is 
surprising to see with what eagerness the theorem of the conservation of energy is accepted 
[by the new generation] as being more or less self-evident.’106 Once new discoveries have 
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become part of the body of current scientific knowledge, it is easy to see them as conventional 
starting points, originating in the obvious and self-evident observation of reality. But this, 
argues Sorel, is a mistake. Sciences hides under logical constructions the experimental origins 
of their concepts, but this ‘dissimulation’ is, for him, contrary to the principles of [scientific] 
method’107 
The introduction of this historical conception of science in Sorel’s epistemology108 fits rather 
well with the general approach outlined at the beginning of the chapter, namely that of 
treating science as a human activity. What it does is give scientific and epistemic traditions a 
decisive role in adjudicating the legitimacy of scientific claims. Science, thus, is an 
experimental practice with a history and a tradition, without which its progresses would 
become an unexplainable mystery. ‘Unfortunately’ he writes ‘very few people understand the 
importance of tradition in science; since Descartes, everybody imagines themselves able to 
reconstruct, through his own forces, the whole edifice of human knowledge’.109 But scientists, 
he goes on, do not follow Cartesian rules of enquiry: 
‘they do not deny anything, they do not know methodical doubt, they know they 
would be powerless if they neglected the works of their predecessors. Instead of 
rejecting all tradition in order to arrive at the clear and distinct ideas in him, the 
observer has little taste for innovations and a bold confidence in his conceptions.’110 
Far from having revolutionary traits, the introduction of new theories is a slow work of 
accommodation of novelty into an accepted body of knowledge. ‘Once a new theory is ripe 
enough to be taught [i.e. ripe enough to reach the crucial moment of transmission to the new 
generations]… it fits so well with body of received doctrines that sometimes one wonders 
where the novelty is.’111  Ignorance of the dynamic of scientific progress thus conceived 
produces a Cartesian impatience to tear the whole construction of science down, and to start 
anew: an urge which, for Sorel, reveals limited familiarity with the  concreteness of scientific 
research.  
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1.5 THE ANCIENNE ET NOUVELLE MÉTAPHYSIQUE 
In order to complete our portrait of Sorel’s early epistemology it is necessary to jump ahead a 
couple of years and devote some space to a long article entitled ‘L’ancienne et la nouvelle 
métaphysique’. 112  The article appears in the newly established Marxist journal the Ère 
nouvelle, a publication that, in spite of its short existence113, Pierre Andreu calls ‘perhaps the 
first’ Marxist journal in France. 114 Nevertheless, the focus of this section will not be on the 
Marxist references. Instead, we shall treat the text as an attempt by Sorel to systematize his 
own epistemological work from 1888 until 1894. This is not only a choice of focus, but also a 
claim on what really matters in the text. The Marxist references in the ‘Ancienne et Nouvelle 
Métaphysique’ are as scarce as they are superficial. There is, it is true, a certain concepual 
affinitiy with a generally Marxist outlook. But the claim here is that these ideas, specifically 
those on the importance of what Sorel calls the ‘artificial milieu’ to scientific activity are not 
innovations derived by a reading of Marx, but the development of older Sorelian intuitions. 
It is in this long and complex text that Sorel tries to reap the fruits of his previous engagement 
with the epistemological problem. A work of systematization, the text threads much old 
ground. Nevertheless, it contains some important developments. To start with, Sorel further 
elaborates his ideas on the origin of the conceptual tools indispensable to scientific activity. 
We have seen how he had argued that they originate in scientific traditions, and he now goes a 
step further by suggesting that they originate in a wider historical context, in what he calls, 
rather generally, an ‘artificial milieu’. Thus, scientific concepts arise out of a host of human 
activities. They have, however, a precise function, which is that of allowing the scientist to 
enquire experimentally. They are indispensable tools whose unique purpose is that of 
allowing a direct confrontation with nature. The idea is that humanly constructed conceptual 
tools are indispensable to enquire scientifically upon nature, and to discover the deterministic 
laws that regulate its functioning.  
A second important aspect lies in the fact that Sorel here finally engages directly with the 
decisive issue of freedom and determinism. Through an engagement with Bergson’s Essai sur 
les données immédiates de la conscience, Sorel dismisses the idea of freedom as a state of 
exception from the determinism of nature, and develops a theory of freedom as creative 
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agency. This choice must be seen as the only possibility for safeguarding the possibility of 
freedom without destroying the natural determinism on which Sorel still bases the claims of 
science. If freedom is not an exception to determinism, then the experimental practice of 
science can claim to discover the causal laws that regulate nature. This solution, of course, 
establishes a distinction between a deterministic world of nature and a human world in which 
this determinism is absent. As we shall see more thoroughly in the following chapter, this 
distinction becomes immensely problematic for questions of social science. But for the time 
being, it allows Sorel to develop a solid theory of science as a human experimental practice 
without negating freedom. In fact, the historically constructed tools which are indispensable 
to science are an instance of the creative agency that characterizes human freedom. 
For analytical reasons as well as for the sake of clarity, the text can be divided into roughly 
three parts. In the first one, Sorel examines the reasons as to why contemporary culture cannot 
come up with a satisfying conception of science. He points his finger at the twin evils of a 
science that has given up its truth-finding ambitions, and rests content with justifying itself in 
terms of its ability to solve practical problems,115 and at an excessively abstract philosophical 
thought that has abandoned the terrain of scientific experience and has become unable to 
speak of it. 116 The way out of this situation consists in reclaiming the terrain of scientific 
experience, and examining the role, function and origins of what he calls ‘expressive 
supports’: the conceptual tools developed and used by scientists. In the second part, Sorel 
engages with the problem of freedom and develops, closely following Bergson, his theory of 
freedom as activity. Free will, on this view, becomes a special kind of determination, one 
springing from the depths of the individual subject. In the final part, Sorel develops his 
conception of science as an historical and collective activity. This allows him to outline a 
conception of science that is epistemically ambitious and at the same time not only 
compatible with, but an instance of human freedom.  
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1.5.1 BETWEEN EMPIRICISM AND METAPHYSICS: SOREL’S THEORY OF EXPRESSIVE 
SUPPORTS 
The work opens with an all-too-familiar tirade against the impotence of traditional 
metaphysics, accused by Sorel of having become a science of nothingness where the arbitrary 
speculations of philosophers can develop unimpeded. Sorel’s synthetic analysis of the 
troubles of contemporary philosophy sets up very well the context within which his own 
arguments move: 
‘Metaphysicians have attracted disdain on themselves through their bizarre 
pretentions to judge and direct natural sciences without having studied them; 
nowadays, they seem to have understood that their kingdom is not of this world, 
and they study the moral space: there, they find no resistance and their fancies can 
develop in the emptiness. But there is a real metaphysics, impossible to ignore if 
one wants to tackle correctly scientific problems and give to them true solutions’117 
What Sorel presents here is a fracture between philosophical thought and scientific practice, a 
fracture that he will attempt to solve. Abstract and a priori ways of philosophizing have 
rendered philosophy incapable of speaking of science. Science thus has been abandoned to 
either simplistic or excessively modest understandings of it, while philosophy has retreated 
into the irrelevance of a moral world with little relation to reality.118 This creates on the one 
hand what Sorel calls ‘idealism’, an abstract philosophy incapable of dealing with concrete 
problems as it ignores the philosophical importance of practice, while on the other, either 
staunch and scientifically-naïve positivism that supposes that scientific activity is an 
unproblematic discovery and representation of the structures of nature, or, more commonly 
and possessing greater sophistication, a modest conception of science as a problem-solving 
activity unwilling or incapable of making substantial claims about nature. Thus, the purpose 
of the ‘real metaphysics’ cannot but be the overcoming of this unfortunate dualism. 
The first point to establish in order to vindicate the real metaphysics is that science remains 
capable of making serious claims about nature, i.e. that it is not a purely pragmatic activity 
whose justification is the satisfaction of our practical needs. This takes the form of a 
distinction between what Sorel calls ‘la systématique’, and true science. The difference 
between the two is that while the former is an eminently practical form of intellectual activity, 
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arising from concrete problems and having their solution as its goal, science’s aim is that of 
arriving at the knowledge of the fundamental processes governing a given set of phenomena. 
‘… science does not have as its direct objective neither [the] application [of its theses] nor 
prediction.’ 119  These are the concerns of practitioners: they rely on empirical studies, 
traditions, and their activity often requires what Sorel calls a ‘practical sense, which we can 
acquire only through a long and detailed experience of things.’ 120 Now, we have seen how 
Sorel does not deny the important role of tradition in science. But then, what is the point of 
this distinction between science and ‘systématique’? It is to stress that science has a primary 
interest in the understanding of things, whereas practitioners are dominated by the urge to 
predict, control and find solutions to concrete problems: it is, in other words, a vindication of 
the high epistemic ambitions that science ought to entertain. 
The building techniques of the Middle Ages are a form of ‘systématique’, and so too are, at a 
higher level of systematization, the attempts of contemporary social economists to come up 
with supposedly scientific labour legislation. What these economists do, according to Sorel, is 
to observe the situation of labour legislation in various countries, produce empirical studies, 
and finally elaborate prescriptions dictated by the practical goal of achieving social peace. 
This might be illuminating, but it is not a science of economics. As with any form of 
‘systématique’, the application of these recipes for social peace requires a practical sense. 
Unlike in architecture or industry, when it comes to economic legislation, this practical sense 
‘arises mainly under the influence of political, moral, religious and literary prejudices. Often a 
mediocre but popular novel has more effect than the best scientific demonstrations.’121 Again, 
this is not a science of economics: the establishment of such science is the task of socialists 
who, Sorel tells us in an excess of enthusiasm, ‘substitute a vague and half-sentimental 
appreciation with a study of phenomena connected to their structural laws and fundamental 
causes.’ 122 Beyond these deterministic excesses, one can recognise here the familiar Sorelian 
discomfort with the idea of science as a useful tool for solving practical problems and, 
complementarily, the insistence on the importance of science as a truth-finding activity. 
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 Ibid., p. 113. ‘…la science n’a point pour objet direct l’application et la prévision’ 
120
 Ibid., p. 99. ‘… le sens pratique, sense qu’on ne peut acquérir que par une longue et minutieuse expérience 
des choses.’ 
121
 Ibid., p. 105. ‘mais ce sens [pratique] n’a pas la même origine que dans le domaine industriel : il se forme, en 
grande partie, sous l’influence des préjugés politiques, moraux, religieux, littéraires. Souvent un roman 
médiocre, mais bien lancé, a plus d’effet que les meilleures démonstrations scientifiques.’ 
122
 Ibid., p. 113. ‘A une appréciation vague, à demi-sentimentale, ils substituent l’étude des phénomenes 
rapportés à leurs lois structurales et à leurs causes fondamentales.’ 
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If, on the one hand, science must not be confused with the excessively empirical and practical 
‘systématique’, it must, on the other hand, be on its guard against the subjectivist excesses of 
traditional metaphysics. The attack on classical metaphysics reiterates the usual themes: 
metaphysics is governed by subjectivism and has become little more than a science of 
arbitrariness in which anything goes. Though it bears a certain resemblance to ‘systématique’, 
traditional metaphysics is, in fact, far worse: while the former is brought back to earth by the 
practical concerns that define it, ‘metaphysicians erect their systems in the air, and display a 
disdain for experience which allows them to pontificate, for their whole life, about things they 
ignore’.123 The crucial element of Sorel’s critique is, of course, the disdain for experience 
displayed by philosophical thought. This disdain for experience has, for Sorel, a precise 
origin: it is born out of a misunderstanding of the use of conceptual tools – what Sorel here 
calls ‘constructions’ – in scientific activity: 
‘Metaphysicians affirm that it is necessary to construct and, on this, they are 
right; – they argue that science itself does this; from there, they move to the 
conclusion that there is no substantial difference between the supposed realities 
of science and idealist imaginings: in both cases, we are dealing with 
productions of the spirit… The metaphysical illusion rests mainly on an 
insufficient critique of constructions.’124 
As we have underlined repeatedly, Sorel is not confortable with the idea that scientific 
propositions emerge unproblematically from the observation of pure data. Science is armed 
with a vast conceptual repertoire that allows it to construct, from the observation of data, 
scientific theories. The observer is not passive, but employs a host of tools as he engages in 
scientific activity. But this acceptance of the active role of the enquirer cannot lead to 
subjectivist conclusions: though we do need ‘constructions’, we need them in order to be able 
to make claims about the natural world. 
In order to reconcile the necessity for conceptual ‘constructions’ with the objective character 
of science, Sorel ventures into a critical examination of the proper use of ‘constructions’ in 
scientific activity. ‘To establish any kind of reasoning, one needs a construction, which I will 
call an expressive support (geometrical figures, mechanisms, living beings, collective 
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 Ibid., p. 115. ‘Les métaphysiciens construisent en l’air et affichent pour l’expérience un mépris, qui leur 
permet de disserter, toute leur vie, sur des choses dont ils ignorent le premier mot’. 
124
 Ibid., p. 117. ‘Les métaphysiciens affirment qu’il faut construire et ils ont raison, sur ce point ; –  ils 
soutiennent que la science elle-même ne fait pas autre chose ; de là, ils arrivent à conclure qu’il n’y a pas une 
grande distance entre les prétendues réalités scientifiques et les imaginations idéalistes : ce sont dans les deux 
cas des productions de l’esprit… C’est dans le défaut de critique que réside, en grande partie, l’illusion 
métaphysique… ’ 
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bodies)… Logic should be defined as “the set of rules regarding the use of supports in the 
demonstrative process” ’.125 Though Sorel is at times imprecise in clarifying rigorously the 
role of expressive supports in scientific research,126 an element emerges clearly: their status as 
tools of human reasoning for dealing with phenomena and their relations in the attempt to 
establish a scientific body of knowledge. This brings Sorel to a list of the three classical 
mistakes associated with the use of expressive supports. Firstly, we can use a support unfit to 
describe the phenomena under examination: this is the case of, for example, teleological 
cosmologies. These cosmologies use a support fit for the study of human production and 
apply it to the study of the universe.127 Secondly, we can use an incomplete support and give 
rise to a large number of conceptual mistakes. Finally, and most importantly, we can 
‘substitute supports for things, and confer to them an objective reality, thus going beyond the 
purpose for which they were conceived.’128 
This is the most common type of mistake associated with expressive supports. Arguing 
against an unnamed critic, Sorel attacks the idea that ‘scientific socialism will remain an 
illusion as long as it will not equip itself with mathematical formulas’. 129 The error in this 
reasoning lies in mistaking an algebraic support for a reality of things: insurance company 
brokers often develop extremely complex mathematical formulas in their business. They use 
models ‘necessitating an important analytical apparatus’130. And yet no one would claim that 
theirs is ‘a science of human longevity’.131  Mathematical supports are tools to deal with 
reality: they ‘contain nothing in themselves, and can only provide us with what we have 
already put in them’.132 The confusion between states of affairs and the mathematical supports 
used to express them is an issue on which Sorel insists quite a bit. When this confusion 
between supports and realities occurs: 
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 Ibid. ‘Pour établir un raisonnement quelconque, il faut disposer d’une construction, que j’appellerai le support 
expressif (figures géométriques, mécanismes, êtres vivants, corps collectifs)… La logique devrait se définir 
« l’ensemble des règles pour l’emploi des supports dans le processus démonstratif ».’ 
126
 At times, such as in pages 141-143, he speaks of their utility in terms of fertility, i.e. the number of 
possibilities they open up, while other times he values clarity and their power of systematization as the decisive 
criteria. 
127Ibid., pp. 129-30. 
128
 Ibid., p. 131. ‘On substitue les supports aux choses et on leur donne une réalité objective, dépassant l’usage 
pour lequel ils ont été construits. 
129
 Ibid., p. 121. 
130
 Ibid. 
131
 Ibid. 
132
 Ibid., p. 120. ‘…on oublie volontiers que les combinaisons mathématiques ne renferment rien per elles-
mêmes et qu’elles ne peuvent fournir que ce qu’on y a mis.’ 
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‘It is easy to see that here we operate, approximately, like peoples when they 
create mythologies with the help of degenerations of language [maladies du 
langage]; we create new entities by creating new expressions… It is in this sense 
that we can say that one creates a world in his own spirit.’ 133 
The social sciences are not immune from this mistake: one creates an abstract model of 
society with a certain logical coherence and ends up mistaking it for the fundamental structure 
guiding social development. Instead of subordinating supports to the relations between 
phenomena, ‘we consider relations as the consequences of this hypothetical reality [the 
expressive support]’.134 The confusion of supports with realities generates social utopias. The 
fact that their defenders ‘believe they have answered all objections when they have shown 
that things are logically connected’ is indicative of this confusion between support and 
reality.135  
It might be useful here to offer a short recap of the context in which Sorel deploys these 
reflections on the role of expressive supports in order to understand both Sorel’s intentions 
and the force of his arguments. The dominant picture of the world is mechanistic and 
deterministic. If the objects of experience are overwhelmingly described in these terms, the 
space left for other kinds of explanations is greatly reduced. This forces philosophical thought 
to retreat from the terrain of scientific experience and look for other fields for its speculations. 
Thus it happens that, in Sorel’s words, philosophers ‘argue that science has boundaries, 
beyond which the human spirit meets the unknowable, at least in the scientific sense, and that 
our nature is made so that we cannot ignore this superior domain.’ 136 For Sorel it is this 
dynamic that creates the tendency he labels alternatively ‘idealism’ or ‘spiritualism’, and that 
he conceives as a retreat from experience bound to result in philosophical subjectivism. It is 
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 Ibid., p. 144. ‘Il n’est pas difficile de voir que l’on a ainsi opéré, à peu prés, comme font les peuples, quand ils 
créent des mythologies au moyen de maladies du langage ; on fait naître des êtres par le seul fait qu’on produit 
de nouvelles expressions… C’est dans ce sens que l’on peut dire que l’on engendre le monde dans son esprit.’ In 
the footnote to this passage Sorel connects the rise of non-Euclidean geometry to precisely this form of 
fetishism. 
134
 Ibid., p. 149.  ‘…on donne le support comme le fond de la réalité et on considère les rélations comme des 
conséquences de cette réalité hypothétique.’ 
135
 Ibid., p. 151. ‘… ils  [utopians] considèrent comme essentielle la description du support expressif et 
s’imaginent avoir  répondu à toutes les objections, lorsq’ils ont montré que les choses sont logiquement 
enchaînées.’ This type of argumentation, in which Sorel accuses utopians of basing their reasoning on a 
confusion between support and social reality, will recur in Sorel’s syndicalist writings, most notably the 
Reflections on Violence.  
136
 Ibid., p. 152. ‘Les philosophes prétendent que leurs spéculations doivent s’élever au quatrième ciel ; ils 
soutiennent que la science a des bornes, au delà desquelles l’esprit aborde des inconnaissables, au sens 
scientifique – que notre nature est constituée de telle sorte que nous ne pouvons nous désintéresser de ce 
domaine supérieur.’ Remember Dunan’s argument about the necessity of connection with the real infinity of 
nature. 
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noteworthy how Sorel, despite clearly rejecting the deterministic excesses of a materialistic 
cosmology, refuses to limit the scope of philosophical thought to what lies beyond the limits 
of science. The Kantian dualism between scientifically accessible phenomena and rationally 
inaccessible noumena is challenged. 137  The very idea that there can be a sphere of the 
unknowable is for Sorel a metaphysical mistake, the result of a confusion between reality and 
expressive supports. The category of the unknowable arises only when we give ‘pseudo-
physical [para-physique] interpretation of the constructions made to explain things.’138  
What Sorel is arguing is that the epistemological problems typical of Kantianism, problems 
that revolve around the question of what can be scientifically known and what cannot, arise 
when we mistake our conceptual instruments for descriptions of things. In scientific practice, 
i.e., in the concrete activity of knowing things, the epistemological problem of the 
unknowable is never encountered. As he had already done, Sorel recurs to practice in order to 
put forward a radically alternative solution to some problems of the dominant epistemological 
conception. Man’s intellectual life is an activity, and our conceptual tools are generated partly 
through this activity and entirely for this activity. Separating them from it and reasoning on 
them as if they were an independent and primary object of knowledge generates the 
conceptual errors of traditional metaphysics, but these errors can be avoided by remembering 
the instrumental nature of our concepts. In this sense, all conceptualisation is, for Sorel, 
eminently practical – linked to the dynamics and workings of intellectual and scientific 
practice. It is important however not to confuse this with the practical dimensions which 
characterize ‘la systématique’. The latter believes that the only legitimate goal of science is 
the resolution, through approximate solutions, of practical problems of human life. Sorel, as 
has amply been shown in this section, strongly believes in the epistemological legitimacy of a 
quest for truth: his only rejoinder is that this quest is itself a practice, and that this must be 
taken into account if one is to understand it correctly.  
Despite the fact that they can generate confusions and conceptual mistakes, expressive 
supports are, for Sorel, indispensable to scientific activity. Confrontation with experimental 
evidence is always mediated by such supports, and the idea that science operates through a 
direct, unmediated appeal to experimental data is alien to Sorel’s thought. It is this 
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 Sorel, in fact, lauds Aristotle for having suppressed the category of the unknowable altogether, and having 
argued that questions of what might be known beyond scientific experience are meaningless: ‘après le 
connaissable, le néant.’(‘Ancienne et nouvelle métaphysique’, p. 154). 
138
 Ibid., p. 155. ‘Les questions sur l’au-delà de la connaissance scientifique ne sont pas données dans la nature, 
mais résultent de l‘interprétation para-physique des constructions faites pour expliquer les choses.’ 
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fundamental importance given to expressive supports that brings Sorel to further reflection on 
this issue. We have seen how, in his final article in the Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne, 
Sorel had argued that scientific concepts, including geometrical postulates, far from being 
conventional starting points are the inheritance of a scientific tradition. In the ‘Ancienne et 
Nouvelle Métaphysique’ he takes this argument a crucial step further, by arguing that these 
supports not only originate in the history of a given scientific field, but, more radically, that 
they emerge from a more general historical context. It is here that Sorel begins to elaborate on 
what we can call an historical sociology of knowledge. Expressive supports are not arbitrary 
or conventional starting points, but the crystallizations of forms of social life. Hence, ‘one 
must look to where these supports come from; each of them has a history, its authors took it, 
unconsciously, from their environment’.139 
The conceptual horizon of a people, including its scientific concepts, arises from the activities 
that dominate its practical engagement with the world. The predominance of final causation 
and teleological cosmologies amongst the Greeks can be understood only by appreciating the 
central role that building and architecture had in the Greek world. What truly interested the 
Greek mind was ‘The practical end of the work, the harmony of parts and the spirit of the 
artist’. Thus, once Greek civilisation ‘came in full possession of itself, it was established that 
all knowledge of nature was to be conceived in terms of a directing, moving and organising 
intelligence. At this point, the evolution was completed: the physical world was definitively 
built and philosophers could now only disagree about details.’ 140  The general idea is as 
follows: intellectual enquiry is an activity that necessitates a conceptual apparatus, and this 
apparatus has its roots in the activities through which people engage with the natural world. 
Philosophy inherits the conceptual apparatus of the milieu: ‘the clearest and better analysed 
explicative elements are those penetrated by our genius, those which we find in the artificial 
milieu’.141 Here Sorel is anticipating what he will describe in a few pages as ‘the social 
principle of science’, namely the idea that to understand the conceptual apparatus of scientific 
research one must refer to its collective and historical dimension. This intuition is absolutely 
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 Ibid., pp. 164-5. ‘Il faut aussi chercher d’où viennent ces supports: chacun d’eux a une histoire ; les auteurs 
les ont pris dans le milieu, sans se rendre compte exact de ce qu’ils faisaient…’ 
140
 Ibid., p. 160. ‘On se préoccupait de trois choses principales : la fin pratique de l’œuvre, l’heureuse 
ordonnance des parties et le génie de l’artiste… Lorsque la civilisation héllénique [sic] eut acquis une pleine 
possession d’elle-même, on proclama que toute connaissance de la nature devait être ramenée à la définition 
d’une intelligence organisatrice, directrice et motrice. A ce moment, l’évolution était pleinement accomplie : le 
monde physique était, définitivement, construit et les philosophes ne pouvaient plus différer, entre eux, que sur 
les détails.’ 
141
 Ibid., pp. 159-60. ‘…les éléments explicatifs les plus clairs, les mieux analysés, sont ceux que nous avons 
pénétrés de notre génie, ceux que nous trouvons dans le milieu artificiel…’ 
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crucial to Sorel’s thought, for it constitutes an anticipation of the more historicist direction in 
which his thought will eventually evolve. What needs to be underlined here is how it 
originates in the context of an epistemological reflection. 
1.5.2 SOREL AND BERGSON ON FREEDOM 
Having established the importance of the ‘artificial milieu’, i.e. the general social and 
historical conditions, in furnishing not only science but also philosophy with its conceptual 
apparatus, Sorel moves on, in a somewhat tortuous manner, to a criticism of the central 
concept on which he believes the contemporary intellectual enterprise to be based: that of the 
individual subject, ‘le moi’. The purpose of this critique of the individual subject is that of 
stressing the collective nature of scientific enquiry, much in the same way he had criticised 
the notion of the lonesome Cartesian enquirer in ‘Deux nouveaux sophismes sur le temps’. 
However, what interests us here is the argumentative route taken, for it consists in Sorel’s first 
direct and thorough engagement with the problem of determinism, as well as of a dialogue 
with Bergson’s first work, the Essai sur les données immediates de la conscience. 
The conceptual apparatus through which much modern scientific and philosophical research is 
done is dominated, for Sorel, by the notion of the individual, ‘le moi’. This generates for Sorel 
an unfortunate ‘invasion of emotions in the realm of representations.’ 142 But what does this 
mean? It means that the excessively subjectivist stance through which epistemological 
problems are dealt with is, for Sorel, the cause of many misunderstandings and conceptual 
mistakes. More precisely, these mistakes arise from this ‘invasion of emotions’. To clarify 
this point Sorel goes to the root of the epistemological problem by referring to Bergson’s 
Essai, that he here labels a ‘vigorous tree rising amidst the desolated steppes of contemporary 
philosophy.’ 143  Sorel’s characterization of emotions largely relies on the Bergsonian 
distinction between the immediate data of consciousness and their quantitative, mediated, 
counterparts. Synthetically put, the internal immediacy of subjective consciousness is not 
amenable to measurement and quantitative differentiation; external reality, being mediated, is. 
Let us try to clarify this point by exploring the epistemological stance required by the 
Bergsonian distinction. 
                                                 
142
 Ibid., p. 166. ‘Representations’ here is to be understood in the light of the distinction outlined above in this 
chapter between representation and hypotheses.  
143
 Ibid., pp. 167-8. ‘…ce livre offre un intérêt majeur ; c’est comme un arbre vigoureux qui s’élève au milieu 
des steppes désolées de la philosophie contemporaine.’ 
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Bergson’s epistemological stance is fundamentally one in which the world that we can 
understand and measure through scientific tools is not a given, but rather emerges through a 
confrontation between the subject and external reality. 144  Given the world as perceived 
scientifically is the result of the interplay between the two elements, the subjective and the 
external, the Bergsonian stance, as Sorel is keen to underline, is not a completely subjectivist 
one. 145  The quantitative element indispensable to science, for both Bergson and Sorel, 
emerges from an active and collective engagement with the external world. This is Bergson, 
quoted by Sorel in the ‘Ancienne et Nouvelle Métaphysique’: 
‘As the conditions of social life realize themselves, the current which takes our 
states of consciousness from the inside to the outside gains strength: little by little 
these states become objects or things; they separate not only from each other but 
from ourselves too. At this point, we can only perceive them in the homogenous 
[i.e. measurable and discrete] environment in which we have fixed [figé] their 
image and through a world that lends them its own everyday character. In this way, 
a second self [un second moi] covers of the first one, a [second] self whose 
existence is made of distinct moments, whose states are separated one from the 
other and can be described without effort through words. ’146 
Paraphrasing: as our collective needs grow, as society develops, we increasingly tend to, as it 
were, solidify our fluid impressions – the immediate data of our consciousness – into discrete 
objects and things, until we create the measurable world that science describes. Emotions, to 
come back to Sorel, are what pertains to the internal and undifferentiated world. Incorporating 
them into a scientific study, means making a conceptual mistake, namely failing to understand 
that the world that science can describe must by definition exclude these undifferentiated and 
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 Sorel, it is important to stress, lauds Bergson for conceiving the question of epistemology in an anti-
subjectivist way and conceding that consciousness receives stimuli from the external world. This, however, 
should not be interpreted as a commitment to an epistemology in which the human mind is purely receptive. 
Instead, here Sorel lauds Bergson for refusing the excessively subjectivist solutions to the problem of freedom 
and determinism. The fact that Bergson recognizes that  ‘the external world leaves an imprint on us’ is to be 
understood as a compliment for a philosopher who avoids the retreat from experience which Sorel believes to be 
the main weakness of the philosophical thought of his time. See ibid., p. 168. ‘He [Bergson] recognises that the 
external order leaves an imprint on us’- ‘Il reconnait bien que l’ordre extérieur s’imprime sur nous’. 
145
 In the conclusion to the Données, Bergson writes: ‘ [we can] affirm that the forms applicable to things could 
not possibly be entirely our work; that they must arise out of a compromise between matter and spirit; that if it is 
true that we [perceiving subjects] lend a lot to this matter, we also receive something back…’. Bergson, 
Données, p. 146 [p. 168]. 
146
 Bergson, Données, pp. 91-2 [pp. 103-4], cited, in an abbreviated version and with the words ‘conditions of 
social life’ highlighted, in Sorel, D’Aristote à Marx, p. 169.  ‘Mais à mesure que se réalisent plus complètement 
les conditions de la vie sociale, à mesure aussi s’accentue davantage le courant qui emporte nos états de 
conscience du dedans au dehors : petit à petit ces états se transforment en objets ou en choses ; ils ne se 
détachent pas seulement les uns des autres, mais encore de nous. Nous ne les apercevons plus alors que dans le 
milieu homogène où nous en avons figé l’image et à travers le mot qui leur prête sa banale coloration. Ainsi se 
forme un second moi qui recouvre le premier, un moi dont l’existence a des moments distincts, dont les états se 
détachent les uns des autres et s’expriment sans peine par des mots.’ 
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fluid elements. But what is more significant and should be retained is that the world of 
science, characterised by its measurability and ‘homogeneity’ arises from a certain 
engagement with the world, from a practical and active stance, rather than being either an 
uncomplicated given or a completely subjective creation. It is a form of engagement with a 
reality outside us: it is on this that Bergson and Sorel are in agreement.147 
Sorel continues his engagement with Bergson’s Données, and grapples for the first time 
directly with the problem of freedom and determinism. The connection between the problem 
of freedom and that of science is highlighted explicitly in Sorel’s text: ‘It is clear that, if there 
is liberty, then no knowledge is possible, even in the shape of an empirical study 
[systématique]; all men, being independent, would be a species of their own… and there 
would be no general relation’148 
In order to solve this problem, Sorel makes use of the Bergsonian epistemology. The 
paradoxes linked to free will are another example of the conceptual mistake just outlined in 
the discussion of ‘emotions’. What is a free act? Surely not an act that is taken in the absence 
of determination: it is, following Bergson, an act that expresses our inner self. As we have just 
seen in the long citation from the Données, this self is essentially alien to the discrete 
categories through which we examine the world scientifically. A free act is an act that springs 
from a realm that knows no discrete entities, no causal relationships, but only fluidity and 
immediacy, durée. Thus, it is impossible to try to examine it through categories 
fundamentally alien to it. In short, the attempt to apply to inner states the analytical criteria fit 
for the study of the external world of science generates the paradoxes linked to free action. If 
a free act is an act determined in the depth of our consciousness, it springs from what Sorel 
had previously called ‘emotions’, i.e. parts of the psyche not susceptible to analysis. 
 ‘It is true that [in freely willed acts] determination appears as having no intelligible 
cause, that there appears to be a gap between the examination of the motives and 
the outcome of the act; it is not difficult however that the gap is produced by 
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 According to Sorel, Bergson always borrows his concepts from the realm of representations. He comments by 
saying that ‘it is impossible to do otherwise. We only think with relations borrowed from the physical world.’ 
(Sorel, D’Aristote à Marx, p. 171). Here the word thinking has to be equated with rational enquiry, and the gist 
of the argument is the following: in order to rationally, scientifically, examine a given phenomenon, we must 
conceive of it in a certain measurable way. And this is also why, in short, scientific studies of our interiority, of 
emotions, are an impossibility. 
148
 Sorel, D’Aristote à Marx, pp. 177-8. 
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emotion. We hear that there is the irruption of an indefinable power in the conflict 
between motives: emotion possesses this indefinable character.’ 149 
On this view, free agency is not the absence of determination, but the presence of an internal 
type of determination that is, by definition, impossible to analyse. It is important to underline 
the fact that Sorel refuses to dismiss determinism. The deterministic laws that regulate the 
natural world do not magically disappear inside the human subject; it is only that, here, they 
are impossible to examine rationally. One of the difficulties of this, however, is that the 
depths of the individual self, the locus from where human action springs, is beyond the reach 
of scientific analysis, at least insofar as science understands deterministic causal relations. But 
this question will be explored in the following chapter.150  
This treatment of freedom is of some importance for Sorel, in that it helps him to 
conceptualize the problem of freedom in a way that opens the way to its solution. The 
conception of free agency as undetermined agency is, for Sorel, paradoxical and problematic. 
This Bergsonian treatment of the ‘mystery of free will’151 allows him to change the terms in 
which the problem is set up. Agency is determined, all the time, and certain acts are called 
free because it is impossible for us to examine the factors that determine them, since these 
factors are internal ones that spring from our inner self. Having explained why what we call 
free agency seems to have no apparent determination, Sorel has paid his dues to the problem 
of determinism in its classical guise. This allows him to put forward another conception of 
free agency, one that avoids the paradoxes of indetermination. Using Bergson, Sorel 
essentially dismisses the idea of freedom as indetermination, and can now develop a theory of 
freedom as creative activity. 
1.5.3 FREEDOM AS ACTIVITY: SOREL’S ‘NEW METAPHYSICS’ 
It is indeed in the development of the text that the idea begins to take a more precise shape. 
After having shown the shortcomings of an excessively empirical and pragmatic science –‘la 
systématique’ – and the equally erroneous subjectivist fallacies of classical metaphysics, it is 
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 Ibid., p. 179. ‘Il est bien vrai que la détermination apparaît souvent comme étant sans cause intelligible, qu’il 
semble exister une lacune entre l’examen du motif et l’acte ; mais il n’est pas difficile de voir que cette lacune 
est produite par l’émotion. On nous dit qu’il y a irruption d’une puissance non définissable au milieu du conflit 
des motifs ; c’est qu’en effet l’émotion à bien ce caractère indefini.’ 
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 Sorel notices this and writes, for example, that this places human action outside of the realm of science (p. 
188). Nevertheless, he maintains that while individual motivations might be unamenable to scientific analysis, 
the larger trends of human society are not. Even more radically, science is a  precisely this study of larger, non-
individual trends. Science is the ‘social adaptation of the individual to physical nature. What was personal 
disappears, and only that which is objective and scientific remains.’ (p. 169). More on this in the following 
chapter. 
151
 Ibid., p. 180. 
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time for Sorel to illustrate the tenets of the ‘new metaphysics’. It is here that the 
systematization of which we have spoken before is at its most obvious, since this last part 
consists essentially of repetition and further elaboration of ideas already expressed in previous 
texts. But it is also the part in which, as we are about to see, the intuition of freedom as 
creative activity begins to emerge more clearly. According to the new metaphysics, science is 
a collective engagement with the natural world. In Sorel’s terminology, science is ‘social’ and 
‘industrial’. It is social in the sense that it is collective and historical, and it is industrial in the 
sense that the purpose of the vast array of expressive supports used by scientists is not that of 
creating a logically coherent system, but that of confronting nature experimentally. 
Sorel begins the constructive part of the text by reminding us of his anti-subjectivist stance. ‘I 
consider knowledge in the Greek way: I believe that reality penetrates in us from the outside 
and leaves an impression.’ 152 As should be clear by now, this is not a commitment to an 
epistemology in which the mind is passively receptive, but a way of reclaiming the terrain of 
scientific experience for philosophical thought. It is the necessity for expressive supports 
which rules out the passivity of the enquirer. Far from being the exclusive business of a 
perceiving subject and his sense impressions of an external reality, science requires a socially 
constructed and historically inherited artificial environment. This unavoidable intellectual 
inheritance is constituted by forms of explanations, conceptual divisions, schemes, as well as 
‘the enormous influence exerted by the expressive organism of society, language.’ 153 It is in 
this sense that science is social. Crucially, there is nothing fixed or natural about this artificial 
environment, which is, on the contrary, essentially dynamic and historical: ‘The milieu is 
incessantly reworked, fabricated and cleansed by his [man’s] activity, and any science of man 
which neglects this milieu is an imaginary anthropology.’ 154 To characterise more precisely 
this artificial environment, Sorel essentially re-elaborates the arguments against 
conventionalism he had first expressed a few years before in ‘Deux nouveaux sophismes sur 
le temps’. 
The image of the lonesome scientist coming up with insights of genius is, according to Sorel, 
a very misleading one. It took a great deal of hesitation for Newton to claim the ambitions of 
universality of his own law: in his time, movement was predominantly conceptualized as 
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 Ibid., p. 190. ‘j’ai déjà eu l’occasion de dire, plusieurs fois, que je considérais la connaissance à la manière 
grecque : j’estime que la réalité pénètre en nous de l’extérieur et s’y imprime.’ 
153
 Ibid., p. 193. ‘… l’influence énorme exercée par l’organisme expressif de la société, la langue.’ 
154
 Ibid.‘Le milieu est fabriqué, travaillé, continuellement épuré par son activité er toute science de l’homme qui 
néglige ce milieu est une anthropologie fantaisiste.’ 
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resulting from shock, and attraction at a distance was considered ‘an occult quality bringing 
science back to anthropomorphic mythologies.’ 155  In general, for a scientific doctrine to 
become established, an ‘enormous evolutionary work’ 156  has to be accomplished: the 
reciprocal adaptation of the milieu and the doctrine to each other. While, at the beginning, 
new doctrines are quite alien to a body of science, when they are fully incorporated they 
‘become social’, they ‘blend in such an intimate way with the old that one struggles to 
understand that a discovery has actually taken place: it appears that all that has happened is an 
ordering and a better exposition.’ 157 This is because 
‘…the sage, the inventor, the philosophers are never solitary characters in the 
manner of transcendental geniuses; they operate on materials prepared for a long 
time by a reasoned empiricism, and they work on them using the tools furnished 
by the science of their time. The isolation of the innovator is more apparent than 
real and does not rest on a separation between him and contemporary thought, 
but on the difficulty of introducing into current usage certain new constructions, 
certain new formulas which at the beginning appear obscure but that become 
very simple once one has the habit of using them.’158 
The importance of the social dimension of science brings with it a necessary critique of the 
Caertesian picture of the isolated enquirer, a critique that, as we have seen, is not new for 
Sorel. Having followed Descartes, we imagine ‘that each of us can be the individual judge of 
science… If this were so, there would be no scientific certainty, science would be rebuilt 
everyday in front of us and would be under the yoke of the whims which depend on our 
emotions and interests.’ 159 The point being made here is that science, given its necessity of 
expressive supports, cannot be thought of as an a-historical confrontation between the 
enquirer and empirical evidence. Science has a conceptual apparatus that is historical both in 
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 Ibid., pp. 194-5. ‘l’attraction semblait être une loi occulte ramenant la science aux mythologies 
anthropomorphiques.’ 
156
 Ibid., p. 194. 
157
 Ibid., p. 199. ‘les nouvelles connaissances, une fois devenues sociales, s’unissent d’une manière si intime aux 
anciennes qu’on a peine ensuite à comprendre qu’il y ait eu vraiment une découverte : il semble qu’il y a eu 
seulement arrangement et meilleure exposition.’ 
158
 Ibid., p. 197. ‘En fait, le savant, l’inventeur, le philosophe ne sont jamais solitaires, à la manière des génies 
transcendants ; ils opèrent, en effet, sur une matière préparée de longue main par l’empirisme raisonné er ils la 
travaillent, en utilisant l’outillage que leur fournit la science de leur époque. L’isolement du savant qui innove 
est plus apparent que réel ; il ne repose pas sur une séparation entre lui et la pensée contemporaine, mais sur la 
difficulté de faire entrer dans l’usage  certaines constructions nouvelles, certaines formules qui paraissent, tout 
d’abord, fort obscures, mais qui semblent ensuite très simples, lorsqu’on a pris l’habitude de s’en servir.’ 
159
 Ibid., p. 199. ‘On est si peu habitué à tenir compte du milieu dans les questions scientifiques que l’on 
s’imagine que chacun de nous est juge individuel de la science… S’il n’était ainsi, il n’y aurait aucune certitude 
scientifique et la science se referait chaque jour devant chacun de nous et serait soumise à tous les caprices qui 
dépendent de nos émotions et de nos intérêts.’ 
 100 
that it is inherited from a scientific tradition and in that it results from the society in which a 
given scientific idea develops.  
This insistence on the artificial milieu and expressive supports, conceived both in terms of 
scientific traditions and of a general historical context could make us attribute to Sorel what in 
contemporary analytic philosophy is known as a coherence theory of truth: the idea that the 
truth of beliefs is dependent on the degree to which they fit with an existing system of beliefs. 
More plainly put, the idea that consensus is truth. But this interpretation would be off the 
mark, and not just because Sorel constantly reminds us of his antipathy towards subjectivism, 
and of his preference for what he calls the ‘Greek’ conception of knowledge. More decisively, 
the interpretation would be wrong because Sorel explicitly rejects it. ‘I did not only say that 
science is social; for one could conclude that I give the name of science to a number of 
widespread prejudices held by everyone; I have no intention of going back to the old mistake 
[bêtise] of universal consensus.’160 Science is not merely social, it is also based on what Sorel 
calls here the ‘economic milieu’, so that ‘its certainty is grounded in its industrial origin, or at 
least in its participation in industrial life.’ 161 
The enigmatic expression concerning the ‘industrial origin’ of science fundamentally means 
that expressive supports by themselves are not sufficient, but that the moment of actual 
confrontation with the forces of nature – the experimental moment – is equally decisive, for in 
an experimental setting we can witness the laws of nature at work and thus verify and falsify 
our hypotheses. This experimental moment occurs, of course, in laboratories, but it also 
occurs, on a much wider scale, in the industrial world, which is, according to Sorel ‘an 
immense physics laboratory in which we let natural energies deploy themselves according to 
artificial models.’162  Machines constructed by engineers are ‘devices which put nature to 
experience’. 163  They are expressive supports of a practical and collective type that, by 
engaging with the forces and laws of nature, allow us to see them at work and thus, 
eventually, to understand them. Great inventors ignore the mathematical expressions of laws 
of nature, but ‘they replace this abstract expression with a concrete one: every movement 
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 Ibid., p. 217. ‘…j’ai pas seulement dit que la science était sociale ; car on pourrait conclure que je donne le 
nom de science à certains préjugés répandus dans un pays et acceptés par tout le monde ; je n’entends pas revenir 
à la vieille bêtise du consentement universel.’ 
161
 Ibid. ‘J’ai ajouté que la science était dans le milieu économique, affirmant ainsi que sa certitude est basée sur 
son origine industrielle ou, tout au moins, sa participation à la vie industrielle.’ 
162
 Ibid., p. 205. ‘On peut donc dire que le monde industriel est un immense cabinet de physique où l’on fait agir 
les énergies naturelles suivant des modes artificiels’. 
163
 Ibid., p. 203. ‘…ce sont des appareils mettant la nature en expérience’. 
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produced by a machine, since it derives from a causal law, can be said to express this law 
under a particular form…’164. Thus, ‘To invent a mechanism is to discover a theorem and 
represent it through material means’165. 
The fact that machines enter into direct relation with the forces of nature also explains the 
polemic that Sorel engages with mathematics. Mathematical formulas are, like machines, 
expressive supports but, in light of their abstract nature and their distance from the forces of 
nature, they lend themselves more easily to misinterpretations. When asked about what their 
theorems correspond to, mathematicians, according to Sorel, answer ‘the laws of [the human] 
spirit. But this expression has a meaning only in the doctrine… of the artificial environment. 
External relations create the current paradigm and the current law of the spirit.’ 166 
Mathematical propositions then do not express the structure of the human mind, but are a set 
of conceptual tools whose function is to help us deal with nature in our effort to understand it. 
More radically, given their status of expressive supports, they do not express the laws of an a-
temporal human spirit, but are scientific concepts with their historical origin, much like 
machines have their own history. Mathematics then is an empirical science with its own 
history167, and essentially an accessory of physics. Believing that mathematics was the only 
‘properly constituted science’, Kant concluded that therefore all experience ought to be placed 
‘in a temporal and spatial framework; this conclusion is unassailable. Nowadays we know that 
mathematics is only an auxiliary knowledge… which had as its object the solution of some 
problems of mechanics.’168 
The insistence on the industrial origin of science then serves to remind the reader that, though 
expressive supports are indispensable, they can only serve us experimentally. The moment of 
active engagement with the forces of nature remains unavoidable and industry does on a 
larger scale what laboratories do in a smaller one: it engages experimentally with the forces of 
nature. In this realm, there is a certain objectivity, for things either work or they do not. This 
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 Ibid., p. 207. ‘Quant aux lois naturelles, ils [inventors] n’en connaissent pas l’expression mathématique ; mais 
ils remplacent cette expression abstraite par une expression concrète ; car tout mouvement machinal, produit en 
vertu d’une loi causale, peut être considéré comme exprimant cette loi sous une certaine forme, qui est 
parfaitement déterminée, si l’appareil est bien construit.’ 
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 Ibid., p. 208. ‘Inventer un mécanisme, c’est découvrir un théorème que l’on représente au moyen de 
grandeurs sensibles.’ 
166
 Ibid., pp. 200-1. ‘… ils croient que la dignité de leur science les oblige à lui donner pour principes les lois de 
l’esprit. Mais que faut-il entendre par cette expression, c’est ce qu’il est impossible de comprendre, sauf dans la 
doctrine… du milieu artificiel. Les relations externes créent le cadre actuel et la loi présente de l’esprit.’ 
167
 Of course, this is the same argument expressed in ‘Deux nouveaux sophismes sur le temps’. 
168
 Ibid., pp. 265-6.  
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is why a scientific theory becomes truly established only when it has become applied, because 
the number of successful verifications that industrial application can offer to a theory is 
immensely superior to the one offered by scientific experiments. There are many doubtful 
theories in many sciences, and these are the theories that ‘have been stated only by laboratory 
people and have not penetrated into industrial life.’169  
Highlighting that the sole purpose of expressive supports is that they make possible 
experimental confrontation with nature allows Sorel to safeguard the objectivity of science 
and its ability to make claims about the world. This is a concern that, as we have seen in this 
chapter, animated his epistemological efforts from the beginning. But beyond the objectivity 
that experimental practice conveys to science, the more fertile part of Sorel’s epistemology is 
the theory of expressive supports: a large category in which Sorel includes concepts, 
mathematical representations and industrial machines. What is crucial about expressive 
supports is that they are, quite simply, human creations. They originate in an historical and 
collective ‘artificial environment’, which, though at this time this element is not emphasised, 
is for Sorel the natural habitat of human freedom. Human freedom, to repeat, is not a state of 
exception from the laws of nature but the possibility of creating tools, concepts and 
combinations that have no natural model. In the conclusion to the text Sorel writes 
emphatically that ‘the fundamental condition of our freedom is the existence of the artificial 
milieu’170 This is because this milieu is the result of a collective, at times unconscious, but 
essentially human work. More precisely, in the artificial milieu, ‘We are free in the sense that 
we can construct tools [appareils] that have no model in the cosmic [i.e. natural] environment; 
we do not alter the laws of nature, but we are capable of creating sequences whose ordering is 
our decision’. 171  The thorny problems associated with the notion of freedom as 
indetermination thus are swept away. The question as to whether there might be an sphere of 
human psychology free from natural determinism is replaced by a simpler one: ‘whether 
individuals can exert a social influence’172, i.e. whether the artificial milieu in which all 
human activities develop is susceptible of being altered by human work.  The answer is an 
affirmative one. 
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 Ibid., pp 212-13. ‘Il y a donc, dans les sciences physico-chimiques, des choses douteuses; ce sont celles qui 
sont restées individuelles et j’entends ce mot dans le sens le plus géneral, comprenant par là celles qui n’ont été 
énoncées que par des hommes de laboratoire er n’ont pas pénétrée dans la vie industrielle.’ 
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 Ibid., p. 264. ‘C’est l’existence du milieu artificiel qui est la condition fondamentale de notre liberté’. 
171
 Ibid. Emphasis added. ‘Nous sommes libres en ce sens que nous pouvons construire des appareils qui n’ont 
aucun modèle dans le milieu cosmique; non ne changeons rien aux lois de la nature, mais nous sommes maitres 
de créer des sequences ayant une ordonnance qui nous est propre.’ 
172
 Ibid. 
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1.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have seen how Sorel dealt with two closely connected philosophical 
problems that were central to his generation: the epistemological one about science, and the 
more philosophical one about freedom. Epistemologically, a mood of uncertainty challenged 
philosophers and scientists alike to reconceptualise the activity of science. Philosophically, 
this was seen as an occasion to create space for human freedom – something difficult to 
defend in a determinist and mechanistic world. The representationalist and Kantian terms in 
which the problem was put, as one about the fit of our subjective impressions to the external 
world, greatly helped philosophers in adopting a specific strategy: reducing the epistemic 
ambitions and credentials of science in order to make space for freedom. Science appeared 
more uncertain, the rigid mechanistic world appeared more as human construct capable of 
explaining efficiently certain experiments than as an accurate description of the universe. But 
this Sorel could not accept, for it implied, precisely, that science was uncertain. The slope was 
slippery: it was but one small step from recognising that science makes use of humanly 
constructed conceptual tools to believing that science was arbitrary convention, justifiable 
because of its usefulness, and not because of its truth. A strong conception of science was 
needed, a nuanced one that problematized the claims of science without shattering them and, 
at the same time, one that left space for human freedom.  
Sorel’s solution to the epistemological problem is the conception of science outlined in the 
‘Ancienne et nouvelle métaphysique’: a social, historical, and experimental conception of 
science, whose core is in the interplay between man-made expressive supports and the 
experimental data that they allow us to gather. Expressive supports thus, on the one hand, are 
the proof of the human capacity for invention, and thus of human freedom, while on the other 
they are what allows scientists to deal with the data of observation, to construct experiments, 
and to discover the deterministic laws that regulate the natural world. 
A crucial step in arriving at this conception was the reconceptualization of epistemology as 
the study of a practice rather than as a question of accuracy of representations. Like Sorel, 
Bergson too was trying to explode the dichotomy between a deterministic world of science 
and an unknowable world of freedom. In possession of greater philosophical education, 
Bergson lucidly recognises the Kantian origins of the problem and dedicates much of his 
conclusions to pointing out Kant’s errors.  To recall the initial citation of this chapter, ‘Kant 
chose to place freedom outside of time, and erect an impassable barrier between the world of 
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phenomena, which he delivers in its entirety to our understanding, and the world of things in 
themselves, which he renders inaccessible.’ 173 
The conceptualization of epistemology as the study of a practice necessarily led Sorel to think 
in historical terms about science. Partly this has a polemical origin, as Sorel understood that 
he could argue, historically, against atomism or Cartesianism. Nevertheless, the discovery of 
the historical dimension of expressive supports did not remain confined to purely polemical 
use. The enquiry upon the origins of various kinds of expressive supports made Sorel aware 
of the importance of scientific traditions, and eventually brought him to the conclusion that a 
scientific concept is an historical product much like any other, deriving from a series of 
historically situated activities: Greek architecture, he argued, is responsible for the 
teleological bent of Greek cosmology. Science is a form of human activity that must be 
studied like any other form of human activity, i.e. historically. The historicization of the 
conceptual apparatus of sciences partly allowed him to come up with the conception of 
science outlined above. More importantly for our study, however, it gave to him the idea that 
there is a sphere of human action – the ‘artificial milieu’ – in which tools are created that have 
no model in the natural world. This idea of an artificial environment, the reign of a freedom 
understood as creative activity, long developed through the course of his epistemological 
work, was Sorel’s attempt to safeguard freedom without rejecting a determinism in which he 
still partly believed and that he needed in order to sustain his strong conception of science. To 
preserve human freedom and to safeguard the ability of science to make strong claims about 
the natural world and not to be demoted to the status of a useful convention, Sorel however 
had introduced a difference between the deterministic world of nature, and a human 
environment in which determinism did not hold. 
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 Bergson, Essai, p. 153 [p.176]. ‘…Kant a mieux aimé placer la liberté en dehors du temps, et élever une 
barrière infranchissable entre le monde des phénomènes, qu’il livre tout entier à notre entendement, et celui des 
choses en soi, dont il nous interdit l’entrée.’ 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL SCIENCE (1892-1895) 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In examining the question of freedom and determinism in the ‘Ancienne et nouvelle 
métaphysique’, let us remember, Sorel had clearly ruled out the idea that freedom consists in 
a state of exception from the deterministic laws of nature. Following Bergson, he had argued 
that the indetermination that appears to characterize human agency stems from the fact that a 
free act springs from inner emotive states, and that these are, by definition, not examinable 
through the rational categories through which we understand the natural world. This dismissal 
of the idea of freedom as indetermination should alert us to the importance of determinism in 
the early Sorel’s understanding of science. Despite acknowledging both the importance and 
the historicity of expressive supports in scientific activity, Sorel, until 1895, still held to the 
idea that it was, in the last instance, the determinism of nature that allowed our knowledge of 
it to be scientific knowledge. It is, in other words, determinism that separates most clearly 
‘science’ from ‘la systématique’. Whereas any kind of phenomenon can be subjected to 
empirical organization of data, only deterministic ones can be explained in terms of laws, i.e. 
scientifically. This is why Sorel needed to characterize human freedom in terms of creative 
agency rather than as indetermination: if the causal necessities of the natural world did not 
apply to human agency, the whole edifice of the natural sciences would be endangered.  Thus, 
in the early Sorelian epistemology, though our cognitive access to the deterministic world of 
nature is necessarily mediated by our expressive supports, constructions that are historical and 
that change, science discovers laws, through experiments, because the phenomena it deals 
with are deterministic, i.e. regular and unchanging. 
With this idea of science in mind, it follows that a science of society is only possible if the 
human world is determined in a way that is substantially analogous to the determinism 
regulating the natural world. But is this the case? Despite rejecting the idea of freedom as 
exemption from natural necessity, Sorel, as shall be outlined more in depth in this chapter, did 
believe that human agency was in some way free.  This freedom was not conceptualized in 
terms of an exemption from the laws of physics, but in terms of the possession of a creative 
power. Human agency is characterized by the power of creating tools, concepts, or, to use 
Sorel’s language, ‘combinations’, which have no model in the natural world. It is easy to see 
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how this makes the question of social science difficult: if the human world is constituted, 
even only partially, by human agency, then society cannot be an object of scientific 
knowledge, since it does not function entirely on the basis of unchanging, and hence 
rationally knowable, causal laws. And thus, a rational science of society is impossible. 
It is true that, in dealing with the social sciences, Sorel, along with many others, was 
venturing into new territory. On a personal level, whereas his technical and scientific 
erudition put him in a privileged position to discuss the philosophy of natural science, his 
knowledge of the social sciences was substantially more limited, meaning that he was unable 
to draw on the wealth of examples from the history of physics or chemistry that had 
characterized his discussions of natural science. On a more general level, sociology, 
economics, and psychology were all relatively young sciences, and thus Sorel entered a 
livelier and more contested field of intellectual debate, characterized in some cases by 
methodological cleavages about the very object of study of the new sciences. Sorel’s 
fundamental difficulty, nonetheless, remained that of reconciling a conception of science 
requiring determinism with the conviction that human agency is creative. If human agency is 
free, in the sense of possessing a creative power, then society cannot be the object of scientific 
knowledge. Conversely, if a science of society is possible, then it becomes unclear in what 
sense human agency can be called free. This difficulty appears in Sorel’s writings of the 
period under the form of a question: how much space ought to be accorded to human agency 
in the study of society? If we exclude human agency, is there enough material left to construct 
a science? Are there, in other words, structural or systemic aspects of society that can be 
studied scientifically? Could these be the mechanisms of circulation of capital and 
merchandise as suggested by Marx? Can these be studied without involving the agency of 
historical and social actors? 
This initial attempt to make sense of the tension between a deterministic conception of 
science and a theory of creative human agency is, so to speak, a structuralist one. What Sorel 
initially tries to argue is that if social science is to be truly scientific it must exclude all 
considerations regarding human agency. It is from this perspective that we can make sense of 
his preference for Durkheim’s sociological holism over Tarde’s approach grounded in 
individual psychology. But the period under examination is one of intellectual transformation 
for Sorel, and as the tension outlined above became increasingly obvious, his going became 
more tentative and hesitant. Slowly but surely, he began to doubt that a meaningful study of 
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the human world could avoid talking about agency, and began to abandon his structuralist 
ambitions, without however yet being in possession of the conceptual tools needed to 
conceptualize the social sciences as explanations of human agency. What we examine in this 
chapter, then, is how reflection on the question of social science brought Sorel’s early 
epistemology to its breaking point, by revealing the impossibility of explaining human agency 
in terms of laws. It is the realization of this impossibility that eventually brought Sorel to 
draw a sharp distinction between the natural and the social sciences. It is in the encounter with 
the works of Labriola, Croce and, most importantly, Vico, that Sorel will elaborate a 
completely different conception of what social science is and what kind of knowledge it can 
produce. But the period under consideration, between 1892 and 1895, is one of questioning 
and transition, in which Sorel holds that social science must produce the same type of 
knowledge of natural science, i.e. laws explaining the functioning of deterministic relations. 
And thus, in all his attempts at social science, he is faced by the stubborn and essentially 
unanswerable question of agency. 
In the first part of the chapter we examine Sorel’s attempt to erect a science of society through 
the removal of the problematic fact of human agency. We begin by examining an important 
Sorelian text, the ‘Essai sur la philosophie de Proudhon’, in which Sorel outlines very clearly 
his theory of human agency as creative and proceeds to argue that a science of economics 
must be based on a systemic analysis capable of ignoring this agency. We then examine the 
parts of the ‘Ancienne et Nouvelle métaphysique’ in which Sorel further elaborates the same 
strategy for the scientific study of society. In the second part of the chapter we contextualize a 
little more and examine Sorel’s engagement with some of the debates surrounding the 
emergence of sociology in the France of the 1890s. We show how Sorel’s preference for 
Durkheim’s sociology over Tarde’s can be explained by the more systemic and holistic 
approach of the former. For Sorel, the advantage of Durkheim’s approach over Tarde’s 
consisted in the fact that, by excluding psychology, Durkheim shrunk the scientifically 
unfathomable sphere of human agency. We conclude by examining Sorel’s engagement with 
Durkheim’s Les Régles de la méthode sociologique, and we argue that in this text we see the 
first signs of a different approach to the study of social questions, i.e. an approach that 
abandons the importance of determinism and sees the social sciences as explanations of 
human historical agency.  
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2.2 PRODUCTION, FREEDOM AND THE SCIENCE OF ECONOMICS: THE ‘ESSAI 
SUR LA PHILOSOPHIE DE PROUDHON’ 
It is in 1892, with an essay on Proudhon appearing in the Revue Philosophique, that Sorel 
starts to deal with the epistemological problems involved in the project of a social science. 1 It 
is true that Sorel had already engaged in historical analyses, both in his two early books, the 
Procès de Socrate and the Contribution, and in the early epistemological writings focused in 
the history of various sciences. Nonetheless, what he does in the study on Proudhon is 
substantially different, for he deals with epistemological issues: in other words he interrogates 
himself and Proudhon about the possibility of a scientific study of a number of specifically 
human phenomena. The focus then is not historical, but epistemological: it is on what can 
make the study of economic phenomena such as production, exchange, and consumption a 
scientific one. At the outset of the article, Sorel warns the reader that much of Proudhon’s 
work will not be dealt with in his short study. Nonetheless, one of the key tasks will be that of 
‘explaining how he [Proudhon] reduced problems of economics to questions of psychology’.2   
The French debate on political economy had, in the nineteenth century, largely been animated 
by two cleavages: a methodological one opposing individualism to holism, and a political one 
between laissez-faire and various attempts to incorporate societal needs into economic 
planning. Generally speaking, the individualist methodology, drawing, through the work of 
the Ideologues, on the sensationalist psychology of the Enlightenment, and conceptualizing 
society as the sum total of interactions amongst utility-seeking individuals, was adopted by 
liberals in their advocacy of laissez-faire, free trade, and as little governmental interference 
with the economy as possible. Owing much to the writings of Cabanis and Destutt de Tracy, 
this tradition of liberal economics counted Jean-Baptiste Say and, closer to Sorel’s generation, 
Frédéric Bastiat and Joseph Garnier, Sorel’s economics professor at the Ponts et chaussées,3 
as its most illustrious representatives. 4 Critics of liberal economics had generally pointed to 
                                                 
1
 Georges Sorel, ‘Essai sur la philosophie de Proudhon’, Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’etranger 33, 
1892, pp. 622-38 and 34, 1892, pp. 41-68 
2
 Ibid, p. 622. 
3
 See ‘Annuaire du ministére de l’agriculture, du commerce et des travaux publics pour l’année 1867’, p. 135 
and ‘Annuaire du ministére de l’agriculture, du commerce et des travaux publics pour l’année 1868’, p. 185, in 
Archives de l’École des Ponts et Chaussées, cotes 1972. In both years, Garnier is listed as full professor of 
political economy. 
4
 Its proudly proclaimed association with the philosophy of the Enlightenment, as well as its insistence that 
collective welfare depends on individual self-interest, made this intellectual school suspect in Restoration 
France, and created opportunities for its opponents. The positivistic school of Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte 
represented the most sophisticated critique of this social scientific stance. This consisted in the development of a 
logic of the social to oppose to the individualist and psychologist starting point of the liberal economists. 
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the potentially socially destructive consequences of its atomistic and individualistic starting 
points. Sorel, however, unconvinced by these accusations of ‘materialism and immorality’5 
directed at the liberal school, joined Joseph Garnier in mocking the ambitions of those ‘naïve’ 
critics who would like to establish a political economy ‘more supportive of the suffering 
classes, a more spiritualist, Christian, charitable, socialist and French political economy.’6 
Sorel’s objections to the liberal school then are not of a political or social nature, but instead 
raise doubts about the scientificity that this school attributes to its own approach.  Liberal 
economists, argues Sorel, are convinced that Smith, Ricardo and Say have created ‘a science, 
based on principles, and arriving at definitive [certaines] conclusions. One must admit that 
this pretension does not seem to be very well demonstrated.’ 7 Contrasting the facility with 
which liberal economists turn a series of observations into a body of science with Proudhon’s 
caution, Sorel endorses the latter’s opinion and argues that the claim to have established a 
science of economics is ‘…“possibly the boldest ever upheld by a philosopher”. ’8  The 
problem with economics is, for Sorel, the lack of a proper conceptual apparatus: ‘to establish 
a science one cannot be happy with common-sense notions; one must extract from them the 
schemes proper to the new science.’9 Of course, the word scheme is not a casual one. Let us 
remember how Sorel had used this word in his 1888 article on causation: schemes were 
conceptual tools allowing the enquirer to isolate causal relationships. Now, following both 
Proudhon and the classical political economists, Sorel sees in the notion of value the starting 
point for the establishment of a science of economics. However the notion is notoriously 
difficult, burdened by the distinction between exchange value, use value, and an elusive real 
value of the objects of production and exchange. For Sorel, as well as for Proudhon and 
                                                                                                                                                        
Politically, notions of solidarity – the word ‘altruism’ was coined by Auguste Comte – were meant to replace the 
older notions of socially useful self-interest. See Cheryl B. Welch, ‘Social science from the French Revolution to 
positivism’ in Gareth Steadman Jones and Gregory Claeys (eds), The Cambridge History of Nineteenth Century 
Political Thought (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2011), pp. 171-99. 
5
 Sorel, ‘Philosophie de Proudhon’, p. 623. 
6
 Ibid. ‘M. J. Garnier se moque, avec raison, des naïfs qui croyaient possible de créer « une économie politique 
plus élevée, plus philosophique, plus morale, plus religieuse, plus démocratique, plus sympathique aux classes 
souffrantes, une économie politique spiritualiste, chrétienne, charitable, socialiste, française »’. The citation 
comes from Joseph Garnier, Notes et petits traités (Paris, Frères Garnier and Guillaumin : 1865), 2nd ed, p. 124. 
7
 Ibid. ‘Les économistes classiques sont persuadés qu’A. Smith, Ricardo, J.-B. Say, ont créé une science, fondée 
sur des principes et aboutissant à des conclusions certaines. Il faut avouer que cette prétention parait bien peu 
démontrée.’ 
8
 Ibid., p. 623-4. ‘Proudhon affirme qu’il existe une science économique ; mais il comprend la chose tout 
autrement que ses prédécesseurs; il se rend parfaitement compte de il se rend l’importance de cette affirmation, 
« la plus hardie peut-être qu’aucun philosophe ait jamais soutenue ».’ The quotation comes from Proudhon’s  
1846 Système de contradictions économiques  ou philosophie de la misère, the book famously attacked, a year 
later, by Karl Marx in his Misère de la philosophie. 
9
 Sorel, ‘Philosophie de Proudhon’, p. 624. ‘Pour constituer une science on ne peut se contenter de notions 
vulgaires; il faut en extraire des schèmes propres à la science nouvelle’. 
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Smith, the way forward consists in connecting value to labour, even though Adam Smith’s 
attempt to do this is, for Sorel, unsatisfactory because it is ‘entirely intuitive’. 10 
2.2.1 HUMAN PRODUCTION AND FREEDOM 
It is here that Sorel’s reasoning becomes interesting. What is needed to establish an economic 
science is a strong conceptualization of work: a precise definition of this notion on which it 
will be possible to erect a science of economics, a usable concept not different from that 
defining work in physics. And so, what is work? In agreement with Proudhon, Sorel sees 
work as the distinctively human activity, that which differentiates our species from the rest of 
the natural world. The necessity of work is, it is true, imposed on us by our necessity to 
consume, but it is far more than a mechanical process of satisfaction of needs: ‘the faculty of 
work, distinguishing humans from brutes, has its sources in the highest depths [les plus hautes 
profondeurs] of our reason’.11  The definition of work, taken from Proudhon and warmly 
endorsed by Sorel, is that of ‘…the exercise, intellectual and physical, of a being composed of 
body and spirit’12. It is, in other words, the production of a being endowed with will. Sorel 
and Proudhon are at one on this point: 
‘Only mankind works; “the animals which, metaphorically, we call labourers, 
are but machines… they conceive nothing, and thus produce nothing… From the 
perspective of consciousness, what difference can we find between the 
silkworm’s digestion and his construction of his web? What, then, is work? 
Nobody has defined it yet. Work is the emanation [émission] of spirit.” ’13 
Now, a moral and almost sacred conception of work, generally accompanied by a negative 
characterization of the unproductive idler, is typical of nineteenth-century socialist rhetoric. 14 
                                                 
10
 Ibid., p. 625. 
11
 Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Système des contradictions économiques, cited in Sorel, ‘Essai sur Proudhon’, p. 626. 
‘La faculté de travailler, qui distingue l’homme des brutes, a sa source dans les plus hautes profondeurs de notre 
raison.’ 
12
 Proudhon, Guerre et Paix, cited in Sorel, ‘Essai sur Proudhon’, p. 626. ‘…l’exercice à la fois physique et 
intellectuel d’un être composé du corps et d’esprit’. 
13
 Proudhon, Système des contradictions économiques, cited in Sorel, ‘Essai sur Proudhon’, p. 626. ‘L’homme 
seul travaille; « … les animaux que nous nommons travailleurs, par métaphore, ne sont que de machines… ils ne 
conçoivent rien, partant ils ne produisent pas…. Quelle différence, au point de vue de la conscience, pouvons-
nous découvrir entre la digestion du ver à soie et la construction de sa toile ?... Qu’est-ce donc que le travail ? 
Nul encore ne l’a défini. Le travail est l’émission de l’esprit ».’ Of course this is exactly Marx’s view as 
expressed in the seventh chapter of Capital : ‘A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and 
a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect 
from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality.’ It 
is unclear whether Sorel had read Capital by this time, though it is plausible to suggest that he was in the process 
of reading it, given that his public embracement of Marxism dates from 1893.  
14
 Though it may be perhaps superfluous to recall the following verses from the Internationale, they are, with 
their reference to ‘the idler’ (l’oisif), a good illustration of this tendency: ‘Ouvriers, paysans nous sommes/ le 
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But there is more in this passage than just this: there is an epistemological point about the 
purposive nature of the productive phenomena studied by economics. To clarify, Sorel 
continues to quote Proudhon, this time from De la justice dans la révolution et dans l'Église: 
‘Movement alone, applied to matter, does not give to it the desired form, does not constitute 
work; it is necessary that this movement be related to a goal to be reached.’15 In short, the 
characterization of what Sorel had suggested ought to be the central scheme of economic 
science, i.e. work, is that of purposive action, moreover action of a being endowed with will 
and intention. But if this is so, it follows that economics must adopt an explanatory mode 
capable of incorporating the purposive nature of production. This is what Sorel means when 
he states that Proudhon explains economics in terms of ‘psychology’. It is not a commitment 
to an individualist methodology denying the existence of social, i.e. collective, phenomena, 
but an insistence on the type of agency that characterizes the phenomena studied by 
economics. 
The point towards which Sorel moves is the impossibility of reduction of the human realm to 
the natural one: economic phenomena are not particular and very complicated instances of 
physical ones, but are altogether different, given that production is purposive action. We had 
seen, in the previous chapter, the importance of pluralism to Sorel’s epistemology. It is also 
partly in the name of this pluralism that Sorel here insists on the distinction between natural 
and social sciences. One of the merits of Proudhon is, for Sorel, that he had understood the 
importance of pluralism at a time in which the ‘notion of the autonomy of causes was 
unfamiliar to philosophers and completely unknown to economists’.16 But the key point is the 
separation between natural and social sciences or, more precisely, the impossibility of 
examining human agency through the expressive supports of the natural sciences. After 
having written that Proudhon’s connection of work with agency is ‘irrefutable’, he continues 
                                                                                                                                                        
grand parti des travailleurs/ la terre n’appartient qu’aux hommes/ l’oisif ira loger ailleurs.’ In the essay under 
consideration, we see Sorel himself approvingly quoting Proudhon on this issue, and speaking of the 
consumption of an unproductive person as ‘detestable’, as well as leading the idler, precisely in virtue of his 
inactivity, to perennial insatisfaction. See Sorel, ‘Philosophie de Proudon’, p. 631. The insistence on the moral 
worth of work will be a central element in Sorelian rhetoric. 
15
 Quoted in Sorel, ‘Philosophie de Proudhon’, p. 626n. ‘Le mouvement seul, imprimé à la matière, ne lui donne 
pas la forme volue, ne constitue pas le travail; il faut que ce mouvement soit en rapport avec le but à atteindre’.  
16
 Ibid., p. 627. ‘En 1846, à l’époque où paraissent les Contradictions, la notion de l’autonomie des causes était 
bien peu familière aux philosophes et totalement inconnue aux économistes, qui embrouillaient tout dans leur 
« littérature peu distrayante »’. 
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by stressing that ‘if this is so, questions of value and labour have to be dealt with through 
psychological methods.’17 In other words:  
‘…industry is a psychological phenomenon, the laws of psychology are 
independent from physics. Work, as an economic concept, being a moral 
phenomenon, is not susceptible to entering any equation representing material 
elements.’18 
To understand why Sorel was so keen to establish a separation between the natural and the 
social sciences it is necessary to connect the discussion to the wider epistemological problem 
examined in the previous chapter. The important issue at stake here is, once more, that of 
freedom and determinism. By characterizing human agency as purposive and intentional, 
Sorel is suggesting that the realm of human production is in some way above the deterministic 
laws that regulate the natural world: spider-webs and factories are different phenomena, for 
spiders act unconsciously while humans act purposively. It is the possession of this specific 
and unique type of agency, at this stage defined in terms of purposiveness, that characterizes 
humanity and sets it apart from the natural world. 
But how is this agency conceived in more concrete terms? How does it function, and how can 
it escape determinism? In order to answer these questions Sorel has to deal directly with the 
issue of determinism, and this he does in the third section of the essay. The arguments used 
will be repeated in the ‘Ancienne et nouvelle métaphysique’: this is why he begins with a 
reasoning that the reader of this study will recognize. The problem of determinism, he writes, 
is made insoluble by the way in which it is approached. The classical exposition of the 
question is asking whether the ‘soul… a psychological point’ is ‘inert like a material point’ or 
has a ‘reactive force’ against the solicitations it receives. 19 The geometrical analogies are 
sarcastic, and indicate where Sorel believes the problem to reside: in the reification of what he 
will later call expressive supports. The argument is simple. Though certain concepts are 
nothing more than useful scientific tools, we mistake them for objects of enquiry, and end up 
creating a series of insoluble problems. Metaphysics thus conceived is ‘a mirage of physical 
                                                 
17
 Sorel, ‘Philosophie de Proudhon’, p. 626. ‘Le travail se trouve ainsi placé dans la sphère des concepts 
psychologiques; et le raisonnement de Proudhon nous semble, ici, irréfutable. S’il est ainsi, les questions sur la 
valeur et le travail doivent être abordées par des méthodes psychologiques.’ 
18
 Ibid., p. 627.‘…l’industrie est un phénomène psychologique, les lois de la psychologie sont indépendantes de 
la physique. Le travail entendu, au sens économique, étant d’ordre moral, ne peut entrer dans aucune équation où 
se trouvent des grandeurs matérielles.’  
19
 Ibid., pp. 635-6.‘La difficulté du problème, dans la philosophie classique, résulte du point de départ : l’âme, le 
moi, un point psychologique, est sollicité par diverses forces ; s’il est inerte comme le point matériel, il y a 
déterminisme ; s’il possède une certaine force de réaction, il y a liberté.’ 
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reality’ and a ‘mythological physics’.20 The solution to this problem consists in recognizing 
the purely instrumental value of certain concepts, and understanding that they are tools, rather 
than objects of knowledge. Sorel here calls them ‘absolutes’, and describes them as the 
working assumptions of a given science. Until this background misunderstanding has been 
resolved, the epistemological problem of freedom remains insolvable, since:  
‘it is quite difficult to understand free will; for one must choose between one of 
these two options: either we transfer to this imaginary world the determinist 
thesis of mechanicism; either, to allow for free will, we disfigure science…’21 
It is only when we establish various ‘absolutes’, and separate the different sciences that we 
can begin to deal with the question of freedom. Once we understand that there is no 
overarching explanatory mode we can approach the question of freedom as an empirical 
question linked to a scientifically studied realm of human experience: we transform, in the 
words of Proudhon, the question of free will from a ‘metaphysical question’ into one of ‘pure 
observation’. 22 In other words, instead of arguing philosophically, on the basis of conceptual 
mistakes, we appeal to history, to the realm of experience, in order to establish the existence 
of freedom. We postulate human freedom as an epistemological absolute and see if it 
manages to make sense of the historical experience of mankind. 
For Sorel, the answer is a positive one: history shows that human agency is indeed creative 
and thus, free. What is freedom? It is the ‘individual power to construct ideas and act in 
conformity with ideas. The power and the reality of this capacity appear very clearly in 
history’. 23  We have here a definition of freedom in terms of activity and in terms of 
construction. Human agency is then characterized by two aspects. To start with, we have the 
possibility of creating elements that have no referent in the natural world, what Sorel will later 
call ‘sequences whose ordering is our decision’.24 There is, in other words, a creative power. 
Secondly, human agency is constituted by the ability to follow these artificially constructed 
models, to act in accordance with them. Though Sorel does not go to the bottom of the issue 
and provides neither detail nor explanation as to how this agency happens, he nonetheless 
                                                 
20
 Ibid., p. 636. 
21
 Ibid. ‘Dans un pareil système, il est bien difficile de comprendre le libre arbitre ; car de deux choses l’une : ou 
bien on transporte dans ce monde féerique la thèse déterministe du mécanisme ; ou bien, pour rendre le libre 
arbitre possible, on défigure la science et on affirme la contingence des futurs, c’est-à-dire l’absurde.’ 
22
 Cited in Sorel, ‘Philosophie de Proudhon’, p. 637. ‘ramener ainsi la démonstration de la liberté à une simple 
classification des faits; d’une question de métaphysique à faire une question d’observation pure’. 
23
 Ibid., p. 638. ‘Nous pouvons définir la liberté : le pouvoir individuel de construire des idées et d’agir en 
conformité des idées. La puissance et la réalité de cette fonction apparaissent très clairement dans l’histoire.’ 
24
 Sorel, D’Aristote à Marx, p. 171. 
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establishes some important points. By attributing purposive agency to human beings he 
establishes the existence of freedom. This, in turn, puts him in a somewhat awkward position, 
for it seems to require him to set up the epistemological question of social science in a very 
precise way: specifically, the social sciences must be those sciences that study the realm of 
human productions, understood in the wide sense of elements whose existence is linked to a 
purposive human agency. 
2.2.3 SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTION 
Given Sorel’s understanding of science as an activity concerned with the discovery of 
deterministic, i.e. unchanging, causal relationships, this particular conceptualization of human 
agency creates huge problems for the establishment of social sciences. If human work is to be 
conceptualized as creative activity, and if it is to be the object of knowledge of economic 
science, it should follow that such a science is impossible. What deep causal nexuses can be 
discovered between phenomena whose essence is creativity, and hence unpredictability? The 
problem, which Sorel notices and addresses, can be stated in more general terms: if human 
agency and production are not deterministic, and if science requires deterministic objects of 
study, how can there be a science of economics and, more generally, of society? 
After having offered his definition of work as a ‘psychological phenomenon’, Sorel notices 
that Proudhon’s argument is problematic, since ‘one cannot see what can be the common 
measure of products’.25 The problem is, if work is to be linked to agency, then it becomes an 
individual and subjective phenomenon, and it is difficult to see how one can establish a 
science on a phenomenon that is affected by so many variables and circumstances. The 
solution offered by Proudhon, but highlighted and followed by Sorel, is to consider 
production as a social phenomenon rather than as an individual one. In other words, the 
solution is to exclude agency from the domain of social science. Here is Sorel commenting on 
passages from Prodhon’s Système des contradictions économiques: 
‘…society is a living being whose personality is as sure as that of the individual 
being. The social being is both producer and consumer: each member pours in 
his share of work and exchanges with all the others. Seen from the perspective of 
the social being [l’être-société], products are capable of being measured.’26 
                                                 
25
 Ibid., p. 627. ‘Mais on ne voit pas encore quelle sera la commune mesure des produits’ 
26
 Ibid., p. 628. ‘Mais la société est un être vivant, dont la personnalité est aussi certaine que celle de l’être 
individuel. L’être social est à la fois producteur et consommateur : chacun des membres apporte son contingent 
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The argument is clear: though work might be an individual phenomenon, it is possible to take 
the economic apparatus of a society in its entirety. In fact, only this operation is capable of 
guaranteeing the scientificity of a study of economic phenomena. ‘The work of an individual’, 
writes Sorel, ‘is something incommensurable: everyone values it according to their own fancy 
and everyone feels entitled to an exceptional reward.’27 No science is possible if we treat 
work from this perspective. ‘In the notion of value, Proudhon gets rid of all these anti-
scientific elements: products are classified not according to fancies and individual claims, but 
according to their position in social production.’28 The establishment of an economic science, 
in short, requires that we adopt a holistic perspective and carry on a systemic analysis of the 
social apparatus of production, consumption, and exchange in its totality. 
Before proceeding, it would be wise to clarify the scope of this argument. It might appear that 
what Sorel is doing is simply setting limits to what the social sciences can aspire to know. 
This is partially true. The idea that the social sciences are unable to penetrate the intricate 
territory of individual agency and individual events is at work here and, moreover, it will be 
an idea that we will encounter again in Sorel’s later writings. He will remain faithful to the 
idea that scientific enquiry into the human world can examine with some profit collectivities 
and general historical trends but is powerless in dealing with individual phenomena. 
Nonetheless, this is not the only, or even the most important thing that Sorel is trying to 
establish here. The question is not mainly one of scale, but one of agency. Sorel’s idea, or, 
perhaps more correctly, hope, is that a systemic analysis of society can avoid dealing with 
agency: if we take society in its entirety we can avoid dealing with the non-deterministic 
phenomenon of human agency. This is why individual work is tellingly labelled as an ‘anti-
scientific’ element.  
It is hard to avoid this interpretation, especially if we think that when Sorel speaks of science 
he is not speaking merely about a systematized body of knowledge29, but about the discovery 
of causal relations, and that this presupposes determinism. The conceptualization of human 
agency as creative is, quite simply, irreconcilable with science, and thus it appears correct to 
                                                                                                                                                        
de travail et entre en échange avec tous les autres. Les produits considérés au point de l’être-société sont 
susceptibles d’être mesurés.’ 
27
 Ibid. ‘Le travail de l’individu est quelque chose d’incommensurable : chacun l’apprecie à sa fantasie et chacun 
prétend avoir droit à une rémunération exceptionnelle.’ 
28
 Ibid., pp. 228-9. ‘Dans la notion de la valeur, Proudhon fait disparaître tous ces éléments antiscientifiques : les 
produits se classent, non plus d’après des caprices et des prétentions individuelles, mais d’après leur place dans 
la production sociale.’ 
29
 A systematized body of knowledge is ‘la systématique’, not science. 
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say that the rationale behind the choice of a systemic analysis is the elimination of the 
problematic fact of human agency. 
2.3 THE SCIENCE OF SOCIETY AND THE TEST OF AGENCY 
The conceptual problem thus put is a difficult one for Sorel to solve, essentially for the reason 
that social science must produce a scientific knowledge of an object of study, the human 
world, characterized by the presence of freedom. This is problematic for Sorel because he 
believes that only phenomena regulated by causal necessity are open to scientific study, and 
whereas the natural world is ruled by necessity, the human world is, at least partially, 
characterized by purposive agency. Given that by definition no science of human agency is 
possible, Sorel attempts, in the ‘Essai sur la philosophie de Proudhon’, what we could perhaps 
call a structuralist solution. The hope is that by treating holistically a social or an economic 
system, one can somehow remove the necessity for the social scientist of taking agency into 
consideration. The problem, of course, is not merely that human agency is difficult to analyse, 
but that it is not regulated by the strict causal relationships that alone for Sorel can constitute a 
body of scientific knowledge. In short, the possibility of social science depends on the 
question of whether there are causal relationships that regulate the global functioning of 
society, i.e. on the issue of whether human agency can, or cannot, be ignored.  
2.3.1 A HESITANT CONVERT 
Despite, or perhaps in virtue of, the difficulty involved in the quest for social-scientific 
knowledge, Sorel continued to engage in it, albeit in a tentative way, attempting to find lasting 
intuitions upon which to develop his thought.  
In order to grasp both the importance that Sorel attributed to the question and, perhaps more 
importantly, his lack of clear answers we must turn to an open letter written in 1893 to the 
Revue Philosophique. In the letter, aptly entitled ‘Science et socialisme’, Sorel protests 
against the superficial critiques with which the French academy is greeting the work of Karl 
Marx. 30 For Sorel, Marx’s approach ought to be taken more seriously, for it appears to be able 
to break the stalemate between idealism and empiricism in which the French intellectual 
                                                 
30
 Georges Sorel, ‘Science et socialisme’, Revue Philosophique XXXV, 1893, pp. 509-11. This letter is 
conventionally considered as the beginning of Sorel’s involvement with Marxism. We shall speak more 
thoroughly of this issue in the next chapter. But one point can be anticipated, namely that Sorel’s discovery of 
Marx is a scientific rather than a political one. The Marx defended and studied by Sorel in 1893 is a sociologist, 
a philosopher and an historian rather than a political leader. More specifically, for Sorel, he is a writer whose 
thought seems to promise a solid and truly scientific conceptualization of the human world. 
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world is stuck. More precisely, Marx appears to offer a potentially scientific approach to the 
study of economics and social science in general. The letter is interesting because it reveals 
that for Sorel the question of social science is a very open one: despite the vocal defence of 
Marx at a general philosophical level, Sorel’s tone is hesitant when he speaks of the science of 
economics that Marxism claims to have established.  
The general structure of Sorel’s defence of Marx echoes the ideas examined in the previous 
chapter: Marx essentially is to be studied and defended because he represents a solution to the 
dichotomy paralyzing the French epistemological debate, divided between metaphysicians 
unconcerned with science and reality, and scientific thought that, being excessively empirical, 
has become relativistic and sceptical. ‘Contemporary philosophy’ writes Sorel ‘is busy 
fighting windmills and wanders in the clouds; if the holders of the official chairs cannot 
produce anything more than idealistic reveries… Marx’s new metaphysics will triumph 
against the subtle refutations offered against it.’31 The ambition of Marx and of his socialist 
project is, for the Sorel of the time, to establish a science, a rational knowledge of economics, 
and this clashes with the Zeitgeist, as eloquently illustrated in this short passage:  
‘I know that such an absolute formulation can appear out of fashion today: we 
only want to hear about empiricism and what is relative. We easily treat 
socialists as dreamers; we compare them to Plato and Thomas More. Rational 
science and utopia are two different things; according to current opinion, 
however, they resemble each other, science being a mere construction of our 
spirit, approximately, though never completely, fitting with reality [adaptée aux 
choses rèelles]: all absolute conclusions would then be forbidden to man.’32 
However, despite this general philosophical defence of Marx, the situation is more complex. 
Sorel approves of the scientific ambitions of Marxism, for he believes them to be healthy 
correctives to the sceptical or idealistic tendencies of the present.33 Nonetheless, he does not 
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 Ibid., p. 509. ‘La philosophie contemporaine bataille contre des chimères et navigue dans l’empyrée ; la 
nouvelle métaphysique réelle de Marx triomphera des réfutation subtiles qu’on lui oppose si les détenteurs des 
chaires officielles ne parviennent point à produire autre chose que des rêveries idéalistes…’ 
32
 Ibid., p. 510. ‘Je sais bien qu’une formule absolue peut sembler bien démodée aujourd’hui : on ne veut plus 
entendre parler que d’empirisme et de relatif. On traite volontiers les socialistes de rêveurs ; on les compare à 
Platon et à Th. Morus. La science rationnelle et l’utopie sont choses quelque peu différentes ; suivant l’opinion 
courante elles se ressemblent beaucoup, la science n’étant qu’une construction de notre esprit, plus ou moins 
adaptée aux choses réelles, mais jamais complètement adaptée : toute conclusion absolue serait donc interdite à 
l’homme.’ Had it not been clear enough already, so long to Sorel the irrationalist. Commenting on ‘Science et 
socialisme’ Shlomo Sand writes : ‘Celui que les historiens ont caractérisé et intégré dans le courant 
antirationaliste de le fin di XIXe siècle et des débuts du XXe siècle est attiré par Marx… du fait de l’insatisfaction 
qu’il éprouve face à l’empirisme et au relativisme qui dominent son époque…’. See Sand, Illusion du 
politique, p. 35.  
33
 The issue of scientific certainty is, for Sorel, something that has a bearing on the wider well-being of society. 
It is worth citing this long passage in order to illustrate what Sorel believes to be the social consequences of 
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yet know whether the social scientific project is practicable or not. From this perspective, 
Sorel’s letter is full of precautions. In fact, the closer we get to the issue of social science, the 
more Sorel becomes prudent.  
Marx attempts to establish a science of economics, and has ‘placed social science on the only 
ground fit for it’, but only ‘if we admit that a social science exists’.34 As he illustrates the 
ambition of the Marxist project the tone becomes progressively less assertive and more 
interrogative. ‘Modern socialism believes that there exists a science, a true economic science. 
Is this thesis well grounded? Here we have something that ought to be examined a little more 
closely than has been done until now.’35 A few lines below, he restates the question in the 
same interrogative terms. ‘Is it true that exchange contains an element capable of being 
incorporated into a rational science, as held by K. Marx, or is it a phenomenon escaping all 
possible scientific categories as Aristotle appears to believe?’36 Sorel defends Marx on the 
general philosophical level, and asks for the French to take seriously the social scientific 
ambitions of Marxism. However, the question of whether the social scientific project can be 
realized is very much an open one, as he makes abundantly clear. The question is essentially 
epistemological and philosophical, and it is a question about the kind of knowledge that can 
be attained of a series of essentially non-deterministic phenomena. ‘The problem is a 
philosophical one, only philosophers used to studying principles can deal with it seriously. It 
                                                                                                                                                        
philosophical and scientific scepticism. The beginning is sarcastic. ‘Isn’t it a nice sight to see the plebs remain 
faithful to the old principles, believe in right and absolute truth, while those supposed to lead them have lost this 
faith? Day after day, scientific scepticism worsens the separation of the classes from a moral point of view. The 
wisest lose all grip on the course of people’s minds because their direction is, almost everywhere, left to 
agitators. People go to them as they imagine these agitators to be animated by their same faith.’ See ibid., pp. 
510-11. ‘N’est-ce pas un spectacle admirable que de voir les plèbes rester fidèles aux vieux principes, croire 
encore au droit et à la vérité absolue, quand ceux qui devraient les diriger n’y croient plus ? Le scepticisme 
scientifique aggrave, tous les jours, la séparation des classes, au point de vue moral. Les plus savants perdent 
toute action sur la marche des esprits et la société court le plus grand danger, parce que la direction des âmes est, 
presque partout, abandonnée à des agitateurs. Le peuple va à eux, parce qu’il suppose chez eux la même foi qui 
l’anime.’ 
34
 Ibid., p. 509. Emphasis added. ‘L’un des mérites de l’auteur allemand a été de placer la science sociale sur le 
seul terrain qui lui convienne (en admettant qu’il existe une science sociale).’ 
35
 Ibid., p. 511. ‘Le socialisme moderne croit qu’il existe une science, une vraie science économique. Cette thèse 
est-elle fondée ? Voilà ce qu’il faudrait examiner d’un peu plus près qu’on ne l’a fait jusqu’ici : je ne crois pas 
que l’on ait réellement réfuté à ce point de vue  les théories de Marx.’ 
36
 Ibid. ‘Est-il vrai que l’échange renferme un élément susceptible d’entrer dans une science rationnelle comme 
le soutien K. Marx, ou bien n’est-il qu’un phénomène échappant à toutes les catégories scientifiques possibles, 
comme semble le croire Aristote. Si le Stagyrite a raison, toutes les thèses socialiste s’écroulent…’ 
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is long that I seek, in vain, a solution to this important issue, and I have still not found 
anywhere an answer’.37 
2.3.2 THE SCIENCE OF ACTIVITIES AND THE SCIENCE OF SOCIETY 
The hesitant tone can be explained by recalling what the fundamental problem of social 
science is for Sorel. Science is rational knowledge of deterministic phenomena, while the 
human world is constituted by creative human agency. Thus, the establishment of a body of 
social scientific knowledge remains an open question, and the strategy pursued by Sorel in the 
years between 1892 and 1895 is that of establishing the sciences of society on the elimination 
of the problematic fact of human agency. It is in the ‘Ancienne et nouvelle métapysique’ that 
we see a more thorough articulation of this attempt. 
The first reference to social science appears in the context of the distinction between rational 
science and ‘systématique’. One of the differences between the two is that while the 
‘systématique’ is interested in producing practical solutions to a given problem, the primary 
aim of science is to understand causal relationships. It is important to underline that Sorel 
discusses social sciences overwhelmingly in terms of ‘systématique’. Thus, he comments on 
the fact that sociologists are fascinated by historical examples, be they classical or medieval, 
and that there is much talk of ‘old corporations and other things that one would like to 
reinstitute, with adjustments to adapt them to modern times.’38 Sorel is keen to deny the status 
of science to these endeavours: ‘all attempts made to establish an experimental sociology 
based on historical generalizations belong to comparative systématique’.39 It is, for Sorel, on 
the one hand a question of method of enquiry. Systematized and comparative empirical 
observations are useful, but they represent a level of knowledge prior to scientific knowledge, 
a sort of pre-science. Works on labour legislation, for example, proceed in this manner:  
‘As soon as there is a large enough number of facts of the same kind, they are 
presented to the public in a descriptive monograph in which one states how the 
law has been created and applied… When enough of these monographs have 
                                                 
37
 Ibid. ‘Le problème est d’ordre philosophique, il n’y a que des philosophes habitués à étudier les principes qui 
puissent sérieusement l’aborder. Voilà longtemps que je cherche, en vain, la solution de cette question capitale et 
je n’ai encore trouvé de réponse nulle part.’ 
38
 Sorel, D’Aristote à Marx, p. 102. ‘On a beaucoup disserté, et on disserte encore, dans un certain monde, sur le 
Moyen-âge, le temporel et le spirituel, les vieilles corporations, et autres choses qu’on voudrait restaurer avec 
quelques accommodations aux besoins modernes.’ 
39
 Ibid., pp. 102-3. ‘Toutes les tentatives faites pour constituer une sociologie expérimentale fondée sur les 
généralisations de l’histoire, appartiennent à la systématique comparative et leur valeur doit être discutée comme 
la valeur des méthodes canoniques de construction. 
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been published over the course of time a more or less distinct current of opinion 
is established, which is a vague form of systematization…’40 
On the other hand, it is a question of goal and ambition. The ambition of these social scientists 
is social reform. Sorel takes the example of social economists, who criticize their liberal 
colleagues in virtue of the latter’s excessive adherence to principles. Social economists, 
however, start and aim at a practical perspective that is fundamentally alien to scientific 
thought, as we have seen in the previous chapter. What they can establish are general 
solutions designed to take into account of as many different instances as possible. But, once 
more, this is not science. These are ‘constructions skilfully crafted to replace, with greater or 
smaller success, the real processes: these constructions’ value resides in the number of 
experimental elements they contain and, from this point of view, they are often of great 
interest.’41 But they remain solidly in the realm of the pre-scientific, empirical ‘systématique’. 
The main problem facing the attempt to establish a scientific study of the human world is the 
one Sorel had highlighted in the study of Proudhon: namely, the peculiar and essentially non-
deterministic fact of human agency. And thus, in the last instance, the problem remains one of 
freedom and determinism. The issue comes up rather clearly in the eighth section of the 
‘Ancienne et nouvelle métaphysique’, and thus it is necessary to go back, briefly, to Sorel’s 
treatment of Bergson’s arguments on freedom in order to highlight once more how central 
determinism is to Sorel’s conception of science.  A free act, let us recall, was one that seemed 
to spring from no obvious determination. According to Sorel, who follows Bergson, this 
‘illusion’42 of free agency depends on the fact that such supposedly free acts spring from the 
depth of our consciousness, from our emotional self, and that these depths are impossible to 
examine rationally: thus, we cannot see what determines the act.  
‘Indeterminism is emotional action in life; I have already explained that all 
serious study of man must be based on the impossibility of representing our 
                                                 
40
 Ibid., p. 103. ‘Lorsqu’on a un assez grand nombre de faits d’un même genre, on les présente au public sous 
forme de monographies descriptives, où l’on dit comment la loi a été faite, comment elle est appliquée ; on 
énonce les opinions que les auteurs précédents one émises sur les effets. Lorsque des pareils mémoires ont été 
lancés durant plusieurs années, il se forme un courant plus ou moins marqué, c’est une forme vague de 
systématisation ; on finit par déclarer que la situation actuelle est absurde et qu’il est ridicule de conserve un 
appareil législatif suranné.’ 
41
 Ibid., p. 104-5. ‘De même qu’il y a pour chaque problème industriel plusieurs théories, de même il y a foison 
d’économies sociales : ce sont des constructions adroitement faites, pour remplacer, avec plus ou moins de 
bonheur, les processus réels ; ces constructions valent par la quantité d’éléments expérimentaux qu’elles 
renferment et, à ce point de vue, elles offrent souvent un intérêt considérable.’ 
42
 Sorel, D’Aristote à Marx, p. 179. 
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affective states; when these intervene, the logical flow of representations is 
broken and the illusion of free will arises.’43 
In other words, Sorel is unwilling to allow for exceptions in the determinism of nature. This 
rejection of freedom as indeterminism is dictated by the fact that if the laws of nature were to 
lose their necessary and universal character, then science would be impossible. The following 
formulation is a little excessive, but it shows very clearly the connection between the fact of 
determinism and the possibility of science: 
‘It is clear that if there is freedom then there is no possible knowledge, not even 
in the form of a systématique; all humans, being independent one from the other, 
would form each their own kind, like angels in the Thomist doctrine, and there 
would be no general relation.’44 
The reason as to why Sorel is so keen to avoid conceptualizing free will as freedom from the 
deterministic laws of nature is that this would imperil the whole scientific edifice which 
necessitates determinism. 
The issue is tricky because, though Sorel rejects the idea of freedom as indeterminism, he still 
nonetheless believes that human agency is constituted by the creative power of which we 
spoke before. There are two conceptions of freedom at work here: one, which he rejects, as 
indeterminism, and another, which he subscribes to, as creative activity. The fact is, however, 
that both create problems for the establishment of a science of the human world.  
So, tackling the problem directly, Sorel asks whether a science of ‘human activities’ is 
possible. What is this science of human activities? It is the attempt to ground social science on 
the classification of different human types. Sorel had already explored this possibility in the 
previous years. In 1893, a year before the ‘Ancienne et nouvelle métaphysique’, he had 
published a few articles discussing the work of Cesare Lombroso.45 These works, dealing 
essentially with the question of political crime and whether it is possible to identify the social 
type prone to be an agent of violent social change, indicate a certain interest in the possibility 
                                                 
43
 Ibid. ‘L’indéterminisme, c’est l’action émotionnelle dans la vie ; j’ai déjà expliqué que toute étude sérieuse de 
l’homme doit être basée sur l’impossibilité de représenter les états affectifs ; lors donc que ceux-ci interviennent, 
le cours logique des représentations est rompu et l’illusion du libre-arbitre se produit.’ 
44
 Ibid., pp. 177-8. ‘Il est clair que s’il y a liberté, il n’y a pas de connaissance possible, meme sous forme de 
systématique ; tous les hommes, étant indépendants les uns des autres, formeraient chacun une espèce, comme 
les anges dans la doctrine thomiste, et il n’y aurait aucune relation générale.’ 
45
 Georges Sorel, ‘La position du problème de M. Lombroso’, Revue scientifique LI, 1893, pp. 206-10; Georges 
Sorel, ‘Le crime politique d’après M. Lombroso’, Revue scientifique LI, 1893, pp. 561-5 and finally, and 
probably best exemplifying the tendency to do social science on the basis of human types, Georges Sorel, ‘La 
femme criminelle d’après M.Lombroso’, Revue scientifique LII, 1893, pp. 463-7. 
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of establishing human types on which to base a social science.46 A science of human activities 
would then neatly solve the problem, for agency could be explained through classification. 
But Sorel’s conclusion is a negative one. Human activity does not develop in a void, but in a 
changing environment. Individuals are educated to act in accordance with their social role, but 
no education is perfect, and moreover, these social roles are subject to change. In short, the 
science of human activities is an impossibility: ‘all one can hope to establish is a series of 
descriptive systématiques, taking into account the changes in the [social] environments.’47 Of 
course, the impossibility of establishing a science of activities is an indirect confirmation that 
Sorel believes human agency to be free. The fact that a social environment changes indicates 
that the human world is transformed by human agency. 
And so, how is social science possible, given that human agency cannot be classified in types 
and that the science of human activities is impossible? The solution given in the ‘Ancienne et 
nouvelle métaphysique’ is the same one sketched in the ‘Essai sur la philosophie de 
Proudhon’: social scientific analysis must exclude agency. Unable to deal with the tricky 
problem of human agency and its ability to rise above the deterministic laws of nature, Sorel 
argues that only a systemic analysis of an economic or social whole can be scientific, and that 
this is because the systemic analysis gets rid of what he had called, in the study on Proudhon, 
subjective and ‘antiscientific elements.’48 Now, it is true that Sorel had already argued, and 
will continue to argue, that the knowledge that a science of society can hope to produce will 
necessarily exclude particular events, individual personalities and, more in general, the micro 
level of analysis. Nevertheless what is being argued in the concluding sections of the 
‘Ancienne et nouvelle métaphysique’ is altogether far more radical, for it essentially amounts 
to an attempt to establish a scientific study of society on the removal of human agency. The 
unspoken intuition is that while human agency exists and breaks the determinism of nature, a 
social and economic system can be examined scientifically only by ignoring this fact. 
                                                 
46
 In one of them, for example, Sorel had dealt with the question of political crime, examining the social and 
geographical conditions favouring the emergence of political criminals. According to Lombroso, political crime 
was the expression of a socially progressive tendency that he had labelled ‘philoneism’. According to Sorel, 
philoneists can be divided in two general categories: geniuses and what he had called ‘les mattoïdes’. See Sorel, 
‘Crime politique’, pp. 563-4.  
47
 Sorel, D’Aristote à Marx, p. 188. ‘Je crois que de tout ce qui précède on peut conclure qu’il n’a jamais été 
possible et qu’il ne semble même pas possible de constituer dans l’avenir une science des actes humains ; tout ce 
que l’on peut espérer faire, c’est un ensemble de systématiques descriptives, qui doivent être révisées de temps à 
autre, en tenant compte des modifications des milieux.’ 
48
 Sorel, ‘Philosophie de Proudhon’, p. 628. 
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The prime example of a social scientific argument given by Sorel is Marx’s analysis of capital 
circulation. In describing the process in which capital becomes commodity before retuning to 
the state of capital, Marx successfully manages to abstract himself from the circumstances in 
which this circulation happens, and thus produces a scientific knowledge of the phenomenon 
of circulation. It is worth quoting a long passage here: 
‘This reasoning is truly noteworthy; one does not try to establish under what 
influences the contracting parties operate, what are the representations directing 
the development of their thoughts; in a word, all the psychological apparatus 
disappears. We take a relation, that of capital and usury, excluding every 
individual phenomenon and we ask what this relation is, rationally. To answer 
this question, we do not need to take into account people, with their passions and 
incidents; we only have to imagine a machine-like support [un support machinal] 
capable of producing the original effect that we are examining.’49   
The machine-like support here is essentially equivalent to an algorithmic abstraction, a 
conceptual mechanism allowing us to isolate a specific relation in the object of our study. But 
the important aspect here is the exclusion of agency, the exclusion of ‘people, with their 
passions and incidents’. It is true that, partially, this is also a methodological point: given that 
it is impossible to treat scientifically individual acts, social science must examine the social 
origins and consequences of given acts.  
Sorel is, in other words, also arguing that it is impossible to deal scientifically with society as 
methodological individualists. ‘Classical philosophers deny’, according to Sorel, ‘the 
existence of social elements; all there is are individuals and collectivities.’ 50  Mill, for 
example, denied that men become something altogether different when assembled in society. 
For Sorel, this means that, since ‘no science of individual human acts exists’, it follows that 
there are no laws ‘in the true sense of the word [law]’ that apply to them. However, ‘Stuart 
Mill is not very demanding and only asks for the possibility of constructing a useful 
systématique’.51 Barthélemy de Saint-Hilaire, French translator of Aristotle’s Ethics, commits 
                                                 
49
 Sorel, D’Aristote à Marx, p. 233. ‘Ce raisonnement est bien remarquable ; on ne s’occupe pas de chercher 
sous quelles influences les contractants opèrent, quels sont les cours des représentations directrices de leur 
pensée ; en un mot, tout l’appareil psychologique disparaît. On prend une relation, qui ne comporte aucun 
phénomène individuel, celle de l’usure et du capital, et on demande ce qu’elle est rationnellement. Pour résoudre 
la question, nous n’avons pas besoin de faire intervenir des hommes avec leurs passions, leurs accidents ; nous 
n’avons qu’à imaginer un support machinal, produisant l’effet primitif sur lequel nous raisonnons.’ 
50
 Ibid.,p .245. ‘Les philosophes classiques nient l’existence des caractères sociaux; il n’y a que des individus et 
des collectivités.’ 
51
 Ibid. ‘J’ai montré plus haut qu’il n’existe aucune science des actes humains individuels ; in n’y a donc pas de 
lois pour eux, au sens vrai du mot ; mais Stuart Mill n’est pas exigeant et il demande seulement qu’on lui 
accorde la possibilité de former une systématique utile.’ 
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a similar error when he asserts that morality is the first amongst the sciences of man since it is 
individual.52 Men do not alter when assembled in society according to Mill, ‘but where do we 
find man outside society?’53 What one must do is avoid discussions on individual agency and 
concentrate on social activity. 
Social activity is not necessarily the activity of collectivities. Individual acts too have a social 
dimension, but ‘As a result of certain mental habits, we see more easily the social dimension 
in the acts of a group than we do in the acts of an individual’.54 For Sorel, the object of 
knowledge of the sciences of man must be the acts of individual and collectivities taken in 
their social perspective. Whereas the decision-making process remains firmly in the 
individualist perspective, and thus cannot be examined scientifically, the ‘objective outcome’ 
of an act creates the object of knowledge of social science.55 The objectivity of this outcome 
derives, of course, from the social point of view adopted by the social scientist: ‘human works 
are easily comparable [between each other] once they are seen as produced by the collectivity 
itself.’56 It ought to be noticed that this is the same point that Sorel had made in the study of 
Proudhon, arguing that ‘products [of human work] must be classified not according to 
individual caprice and pretensions, but according to their role in social production.’57 
In short, Sorel is trying to establish the possibility of a science of the human world. For a 
start, a science cannot be the systematized exposition of empirical data, but must be the 
knowledge of causal mechanisms regulating the given phenomena. But here comes the 
problem, for the human world is also partly constituted by human agency, and Sorel clearly 
believes human agency to be somewhat above the deterministic laws regulating the natural 
world. Sorel conceptualizes the fact of freedom in terms of creative agency, the ability to 
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 See ibid., p. 252. 
53
 Ibid., p. 251. ‘Stuart Mill dit que l’homme ne change pas, quand il est en société ; mais où donc l’homme est-il 
autrement qu’en société ?’ 
54
 Ibid., p. 250. ‘Par suite de certaines habitudes d’esprit, nous voyons plus facilement ce qu’il y a de social dans 
les actes d’un groupe que dans les actes d’un individu : c’est là un simple accident subjectif : mais on finit par 
confondre social et collectif, parce que ce sont des groupes qui nous ont fait connaître d’une manière sensible les 
relations sociales.’ 
55
 Ibid., pp. 253-4. ‘… nos actes peuvent être examinés à un double point de vue. Les processus personnels n’ont 
aucune commune mesure et ne peuvent être considérés que dans l’individu ; les effets objectifs, traduits par des 
transformations matérielles, constituent des choses qui sont toutes de même nature et qui peuvent être comparées 
comme des œuvres anonymes.’  
56
 Ibid., p. 254. ‘Les œuvres humaines sont facilement comparables, dès qu’on les regarde comme faites par la 
collectivité pour elle-même.’  
57
 See Sorel, ‘Philosophie de Proudhon’, pp. 628-9. ‘Le travail de l’individu est quelque chose 
d’incommensurable : chacun l’apprecie à sa fantasie et chacun prétend avoir droit à une rémunération 
exceptionnelle. Dans la notion de la valeur, Proudhon fait disparaître tous ces éléments antiscientifiques : les 
produits se classent, non plus d’après des caprices et des prétentions.’  
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produce artefacts, concepts and tools that have no model in the natural world. This creative 
power, however, generates a serious problem for it puts human agency beyond the reach of 
scientific analysis: how can there be a scientific knowledge of that which is mutable? Sorel 
tries to solve this problem by reducing the space for agency in the explanation of social 
phenomena. Social phenomena have to be examined in terms of the social system in which 
they occur. If seen from this systemic, global perspective, then social phenomena become 
potential objects of scientific study, removing, by way of abstraction, the actors involved in 
the creation of these phenomena. On the one hand there is the idea, articulated somewhat 
tentatively by Sorel, that the whole possesses a logic that is not reducible to that of its 
component parts.58 On the other, however, the insistence on this logic of the social as the only 
possible foundation for a science of the human world, derives much of its necessity from the 
problem just highlighted, namely the contradiction between a theory of human freedom as 
creative agency, and one of science as the knowledge of deterministic objects of study.  
2.4 SOREL AND THE NASCENT SOCIOLOGY 
The difficulty encountered by Sorel in his conceptualization of the sciences of man did not, 
naturally, happen in a cultural void, but profited much from the flourishing of a number of 
relatively new social sciences in the opening years of 1890s France. We have mentioned in 
the previous chapter how the Revue Philosophique promoted the establishment of 
experimental psychology. Criminology too was a blossoming science or, perhaps more 
correctly, a field of study and an issue that was attracting interest. Economics, though a more 
established discipline, was discussed and attracted a large deal of attention. From this 
perspective, Sorel’s interest in a science of man is rather typical of the period.  
One of the reasons for this interest in social sciences was that they were perceived as being 
potentially able to offer political guidance to the French nation: the study of society, if proven 
to be scientific, could help the politician steering the country in a phase of economic and 
social transition. We had seen how Sorel had insisted, in his defence of Karl Marx in the 
Revue Philosophique, on the negative social effects of scientific uncertainty, thereby 
suggesting that social science ought, eventually, to be employed to guide economic policy: 
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 Commenting on Stuart Mill’s individualist methodology, Sorel writes that we find ‘a curious application of the 
metaphysical errors concerning the simple. One tries to decompose society into elements and lets oneself be 
guided by the crassest appearances that belong to empirical knowledge…’. Ibid., pp. 251-2. ‘On trouve ici une 
curieuse application des erreurs métaphysiques sur le simple. On cherche à décomposer la société en éléments et 
on se laisse guider par les apparences les plus grossières de la connaissance empirique.’  
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‘What does socialism demand? That public force act in conformity to the rules of a rational 
state’. 59  If we read the opening declaration of the Revue Internationale de Sociologie, 
established in January 1893 by René Worms, we find similar, as it were, technocratic ideas. 
After having stated that sociology is still young and consequently still unable to provide 
scientific policy guidelines, we find a revealing medical analogy. Before establishing laws, 
one must examine facts: ‘Isn’t this what must be done for the social organism, in the same 
way in which it has already ably been done for the human organism? Medicine only became a 
science after anatomy revealed in detail the structure of the human body.’60 The relevant 
analogy is not that between organism and society, typical of Worms’ sociological thought but, 
instead, that between sociology and medicine, since it shows the practical policy 
consequences that social science was eventually thought to imply. 
One of the elements characterizing this flourishing of the social sciences was the lack of clear 
disciplinary boundaries. Indicative of the vagueness which characterized the boundaries 
between the new social sciences is the fact that Alfred Espinas could obtain, at the expense of 
Émile Durkheim, what was essentially a sociology chair at the Sorbonne in 1893 on the basis 
of his publications in the history of economics.61  We have stated above that the Revue 
Internationale de Sociologie was established in 1893, and Worms in the same year 
established the Institut International de Sociologie, whose first congress, held in 1894, was 
dedicated to the question of ‘What is sociology?’. 62  Institutions and initiatives were 
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 Sorel, ‘Science et socialisme’, p. 510. ‘Que demande donc le socialisme? que la force publique agisse 
conformément aux règles d’un État rationnel.’ Later on, more emphatically, Sorel insists on the connection 
between science and policy by paraphrasing Hegel. ‘Socialism aims at establishing, today, an economic science; 
if this claim is grounded, then it has the right to demand a legislative change from the state: its theorems must be 
applied; what is rational and demonstrated must become real.’. ‘Le socialisme prétend établir, aujourd’hui, une 
science économique ; si sa prétension est fondée, il a le droit de réclamer la refonte législative de l’État ; ses 
théorèmes doivent être appliqués ; ce qui est rationnel et démontré doit devenir réel.’ The idea of a scientific 
direction of society will decidedly disappear as Sorel deepened his knowledge of Marx. 
60
 ‘Notre programme’, Revue Internationale de Sociologie 1, 1893, pp. 2-3.  
61
 The ambiguity over whether the chair holder was going to teach the history of economics or sociology, as well 
as the final outcome displeased Durkheim greatly. On the ‘Espinas affair’ see Marcel Fournier, Émile Durkheim: 
a biography, trans. by David Macey (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2013), pp. 163-7. At the time of 
the events, Espinas’ major work had been a history of economic thought that had been given a cautiously 
favourable review in the Journal des Économistes. See Alfred Espinas, Histoire des doctrines économiques 
(Paris, Armand Colin: 1891) and its review Gustave du Puynode, ‘Alfred Espinas – Histoire des doctrines 
économiques’, Journal des Économistes 51, 1892, pp. 112-16. The review praised the historical erudition but 
urged the author to take the science of economics as a real science rather than as a mere craft. The reviewer 
ended on a somewhat awkward note, if we consider that the book is about the history economic thought, as he 
encourages Espinas to ‘re-read or read’ the classics. ‘Bien plus, il ne regarde au fond l’économie politique 
qu’ainsi qu’un art, et il finit par le dire à peu près en propres termes. Sans doute, c’est un art dans ses 
applications ; mais c’est une science et une pure science dans ses principes, ses doctrines et ses enseignements. 
Que M. Espinas relise ou lise Rossi, Mill, Courcelle-Seneuil, et de Molinari, et il s’en convaincra facilement.’ 
62
 See Fournier, Durkheim, p. 170. 
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flourishing: besides the abovementioned chair at the Sorbonne, the Comte de Chambrun also 
financed, in 1895, the creation of the Musée Social, a research institution dedicated to the 
scientific study of social phenomena, an initiative that benefitted from the patronage of the 
then prime minister Léon Bourgeois. 63  The 1895 international exhibition of Bordeaux 
dedicated a space to the new science of sociology.64 This lack of disciplinary limits was, for a 
number of emerging and, as it were, neighbouring sciences, unsurprising. However, coupled 
with the fast institutional development it became a cause for concern for some practitioners 
who saw potential risk in a generalized but unfocused enthusiasm. Émile Durkheim, for 
example, worried in 1895 that ‘all this activity will go in a dangerous direction if it does not 
have a method to guide it’.65 In the same year, he wrote to his rival Tarde that the excess of 
amateurs and self-proclaimed sociologists were ‘compromising a science that is already too 
easily compromised’.66 
2.4.1 SOREL, DURKHEIM, TARDE 
The question of method was thus becoming an important one. A convincing methodological 
statement would have not only allowed sociology to define its field of enquiry and distinguish 
itself from the other sciences, but would have vindicated, in a context in which sociology was 
becoming a fashionable discourse, its scientific credentials and prestige. Many practitioners 
were aware of this problem. We had seen how the methodological question was central to 
Sorel’s writings on the social sciences and we have to look no further than the opening lines 
of Gabriel Tarde’s Les lois de l’imitation to find the interrogation about the scientific 
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 This political patronage indicates well what kind of political use the nascent sociology could potentially serve: 
that of providing a discourse capable of dealing with the ‘social question’ without embracing the Marxist 
doctrine of class struggle embraced by the socialists that had, as we shall see in the following chapter, just 
obtained their first electoral victories. Bourgeois, prime minister and, in 1920, Nobel peace prize laureate, 
embodied well these anti-socialist collectivist ambitions. In 1896 he published La Solidarité, outlining a political 
course that was supposed to be alternative both to liberal laissez-faire and to socialism. ‘On la [the solidarist 
doctrine] trouve professée par des socialistes chrétiens, et pour eux c’est l’application des préceptes 
évangéliques ; par certains économistes, et pour eux c’est la réalisation de l’harmonie économique. Pour 
quelques philosophes, c’est la loi « bio-sociologique » du monde ; pour d’autres, c’est la loi « d’entente » ou 
« d’union pour la vie » ; pour les positivistes, c’est, d’un seul mot, « l’altruisme ». Mais pour tous, au fond, et 
sous des noms divers, la doctrine est la même, elle se ramène clairement à cette pensée fondamentale : il y a 
entre chacun des individus et tous les autres un lien nécessaire de solidarité ; c’est l’étude exacte des causes, des 
conditions et des limites de cette solidarité qui seule pourra donner la mesure des droits et des devoirs de chacun 
envers tous et de tous envers chacun, et qui assurera les conclusions scientifiques et morales du problème social.’ 
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credentials of the social sciences.67 Examples of this sort could be abundantly multiplied. It 
was one of the most brilliant representatives of the new sociological school, Émile Durkheim, 
who successfully managed to produce one such methodological statement, with the 
publication of four articles in the Revue Philosophique in 1894.68 These articles, later to 
become Les régles de la méthode sociologique, are a seminal work in the developing of 
sociological thought, and raise a large number of issues with which we shall not deal. All we 
need to underline here is that their main ambition was the establishment of a science of 
sociology, the definition of a field of enquiry and of a methodology capable of separating 
sociology from other sciences and of legitimating its scientific ambitions.  
Durkheim’s attempt to establish a methodological canon for sociology was bound to 
encounter various types of resistance. Some came from Sorbonne professors uncertain as to 
whether sociology could be admitted into the educational institutions of the country. 69 
Another type, more interesting for us, came from fellow sociologists, uncertain as to whether 
Durkheim’s characterization of social facts – the object of knowledge of sociology – stood up 
to scrutiny. We have stated that one of the ambitions of the nascent sociology was to define 
its field of study. This implies a clear definition of the object of study, what Durkheim calls a 
‘social fact’:  
‘The question is all the more necessary because the term [social fact] is used 
without much precision… under this heading there is, so to speak, no human 
occurrence that cannot be called social… If therefore these facts were social 
ones, sociology would possess no subject matter peculiarly of its own, and its 
domain would be confused with that of biology and psychology.’70 
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It is the differentiation of sociology from biology, and mainly psychology, that interests us 
here. The reference to psychology had as its target the work of Gabriel Tarde, who had, partly 
also in the above cited Les lois de l’imitation, attempted to establish sociology on 
individualist terms and had conceptualized its field of enquiry as those phenomena resulting 
from the interaction between psychological selves tendentially explained in terms of 
imitation.71 Mostly concerned with the separation of sociology from biology and biological 
explanations, Tarde saw in psychology the key to establishing this separation. ‘It was 
believed’ he wrote in 1890 ‘that the only way of giving to sociology a scientific character 
[tournure] was giving to it a biological, or, even better, a mechanical air’. 72  Instead of 
reasoning in analogy with biology, sociology ought to take advantage of its ‘exceptional 
privilege’: 
‘In social matters, we have under our eyes, through an exceptional privilege, the 
real causes, the individual acts that make up the facts, something which is hidden 
to us in all other fields of study. It seems then that we are exempted from having 
to recur, for the explanation of social phenomena, to the so-called general causes 
that physicists and naturalists are forced to set up and label forces, energies, 
conditions of existence and other verbal palliatives for their ignorance of the 
transparent bottom of things.’73 
If individual acts are the ‘transparent bottom’ and the ‘real causes’ of social phenomena, it 
follows that the explanation of society ought to be framed in terms of interactions amongst 
individuals. Moreover, it follows that psychology, the science studying individual minds, 
conceptually precedes sociology. In 1895 Tarde wrote a preface to the second edition of the 
Lois de l’imitation in answer to his critics, and insisted in defending his approach. The 
imitative interaction amongst individuals is so important that ‘the psychological is explained 
by the social [i.e. by imitative interaction] precisely because the social is born out of the 
psychological.’74 
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Durkheim’s Régles moved in the opposite direction, and tried to establish a fundamental 
difference between social and psychological facts. In a footnote to the first part of the Régles, 
the part in which he defines the social fact, Durkheim had acknowledged ‘how far removed 
this definition of the social fact is from that which serves as the basis for the ingenious system 
of Tarde.’75  For Durkheim, Tarde inverses the causal relationship between imitation and 
social character of a fact: ‘its capacity for expansion is not the cause but the consequence of 
its sociological character.’76 The indefinite multiplication of individual facts, moreover, does 
not constitute a social one, for they are altogether different phenomena: ‘an individual state 
which impacts on others, none the less, remains individual.’77 
The question essentially amounted to whether social action could or could not be explained in 
individualistic terms, i.e. whether the social whole possessed a logic that was not susceptible 
to being examined through the explanatory modes that we employ in the case of individual 
agency. For Durkheim, the independence of sociology could be asserted by showing the 
impossibility of reduction of social facts to individual ones: much like Sorel, he opposed 
methodological individualism. Thus, can society be examined more fruitfully in terms of its 
atomic component parts? Can sociology be grounded in psychology? 
 ‘…it will be argued that since the sole elements of which society is composed 
are individuals, the primary origin of sociological phenomena cannot be other 
than psychological. Reasoning in this way, we can just as easily establish that 
biological phenomena are explained analytically by inorganic phenomena. It is 
indeed certain that in the living cell there are only molecules of crude matter. 
But they are in association, and it is this association which is the cause of the 
new phenomena that characterize life, even the germ of which is impossible to 
find in a single of these associated elements. This is because the whole does not 
equal the sum of its parts; it is something different, whose properties differ from 
those displayed by the parts from which it is formed.’78 
In the context of the passage just cited, the reference against which Durkheim is arguing is 
Spencer, but the closer target is Tarde, whose first substantial reaction to the Régles came at 
the first congress of the Institut international de Sociologie, held in October 1894 in Paris.79 
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According to Sorel, at the congress ‘Tarde pushed the absence of tact to the point of 
acrimoniously attacking Durkheim’s theses; - it is true that any institute is incompetent when 
it comes to judging a man of the value of the eminent professor from Bordeaux.’80 In that 
opening congress Tarde stood by his methodological individualism and, indeed, dedicated a 
number of pages to the critique, at times carried out in a mocking tone, of Durkheim’s ideas. 
He asserted, against Durkheim, that there was no way of making sense of social facts beyond 
their individual occurrences, and accused him of doing metaphysics.  How could a social fact 
‘replicate itself before existing, and how could it, let us speak clearly, exist outside of every 
individual?’81 Durkheim was victim of an ‘ontological illusion’82 and his sociology was based 
on ‘transcendental social facts that M. Durkheim erects to the rank of resuscitated Platonic 
Ideas’.83 
How did Sorel deal with this debate? How did he react to the shaping up of these two 
different positions on the question of social science? The first part of the answer consists in 
saying that he agreed with Durkheim rather than with Tarde. It will be sufficient to recall the 
arguments examined in the first part of the chapter to establish that Sorel rejected 
methodological individualism. Not only does society have, for Sorel, a character that cannot 
be reduced to that of its component parts, but, moreover, the analysis in terms of individuals 
is the result of a conceptual abstraction from a reality that is essentially social.  
‘Stuart Mill states that man does not change when he is in society; but where is 
man except than in society? If we can consider man in its individual state, it is 
through a scientific abstraction; but this division cannot determine a change in 
the nature of things. We find here a curious application of the metaphysical 
errors concerning the simple. One tries to decompose society into elements and 
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lets oneself be guided by the crassest appearances that belong to empirical 
knowledge’84 
We have also seen why this rejection of methodological individualism makes sense in Sorel’s 
thought, since he believes that the individual psyche is not susceptible to scientific study. For 
Sorel, ‘there is no science of individual human acts; there is no law, in the proper sense of the 
word, for them’. 85 
The aversion towards methodological individualism and, consequently, the preference for 
Durkheim over Tarde surfaces in some of Sorel’s writings of the period. For example, in 1895 
he wrote an article on Durkheim and Tarde’s views on crime for the Italian Archivio di 
psichiatria, scienze penali ed antropologia criminale, the criminology journal established by 
Cesare Lombroso.86 In the article Sorel, in fact, defends Lombroso against both Durkheim and 
Tarde, arguing that the physiological basis of crime, as well as the economic conditions 
within which it occurs, are factors that ought to be given importance. Nonetheless, a 
preference for Durkheim over Tarde emerges clearly. 87  Thus, Sorel lauds Durkheim for 
having taken sociology out of its previous state, in which it was little more than ‘a set of 
declamations in an obscure and barbaric language’. 88  As for Tarde, he is the object of 
mockery. When he retorts to Durkheim that his conception of science is ‘a cold product of 
abstract reason’,89 he is met by Sorel’s sarcastic dismissal: ‘Mr Tarde is highly suspicious of 
reason; this is easy to see.’90 Further on, Tarde is accused of ‘anti-scientific tendencies’,91 and 
when he claims, citing J.S. Mill, that, contrary to what Durkheim asserts, a normal social state 
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is characterized by the ‘complete extermination of crime, vice, ignorance, misery and abuse’92 
Sorel mocks him again: ‘But this is an otherworldly existence! Our author still holds by the 
naïve optimism of the 18th century: he believes in the natural goodness of man and the healing 
of all human ills through good will.’93 
In the following year Sorel reviewed, for the Devenir Social, Théodule Ribot’s La 
psychologie des sentiments.94  In the book, Ribot offers a vast overview of a number of 
feelings, examining the simplest ones at first, and gradually evolving towards more complex 
social feelings.95 It is on the latter part that Sorel concentrates. This engagement with the work 
of France’s most established psychologists96 allowed Sorel to return briefly to the question of 
sociology and psychology. Having found the book reasonable but lacking in decisive insight, 
Sorel questions the possibility of establishing sociology on psychological bases. His targets 
are ‘psychologists [who], not finding the human heart interesting anymore, begin to analyse 
society.’97 In order to show that their scientific ambitions are illusory, continues Sorel, ‘it is 
not bad to compare their vain and pretentious theories’ with the findings of ‘the undisputed 
master of psychology in France’.98 In short, Ribot’s book reveals the provisional and evolving 
character of the discipline of psychology. But if this is the case, how can sociology be 
grounded on such a young discipline?99 
2.4.2 THE WORK ON DURKHEIM 
Overall, Sorel’s intellectual preference for a holistic approach over methodological 
individualism is difficult to dispute, while his sympathy for Durkheim and antipathy towards 
Tarde emerges rather clearly. And yet, despite the clarity of his preferences, Sorel never gave 
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to Durkheim more than a qualified approval, and always remained relatively marginal to the 
sociological debate. This fact can appear quite surprising if we consider that, as we have seen, 
Sorel thought and wrote about essentially the same issues with which Durkheim, Tarde, and 
other sociologists dealt.100 The situation can be explained by underlining Sorel’s adherence to 
Marxian socialism and understanding that, as we shall see in the next chapter, this put him in 
a particular intellectual position that prevented him from fully embracing sociology.  
Both Marxism and sociology were, in the France of the 1890s, social scientific attempts to 
make sense of ‘la question sociale’, of the phenomena of industrialization and the rise of the 
working classes. It was the notion of class struggle that separated sociologists from the rather 
small community of French Marxists: whereas the latter framed the issues in terms of social 
conflict, sociologists tended to shun this view and argue in favour of social unity. Sorel’s 
vitriolic account of Espinas’ opening lecture at the Sorbonne is a good example of this 
fundamental disagreement. For Sorel, Espinas ‘seemed to [ministerial bureaucrats] the person 
most suited to destroy socialism, anarchy, demagogy and all the monsters preventing 
respectable family men from sleeping at night.’101 The arguments in favour of social solidarity 
remind Sorel of the ‘theology of the positivist church, and we have heard a hundred times this 
refrain from Bonapartist metaphysicians.’102 Durkheim was moderately sympathetic to the 
workers’ plea but, much in the same way in which he could not accept the  conceptualization 
of society based on the conflict of utility-maximizing individuals put forward by liberal 
economists, he could not see society as the locus of a struggle between classes.103  
Durkheim, moreover, was sceptical about the scientific credentials of socialism, and went as 
far as saying, in a course on socialism that he gave in Bordeaux in 1895/96, that ‘there can be 
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no scientific socialism’.104 More precisely, he argued that socialist thought is not a science, 
but a ‘cry of pain and, sometimes, of anger, raised by those who feel most acutely our 
collective malaise.’105 But if so, asks Durkheim, ‘what would we say about a doctor that took 
the desires and answers of his patient as scientific propositions?’106  This short argument 
expresses well Durkheim’s proximity to a mild socialist ideal as well as his distance from 
socialist theory. Though he sympathized with the idea of a reorganisation of production, he 
could not endorse the very Marxian idea that class conflict is a fertile historical phenomenon. 
As Raymond Aron points out, Durkheim ‘refuses to consider class struggle… as an essential 
element of present society, or even as the essence of the historical movement. For Durkheim, 
as a good disciple of Auguste Comte, conflicts between workers and capitalists are proofs of a 
lack of organisation, of a partial anomaly of modern society that must be rectified.’107 
Thus, though he was intellectually attracted to Durkheimian sociology, as a Marxist Sorel 
could not fully embrace it. Nonetheless, he dedicated a long article to Durkheim’s Régles in 
the Marxist Le Devenir Social. The text consists in a thorough examination of Durkheim’s 
method in which Sorel’s focus is firmly on the epistemological difficulties involved in the 
establishment of sociology.108 Sorel’s stance throughout the article is one of very respectful 
dissent: though he has some strong objections to make, he never loses an occasion to 
underline Durkheim’s intellectual superiority when compared to the sociological standard. 
Nonetheless, he begins by declaring very clearly the political differences between socialists 
and Durkheim, a thinker that claims scientific objectivity but that, for Sorel, has not distanced 
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himself from ‘the passions and prejudices of his own political side’.109 What is this political 
side to which the new sociology lends an intellectual hand? 
 ‘‘… M. Durkheim does not belong to the old school of J. –B. Say, a school 
whose shortcomings he has seen. He is in favour of state intervention, and he 
deals with problems animated by a very progressive spirit. The new ideas of 
conservative democracy, that demand more justice in economic relations –  
favouring the intellectual and moral development of the people, pushing industry 
towards more scientific paths – have finally found a theorist who is at the same 
time a metaphysician of rare subtlety and an erudite perfectly equipped for the 
fight.’110  
After these, as it were, political preambles, Sorel jumps immediately to the question that 
interests him most, the one concerning the possibility of a sociological science. Bearing in 
mind that for Sorel science is concerned with the explanation of deterministic causal 
mechanisms, it is significant that he begins by writing that ‘It is not always easy to know what 
idea Mr. Durkheim has of science’.111 Through a bizarre but interesting comparison between 
sociology and meteorology he makes two initial points. First, he remarks that both sciences 
are observational rather than experimental, that is to say, both sciences lack the possibility of 
constructing experimental conditions allowing them to isolate the relevant variables and 
causal connections. Secondly, and consequently, this means that both sciences work on 
statistically constructed theoretical objects, what Sorel calls ‘type moyen’, or ‘état moyen’. 112 
These preliminary considerations already make Sorel doubt whether Durkheimian sociology 
can really be called a science. The causal relations holding together two social phenomena are 
to him ‘empirical relations based on the knowledge of facts corrected in order to erase 
eccentric individualities’.113 In these conditions, he adds, it is impossible to separate ‘craft 
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from science.’114 In other words, without the possibility of experimentation, the role played 
by expressive supports becomes problematically central. 
However, the crux of the question continues to be the issue of freedom and determinism, and 
it is here that Sorel delivers his strongest argument against Durkheim. It will be recalled that 
for Sorel the possibility of a science of society is inextricably linked to whether there are 
phenomena in society that are linked by causal relations similar to those that we find in the 
natural world. So it is not surprising that he takes issue with the passage in the Régles in 
which Durkheim asserts that, though sociology offers causal explanations, it avoids taking a 
stance on the question of freedom and determinism. For Durkheim sociology has no need ‘to 
affirm free will rather than determinism’.115 But his agnosticism is very problematic for Sorel, 
for the possibility of social science depends precisely on the existence of some form of social 
determinism. Consequently, Durkheim’s argument ‘appears extremely weak’.116 Durkheim’s 
agnosticism on the question of free will means that he cannot legitimately speak of causation. 
‘…very clearly, in sociology, the word cause has a completely different meaning 
than in physics… Physics and chemistry do not imply a loosening of the 
deterministic chain: their laws either hold or do not hold, and apply to each 
individual. But how can we talk of causes (similar to those of physics) in 
sociology where the elements connected are fictions devoid of individual 
reality?’117 
Durkheim’s refusal to engage with the question makes Sorel doubt that sociology can ever be 
a real science. And his conclusion follows in a linear way.  Sociology can aspire, in the best 
cases, at being a systematized body of empirical observations, a ‘systématique’. ‘In sociology 
we do not, thus, reach real causal relations (in the way we do in physics), but only general 
vectors of transformations [ordres de changements principaux].’118 Further on, he is even 
more explicit in rejecting the idea that something akin to the strong causation of the natural 
sciences can ever be established in sociology: ‘we must say that in social history there are 
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phenomena capable of being linked by empirical formulas similar to those used by 
empiricism to attain knowledge of certain domains of the natural sciences.’119 Sorel goes on 
to discuss various aspects of Durkheim’s Régles. He further explores the problems that derive 
from the impossibility of sociological experimentation. He deals with the question of 
methodological individualism and, despite a number of reservations he makes about 
Durkheim’s definition of social facts, essentially ends up agreeing with him.120 Throughout 
the article he continues to maintain that sociology cannot aspire to proper scientific status in 
virtue of its inability to speak of causes. 
Of course, this is problematic. If there is no determinism there can be no causation, and 
without causation there can be no social science. So, if Durkheimian sociology, despite all the 
praise that Sorel heaps upon it, cannot be called a science, what can? How can, in other 
words, one speak of causation in the social sciences? Interestingly, Sorel gives to this question 
two contradicting answers, and bases both on Marxism. 
There is, of course, a standard Marxist answer to this question, and it is that economic 
phenomena constitute the structure of the social world. Economic phenomena are phenomena 
about which it is possible to speak of causal relations, much in the same way one does in 
physics. Thus sociology, in order to become scientific, must deal with such phenomena. At 
times, Sorel gives this answer, suggesting Marxist materialism as the necessary corrective to 
Durkheim’s approach. Thus, Durkheim’s difficulty classifying different types of familial 
unions would be resolved if he, like Jacques Flach, choose to examine them by taking into 
account property relations and the influence they exert on the family structure.121 Further on, 
Sorel is more direct. He argues that ‘non-socialist sociology’ is incapable of examining social 
reality according to a ‘truly scientific principle, based on the theory of knowledge.’122 The 
principle invoked is Marxist economic materialism. After having declared that all juridical 
relations possess a formal and unchanging aspect, as well as a substantial one that determines 
their evolution, he generalizes the point made: ‘the substance of sociology is, in Marx’s 
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philosophy, the system of production and exchange.’ 123  In short, what Sorel appears to 
suggest is that Durkheim’s sociology could become truly scientific if it understood social facts 
as superstructural manifestations of essentially economic phenomena. Only by taking this 
approach sociology can hope to deal with strong causal relations and thus become scientific. 
As indicated above, this is a standard Marxist position, and Sorel articulates it without much 
originality. 
Parallel to this argument, however, Sorel develops another line of reasoning that goes in a 
different direction. Instead of looking for deterministic causal connections based on the 
economic structure of society, he sketches a theory of social analysis centred on human 
agency. In examining the concept of social milieu, Sorel remarks that it necessitates a, as it 
were, relational approach to the study of society: the concept of milieu ‘has a great value in 
the history of thought, for it allows one to move from the philosophy of entities to that of 
relations: an object is examined in an incomplete and mistaken way if it is not put in its 
milieu, and a milieu is defined by the relations that it entertains with the object it contains.’124 
The proper understanding of this concept implies, for Sorel, that society is far from being a 
static object of study, but that, on the contrary, ‘the consideration of a milieu is inseparable 
from that of movement’.125 In other words, social structures are historical, i.e. they undergo 
transformations. What generates these transformations? The answer is social conflict: ‘What 
is most striking in modern society’ is ‘the furious clash of interests, the anarchy of 
competition, the absence of all coordination.’126 It is here that the value of Marxism emerges 
most clearly, for ‘the new philosophy [Marxism] perceived as fundamental the division that 
older theories saw as accidental.’127  This, of course, is part of the Marxist attack on sociology 
as an approach incapable of conceptualizing conflict. But what ought to be remarked is that a 
society that changes, whether through conflict or otherwise, constitutes an awkward object of 
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study for a science concerned with the discovery of deterministic causal relations. Instead, the 
emphasis is placed on the agents of this change. 
Marxists explain historical change through conflict, but how do sociologists explain it? 
Spencer appeals to the vague notion of a ‘need for greater happiness’,128 whereas Comte to a 
‘basic tendency “which directly impels man continually to improve his condition in all 
respects” ’ 129  These, to Durkheim and Sorel, are not satisfying explanations. For the 
sociologist, ‘to demonstrate the utility of a fact does not explain its origins, nor how it is what 
it is.’130 Durkheim argues that although social phenomena might serve useful functions, such 
functions cannot straightforwardly be the causes of these phenomena. 131 Sorel wholeheartedly 
agrees but notices that in order to say this Durkheim must take into account the actors that 
bring forth social transformations and their struggles. In this respect, the Marxian concepts of 
class and class struggle can add much to Durkheim’s analysis:  
‘Thanks to the doctrine of class struggle we can follow the real historical 
process, whereas the one described by our author [Durkheim] is merely 
schematic and logical. Thanks to the theory of classes, socialists do not connect 
ends to imaginary entities, to the needs of the collective soul and other 
sociological absurdities, but to real humans collected in groups acting upon 
social life. ’132 
The definition of classes as the agents of social change brings psychology back into the 
picture: ‘put in its proper place’ psychology can ‘equip sociology with explanations, more or 
less like chemistry with the natural sciences.’133  
It is noteworthy that what brings Sorel to underline agency are considerations on the 
historicity of the social world. At any rate, agency is conceptualized here as the central 
phenomenon of the human world. Whereas professional sociologists are too easily tempted by 
the regularities that statistical analysis can suggest, amateurs, and Marxists, see the distinctive 
trait of the human world: ‘what is striking in the human milieu is that which is human, that is 
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to say action considered from the perspective of the agent.’134 Institutions, continues Sorel, do 
not emerge mysteriously, but are human works, they result from human activity. Thus, the 
Marxist theory of class struggle is a helpful way of conceptualizing agency: 
‘So we have a way of recognizing what is truly human in sociology; we can 
correctly define the active groups and see the economic conditions of their 
formation. Their movements must be described by psychological terms and 
every analogy drawn from physics can only lead us to errors…’135 
The sociology sketched here is very distant from a science looking for deterministic causal 
patterns. The picture painted by Sorel is historical, diachronic, since evolution and change are 
fundamental elements, and conflictual, given that transformations come from the clashes 
between social agents. In virtue of all this,  it is a picture focused on the question of agency. 
Human agency, ‘ce qui est vraiment humain’, becomes the central social phenomenon to 
examine. It is unclear how much Sorel sees the tension between the determinist social science 
based on economic phenomena and the social science concerned with agency and conflict that 
he sketches at the end of the article. He never addressed the tension in the text. In the coming 
years, however, his Marxism will develop in the second direction.  
2.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have essentially examined a tension in Sorel’s thought, one resulting from a 
conception of science permeated with determinism and characterized by a strong notion of 
causality, and a theory of human agency as possessing a creative power. The terrain where 
these two Sorelian ideas meet is that of social science. In order to be scientific, social science 
must deal with deterministic causal relations, but since it deals with the human world, it must 
take into account human agency, and this agency is creative rather than deterministic. The 
circle is difficult, if not impossible to square. Sorel’s first reaction consisted in attempting to 
establish social science on the exclusion of agency: his suspicion of psychology and 
insistence on structural analysis point in that direction. Nonetheless, as the text on Durkheim 
shows, Sorel could not envisage a social science that took no interest in the question of human 
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collective agency. The insistence, in 1895, on the notion of class struggle shows Sorel’s 
inability, or unwillingness to square the circle. 
As we shall see in the following chapters, Sorel increasingly moved away from his conception 
of science as the investigation of causal relationships and developed his Marxism along the 
lines sketched in the article on Durkheim. In order to do this, however, he needed a different 
theory of knowledge, an epistemology capable of explaining human production, which he 
found in a number of Italian thinkers. But in order to show what he absorbed from the works 
of Vico and Labriola, is it first necessary to examine through what circumstances and in what 
conditions he read them. 
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CHAPTER THREE: MARXISM IN 1890S FRANCE 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Sorel’s turn to Marxism, as we have seen, dates back to 1893, year in which he sent his 
‘Science et socialisme’ letter to the Revue Philosophique. Any examination of an intellectual 
encounter between two thinkers must take into account the context within which this 
encounter occurs. This is even more so in cases, such as ours, in which the distance between 
Marx and Sorel is both geographical and chronological: this distance generates a large amount 
of mediation between the two that it would be unwise to ignore. In fact, this mediation 
constitutes the principal factor of explanation of Sorel’s engagement with Marxism: in other 
words, the main features around which Sorel’s Marxism developed can be better explained by 
a number of contextual factors rather than through a direct reference to Marx’s work. In the 
last two chapters, for example, we have outlined a conceptual problem regarding social 
science, human agency and determinism that would be impossible to ignore when examining 
Sorel’s engagement with Marxism, for it would amount to ignoring the deep theoretical 
questions that Sorel was trying to solve through such an engagement. But it would be equally 
wrong to ignore context understood in a narrower way, namely in terms of what 
consequences, in terms of constraints and opportunities, derived from the public embracement 
of Marxism in the France of the 1890s. It is with this question that we shall deal in this 
chapter. 
Synthetically put, the particularity of Sorel’s turn to Marxism consisted in the fact that it was 
animated by an eminently intellectual attraction to Marx’s theories in a context in which such 
theories were, optimistically, marginal and generally misunderstood –  or more negatively –  
virtually unknown. Sorel, let us recall, saw in Marxism a ‘new metaphysics’, a method and a 
philosophical stance capable of resolving the stalemates that, in his opinion, paralysed French 
intellectual life. But the Marxism that circulated in the France of the time was far from having 
the complexity and articulation needed for such a task. Marxism was a marginal doctrine that 
was understood in very simplistic terms, and thus was incapable of becoming an intellectual 
force in the French context. Both the wealth of French socialist and revolutionary traditions, 
and the fact that the political organizations of the working class – important loci for a 
potential implantation of Marxism in France – were weaker and more fragmented than their 
German counterparts, contribute to explain this marginality. Moreover, the only thoroughly 
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Marxist party in the landscape of French socialism – Jules Guesde’s Parti Ouvrier Français 
(POF) – displayed a certain indifference to questions of doctrine and of theoretical 
elaboration. The consequence was that Marxism was often reduced to a caricature: 
deterministic, shallow, excessively concerned with conflict and with the basest economic 
motivations that agents might entertain, Marxism was seen, by political enemies as well as by 
a number of socialists, as a ‘German’ theory, the intellectual expression of a land devoid of 
juridical culture and obsessed with violence and barbarity. 
Sorel’s engagement with Marxism was profoundly conditioned by this context. To start with, 
the modesty and indifference to theory of socialist parties meant that intellectuals could 
develop the theory in conditions of relative freedom. To appreciate this, it is sufficient to 
underline the fact that someone without any political affiliations like Sorel could have a 
central role in the implantation of Marxism in France. Moreover, the activity of such 
intellectuals could not be limited to the usual task of, so to speak, spreading the gospel: 
Marx’s theory had to be understood and woven into the fabric of French intellectual life, and 
this necessitated a work of conceptual clarification, of redescription of Marxism in terms that 
were compatible with the French context. The two tasks, dissemination and theoretical 
elaboration, were, in fact, deeply connected. If the intention was that of vindicating the 
scientific credentials of historical materialism, of convincing the established intellectual 
authorities that they ignored Marx at their peril, then the political slogans of the POF would 
not be sufficient. A more elaborated Marxism was needed, one capable of addressing the two 
main objections directed against it: that of determinism, and that regarding Marxism’s 
excessive reliance on economic explanation at the expense of right and ethics. But France 
lacked the resources needed for this work of re-elaboration, and this is why this process was 
extremely permeable to foreign influences, which in Sorel’s case proved decisive. 
In the first section of the chapter, in part with the help of a comparison with Germany, we are 
going to deal with the question of the place of Marxism in the French intellectual field of the 
closing decades of the 19th century. With what was Marxism associated? How was it 
understood? On what grounds was it attacked, and how was it generally defended? In the 
second part of the chapter we shall focus on how this context influenced Sorel’s engagement 
with Marx. We shall spell out how Sorel’s attempts to implant Marxism in France required a 
work of theoretical elaboration capable of answering the objections of determinism and of 
indifference to right that were routinely directed at Marxism. We shall also highlight how the 
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poverty of French Marxism meant that foreign influences were very important in this process 
of theoretical re-elaboration, and we shall begin examining the decisive encounter between 
Sorel and two Italian thinkers, Antonio Labriola and Benedetto Croce. 
3.2 BACKGROUND 
The place of Marxism in the France of the end of the 19th century was a marginal one. This 
marginality, to a large extent, derived from the political and theoretical fragmentation that 
characterized the French socialist movement. If we compare it to the German one, the 
differences are striking: while on the German side of the Rhine we had an organised mass 
party, on the other we find a fragmented socialist front, composed of many currents and 
parties often entertaining conflictual relationships even between themselves. Whereas in 
Germany the necessities of such an organisation implied an effort of coherence and doctrinal 
systematization that produced a coherent Marxist ideology, the French fragmentation allowed 
each current and organisation to frame the theoretical discourse with greater freedom, 
generating a corresponding theoretical fragmentation. Moreover, whereas in Germany the 
theoretical hegemony of Marxism was, by the 1890s, largely beyond question, France had a 
rather different situation, characterised by the presence of a strong and rich autochthonous 
tradition of socialist reflection, offering many theoretical options and thus reinforcing the 
fragmentation. If we add to this the theoretical shortcomings of the main Marxist party, Jules 
Guesde’s POF, we can understand the extent of the obstacles that prevented Marxism from 
taking hold successfully in France.  
Beyond the political and doctrinal fragmentation of French socialism, however, a further and 
more fundamental element must be highlighted in accounting for the marginality of Marxism, 
and that is the complex relationship between the republican ideal and socialism. The strong 
autochthonous French socialist tradition saw itself as continuing the legacy of 1789, a legacy 
that was also embodied in the republican institutions of the time. Thus, a doctrine like 
Marxism, with its emphasis on economic conflict and on the ‘bourgeois’ character of said 
institutions, was bound to be met with resistance not only by figures of the republican 
establishment, but also by some fellow socialists. This emerges rather clearly if we focus on 
the standard objections that were directed at Marxism in the France of the 1890s. If we 
exclude the accusation of historical determinism, we see that Marxism is seen, first of all, as a 
‘German’ theory, and thus as fundamentally alien to the French tradition. More interestingly, 
this distance from the French tradition is understood in terms of an inability to make sense of 
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the importance of rights. Marxism understands history as the almost mechanical unfolding of 
conflicts understood in purely economic terms, and this, to republicans and to socialists alike, 
was unsatisfactory, as it ignored the juridical conquests of 1789.  
3.2.1 SOCIALIST PARTIES AND MARXIST DOCTRINE: GERMANY AND FRANCE 
The theoretical and political light of European socialism was, in the closing decades of the 
19th century, the German SPD. In 1890 the party had been allowed, for the first time since 
1878, to fight for electoral success in the federal elections without the restrictions imposed on 
it by Bismarck’s anti-socialist laws.1 The 35 seats and almost 1,5 million votes obtained2 
represented, for a party coming out of 12 years of semi-clandestine existence, an outstanding 
success proving its popular appeal, resilience and, above all, organisational strength. The 
party, despite the severe restrictions that had hampered its development between 1878 and 
1890, could rely on a wide network of unions, clubs and publications – amongst which we 
ought to mention Der Sozialdemokrat, printed in Zurich and edited, from 1881, by Edouard 
Bernstein, and the more theoretical Die Neue Zeit, established and managed by Karl Kautsky 
– that ensured its development in the years of underground existence.  
From a theoretical perspective, the SPD was also the more markedly Marxist organisation in 
the landscape of European socialism. In 1891, under the aegis of Kautsky, Bebel and 
Bernstein, the party had adopted a new programme at the Erfurt congress, a programme that 
was strongly coloured by a Marxist analysis of social development. It forecasted the 
increasing polarization of capitalist society into the ‘two hostile camps’ of the bourgeoisie and 
the proletariat and the increase ‘of misery, of pressure, of oppression, of degradation, of 
exploitation’ for the latter.3 The success of the Marxist line in the SPD, as well as the weight 
that the party had in the wider European context, can partially be explained by the fact that the 
German party could count, until his death in 1895, on the immense work of systematization of 
Marxism conducted by Friedrich Engels. In entering the political struggle, the space for 
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theoretical reinvention shrinks as the doctrine must find its canonical form, and the SPD could 
rely on nobody less than the co-author of the Manifesto for this task. 
We shall come back more than once to the SPD and to its hegemonic role in European 
socialism in the period from 1890 until the First World War. For now, we shall briefly point 
out that these political and theoretical strengths ensured its role, in the years in question, of 
guardians of the theoretical orthodoxy. The defence of a body of doctrine manifests itself in 
publications, congress attacks, participations in debates and the like, and we shall deal more 
thoroughly with some such episodes in what is to follow. But the schoolteacher tone of the 
following remark by Engels on a text by Labriola renders very well the extent of this German 
hegemony: ‘All very well, only a few factual misunderstandings and too scholarly in prose. I 
am eager for the rest.’4 Years later, commenting on the accusation of ‘dilettantism’ directed at 
Labriola by Trotsky, Antonio Gramsci concluded that the only way to make sense of the 
judgment was to see it as ‘an unconscious reflection of the pseudoscientific pedantry of the 
German intellectual group, that had so much influence in Russia.’ 5 
While, then, the German workers’ movement could rely on a solid doctrinal codification and a 
strong and successful mass party, the situation was different in other European countries: not 
only the political organisation lacked the unity that characterized Germany, but also the 
theoretical landscape was more heterogeneous. These two traits describe particularly well the 
situation of France. Unlike Germany, France had pre-existing revolutionary traditions of 
considerable importance and, compared to Germany, it displayed a much richer field of 
socialist reflection. Whereas in Germany the only real theoretical antagonist to Marxism was 
represented by the statist socialism of Ferdinand Lassalle, in France reflection on socialism 
was much older and spanned from the utopianism of Fourier to the positivism of Saint-Simon, 
without forgetting the important presence of Proudhon. Thus, whereas the domination of 
Marxism was, by the 1890s, virtually unchallenged in Germany, the situation was rather 
different in France. 
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 Cited in Giuseppe Bedeschi’s introduction to Antonio Labriola, Del materialismo storico: dilucidazione 
preliminare (Roma, Newton & Compton: 1972), p. 11. The citation refers to Labriola’s ‘En mémoire du 
Manifeste du Parti Communiste’, Devenir Social 1, 1895, pp. 225-52 and 321-44. ‘Alles sehr gut, nur einige 
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 Cited in Bedeschi, ‘Introduzione’, p. 12. The original citation comes from Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del 
Carcere, vol. 2, ed. by Valentino Gerratana (Torino, Einaudi: 1975), p. 1507. ‘Non si capisce questo giudizio (a 
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Any analysis of the situation of French socialism in the second half of the nineteenth century 
must start from the semaine sanglante, the brutal repression that ended the Paris Commune in 
May 1871. Though it certainly hampered the organisational development of the French 
proletariat, whose first party, the ephemeral Parti Ouvrier, was set up only in 1879 at the 
Marseilles congress, the true significance of this repression was that it widened the gulf 
separating the working class from republican institutions. The events of May 1871, in other 
words, were later narrated by a number of French Marxists as formidably weighty examples 
of the intrinsically bourgeois character of the republic, a republic whose true nature, behind 
the egalitarian façade, was that of class oppression. The ideology that seemed to be able to do 
more justice to this fact was, of course, Marxism, with its insistence on the fundamental role 
in society of class conflict, and the Commune was the perfect example to invoke when one 
had to vindicate this point. At least until 1892-93, this was perhaps the defining feature of 
Guesdist theory and practice: the Marxist theory emphasized the class basis of institutions, 
while the political practice consisted in an oppositional stance towards the Republic. If we 
look, for example, at the 1880 programme of the Parti Ouvrier, a programme adopted at the 
Le Havre congress and elaborated in London by Guesde, Lafargue, Marx and Engels, we find 
ample confirmation of this. The programme is filled with Marxist formulas regarding the 
‘revolutionary action of the productive class’6 and, even more importantly, on two points – 
the confiscation of Church property and the empowerment of workers in factory legislation – 
there is a direct reference to the legislative activity of the Commune. 7  
And yet things are more complicated. Though the experience of the Commune certainly 
contributed to alienating the working class from the republican tradition, the extent of this 
alienation is at times overestimated. In his Marxism and the French left, Tony Judt goes as far 
as to say that one of the legacies of the Second Empire was that it gave to the French 
proletariat the awareness that ‘the political power which accompanied the rise of a capitalist 
bourgeoisie would always be used at the expense of the working population’.8 This might be, 
as we shall see, an overstatement. The doctrine that expressed most forcefully the separation 
between the working class and the bourgeois republic was, we have said, Marxism. The many 
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 Karl Marx, Jules Guesde, Paul Lafargue and Friedrich Engels, Programme du Parti Ouvrier Français [1890], 
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difficulties it experienced in establishing itself in the French context, as well as the nature of 
these difficulties, might indicate that, after all, the essentially ‘bourgeois’ character of the 
republic was not such an uncontested given amongst socialists and proletarians. We shall 
examine this point more thoroughly in the next section. But for now, even a summary 
examination of the sources relating to the Marseilles and Le Havre congresses testifies the 
weight of the French revolutionary tradition and of its republican heritage: ‘…we are in the 
land of the Revolution that proclaimed the rights of man and citizen; we possess civil equality 
and enjoy universal suffrage! Why have we not conquered yet our rightful place in our 
democratic society?’ asked the general report of the Le Havre congress. 9 Notice how the 
disenfranchisement of the working class is seen as the failure of a worthy ideal, and not, as 
Marxism would have it, as the logical consequence of a process of bourgeois development. 
Moreover, a superficial glance at the working-class members of the organizing committee of 
the Marseilles congress shows the conspicuous absence of anything resembling the proletariat 
of large industrial agglomerations and, instead, displays the presence of professional profiles 
that could perhaps better be characterized as artisans.10 
As stated above, we shall come back later to the fundamental relationship between French 
socialism and the republic. For now, it is important to underline two points. Firstly, that 
French socialism, unlike the monolithic SPD, was characterized by a high degree of political 
fragmentation that was frequently accompanied by internal conflict. In the previous 
paragraphs, we have called the Parti Ouvrier ephemeral. The party was established in 1879, 
and already in 1881 it endured a first split, with the followers of Edouard Vaillant exiting in 
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Générale J. Doucet : 1879), pp. xiii-ix. For a synthetic overview of French labour history in the 19th century see 
Judt, Marxism and the French left, pp. 26-51. 
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order to establish the Comité Révolutionnaire Central. In 1882 a further, politically more 
relevant, split occurred: that between Jules Guesde’s Marxists, that went on to set up the POF, 
and their more moderate enemies, Paul Brousse’s ‘possibilists’, a faction asserting, 
significantly, that ‘the time of “all or nothing” appears to be behind us’.11 The split between 
the Guesdist Parti Ouvrier Français (POF) and Brousse’s Féderation des Travailleurs 
Socialistes deployed itself over a number of socialist congresses 12  and French political 
events,13 and culminated in the debacle of 1889 over the organisation of the International 
Socialist Congress in Paris. 14  Very generally, it was a division over whether political 
participation in the ‘bourgeois’ republic was to be pursued or not. In any case, the story of 
splits and divisions could be continued for a while, and also partly in virtue of this 
fragmentation the political force of French socialism never quite equalled that of the SPD. 
The second point to keep in mind concerns the aforementioned wealth of French socialist 
reflection on socialism. The richness of the French tradition meant that the position that 
Marxism could occupy in the French context was far more marginal and, as we shall see, 
contested, than the one it enjoyed in Germany.15 Of all the currents and organisations that 
animated the socialist front only Jules Guesde’s POF, admittedly the strongest and most 
important one, declared its allegiance to Marxism. But in what sense could the Guesdists be 
called Marxists? This is an important, though complex, question to tackle. Their insistence on 
class, on the importance of economic factors, as well as their hostility towards parliamentary 
activity in the republican institutions that they saw – in true Marxist fashion – as a tool of the 
bourgeoisie16, seems to suggest a positive answer, as it is incontestable that their political 
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Mouvement socialiste en France (1893-1905): Les Guesdistes (Paris, Éditions Sociales: 1965), p. 21. ‘Le temps 
du « tout ou rien » paraît passé…’ 
12
 The split was finally sanctioned at the Saint-Etienne congress of 1882 when the Guesdist minority decided to 
abandon the unitary congress and set up its own one in Roane. See Willard, Les Guesdistes, pp. 23-6. 
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activity was shaped by a Marxist analysis of society. And yet, doctrines are not merely tools 
of political mobilization, they are also interpretations of the world that are articulated in 
historical and philosophical terms. If we take Marxism in this latter sense, the question 
becomes more complex. 
It is one thing to base political activity and to understand history through broadly speaking 
Marxist categories, but quite another to establish Marxism in France, in that the former is 
essentially a political endeavour, while the latter an intellectual one. In his Marxism at work, 
Robert Stuart argues that the exclusion of Guesdists from the Marxist pantheon is the 
consequence of historiographical approaches dominated by what he calls ‘scholarly 
“intellectualism” ’. 17  But it is important here not to conflate the two dimensions – the 
theoretical and the political. If we look at the theoretical elaboration of the POF, the record is 
dire. We can agree that Marx’s famous remark concerning them – ‘If this is Marxism, then I 
am no Marxist!’ 18 – is too extreme to be taken as a faithful representation of their theoretical 
weaknesses. Nevertheless, contemporary scholarship seems to confirm Sorel’s intuitions of 
the time: namely that ‘… many socialists who invoked the authority of Marx and Engels did 
not care whether one studied the texts of their prophets too closely.’ 19 Guesde, after all, used 
to declare in public that he had become a Marxist before he even read Marx.20 
Reviewing Claude Willard’s work on the Guesdists, Michelle Perrot comments on the extent 
to which they contributed to the development of French Marxism. Willard’s book, according 
to Perrot, ‘confirms what we already knew: the complete absence [la nullité] of Guesdist 
contributions to research in all the fields of what we call human sciences: political economy, 
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philosophy, sociology’21, before adding that ‘if they did little to make Marx’s work known, it 
is because they did not know it well themselves.’ 22 The judgment of another French historian, 
Daniel Lindenberg, though going in the same general direction, adds an explanation. 
Lindenberg acknowledges the theoretical weakness of the Guesdists, but insists that focusing 
on this weakness misses the point: ‘To think that they intended to develop theory, to implant 
Marxism but failed, would be to anachronistically lend them the preoccupations of other years 
such as 1930 or 1965.’23  The point, for Lindenberg, is that the Guesdists did not try to 
develop and implant Marxism, but rather that they adopted Marxism for the purely political 
purposes of placing themselves under the aegis of the SPD and having thus the possibility of 
‘crushing all other sects’ with the help of their ideological weaponry.24 For Lindenberg, the 
Guesdist adoption of a Marxist discourse amounts to a ‘means in the pursuit of the goal of 
constituting a powerful workers’ lobby, capable of defending their material interests.’25  
3.2.2 A ‘GERMAN’ DOCTRINE: FRENCH OBJECTIONS TO MARXISM 
Many factors thus prevented Marxism from becoming the dominant ideology of the French 
workers’ movement, ranging from the political and theoretical fragmentation of the forces of 
socialism to the complex relationship with the republican tradition, without forgetting the 
indifference to theory displayed by that most important of Marxist organisations – the POF. 
But, more in detail, how was Marxism understood? How was it conceptualized? For the 
Guesdists, we have seen, being Marxists meant insisting on the importance of classes, on the 
clash between the productive class and its bourgeois exploiters, on the intrinsically bourgeois 
nature of the republic, but also on the eventual collectivisation of the means of production. 
The prevalent mood towards Marxism in France, however, was one of hostility. Of course, a 
large part of this hostility derived from the fact that Marxism, in its Guesdist guise, was an 
ideology of social subversion: the republican enemies of socialism could point out to the fact 
that Marxists tended to deny any political legitimacy to the republic.26 But what is more 
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interesting is to see how a number of non-Marxist socialist shared the same reservations about 
Marx’s doctrines, and how the main objections directed at Marxism at the time were, so to 
speak, indifferent to the political spectrum. The perplexities of political friends and political 
foes, in other words, were remarkably similar: they saw in Marxism an excessively 
deterministic tinge and an inability to understand historical phenomena such as rights and 
ethics, elements that the Marxists reduced invariably to shadowy manifestations of more 
fundamental economic phenomena. These two objections, moreover, were couched in a wider 
interpretative framework that saw Marxism, especially the doctrine of class struggle, as a 
‘German’ doctrine, an intellectual expression of the barbarity and taste for violence that 
characterized that country. 
Hostility to Marxism, to start with, arose from various figures of the republican status quo, 
worried mainly by the subversive and revolutionary message of the ‘German’ ideology. We 
have seen in the last chapter how the nascent sociology could be put to political use, by 
suggesting a non-conflictual interpretation of the social question. Durkheim’s patronising 
rebuttal of Marxism is telling in this regard: Marx’s work cannot be treated as scientific, since 
it is animated by an excessive proximity to the plea of the working class, and as such, can be 
reduced to the ‘cry of pain’ of a patient, something that a doctor should not mistake for 
medical science.27 The conflictual element in Marxism was thus seen not only as politically 
dangerous, but also as intellectually weak. But we get a more interesting articulation of these 
perplexities regarding Marxism in a short book, a collection of two speeches, by Léon Say, 
aptly titled Contre le socialisme. 28 An interesting initial aspect arises in Say’s speeches, that 
the German origin of Marxism functions as an argument against it. Envisaging a future 
socialist dictatorship, Say tells his socialist interlocutor that, at that point, ‘you will recognize, 
                                                                                                                                                        
aims socialist members of parliament ought to realize: ‘Et si, par hasard, quelques-uns des nôtres devaient forcer 
les portes des assemblées représentatives, ce ne serait que pour continuer de plus haut leur propagande 
expropriatrice et collectiviste ou communiste, et mettre au pied du mur – de leur propre mur parlementaire – nos 
bourgeois dirigeants qui ne font qu’un avec nos bourgeois possédants.’ Guesde and Lafargue, Le programme du 
Parti Ouvrier, p. 31.  
27
 Émile Durkheim, Le socialisme, p. 37. 
28
 As his name suggests, Léon, whose full name was Jean-Baptiste Léon Say, was part of the same Huguenot 
family to which the liberal economist Jean-Baptiste Say, Léon’s grandfather, belonged. Banker, journalist and 
then director of the Journal des Débats, Léon went into politics in 1869 and was four times Minister of Finance 
with various governements of the Third Republic. An establishment figure with impeccable and never 
abandoned liberal convictions, he was elected to the Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques in 1874, after 
his first spell as finance minister, and to the Academie Française in 1886. Léon Say, Contre le socialisme (Paris, 
Calmann Lévy: 1896). The book is a collection of two speeches, both given in November 1895, to the Academie 
des sciences and in the Chambres des députés. 
 154 
but it will be too late, that you have intoxicated the country with German inventions.’ 29 
Marxism, further on, is associated with class struggle, which in turn is seen as the natural 
expression of a country devoid of an ethical and juridical culture such as Germany. ‘If sheer 
numbers [i.e. the working class]’, concludes Say, ‘have in France the power to dispose of 
property and of the bodies of a minority, which it crushes under its weight, then France would 
cease being the soldier of right. Force would have overcome right, and we all know that, until 
now, no one has dared foreseeing the day in which this maxim will become a French 
maxim.’30 
Even more indicative is the following synthetic appraisal of Marxism, taken from Say’s 
speech to the Chambre des députés.  
‘In history there have only been struggles amongst classes fighting over 
economic interests; what has occurred in the past will occur in the future; the 
most numerous class – that is to say the workers – being facilitated, by virtue of 
numbers, in the oppression of the other classes, will triumph in this struggle and, 
after its victory, in the impossibility of turning against itself, will be absorbed in 
a great unitary State. I believe that such a doctrine, even when it does not push 
people to the fight, encourages this fight by claiming its inevitability. When you 
[the socialists] tell the people that the battle is inevitable, you push them towards 
the battle… Now, this evolution theorized by Karl Marx, ending up in brutality 
and barbarity, seems to me to be an evolution towards decadence.’31 
This characterization of class struggle is revealing, and not only because it betrays the rather 
real fear of social conflict and the consequent condemnation of anything that might, however 
indirectly, further it. It is also interesting because it ascribes to Marxism an understanding of 
social conflict that is purely economic, i.e. understood in exclusively economic terms. 
As we have stated, it is unsurprising that figures of the republican status quo would voice 
concerns and objections against the revolutionary doctrine of Marxism. What is far more 
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interesting is to see remarkably similar concerns voiced in a long article by a socialist, 
Gustave Rouanet32, written in 1887 for the ecumenical33 Revue Socialiste. In the article we 
see clearly that, in order to implant itself in France, Marxism had to struggle with a strong and 
well-developed autochthonous socialist tradition, and that the main points of contention 
regarded the relationship of socialism, be it Marxian or not, with what we might call the 
revolutionary and republican heritage of 1789. In assessing the relationship between Marxism 
and French socialism, Rouanet paints a picture that is mildly negative at best: a ‘Purely 
materialist, final evolution of the German historic-fatalistic school that was a reaction to the 
[French] philosophy of the 18th century; Marx’s thought is essentially anti-French.’ 34 More 
precisely, the target is the, so to speak, un-juridical doctrine of class struggle, which Rouanet 
sees as a direct derivation of a supposedly Hegelian philosophy of history, in which whoever 
is victorious in the historical struggle is ipso facto vindicated: ‘… for Hegel… war is the great 
judge.’ 35 The key point is, again, about rights and juridical considerations, these constituting 
the great heritage of the revolution of 1789.  The interpretative framework is nationalistic: the 
‘German historical school’ from which Marxism arises is, for Rouanet, characterized by its 
tendency of ‘opposing fact to right’ in virtue of its more general opposition to the juridical, as 
opposed to historical, rationalism of the French Revolution. 36 
And the French Revolution is, indeed, a central point of contention. Rouanet, seeing socialism 
as a continuation of the ideals of 1789, cannot accept the Marxist characterization of ‘the most 
glorious event not only in French history, but in world history’37 as a ‘bourgeois’ revolution. 
The indignant tone with which he comments on Engels’ comparison between Babœuf, 
Thomas Muntzer and the English levellers is revealing of a deep belief in the historic 
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significance of the events of 1789, as well as of the profound continuity that he tries to 
establish between those events and the workers’ movement. ‘The French Revolution put on a 
par with the English one, and with German religious wars! Babœuf, who opens the era of 
contemporary social struggles, compared to a visionary [un illuminé], and his comrades to 
hysterical English puritans!’38 It is from these premises that Rouanet can accuse the Marxist 
Guesdists of being unable to mobilize the masses: if there are no considerations of rights, of 
ethics, but merely economic clashes, if the POF is merely the ‘parti du ventre’, how can one 
hope to mobilize workers? ‘The theory [Marxism]’ writes Rouanet ‘appeals to motivations 
that have never determined vast social upheavals: contrarily to the French socialism of 1848, 
which never ceased invoking the idea of rights and the feeling of fraternity [not a casual 
word] to support its demands…’39 In short, for Rouanet, the introduction of Marxism into the 
political experience of the French proletariat was not, ultimately, a step forward: 
‘Our conviction is… that in trying to avoid an evil we have worsened our 
situation. We have merely substituted the clearly exaggerated sentimentalism of 
the generation of 1848 with a materialism that, under the guise of scientific 
rigour, is equally simplistic; to an incomplete theory we have substituted its 
equally narrow opposite, with the difference that the latter has the immense 
inconvenient of being a German import, thus of not taking into consideration 
neither French temperament nor the French context.’40 
In conclusion, Marxism was not only marginal in the France of the 1890s, but also viewed 
with a substantial degree of suspicion. It was understood as simplistic, as excessively 
preoccupied with the narrow economic interest of historical actors, and consequently 
incapable of accounting for ethical or juridical factors in the historical process. From this 
narrow ‘German’ anthropology, derived a deterministic theory of social development based 
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on conflict, understood as motivated by the basest economic motivations of man. The 
politically transversal nature of these objections, shared by political friends and foes alike, 
testifies to how rooted they were in the French context, and how much of a point of 
contention was Marxism’s, so to speak, indifference to the events of 1789. As we shall see in 
the following section, this climate of general suspicion implied that any attempt to radicate 
Marxism in the hexagon would have had to address these objections. 
3.3 CONSEQUENCES OF MARGINALITY 
In assessing Sorel’s engagement with Marxism we must not forget that, as Shlomo Sand has 
written, it was ‘science, and not politics’ that brought him to the German thinker. 41 This not 
only means that Sorel was quite outside the polemics that characterized the relationship of 
Marxism to the French socialist tradition and to the heritage of 1789, but also, more generally, 
allows us to understand how peculiar was his predicament when, in 1893, he entered the 
scene of French socialism. Far removed from the battles for the control of proletarian 
allegiance and, indeed, from political activity tout court, Sorel embraced Marxism animated 
by eminently intellectual motivations, as a thinker embraces a new and promising body of 
doctrines. In his 1893 letter to the Revue Philosophique he had, after all, spoken of Marxism 
as a new metaphysics, and even the choice of the forum in which to declare his allegiance to 
Karl Marx betrays rather unequivocally the intellectual focus of his Marxist conversion. More 
than in the emancipation of the working class, Sorel was interested in overcoming the 
dichotomy between idealism and scientistic positivism and, more than the bourgeois 
expropriators, Sorel’s targets were the ‘holders of the official chairs’ at the Sorbonne.  
However, as the earlier examination of the context reveals, this new metaphysics was not 
faring too well in the France of the time. Mostly known through its Guesdist version, the 
Marxism circulating in France at the time was reduced to its theoretical bone. With a few 
exceptions amongst which we must count Sorel, the Sorbonne Germanist Charles Andler and 
Paul Lafargue, few people were interested in an in-depth theoretical examination of Marx’s 
work, and even fewer engaged in the task of tackling the main scientific and intellectual 
problems of the time from a Marxist angle. Academically non-existent, politically marginal, 
viewed with equal suspicion by friends and foes alike and accused of being deterministic, 
teleological, alien to the French juridical tradition and, above all, excessively German, 
                                                 
41
 Sand, Illusion du politique, p. 43. ‘Ce qui amène  Sorel au Marxisme, c’est donc la science, et pas la 
politique.’ 
 158 
Marxism was not a blossoming doctrine in France at this time. This situation had, for an 
intellectual that, like Sorel, saw in Marxism a number of intuitions capable of unlocking the 
conceptual stalemates of French intellectual life, a number of important consequences.  
The first of these consequences was that a work of propagation of Marxist ideas was 
necessary, and a type of propagation whose targets were radically different from the usual 
ones. If one wanted to establish Marxism as an intellectual force in France, it was not 
sufficient to educate the working class to key concepts such as the class struggle, but it was 
necessary to enter into a critical dialogue with the established intellectual authorities. It was 
necessary, in other words, to weave the Marxist perspective into the main debates 
characterizing the French intellectual life of the time, it was necessary to conduct operations 
such as those attempted by Sorel in his long essay on Émile Durkheim, or to write letters such 
as the one written by Sorel to the Revue Philosophique. If, in that text, Sorel had spoken 
polemically and had talked of Marxism as a ‘new metaphysics’ capable of triumphing over 
the ‘idealistic reveries’ of the ‘holders of the official chairs’ 42, it is obvious that the very fact 
of writing to the Revue meant wanting to engage in dialogue with the much-despised holders 
of these chairs.   
The theoretical poverty of French Marxism examined above heavily conditioned the modes 
through which such an operation could be conducted. To start with, it is clear that in order to 
engage in a debate with the intellectual mainstream, the Guesdist repertoire was largely 
insufficient. Slogans and general ideas would not do if one wanted to vindicate the scientific 
credentials of Marxism. But the problem with the available Marxism was not just one of 
theoretical under-elaboration. A further difficulty emerged from the fact that, however 
underdeveloped, the Marxism of the POF did not address the key objections that were voiced 
in France against Marxism at the time, i.e. those of historical and economic determinism. This 
meant that a simple work of propagation would have resulted insufficient to implant Marxism 
in France. What was called for was a much more substantial effort of creative re-elaboration 
of Marxism, which, in turn implied a preliminary work of conceptual clarification of a 
number of key Marxian concepts. Precisely because this need of conceptual clarification and 
creative re-elaboration arose out of the necessity of establishing a critical dialogue with the 
French intellectual mainstream, it followed that it could not afford to ignore the main 
objections directed at Marxism, namely those regarding economic and historical determinism. 
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If Marxism was to succeed in France, in other words, it could not ignore French perplexities. 
And thus, the questions of determinism and, more importantly, that of ethics and right, 
became important axes around which this work of conceptual clarification developed.  
Though the absence, in France, of a party like the SPD – concerned with theory and capable 
of equipping its intellectuals with a reasonably solid Marxism capable of engaging in dialogue 
with bourgeois economists or historians – put all the burden of implanting Marxism on the 
shoulders of intellectuals, this absence also meant that they were able to carry on this task in 
conditions of substantial freedom from party directives. This means that the circumstances 
favoured ambitious attempts to reformulate Marxism. The absence of a strong mass party 
capable of dictating a theoretical line generated a lot of free space within which intellectuals 
could move, while the extent of the theoretical work that had to be done pushed them to a 
thorough investigation of Marx’s theories. The highly unorthodox Marxisms of Sorel and 
Jean Jaurès are legacies of a climate of intellectual effervescence, a climate in which the 
engagement with Marxism could be rather creative, precisely in virtue of the theoretical 
limitations of what was available in the hexagon.  
3.3.1 THE ÈRE NOUVELLE AND THE DEVENIR SOCIAL 
As Sorel wrote in 1919 in one of his rare autobiographical texts, ‘Between 1894 and 1897 I 
devoted virtually all of my time to two Marxist publications, the Ère Nouvelle and the 
Devenir Social’.43 These journals are excellent examples of the spaces in which this work or 
re-elaboration and implantation of Marxism in France took place. They marked their 
difference from the existing Marxist publications by focussing on theory and doctrine far 
more than on politics, and they differentiated themselves from publications such as the Revue 
Socialiste by openly and exclusively adopting a Marxist point of view. Their ambition was, in 
short, that of establishing Marxism as a force in French culture, and this was done through a 
number of editorial strategies, ranging from cultural and intellectual polemic to the translation 
and dissemination of texts by Marx, Engels, and other notable European Marxists. 
The relationship of these publications with the POF, though not a tenuous one, was 
characterized by a substantial degree of independence. The short-lived Ère Nouvelle, for 
example – the first Marxist publication with which Sorel collaborated – was set up by a 
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Romanian student, Georges Diamandy, and arose out of a radical Parisian university milieu: 
the Étudiants socialistes révolutionnaires internationalistes (ESRI), and out of their attempts 
to make sense of the work of Marx and Engels. 44  Despite the fact that the journal did 
entertain close contacts with the POF, as is testified by a number of articles by Guesde and 
Deville45, it is noteworthy that one of the first French journals of theoretical Marxism could 
be set up by the initiative of socialist students, without formal control by the POF. In its first 
and only year of publication, we find a number of Marxist summas by Lafargue46 as well as 
the first translation of Engels’ Origin of the family, for it was ‘regrettable that a French 
translation has not yet been published to allow our proletariat and intellectuals to appreciate 
the immense value of this analysis of the historical development of humanity’.47 But it is by 
looking at the déclaration, the customary introductory text that French journals of the period 
published in their first issue by way of manifesto, that we appreciate more clearly the 
journal’s intention to act as a broker between French culture and Marxism. The text, written 
by Diamandy in a flamboyant and almost literary style, mentions Marx and Engels only once, 
crediting them with the discovery of ‘economic materialism’, while the bulk of the text is 
occupied by a very French discussion of Zola and Taine. 
Similar considerations apply to the Devenir Social, in a way the successor, on a grander scale, 
of the Ère Nouvelle. If we look, for example, at its first year of publication, we become 
immediately aware of the theoretical ambitions of the journal: we find Plekhanov writing on 
Augustin Thierry, Sorel on Durkheim and Brunetiére, Labriola on historical materialism as 
well as a translation of Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s philosophy of right. 48 Though we shall not 
deal in great depth with those two publications, it is important to examine, however 
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summarily, one of the strategies through which they pursued their attempt to establish 
Marxism in France, namely what Madeleine Réberioux has called the ‘critique militante des 
livres’, and which consisted in an intense and at time vicious activity of militant book 
reviewing from a Marxist perspective. 49 The necessity of examining this activity of book 
reviewing does not merely arise from the fact that it shows the intellectual ambitions of such 
publications and that it gives evidence of their attempt to establish a critical dialogue with the 
French intellectual mainstream, nor does it simply spring from the fact that book reviewing 
was a genre that Sorel was fond of and in which he excelled.50 Those are all good reasons, but 
they point to a more important one, namely that these book reviews are excellent sources for 
understanding how a new body of doctrines makes its way into a hostile environment. In 
other words, it is by looking at these reviews that we can understand how a host of Marxist 
intellectual outsiders, and Sorel in particular, responded to the accusations of historical and 
economic determinism that were routinely directed at Marxism. 
In the case of Sorel, this response changed over time. His first text for the Ére Nouvelle, a 
review of a book by the liberal economist Gustave Courcelle-Seneuil, displays intransigence 
and a stubborn self-confidence in Marxism. Sorel mockingly introduces the author as a 
‘remarkable man: distinguished economist, collaborator of the Journal des Economistes, of 
the Nouvelle Revue, of the Temps, [and a] member of the Institute.’ 51 Sorel’s engagement 
with the many issues raised by Courcelle-Seneuil is minimal, and limits itself to ridiculisation 
and sarcasm. When Courcelle writes of a rationally unknowable yet real God Sorel replies as 
follows: ‘This is surely very profound, but, in my common sense judgment [ma modeste 
jugeote], I do not hesitate to translate it in vulgar language as “God! Think what you will of 
Him; I do not take this seriously; but do not deny Him, for this would upset the Institute.” ’52 
The short review continues along these lines, touching on the issues of freedom of contract, 
the political economy of Smith and Marx, and Courcelle’s elitist views on democracy. Sorel’s 
conclusion is eloquent: ‘We now know what principles he opposes to our ones, and we say to 
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those not convinced by socialist propaganda: “Buy Courcelle-Seneuil’s volume, read it, and, 
if you possess philosophical spirit you shall come to our side.” ’53 
But of course, scathing attacks would not be sufficient to advance intellectually the cause of 
Marxism. What was needed was a theoretical elaboration capable of vindicating scientific 
socialism, and of showing that Marxism could not be reduced to an uncomplicated historical 
teleology based on the almost mechanic struggle between conflicting economic interests. 
This, as we have pointed out, required an answer to the objections of economic and historical 
determinism that were constantly directed at Marxism. Now, it is fundamental to highlight 
that Sorel was not at all indifferent to such objections. If we look at his review of the Léon 
Say’s abovementioned Contre le socialisme, we see to what extent he was convinced that the 
accusations of economic and historical determinism highlighted serious problems in Marxist 
doctrine. When, for example, Say ridiculed the economic determinism of the Marxists, Sorel 
accused him of having ‘a very restrictive interpretation’ of the theory of class struggle and of 
believing that according to Marxism historical evolution is determined ‘by the mere pursuit of 
economic interests.’54 However, significantly, he conceded that such simplistic interpretations 
of Marx’s historical materialism were common amongst socialists too, and, indeed, 
reproached his fellow socialists for making themselves vulnerable to such criticisms.55 When 
Say accused Marxists of venturing into scientifically doubtful predictions of social 
development, Sorel, instead of countering that capitalism was bound to generate a self-
destructive social polarization, answered in the following way: 
‘…since when has science had the ambition of prediction? This could be 
possible, technically, with an idealist conception of history; but this is 
incompatible with Marx’s system. Marxists have as much disdain as our author 
[Say] has for the inventors of fairy tales.’56 
The defensive strategy adopted here is radically different from that employed against 
Courcelle-Seneuil: instead of ridiculing Say, Sorel essentially accepts his objections but 
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defends Marxism by claiming that the socialism known to Say has little to do with the one 
which he is prepared to defend, that of the ‘workers’ parties, inspired by Marx’s Manifesto’.57 
But in fact, this was something of a bluff: the references to ‘Marx’s system’ or to ‘Marx’s 
doctrine’ pointed to a non-deterministic Marxism that was still nowhere to be found in France 
at that time. The Marxism that circulated was, as Sorel implicitly admits, very much 
vulnerable to these objections. But Sorel’s willingness to accommodate for these objections 
gives us a clue as to the direction in which he will, a number of years later, re-elaborate 
Marxism.  
3.3.2 SOREL, LABRIOLA, CROCE 
It is important to highlight how much the work of conceptual clarification and re-elaboration 
was connected to the theoretical shortcomings of French Marxism. In fact, it is quite easy to 
define with precision what this connection amounted to: it was precisely the theoretical 
poverty of French Marxism that made the work of conceptual development and clarification 
necessary. This poverty of French Marxism had a further important consequence, in that it 
made the whole theoretical debate extremely permeable to foreign influences.  If intellectuals 
had to build up a theoretically sophisticated Marxism, and if French Marxism was not up to 
the task, it was natural that other conceptual and philosophical sources were employed in this 
task. Sorel, for a number of reasons, could not refer to people like Guesde or Lafargue for 
counterarguments against the objections of historical and economic determinism. On the one 
hand this was because either the theory was underdeveloped, as in the case of Guesde, or it 
was not to Sorel’s liking, as in the case of Lafargue. On the other, this was because the belief 
in economic and historical determinism was central to the French Marxism of the time. In 
fact,  the emphasis on economics and the belief in an imminent and inevitable collapse of the 
capitalist order were common currency at the time even beyond the French borders, and 
particularly on the other side of the Rhine. Though the level of theoretical elaboration attained 
by the SPD was vastly superior to what could be found in France, German Marxism remained 
anchored in the two forms of determinism and, in virtue of the hegemonic role of the German 
party, constituted the model to which other European Marxisms, Guesde and Lafargue 
included, looked for guidance.58 This meant that the work of re-elaboration had to draw on 
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other sources, and whereas Jaurès drew extensively from distinctly French ones, Sorel found 
in Italy the concepts that he needed in order to make sense of historical materialism. 
Partly in virtue of French theoretical shortcomings, partly in virtue of the internationalist 
character of the socialist movement of the time, Marxist publications collected contributions 
from all over the continent, and sometimes even beyond. If we look at both the Ère Nouvelle 
and the Devenir Social we are struck by their markedly international ambitions and 
authorship. If Diamandy, in his déclaration, had insisted that the journal was going to be 
‘international and eclectic’59, it is by looking at the first year of the Devenir Social that we see 
the international dimension more strikingly: in it, we find Marxists from all over the 
continent, from the British atheist Edward Aveling to his unlucky partner Eleanor Marx, from 
Plekhanov to the positivist criminologist Enrico Ferri. 60 As a contributor to and reader of 
these publications Sorel was exposed to these foreign influences, and it is in his capacity as a 
member of the editorial board of the Devenir Social that Sorel made the encounter with the 
Italian Marxist Antonio Labriola and with his younger friend Benedetto Croce. 61  The 
encounter was to prove decisive for Sorel’s elaboration of his take on historical materialism.  
We can detect, in this encounter, an important symmetry between Labriola and Sorel. Both 
came from contexts in which both the working class movement and Marxist doctrine were in 
a less advanced state than in Germany, and, moreover, the excessively deterministic 
understanding of Marxism that they saw developing in the respective countries perplexed 
both. Much in the same way in which Sorel was beginning to be aware of the necessity, in 
France, of a less deterministic and economic understanding of historical materialism, 
Labriola, in a much more exasperated tone, poured spite over what passed as Marxism in 
Italy. With a nationalistic self-flagellation typical of a certain Italian intellectual class he 
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complained to Croce of the Italian confusions over Marx’s materialistic conception of history: 
‘…that charlatan, Loria’ writes Labriola ‘has made the issue so confused that, in this land of 
approximators and cultivated ignoramuses [di arruffoni e di dotti analfabeti], it is difficult to 
see how one can put things right.’62 Without digressing too much, it is important to stress that 
Achille Loria, an economist, had popularized in Italy a heavily deterministic version of 
Marxism, characterized by the automatism with which entire historical periods and spheres of 
human activity derived from the economic phenomenon. 63 The point to stress is that, much 
like Sorel, Labriola was looking for a corrective to the excessive insistence on historical and 
economic determinism. 
It is necessary to examine the beginnings of the interactions between Sorel, Labriola, and 
Croce, in order to understand why their collaboration proved so fruitful, and so important to 
the shaping of Sorel’s own ideas on historical materialism. It is worth underlining, to start 
with, that despite Labriola’s age and the maturity of his reflections on Marxism, he had never 
published anything on the subject and, what is more, he was quite reluctant to do so, despite 
Croce’s constant solicitations and offers of financial support. It was only when Sorel entered 
into the scene that Labriola began to change his mind, attracted by the possibility of 
publishing in a French journal. In April of 1895, Labriola wrote to Croce telling him that he 
will publish an article on Marxism in the Devenir Social, encouraging Croce to subscribe to 
the journal which he describes as ‘a true journal, not like Turati’s Critica Sociale’. 64 The 
French publication of the essay ‘En mémoire du Manifeste du parti communiste’ must have 
pleased Labriola, because after it he became much more open to the idea of publishing a more 
general work outlining his views on Marxism. 65 Finally, he yielded to Croce’s solicitations 
and accepted his younger friend’s offer, also explaining that he had been reluctant to do so 
before because of his unwillingness to be associated with a socialist movement – the Italian 
one – from which he felt alienated. 
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 ‘I would not know what to do with what I have learned and thought if I did not 
accept an offer such as your one… I have lost my desire to be seen as an Italian 
socialist and politician: above all, I do not want to be seen as associated with T., 
A., C., and P., all more or less impostors. And what a meagre consolation it is 
for me to know that someone in Vienna or London sees me as the champion of 
Italian socialism…. an inexistent socialism! On the other hand, I do not want to 
print my lectures, as was suggested to me… So your generous proposal takes me 
out of a delicate situation I had not quite acknowledged, and opens up an 
unexpected possibility.’66 
A few months after the publication of Labriola’s ‘En mémoire’ Sorel, looking for contributors 
to the Devenir Social, wrote for the first time to Benedetto Croce. As he declared in the 
opening of the letter, it was Labriola who had put him in touch with Croce. The staff at the 
Devenir, he complained to Croce, ‘find it difficult to obtain articles regularly’67 and thus a 
collaboration by the young philosopher – Croce was 29 at the time – would have been 
welcome. What was Sorel looking for? ‘Good’ articles ‘capable of showing to the sceptics 
(and there are many) that socialism is worthy of belonging to the modern scientific 
movement.’68 The foes of socialism, continued Sorel, are ‘always ready to criticize, with 
disdain, the weak parts of our work.’69 The letter constitutes, inter alia, a perfect example of 
the intellectual nature of Sorel’s concerns about Marxism as well as of the fact that he had to 
look outside of France to address them. 
As a response, Croce sent him two texts, which Sorel read ‘with the greatest interest.’70 The 
expression conveys, as over two decades of future friendship between the two testify, more 
than mere politeness. In fact, Sorel’s enthusiasm for Croce’s writings was barely mellowed by 
the fact that they could not be published, since they contained too bold an attack on 
Lafargue’s work. Sorel thus regretted that this ‘creates for us an uncomfortable situation’ for 
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the attack was so conclusive that it meant that ‘Lafargue and you cannot write for a same 
publication, especially for one in which he is one of the founders!’71 But the fact which 
should not go unnoticed is that Sorel agreed more with a young philosopher that he had never 
met than with Lafargue, a central figure of French Marxism: ‘reading what Lafargue had to 
say about Church Fathers and Jewish philosophy, it had occurred to me that his article could 
be the work of an incompetent man; but I did not think he was as incompetent as you 
establish in such a conclusive manner.’ 72  
These early exchanges were the beginning of a fertile collaboration between the three thinkers 
that would last until the end of 1897. During these years the three were engaged in what can 
only be described as a common project of conceptual clarification of Marxism. Again, it is 
important to underline the contextual symmetries that set the conditions for such a fertile and 
intense period of collaboration, symmetries that apply in particular to Sorel and Labriola: both 
thinkers wrote in a context in which Marxism was underdeveloped, and in which the 
dominant understanding of the doctrine remained fixed along deterministic lines. So both 
looked for a theoretical corrective to essentially the same problem. We shall examine more in 
detail in the next chapter how the interaction with Croce and Labriola played a fundamental 
part, at a conceptual and philosophical level, in the development of Sorel’s Marxism. For 
now, we shall be happy with illustrating the sheer amount of interaction between the three by 
showing how all of the important Marxist texts of Labriola and Croce in the relevant years 
arose out of the dialogue between the three. 
We have seen how Labriola’s first important Marxist text, ‘En mémoire’, was published in 
France thanks to Sorel and to Croce’s continuous invitations to publish something on 
Marxism. The second important Labriolan text – the abovementioned ‘Del materialismo 
storico’, a more theoretically oriented essay on the materialist conception of history – equally 
bears the mark of Sorel and Croce. We have seen how Croce paid for the publishing expenses 
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of the publication, and we must add that one of Croce’s Marxist texts, the ‘Sulla concezione 
materialistica della storia’73, consists of a review of Labriola’s ‘Del materialismo storico’. 
Croce’s review, of course, was not merely based on the reading of the text, but also on the 
close reading of its drafts, and on the constant dialogue about it with Labriola.74 As soon as 
the text was published in Italy, Sorel reviewed it for the Devenir Social and when it came out 
in France, he wrote an enthusiastic preface for it. 75  As for the third important text on 
Marxism by Labriola, Discorrendo di socialismo e filosofia, it consists of a series of fictional 
letters addressed to none other than Sorel.  
Similar considerations apply to the main Crocean texts on Marxism. If we examine Croce’s 
bibliography, we see that, pre 1898, there are three important writings on Marxism: ‘Intorno 
al comunismo di Tommaso Campanella’, dating from 1895, ‘Sulla concezione materialistica 
della storia’, in 1896, and, in the same year, ‘Le teorie storiche del prof. Loria’.76 All of the 
essays bear the mark of the three three-way discussions with Labriola and Sorel. We have 
seen how the text on Campanella was one of the first things sent to Sorel by Croce, and how it 
could not be published in the Devenir because of the critique of Lafargue’s work. The second 
work, as we have seen, is a review of Labriola’s ‘Del materialismo storico’. It is a text that 
Sorel thought should be published in the Devenir, only to later change his mind, since the 
attack on Plekhanov it contains was bound to make the publication ‘truly impossible’.77 As 
for the attack on Loria, it was a text insistently requested by Labriola: ‘Why do you not 
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prepare for that journal [the Devenir Social] a (- first -) text on the illustrious Loria’s 
nonsense?’.78 ‘Remember about Loria’.79 ‘Sorel himself begs me to ask you to write an article 
[for the Devenir]. Will you? Could you not begin with a series of notes on the illustrious 
Loria’s nonsense?’. 80  Moreover, not only was the article first published in the Devenir 
Social,81 but Sorel had read it in its first draft in Italian, prior to publication.82 
This wealth of bibliographical informations omits to mention how Labriola and Croce 
influenced Sorel, or how they were involved in his own re-elaboration of Marxism. The 
content of the interaction will be examined in the following chapter. Here, it was necessary to 
highlight the intensity of the conversation that the three entertained on the question of 
historical materialism between 1895 and 1897. 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have addressed the question of which consequences followed for an 
intellectual who, like Sorel, chose to embrace Marxism in the France of the 1890s. We have 
highlighted that Marxism was a marginal doctrine in the French intellectual and political 
context, and we have also insisted on the fact that what was available, in terms of Marxism, 
was theoretically rather weak and thus unable to establish itself as a legitimate intellectual 
option. These conditions spelled out a number of consequences. For a start, there was a need 
to diffuse and propagate Marxist ideas by targeting the established intellectual authorities and 
the main debates animating the French intellectual life of the time. But precisely because the 
ambition was to establish Marxism as a legitimate force within French culture, it followed 
that it was necessary to develop Marxism beyond the usual Guesdists generalities: the 
rudimentary character of French Marxism imposed a work of conceptual clarification and re-
elaboration. The disinterest of the POF towards questions of theory meant that this work of 
clarification and re-elaboration was carried on in a context of relative freedom, while the need 
to engage in a critical dialogue with the opponents of Marxism meant that the re-elaboration 
revolved around two central points: historical and economic determinism. These were the two 
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main objections directed at Marxism, and no attempt to implant Marxism in France would 
have succeeded by ignoring them. As can be perhaps guessed, the conditions were favourable 
for a rather creative engagement with Marx: no party was either capable or interested in 
imposing a theoretical orthodoxy, the doctrine was largely unknown in its details and, most 
importantly perhaps, the work of elaboration had to take into account a series of specific 
objections. The attempt to theoretically elaborate Marxism necessitated an engagement with 
those elements of the French tradition that offered greater resistance to it. Thus, we can say 
that the context necessitated the creation, if not of a French Marxism, then of a Marxism 
capable of engaging with the central features of the French intellectual tradition.  
And yet, beyond these intellectual constraints and possibilities determined by the context, it is 
important not to forget what Sorel was trying to do through his engagement with Marxism, 
which was to develop an approach and method capable of engendering a truly scientific study 
of the human world.  As he had indicated to Croce in 1895, the purpose of an operation like 
the Devenir Social was that of showing ‘that socialism is worthy of belonging to the modern 
scientific movement’.83  As we have seen, Sorel had struggled with this question for some 
time, and his greatest difficulty was that of incorporating the fact of human agency into social 
science. The Marxism that Sorel developed, which we shall examine in the next chapter, thus 
responded to these two features. On the one hand, it was the attempt to develop and implant in 
France a doctrine that was still largely marginal and misunderstood, and from this he derived 
both the thoroughness of his theoretical work and its engagement with the typically French 
questions of ethics and right. On the other hand, Marxism was an attempt at social science, 
and as such needed to solve the central problem that for Sorel confronted any such attempt: 
that of the incorporation of the non-deterministic phenomenon of human agency into a body 
of knowledge that, in order to be scientific, had to possess the ability to make strong causal 
claims. It is from the blending of these two kinds of constraints, both contextual and 
conceptual, that Sorel’s re-elaboration of Marxism emerged. It is to this re-elaboration that we 
now turn. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: SOREL’S MARXISM 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter we have shown that the French context was highly favourable to a 
creative and thorough engagement with the doctrines of Karl Marx: the general ignorance 
surrounding them and the indifference of political parties to questions of social science and 
theory left to intellectuals the task of making sense of Marxism and of elaborating it more 
thoroughly. This also meant that this engagement was bound to, in some way, transform and 
re-elaborate Marx’s doctrines in order to establish them in a very different context. As we 
shall see in this chapter, Sorel’s work of conceptual clarification of Marxism did not ignore 
the main French objections and tried to offer a convincing Marxist reply to the accusations of 
historical and economic determinism. At the same time, we must not forget that Sorel saw 
historical materialism as an answer to the question of social science, i.e. as a method capable 
of producing a scientific study of the social world. As shown in the first two chapters, the 
question of social science was problematic for Sorel, because it brought the tension between a 
‘strong’ conception of science based on causality and determinism and the belief in the 
creative character of human agency to its breaking point. The dualism between the historical 
and contingent human world and a natural one understood deterministically – in Sorel’s 
vocabulary, the dualism between the ‘natural’ or ‘cosmic’ milieu and the ‘human’ or 
‘artificial’ one – could sustain a satisfying conceptualization of the natural sciences. These 
were human activities, permeated by the creativity and historicity typical of human agency, 
that nonetheless, through experimental practice, dealt with the deterministic causal relations 
that regulated the natural world. But the question of social science, i.e. of a scientific study of 
non-deterministic phenomena, short-cicuited this dualism of Sorel’s early epistemology. A 
scientific, as opposed to merely empirical, study of the human world was a conceptual 
impossibility with such premises. 
Sorel’s early ‘structuralist’ attempts at social science, based on the relegation of all aspects 
pertaining to the agency of individuals or groups to the unflattering category of ‘antiscientific 
elements’1, have thus to be seen as attempts to hold on to the hope of explaining the human 
world deterministically, in terms of laws. It is worth underlining that Sorel never tried to 
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explain agency in such a way. Instead, he argued that society could be explained in terms of 
laws precisely when agency is set aside. Already by the time of his essay on Durkheim, 
however, he had begun to doubt the validity of this approach and, in fact, began to timidly 
move in the opposite direction, convinced that social science could not, in the end, ignore the 
fact of agency, ‘ce qui est vraiment humain.’ 2 In the following years, formative ones for his 
Marxist engagement, Sorel moved even further in this direction, increasingly putting human 
agency at the centre of the historical process. From what has been said just above it should 
result clearly how problematic, from an epistemological point of view, this incorporation of 
agency into the field of enquiry of the social sciences was. Sorel’s understanding of science 
was unable to deal with a phenomenon defined in non-deterministic terms, and thus the only 
solution to the problem was to abandon that conception of science and replace it with a 
different one, capable of making sense of human agency. In other words, what was needed 
was essentially an epistemological revolution. 
The first question that Sorel needed to address was an epistemological one: if scientific 
knowledge presupposes deterministic causal relations, and if the human world is defined by 
the absence of these relations, how can one study it scientifically? Put in this way, the 
problem is unsolvable, and this is why Sorel managed to solve it by altering one of the 
variables, i.e. his conception of knowledge and science. This new understanding of science 
and knowledge Sorel found in the reading of the 18th century Italian philosopher Giambattista 
Vico, and specifically in his principle of verum ipsum factum, according to which knowledge 
is not the representation of an external reality, but rather the enquiry into the genesis of the 
relevant phenomenon. It is the creator of something, the agent, that, according to Vico, can 
truly know what that thing is, and thus humans can understand the human world precisely 
because they make it, i.e. because the historical world of mankind is a series of human 
productions. This theoretical breakthrough allowed Sorel to both see the social world as 
constituted by human agency and as rationally understandable precisely in virtue of its human 
origin. The sense in which this knowledge was ‘scientific’ was, clearly, utterly different from 
what Sorel had called science before. In particular, the criteria of verum ipsum factum 
radicalized the historicist tendencies that had always been strongly present in Sorel’s 
epistemology. Sorel had always insisted on the historical, human, genesis of the totality of our 
scientific concepts, but he had also argued that they allow us to discover deterministic 
relations that are neither historical nor humanly generated. With Vico, this latter aspect fades 
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away, and science is conceived entirely in terms of its practice, and thus in terms of its 
history. Experimentation, that once guaranteed contact with the forces of nature, are now seen 
as human creations, with the result that science, both natural and social, becomes one of the 
many activities that humans engage with in their historical existence. As such, it loses all 
aspirations to universality and atemporality. Like all the rest of the human world, science too 
is historicized. Though the adoption of Vico’s epistemology allowed Sorel to make sense of 
the phenomenon of agency, it resulted in a radically different conception of both what science 
is and and of what kind of knowledge it produces. 
The kind of knowledge produced by the social sciences, in particular, is of a genetic kind, i.e. 
it is the historical knowledge of the origins of various human institutions and creations. This 
follows rather straightforwardly from the Vichian epistemology of verum ipsum factum: 
knowledge is the knowledge of the process through which a thing came to be what it is, and 
thus it is essentially historical knowledge. But the Vichian epistemology had another 
important implication, namely that it allowed – in fact, required – Sorel to finally affirm the 
human genesis of the social world, i.e. to affirm that the human world was the product of 
human agency. The conceptualization of the social world in terms of agency, in turn, 
amounted to a rejection of determinism. Because the human world is created by agency, and 
since human agency is creative, it results that its development does not follow laws, that it, 
and the knowledge that one can have of it, is essentially historical, i.e. that the human world 
is a temporal phenomenon that unfolds in terms of past, present, and future. Whereas the 
deterministic world of nature is atemporal, in the sense that laws either apply to it or do not, 
in the human world time is real. This means not only that only the past can be the object of 
social scientific knowledge, but that the future, because it will result from the actions of future 
agents, and because their actions will be creative and non-deterministic, becomes an 
illegitimate object of enquiry for the social sciences. Predictions, in simpler words, do not 
belong to the social scientific discourse. 
The acknowledgment that the social world is the result of human agency and that this fact 
confers to it its intelligibility still left, however, a number of questions unanswered. More 
precisely, it left unanswered the huge question of how this agency deploys itself through 
history, and whether there are general criteria regulating its unfolding. How do, in other 
words, humans produce the social world in which they live, composed of juridical, ethical, 
economic and political relations? How do these social relations arise? Already in his writings 
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on Vico, Sorel had begun to develop the notion of institutions, arguing that they constitute the 
loci in which social relations develop. But the big question as to whether there are general 
criteria regulating the relationships amongst institutions and spheres of human activity 
remains. The importance of this question was that there was, in France, what was perceived as 
a standard Marxist answer: the structure of the social world is an economic one, and social 
relations that are not economic ones can always be reduced to this fundamental phenomenon. 
Sorel, however, refused this answer. Taking his cue from Labriola, he insisted on the 
impossibility of a general criterion regulating the interactions amongst institutions and forms 
of human activities: potentially, in the social world, everything interacts with everything, and 
thus it is impossible to establish a general hierarchy of social forms. Marxist social science, 
for Sorel, can only proceed on a case-by-case basis, precisely because it is aware of the 
constant interactions between the juridical, economic, political spheres in society. 
The Marxism that Sorel came to elaborate then insisted greatly on the rejection of 
determinism in all its guises, whether it be the belief in a necessary evolution of the historical 
process or the belief in a necessary structure of the social world. The historical world of 
mankind was, in the end, the product of human agency embedded in institutions, and thus 
essentially a non-deterministic world. Beyond the rejection of economic and historical 
determinism, a third important point characterised Sorel’s revision of Marxism, namely the 
understanding of social science, Marxism included, as historically conditioned and 
historically embedded rationality. Marxism could not represent an exception to the principles 
of historical materialism, and this implied that it could not understand itself as an unsituated, 
detached, social science. Increasingly, despite still clinging on to the language of ‘science’, 
Sorel came to see Marxism less as a general, unhistorical, sociology, and more as the 
theoretical production of an historically situated subjectivity, i.e. as the expression of the 
proletarian movement. 
Having stripped Marxism of its predictive ambitions and having declared the fundamental 
absence of laws in the historical process, Sorel came to see, coherently with his understanding 
of the historical process, agency – the agency of the working class, more precisely – as the 
central and most fundamental aspect of Marxism. Everything in Marxism, from the theoretical 
elaboration to the political struggle, received its legitimacy from the vitality of the proletarian 
movement, and socialism consequently came to be seen as the historical triumph of the 
modern proletariat. The transformation from capitalism to socialism was conceived 
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accordingly as the development and eventual victory of a new set of social relations whose 
birthplace could only be the institutions of the workers’ movement. Detaching himself from 
the catastrophist understanding of the transformation in terms of an inevitable collapse of the 
capitalist system, Sorel, despite his insistence on the impossibility of prediction, put much 
thought into the question of how a post-capitalist society could emerge. He conceptualized the 
transformation in a nuanced way, asking himself what would replace the old order, and his 
answer was that a new society could only arise through a process of proletarian institutional 
development, through what he called the ‘work of preparation’ of the proletariat. The 
revolution was not conceived in terms of merely an economic transformation, but as a more 
wide-ranging historical transformation of all sorts of social relations: economic ones of 
course, but also juridical, political and moral ones. The revolution, moreover, was not 
conceptualized as necessarily violent and insurrectional: in fact, Sorel believed that the 
presence of violence signalled the untimeliness of the revolutionary transformation, for it 
showed the strength of the old order. The revolution, more importantly, was not something 
that was bound to happen. Its possibility depended on the vitality of the new social force – the 
proletariat – and this historical vitality was a question of institutional development. 
4.2 VICO AND THE HISTORICIST TURN 
The conceptual difficulty that Sorel had not yet resolved by the time of his study of Durkheim 
was the following one: how does one understand, scientifically, human agency? We have seen 
that Sorel was partially dissatisfied with some of Durkheim’s answers, and that he had 
remarked that ‘in sociology, the word cause has a completely different meaning than in 
physics…’3 In this passage, Sorel cast doubt over the legitimacy of constructing, statistically, 
theoretical objects in order to engage in sociological research: for him, this compromises the 
rigour of causal deduction. But there are passages in the essay on Durkheim in which the 
examination of society is conducted without any reference to causal relationships between 
elements. One of the problems with statistical models is that they miss what Sorel has already 
identified as a crucial element of sociological and historical phenomena, namely, agency. 
‘Amateur sociologists’ he wrote ‘have often understood this issue better than professionals… 
[amateurs] try to bring events to life, and insist much (too much, perhaps) on currents of 
opinion, centres of revolutionary agitation, political groups.’4 Even if lacking in method, these 
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 Sorel, ‘Théories de Durkheim’, p. 7. 
4
 Ibid., p. 168. ‘Les écrivains qui ne font pas dogmatiquement de la sociologie se sont souvent mieux rendu 
compte de cette situation que les professionnels… ils cherchent surtout à faire sentir la vie dans les événements 
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amateurs describe what strikes them most forcefully, and in sociology ‘what is striking is 
what is human, that is, action considered from the perspective of the agent.’5 In order to deal 
with this aspect, rather than adopting as Durkheim does, a ‘terminology borrowed from 
physics’ 6 , it would be better according to Sorel, to understand, as socialists do, that 
‘institutions do not have a mysterious origin: they are human works’.7 In short, what Sorel is 
doing here is connecting the genesis of human institutions to the agency of collectivities, and 
suggesting that it is by enquiring into this origin that they can be understood. This is why 
Marxism gives so much importance to the doctrine of class struggle, because, by identifying 
the relevant collectivities, it allows the social scientist to emphasize agency. Moreover, in 
dealing with the agency of what Sorel calls ‘active groups’, ‘their movements will have to be 
described through psychological qualifiers, and all analogy with physics is bound to lead us 
into error.’8 
What is tentatively sketched here is the solution that Sorel will eventually adopt. It consists in 
the abandonment of the search for strong causal connections in favour of an enquiry into the 
genesis of institutions conducted by examining the agency of groups. But what Sorel is 
missing at this stage is a philosophical justification capable of legitimising the scientific 
credentials of this way of proceeding. Although this short examination of the importance of 
agency in sociology clearly departs9 from his earlier structuralist attempts, it seems to come at 
the expense of the scientific status of the social sciences. This is because, in 1895, Sorel did 
not possess an alternative to the conception of science as concerned with regularities, 
prediction and with the knowledge of deterministic causal relations. And this conception of 
science was clearly incapable of dealing with human agency. In the absence of a new 
epistemological criterion, the conclusion that seemed to follow was that no science, in the 
strong sense, of society was possible. 
4.2.1 EXPERIMENTAL KNOWLEDGE AND THE LIMITS OF REPRESENTATIONALISM 
                                                                                                                                                        
et ils insistent beaucoup (trop parfois peut être) sur les courants d’opinion, les centres d’agitation 
révolutionnaire, les sociétés politiques.’ 
5
 Ibid. ‘Sans avoir de principes arrêtés, ils disent ces qui les frappe : et ce qui est frappant dans le milieu humain 
est ce qui est humain, c’est-à-dire l’action considérée dans l’agent.’ 
6
 Ibid. ‘Si on voulait opérer comme M. Durkheim et adopter une nomenclature empruntée à la physique…’ 
7
 Ibid. ‘… les institutions ne sont pas des choses ayant une origine mystérieuse : ce sont des œuvres humaines…’ 
8
 Ibid., p. 169. ‘Ainsi, nous possédons le moyen de reconnaître ce qu’il y a de vraiment humain dans la 
sociologie ; nous pouvons définir correctement les groupes actifs… Leurs mouvements devront être décrits avec 
des qualificatifs psychologiques et toute analogie tirée de la physique ne pourrait que nous induire en erreur…’  
9
 And this distance is most clear in the important role that Sorel gives to psychology. It is sufficient to compare 
this to what he had had to say about psychology in the 1892 ‘Étude sur Proudhon’ or the 1894 ‘Ancienne et 
nouvelle métaphysique’ to see the distance travelled by Sorel in the relevant years. 
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It might be objected, at this point, that we are attributing an excessively deterministic 
conception of science to Sorel: after all, his early epistemological writings had already 
emphasized the artificial dimension essential to all scientific activity. Had Sorel not insisted at 
length on the notion of artificial expressive supports? Had he not ventured into a tentative 
sociology and history of science, arguing that the scientific concepts through which scientists 
through history had carried on their activity derived both from a scientific tradition, and from 
a more general historical context? He had indeed. But he had also insisted on the strict 
separation of the artificial conceptual toolbox that was essential to science from the discovery 
of the actual relations that linked the phenomena examined. The tools through which we 
conduct scientific activity are man-made, but what we discover is not. This is the reason as to 
why experimental knowledge was fundamental to Sorel’s philosophy of science. Only in 
experimental settings it is possible to come into contact with the deterministic laws regulating 
the natural world, and a scientific theory is not proved until it has passed this test. In fact, the 
‘certainty of science’, Sorel had argued in 1894, ‘is based on its industrial origin or, at least, 
in its participation to industrial life.’10 The idea is that ‘the industrial world is an immense 
physics laboratory in which we let natural energies deploy themselves according to artificial 
models.’ 11  Thus, experiments were the moment in which, thanks to the employment of 
artificial tools, scientists entered into contact with the deterministic forces of nature, and 
understood them scientifically. 
Though we have already made this point in the first chapter, it is useful to repeat that Sorel 
insisted a great deal on the fact that science does make claims about the natural world and that 
it can in no way be equated to a coherent human discourse whose relationship with the facts it 
describes is difficult to prove. The connection with the natural world is guaranteed, as we 
have seen, by experiments. Without experiments, science would amount to ‘a number of 
widespread prejudices held by everyone’ and would effectively be what Sorel had called in 
the ‘Ancienne et nouvelle métaphysique’, the ‘old error of universal consensus.’ 12  The 
connection with the natural world is then absolutely crucial to Sorel’s understanding of 
science, and moreover, this connection is configured along a representationalist model, i.e. a 
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 Sorel, D’Aristote à Marx, p. 217. 
11
 Ibid., p. 205. ‘On peut donc dire que le monde industriel est un immense cabinet de physique où l’on fait agir 
les énergies naturelles suivant des modes artificiels’. 
12
 Ibid., p. 217. ‘j’ai pas seulement dit que la science était sociale ; car on pourrait conclure que je donne le nom 
de science à certains préjugés répandus dans un pays et acceptés par tout le monde ; je n’entends pas revenir à la 
vieille bêtise du consentement universel.’ 
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model according to which an enquiring subject tries to map out phenomena that are external 
to him. Again, the Sorel of 1894 provides us with rather clear indications on this matter: 
‘In the last two centuries, we have tried to ground knowledge in a process that 
starts from man and moves outside of him; the materialist point of view (in the 
Marxist sense) is utterly opposed to this way of seeing things; I have many times 
repeated that I consider knowledge in the Greek manner: I believe that reality 
penetrates in us from the outside and leaves its print.’13 
Despite all the insistence on the artificial conceptual toolbox through which we do science, 
science remains, as this quotation testifies, the process of mapping out a reality that is 
fundamentally external to man. In the years following the publication of the ‘Ancienne et 
nouvelle métaphysique’, however, we begin to see an important change of emphasis in Sorel’s 
epistemology. Whereas in 1894 the stress was on how experiments allow us to make claims 
about the natural world, in 1896 he appeared to believe that experiments could only yield 
knowledge of the artificial milieu: ‘…scientific relations belong to the artificial and not the 
cosmic milieu… they are human works in a certain way and they do not pre-exist, eternally 
established, in some divine place as the old philosophy imagined.’ 14  This, of course, 
endangers the entire scientific enterprise, for it breaks the connection between human 
representations and the natural phenomena that they are supposed to represent, effectively 
erecting a wall between science and reality. Sorel is aware of the problem: ‘If laws could be 
discovered merely by observation of cosmic phenomena [i.e. without experimentation] one 
would find… only empirical formulas; and if the artificial milieu [i.e. experiments] deformed 
the supreme reason of things, it would be absurd to base scientific research on 
experimentation.’15 The solution to this dilemma given by Sorel in the beginning of 1896 is 
simplistic and unsatisfactory: he limits himself to assuming a preordained symmetry between 
                                                 
13
 Ibid., p. 190. ‘Depuis deux siècles, on prétend fonder la connaissance sur un processus qui part de l’homme 
pour aller à l’extérieur ; le point de vue matérialiste (au sens marxiste du mot) est absolument opposé à cette 
manière de voir ; j’ai déjà eu l’occasion de dire, plusieurs fois, que je considérais la connaissance à la manière 
grecque : j’estime que la réalité pénètre en nous de l’extérieur e s’y imprime.’ 
14
 Georges Sorel, ‘La science dans l’éducation’, Le Devenir Social 2, 1896, p. 136. ‘… un fait très réel, à savoir 
que les relations scientifiques appartiennent au milieu artificiel et non au milieu cosmique, qu’elles sont œuvre 
humaine dans un certain sens et qu’elles ne préexistent pas formées de toute éternité dans un lieu divin, comme 
l’avait supposé la philosophie antique.’ Of course, this amounts to breaking the connection between science and 
reality, between the scientific representation of something and the 
15
 Ibid. ‘…si la loi cherchée ne pouvait être découverte que par l’observation des phénomènes cosmiques, on ne 
trouverait, généralement, que des formules empiriques ; -et si le milieu artificiel déformait la suprême raison des 
choses, il serait absurde de faire reposer sur l’expérimentation toute recherche scientifique.’ 
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the artificial and the natural milieus, speaking of the ‘rational identity of the two 
environments.’ 16 
The question of how we can establish the connection between our subjective representations 
and objective reality is a classical dilemma of modern philosophy, and becomes virtually 
unsolvable once we ascribe, as Sorel does, an essentially artificial and subjective character to 
our representations. The problem is a fundamental one, and its examination takes us to the 
philosophical core of Sorel’s engagement with Marxism, and, indeed, of his wider 
philosophical project. As soon as Sorel ascribes to experimental knowledge an essentially 
artificial character, he reaches a point where the classical representationalist model of 
knowledge breaks. It becomes impossible to conceive of knowledge as a more or less faithful 
representation of reality, for there is no way of connecting man-made representations to 
natural states of affairs. The only solution consists in an epistemological revolution, i.e. in a 
different conception of knowledge. In his introduction to the Phenomenology, Hegel dissects 
the problem with great clarity. He writes: 
‘If knowledge is the instrument to take hold of absolute Reality, the suggestion 
immediately occurs that the application of an instrument to a thing does not 
leave the thing as it is, but brings about a shaping and alteration of it. Or, if 
knowledge is not an instrument for our activity, but a more or less passive 
medium through which the light of truth reaches us, then again we do not receive 
this truth as it is in itself, but as it is in and through this medium. In both cases 
we employ a means which immediately brings about the opposite of its own 
end…’17 
In other words, once we ascribe, as Sorel does, a transformative character to the activity of 
science, we end up with a distinction between how things are for our consciousness and how 
they are in themselves. Moreover, knowledge of things in themselves seems unreachable. 
Now, the standard Kantian answer to this dilemma is that of engaging in a critique of 
knowledge, an enquiry into ‘the way in which the instrument operates’18 in order that we may 
know under what conceptual constraints our scientific activity takes place. But again, 
according to Hegel, this solution is incapable of yielding to us the knowledge of things as they 
are in themselves. If our scientific activity modifies that which it examines, then an 
understanding of how this modification takes place is powerless in giving to us the thing in 
itself, for even supposing that we could characterize and know the extent and manner of this 
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 Ibid. ‘… l’identité rationnelle des deux milieux, identité qui forme le postulat de toute experimentation…’ 
17
 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §73. 
18
 Hegel, Phenomenology, §73. 
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modification, we would not be able to remove it without falling back into a pre-scientific, 
commonsensical understanding of things, thereby going back to where we started from. In 
other words, it is unclear how an understanding of the conceptual constraints to which our 
scientific activity is subjected is able to yield knowledge of things as they are in themselves.19 
One ‘solution’, or perhaps capitulation to this problem, is the Kantian one according to which 
science operates at the level of modified representations of things, phenomena, and is 
powerless to examine things in themselves, noumena. The Hegelian solution moves, however, 
in a different direction. Hegel begins by pointing to the ease with which these preoccupations 
lead to scepticism, and wonders whether the mistake may not lie in conceptualizing science in 
terms of things and their representations: 
‘Meanwhile, if the fear of falling into error introduces an element of distrust into 
science, which without any scruples of that sort goes to work and actually does 
know, it is not easy to understand why, conversely, a distrust should not be 
placed in this very distrust, and why we should not take care lest the fear of error 
is not just the initial error.’20 
Hegel goes on to show that the problem is framed in a particular manner: the 
representationalist view presupposes ‘ideas of knowledge as an instrument, and as a medium, 
and presupposes a distinction of ourselves from this knowledge. More especially it takes for 
granted that the Absolute stands on one side, and that knowledge on the other side…’21. The 
issue, for Hegel, cannot be satisfyingly resolved under this paradigm, and so he proposes to 
subject these presuppositions to critical analysis, an analysis that will reveal, in the famous 
sentence, that representationalism is ‘a position which, while calling itself fear of error, makes 
itself known rather as fear of the truth.’22 
The point here is that Sorel, as we have seen at the beginning of the section, was coming close 
to a very similar dilemma by 1896. The emphasis put on the artificial character of 
experimental knowledge cast doubts over whether science could make claims about the 
natural world. More importantly, the epistemological stance, and the conception of science to 
which Sorel still held, were not able to account for human agency, whether this agency was 
deployed in the historical genesis of human institutions or in the construction of scientific 
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 ‘…if the examination of knowledge, which we represent as a medium, makes us acquainted with the law of its 
refraction, it is likewise useless to eliminate this refraction from the result. For knowledge is not the divergence 
of the ray, but the ray itself…’Hegel, Phenomenology, § 73. 
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 Hegel, Phenomenology, §74. 
21
 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 
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concepts. Both these elements made the discovery of a way of dealing, scientifically, with the 
artificial milieu a priority. What Sorel needed was an epistemological approach capable of 
yielding knowledge of the artificial environment, an environment that was essentially 
understood in terms of human agency. Much like in Hegel’s case then, the solution consisted 
in a radical epistemological break with the representationalist paradigm and with a new 
definition of knowledge that Sorel found not in Hegel, but in a short formula first expressed in 
1710 by Giambattista Vico: verum esse ipsum factum. 
4.2.2 VERUM IPSUM FACTUM AND VICHIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 
Sorel’s encounter with Vico can be dated to some months before the autumn of 1896, when 
he published a long and important essay on the Neapolitan philosopher in the pages of the 
Devenir Social. 23 Though it is not completely clear through what channels Sorel discovered 
Vico, a few hypotheses can be advanced. The most reasonable guess is that the reading of 
Vico is the first important consequence of the Sorel-Croce-Labriola triangulation. We know 
that Labriola had lectured on Vico in 1887, and that he again lectured on him as a ‘precursor’ 
of historical materialism in 1894/1895, in his lectures that were to constitute the basis of his 
Del Materialismo Storico. 24 In the spring of 1895 Labriola, after having published his essay 
on the Communist Manifesto in the Devenir Social, tells Croce, ‘I am thinking about the 
second booklet: Perhaps “From Vico to Morgan”’,25 and in those months he enquires with 
Croce about a book on Vico. 26 It is highly likely that Labriola would have spoken to Sorel 
about Vico, but, in the absence of definitive proof, we cannot go beyond a consideration of 
this as a high probability. The conceptual similarities between the lessons learnt by Sorel from 
Vico and from Labriola seem to reinforce this hypothesis. 
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 Georges Sorel, ‘Étude sur Vico’,  Le Devenir Social 2, 1896, pp. 785-817, 906-41 and 1013-46. 
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 In a letter to Croce dated 8/12/1894 Labriola writes that for this academic year he will ‘unite under the title of 
“the materialist conception of history” all my courses from past years’, amongst which we find an 1887 course 
entitled ‘Vico the precursor’. Labriola, Lettere a Croce, p. 60. ‘Vorrei che fossi quest’anno a Roma per udire le 
mie lezioni di filosofia della storia, nelle quali raccolgo finalmente sotto il titolo: “la concezione materialistica 
della storia” tutti i miei corsi degli anni precedenti ( -e in forma sistematica): e cioè i corsi: 
1887 – Vico precursore 
1887-88. a) Historica e Filologia -2) origini della società moderna 
1888-89 – La rivoluzione francese 
1889-90 – Dei rapporti fra Chiesa e Stato da Costantino alla pace di Westfalia 
1890-91  La preistoria e la 
1891-92  dottrina di Morgan 
1892-93  La genesi del socialismo 
1893-94  moderno’. 
25
 Labriola, letter to Croce 20/5/1895, in Labriola, Lettere a Croce, p. 72. ‘Io sto già pensando al secondo 
opuscolo. Forse “ da Vico a Morgan ”.’ 
26
 Letters to Croce 28/5/1895 and 5/6/1895, in Labriola, Lettere a Croce, pp. 74-5. The book was the study on 
Vico by Scottish theologian Robert Flint. Robert Flint, Vico (Edinburgh, Blackwood and Sons: 1884). 
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A second and more direct access is constituted by Jules Michelet’s Vico translations. 
Michelet’s complete works came out between 1893 and 1898, edited by Gabriel Monod. In 
fact, as Sorel himself reveals, his access to Vico is through ‘Michelet’s translation, [and more 
specifically, the] 1894 edition. The volume includes, in addition to the Scienza Nuova, Vico’s 
autobiography, the treaty on the ancient wisdom of Italy, and some minor works.’27 As is to 
be expected when a thinker of a certain stature engages with another such thinker, Michelet’s 
selective translations of Vico display evidence of Michelet’s preccupations as much as they 
do of Vico’s own. On a general level, post-Revolutionary France was ripe to welcome a 
philosopher whose insistence on the importance of poetry and anti-Cartesianism fit well with 
an emerging Romantic mood. But there is more. Tellingly, the title given to the abridged 
translation of the Scienza Nuova was Principes de la Philosophie de l’Histoire. The picture of 
Vico which characterized his French reception is that of a philosopher of history, and it is in 
this capacity that Vico made his fortune in post-Napoleonic France. Generations that had 
witnessed the terrifying powers of historical forces were bound to be receptive to the question 
of history, and this explains the enthusiasm generated by Michelet’s translations. As Alain 
Pons writes, arguing for such a Romantic reception of Vico: ‘For contemporaries, as well as 
for the following generations, the radical upheavals provoked by the Revolution in France and 
Europe put forward questions to which only a philosophical meditation on history could 
provide answers.’28  
Both for Labriola and for Michelet then the importance of Vico was linked to his insights into 
historical methodology. For Sorel too, as we are about to see, Vico was important insofar as 
he opened up the possibility of a rational understanding of the artificial milieu, and 
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 Sorel, ‘Étude sur Vico’, p. 785n. ‘Les citations que je ferai se rapportent toutes à la traduction de Michelet, 
édition de 1894: ce volume comprend, en plus de la Science Nouvelle, l’autobiographie de Vico, le traitè sur 
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complete works of Michelet, edited by Gabriel Monod, dedicated to the Vico translations and containing, as 
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in the France of the mid nineteenth century, to the point that even Balzac, in his L’Illustre Gaudissart, mentions 
the Neapolitan philosopher. ‘One can be a genius’ writes Balzac ‘ and live unacknowledged…. This was almost 
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is well, Vico! That makes me happy.’ Honoré de Balzac, L’illustre Gaudissart [1833], quoted in Alain Pons, ‘De 
la « nature commune des nations » au Peuple romantique. Note sur Vico et Michelet’, Romantisme 9, 1975, p. 
42. ‘On peut être un beau génie et vivre ignoré. C’est une farce… qui a failli être le cas du grand Saint Simon, et 
celui de monsieur Vico, homme fort qui commence à se pousser. Il va bien, Vico ! J’en suis content…’. 
28
 Alain Pons, ‘Vico et la pensée française’, Études philosophiques 23, 1968, p. 369. ‘Pour les contemporains 
comme pour les générations immédiatement postérieures, les bouleversements radicaux provoqués par la 
Révolution en France et en Europe posent des questions auxquelles seule une méditation philosophique sur 
l’histoire permet de répondre.’ 
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consequently of the historical process. This brings us to the final and most obvious 
observation concerning Sorel’s access to Vico. As highlighted in Sorel’s study, Vico is cited 
in Marx’s Capital: comparing Darwin’s works to his own intellectual project, the German 
philosopher justified the study of the productive organs of social man on the fact that ‘as Vico 
states, human history differs from natural history in this, that we have made the former but 
not the latter…’.29 
The idea that the intelligibility of history is guaranteed by its human genesis, what Sorel calls 
‘the conception of the construction of history by man’30, appears however to beg the question. 
The fact that Sorel enthusiastically endorses this conception shows the increasing importance 
that he attributed to the fact of agency. Nonetheless, the assertion that historical phenomena 
are human productions does not appear to solve Sorel’s problems concerning the 
conceptualization of agency in the social sciences: in fact, it appears to be a mere re-statement 
of the problem. If history were the product of forces operating constantly through time, then 
we would have some hope of establishing a scientific study of it. But how is this forceful 
restatement of the centrality of human agency in history supposed to make a rational study of 
the human world any easier? 
The answer is that, in addition to the idea that history is the product of human activity, Sorel 
took from Vico something else, namely an epistemological principle concerning the nature of 
knowledge –  the abovementioned verum ipsum factum. Let us explore this theory of 
knowledge more in detail. As Sorel correctly remarks, Vico’s epistemological theses are 
developed in opposition to the anti-historical Cartesianism of the early 18th century. 31 In 
search for an epistemological principle capable of vindicating historical knowledge and of 
neutralising Descartes’ cogito Vico arrived at a definition of knowledge that essentially 
asserted that to know a thing is to have the knowledge of how that thing came to be. From this 
it followed that only the maker of a given thing can have a proper knowledge of it: ‘the 
criterion and rule of truth is to have made it’.32 On the one hand this equation of the known 
with the made – the principle of verum ipsum factum –  effectively reduced Descartes’ cogito 
to banal self-awareness, to mere ‘consciousness (conscientia), not science (scientia), and 
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 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, trans by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (London, Lawrence and Wishart: 
1954), p. 352n. Cited in Sorel,‘Étude sur Vico’, p. 786. 
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 Ibid. ‘C’est cette conception de la construction de l’histoire par l’homme, qui constitue la partie originale de 
l’oeuvre de Vico…’ 
31
 See ibid., pp 810-11. 
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 Giambattista Vico, De Antiquissima Italorum Sapientia [1710], trans. by Jason Taylor (London, Yale 
University Press: 2010), p. 27.  
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commonplace knowledge available even to a person without any learning…’ 33 The certainty 
of the cogito cannot amount to science, since ‘while the mind knows itself, it does not make 
itself’.34  
On the other hand, the principle establishes a new hierarchy amongst the sciences. The natural 
sciences are put at an immense epistemological disadvantage, since man is not the creator of 
nature: ‘… one science is more certain than another only inasmuch as it is less immersed in 
bodily matter than another’35. In other words, in sciences such as physics we attempt to gain 
knowledge of something, the natural world, which God has created and only God can thus 
know in the strong sense. Mathematical knowledge is, conversely, possible, but only since 
man ‘founds within himself a sort of world of forms and numbers, a universe circumscribed 
by himself’36 and thus can arrive at the knowledge of this artificial universe. Of course, the 
price to pay for the certainty of mathematical knowledge thus conceived is that mathematics 
become powerless to explain reality, and become merely a logical game with internal 
coherence: as Croce remarks ‘the certainty that he [Vico] claims for that reasoning 
[mathematical reasoning] is… acquired at the expense of reality… the stress… falls not so 
much on the truth of such disciplines but on their arbitrariness.’37 
Conversely, and this is the decisive point, the study of history is fully vindicated by verum 
ipsum factum since the object under examination has been created by humans themselves. Of 
course, the step is not unproblematic since it is not clear exactly how the chaotic mass of 
historical phenomena – cultures, institutions, economic systems, arts – can be said to be made 
by the human spirit in the same way as mathematics can be said to be. This is a separate 
question that shall be addressed in a short while. Nonetheless, the argumentative logic is 
sufficiently clear: to know is to have knowledge of origins, it is thus to have made the thing 
that one wishes to understand, and human history is the product of human activity. 
Consequently, it is the most perfect object of science: 
‘But in the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest antiquity, so remote 
from ourselves, there shines the eternal and never-failing light of a truth beyond 
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all question: that the world of civil society has certainly been made by men, and 
that its principles are to be found within the modifications of our own human 
mind.’38  
It is important to spend a few words on the question of what kind of knowledge is being 
conceptualized here, for constitutes the blueprint of the type of knowledge that Sorel will 
ascribe to the social sciences. Unlike the knowledge produced by the natural sciences, the 
knowledge that one can have of the human world is genetic, i.e. concerns the process through 
which a thing becomes what it is. In the words of Vico, it is the ‘knowledge of the genus, or 
mode, by which a thing comes to be’.39 From this genetic understanding of knowledge, it 
follows, as already stated, that the most perfect knowledge is that which a producer has of his 
productions. Thus, whereas the older ‘Greek’ conception of science to which Sorel subscribed 
presupposes a rigid but epistemologically-problematic separation between the enquirer and 
the object of enquiry, between the natural and the artificial milieus, the Vichian criterion 
justifies knowledge precisely on the abandonment of the epistemological dualism between 
subject and object. Knowledge thus is not the correct representation of an alien object, but the 
understanding of one’s own productions and thus, essentially, an elaborate form of self-
knowledge. 40  It is precisely the underlying unity between the enquirer and the object of 
enquiry that guarantees the possibility of knowledge. As Croce wrote in 1913, the historical 
understanding conceptualized by Vico displays ‘an indissoluble connection between the 
subject and the object of knowledge’41.  
Philosophically speaking, two points have to be highlighted. For a start, this connection 
between knowing subject and object of knowledge resolves the problem of the matching 
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between artificial representations and the objects of enquiry, since both the creation and the 
understanding of history are the activity of the same human mind. 42  Secondly, since 
knowledge is genetic, i.e. the knowledge of how a thing came to be that which it is, it is an 
essentially temporal and hence historical kind of knowledge. Whereas, as we have previously 
highlighted, knowledge in terms of laws is atemporal, the Vichian conception of knowledge 
does justice to the diachronic, temporal dimension of phenomena in a way that no causal 
relation can. 
4.2.3 THE HISTORICAL GENESIS OF HUMAN IDEAS  
The Vichian notion of verum ipsum factum thus is absolutely fundamental for Sorel. The 
principle legitimizes the study of the historical world of mankind without having to exclude 
human agency: in fact, it is precisely the centrality of agency in history that allows the 
historian to understand it. Nonetheless, the adoption of this apparently minimal 
epistemological principle is a true epistemological revolution that has profound consequences 
for Sorel’s conception of science in general and of social science in particular. This should not 
surprise us too much. As we have outlined in chapter two, the importance that Sorel gave to 
agency sat uneasily with the deterministic conception of science he held to. The discovery of 
a principle capable of accounting for agency then led Sorel to a radical reshaping of his 
conception of science. In other words, the science based on Vico’s epistemology is radically 
different from the activity that discovers deterministic causal connections. Thus, starting from 
this principle, Sorel will engage in a much-needed redefinition of the scope, ambition, and 
methods of both the social and the natural sciences. 
The argument that Sorel deduces from Vico, to be clear, is made in two steps. On the one 
hand there is the epistemological principle that bases knowledge on human agency, verum 
ipsum factum. On the other, however, there is the assertion that history is wholly constituted 
by this agency, since it is made by humans. This means that, thanks to the principle of verum 
ipsum factum, Sorel is able to radically historicize the entirety of human thought. This, in turn, 
has profound consequences for the epistemic status of natural and social sciences, 
consequences that are similar to those deduced by Vico from his epistemological principle: on 
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the one hand, we have the legitimation of the social sciences, while on the other, the 
possibility that natural sciences might make claims about the natural world is now abandoned. 
The principle that Sorel invokes to conceptualize this historicization is what he calls ‘Vico’s 
ideogenetic law’.43 The law consists in the Vichian teaching that one ought to ‘look for the 
origins of our metaphysical constructions in the more or less empirical constructions of social 
life’ 44  or, more elegantly put, the law explains ‘the formation of philosophy under the 
influence of the spectacle offered by the practice of political life.’45 It follows, to start with 
that the epistemic ambition of the natural sciences are drastically lowered. The experiments of 
natural sciences, for example, are now conceived as human activities whose rationality resides 
precisely in their artificial and man-made charcter, in a similar way in which Sorel had 
described them in his ‘Science dans l’education’. ‘Man’ writes Sorel ‘does not place himself, 
as philosophers normally claim, in front of nature to observe it and know it. The scientist 
works on material bequeathed to him by previous generations, and this material belongs to 
what we now call  the artificial milieu. It is thus in a milieu made by mankind that we practice 
out induction, and not in the cosmic milieu.’46 ‘When we conduct an experiment’ continues 
Sorel ‘we do not imitate nature; we employ combinations and tools that are truly ours… 
Experimentation is thus a form of creation; it belongs entirely to the artificial milieu: it is at 
once the made and the true.’47 The possibility that natural sciences might be able to make 
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claims about the natural world is thus put in serious doubt: ‘we never know truly the cosmic 
world; but we are able to know the artificial world for we make it – on the first we can have 
opinions and form hypotheses, the second gives us science.’48 
The idea that  natural science has a history, and perhaps even a sociology, is of course, not 
entirely new. In fact, many of the arguments Sorel uses to illustrate the historical dimension of 
the natural sciences are taken almost verbatim from his earlier writings. 49  But while, 
previously, the emphasis on constructed conceptual tools was accompanied by the idea that, 
thanks to experiments, these tools allow us to make claims about the natural world, now this 
latter idea is abandoned and what remains is the agency of individuals and collectivities. We 
have seen in the previous section that already in the ‘Science dans l’education’ Sorel had 
characterized experiments as belonging to the artificial milieu. But in that text Sorel had 
added an important rejoinder concerning the ‘rational identity of the two environments.’50 
This rejoinder allowed him to hold on to the idea that the natural sciences were able to 
describe and to make claims about the natural milieu. But this time the rejoinder is 
abandoned, with the conclusion that the natural milieu can at best be the object of ‘opinions 
and hypotheses’, but not of science. Everything is thoroughly historicized, everything is 
immersed in the historical world of mankind. Natural sciences, social sciences, institutions, 
ethical convictions, juridical systems: all are conceptualized as human productions, results of 
the historical agency of humankind. This, of course, has relativistic implications of which 
Sorel is acutely, and, it seems at times, painfully aware. 
This emerges clearly in Sorel’s treatment of Vico’s notion of an ideal and recurring history 
guided by divine Providence. For Sorel, the reason as to why Vico had to postulate this theory 
is precisely to fight the relativistic implications of his ideogenetic law, i.e. the imperative ‘to 
look for the origins of our metaphysical constructions in the more or less empirical 
constructions of social life’.51 Science and ethics are generally understood to be ahistorical: 
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scientific laws operate irrespectively of human history, and what was immoral yesterday is 
still immoral today. This, at least, is Sorel’s starting assumption. But Vico’s principle seems 
to invalidate this. This is why, according to Sorel, Vico has to postulate a cyclical and 
recurring history. ‘It is necessary’ he writes ‘that the experimental bases of the science of 
ethics display enough uniformity so that reflexive thought is not exposed to the danger of 
finding contradictory moralities…. These contradictions in the human spirit could not be 
reconciled with the existence of right in God…’52. It in order to avoid this relativism that, 
according Sorel, Vico needs to postulate a providential guidance of history and the cyclical 
conception of storia ideale: ‘…since these [philosophical] principles [of right] have to be 
found by induction, by studying the historical movement, one has to admit that the historical 
movement has already operated in a complete manner [in order to avoid relativism].’53 
Abstractly put, the problem is that of reconciling a thorough historicism with substantial 
standards of truth and rationality. Though he rejects Vico’s providential solution as being too 
transcendental,54 and in too stark a contrast with the historicist principle concerning the social 
genesis of human ideas, he is acutely aware of the problem, particularly when it comes to two 
aspects of human activity: ethics and science. The following passage is rather clear: 
‘Thus, ideal history has perished, buried by the development of historical 
research; it remains only a memory of the past; but the ethical problem to which 
it gave so simple and satisfying a solution remains, and cannot be abandoned 
like a thing of the past. In the science of nature there is a similar issue which 
contemporary philosophy has proven powerless to resolve. Criticism of the idea 
of God has shaken the foundations of various types of knowledge, whose 
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certainty rested on the old conception of “God within nature”. Nowadays, 
science does not seem to be guaranteed against contingency; the point of 
reference has disappeared… It is not easy to answer those who ask what 
becomes of right in the materialist conception of history. The difficulty is the 
same one presented above, since an immutable right  resting on a divine Idea has 
disappeared, much like the total science possessed by God. It would be fruitless 
to deny the difficulties which result from the new principles; but this is not a 
reason to go back to doctrines which we know to be false… It is precisely 
because we recognize its importance [of the problem of right and ethics] that we 
do not want to accept illusory solutions.’55 
Both science and ethics are seen as thoroughly human productions, the result of human 
agency. But this invalidates their universal and, essentially, ahistorical character. What Sorel 
does not yet seem to notice is that this principle would seem to hold for social science as well. 
If the natural sciences are the formalization of scientific practice, and if ethical maxims 
emerge out of the moral practices of individuals within communities, ought not social science 
equally reflect a number of social experiences? This question, Sorel does not yet approach. In 
any case, the search for strong causal connections in the historical world of humankind is 
conclusively rejected. 
 ‘Without doubt, we lose, once more, the hope of unifying things through 
abstract formulas, of establishing an historical science that has an analogy with 
physical sciences; but this negative outcome guarantees the worth of historical 
materialism… We know now that historical laws do not express the effect of a 
cause but that they represent, in a mistakenly unitary guise, an infinite 
complexity of causes… We do not look for unity in the immanent tendencies of 
mankind, which one imagines in order to give a substance to the appearances of 
history, but in psychological evolutions, that are hidden under the cloak of 
historical laws.’56 
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We are quite distant from the search for causal regularities that had characterized Sorel’s early 
social scientific attempts. Laws are, at best, simplifications, but they do not operate constantly 
throughout the historical process. What gives human history its unity, and thus allows the 
historian to understand it, is the fact that it is the product of human agency, however vaguely 
defined. 
4.2.4 AGENCY, INSTITUTIONS AND REVOLUTION 
The thorough historicism that Sorel develops from his reading of Vico, however, suffers from 
the vagueness with which the deployment of human agency through history is dealt with. 
Though the general argument is clear, its important details are not. The human world is a 
series of human productions, but how do – concretely – various social and intellectual forms 
arise in the historical process? In order to clarify Sorel’s answer, it is necessary to anticipate 
that Sorel refuses to provide, à la Hegel, a clear outline of the succession of social forms 
through history and proceeds, in the study of Vico, in a completely empirical manner, 
addressing specific questions and avoiding general answers. As we shall see later on, it is only 
with the reading of Labriola that he will offer an argument justifying his refusal to specify a 
general criterion. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, one of the weaknesses of Marxism in France was its 
perceived inability to make sense of law and of ethics. It is unsurprising then that, in addition 
to science, which we have examined in the previous section, Sorel dedicates to these two 
questions quite a lot of space in the ‘Étude sur Vico’. Both ethics and law, to be sure, are seen 
as historical human productions, arising from given social conditions and societies. More 
precisely however, these human productions arise when the collective life of people is 
organized into what Sorel calls institutions. Now, this ill-defined but ever present concept 
plays an important role, for, however vaguely, it is an attempt to specifiy more concretely 
how human agency deploys itself in history, and how it is able to produce the complex 
systems that we call morality and law. What are then institutions? Sorel never quite defines 
this satisfyingly, so a little guesswork is required. Institutions are the organizational forms of 
collective life, this much seems to be guaranteed. They are, moreover, intermediate social 
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forms, wider than the individual but definitively smaller than society: an individual 
participates to the life of an institution, but society is seen by Sorel as a set of institutions. 
The best way of partially clarifying this nebulous concept is for example, by looking at how 
Sorel uses it. In examining the question of ethics, Sorel indicates a particular institution – the 
family – as ‘the main source of our moral ideas’.57 This means, for him, that the pretension to 
improve mankind’s lot through individual moral education is doomed to fail: instead, one 
must address the issue at an institutional level, and deal with the ‘general causes’ of morality 
that are ‘the forms established through daily practice.’58 Somewhat frustratingly however, the 
family itself is not seen as a given, but is put in relation, in its turn, with a number of other 
institutions and aspects of society. For example, the class aspect influences familial practices: 
‘in the proletariat, the conception of the family is different from that of the nobility, and is less 
permeated by notions of paternal authority.’59 Here, we have an economic class qualifier 
acting upon the familial institution. Neither the permeability of institutions to other societal 
factors, nor the amount of interactions between various institutions is ever regulated by a 
criterion specified with any amount of precision. What Sorel does is proceed empirically, case 
by case. To give another example, the soft character of contemporary penal law, is for Sorel, 
derived from the political practice of democracy: we have an institution, the juridical one, that 
is affected by a political practice.60  
The picture painted is thus rich in interesting detail, but the lack of a criterion regulating the 
interactions between institutions and human activities makes it essentially chaotic. Sorel’s 
social world is a world in which everything potentially interacts with everything else, and no 
effort is made to shed some analytical clarity on these social interactions. This brings us to a 
rather important point, namely that institutions are not conceived in exclusively, or even 
principally, economic terms. There is no attempt to deduce the institutional life of mankind 
from the productive processes that occur in wider society. This, of course, does not mean that 
economics has no role to play, but merely that it does have a privileged position, i.e. it does 
not possess a foundational role in the complex web of human activities that makes up society. 
The example of the family is illustrative: the family, rather than the productive system, is the 
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source of most of our moral ideas, but at the same time it is an institution that is permeable to 
the influence of economic factors. That this should be so is unsurprising: erecting economics 
to a structural level would mean determining a criterion that regulates the web of interactions 
that characterize the social world. But, as we have seen, Sorel does not do this, and hence 
does not give to productive acitivy the centrality it traditionally possesses in Marxism. 
The lack of clear guidelines to examine the interactions amongst institutions will play an 
important part in the years to come. But if the structure of the social world remains chaotic, 
the dynamic of its transformation is sketched by Sorel with surprising clarity, almost as if he 
had arrived at the concept of institutions by thinking about the question of historical change. 
Such transformations are, for Sorel, a question of the development and the affirmation of new 
social relations, and these social relations, as we have seen, require an institutional habitat. 
This means, crucially, that a revolutionary process is a long term game in which older social 
realtions are slowly and gradually replaced by those produced in new institutions. 
Revolutionary activity then is less a critique of the status quo in the name of ideals, and more 
the affirmation of those social relations that are already in place in the new institutions. 
Sorel’s conception of the revolution, sketched here for the first time, follows what Marx wrote 
in a letter to Ruge in 1843, when the German philosopher had declared  
‘We do not say to the world: Cease your struggles, they are foolish; we will give 
you the true slogan of struggle. We merely show the world what it is really 
fighting for…’61 
What dominates Sorel’s conception of the revolution is, paradoxically, a concern with 
continuity: the revolutionary process is not a clean break with the past, but the 
acknowledgment of a presently existing new reality. The concerns of those who think that 
socialism ‘could compromise European civilisation, acquired through such patient work’62 are 
thus shown to be misplaced. The socialist transformation will not be the work of ‘an exalted 
mass, enchanted by the preaching of idealists, rushing to the destruction of what is established 
and breaking abruptly with the past, under the misguided ambition of realizing some 
wonderful plan conceived in some brain’.63 Instead, it will be determined by the degree of 
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institutional development of the proletariat. Thus, for example, ‘juridical continuity will not 
even be violently broken by the proletarian revolution, provided that the current civilisation 
will have elaborated a system of laws regulating… the relationship of industrial actors 
[coopérateurs]: the capitalist part of the code will be able to vanish… without causing a great 
stir in juridical ideas.’64  Much the same goes for economic continuity. By the time the 
socialist revolution takes place, collective property will already be a reality – a necessity of an 
advanced capitalist economy – and thus the transition will be effected without shock. In fact, 
one of the necessary  preconditions of the revolution is that ‘the organization of labour in 
large industry be so well adapted to the needs and the conditions of collective production that 
economic realities will constitute the bridge through which the transformation from one state 
to the other will be accomplished.’65 
We shall come back later in the chapter to Sorel’s conception of the revolution, also because it 
will be developed more thoroughly only in later writings. But the essentials are already 
present in the study on Vico. In true Marxian fashion, Sorel conceives of socialism as the next 
step in the social evolution of mankind, and thus its character will not be that of negating 
capitalism, but of incoroporating into a new society all the most advanced aspects of the 
former system. Two important points follow. For a start, it follows that the revolutionary class 
cannot be conceived in terms of poverty and oppression, but must be conceptualized as, in 
some way, the most advanced class in society, since it is the class that deals with industrial 
production. As he had written to Croce in October 1896: 
‘… the struggle of the poor against the rich was the basis of every revolution in 
ancient republics and in the middle ages; I do not believe that [Babœuf] rose 
much above this conception that tended to keep cities in a semibarbaric state. 
The modern proletariat is an organized productive force and has within itself the 
seeds of scientific and industrial progress: it is very dissimilar from the petit 
peuple of medieval Italian cities.’66  
                                                                                                                                                        
prétexte fallacieux de réaliser quelque plan merveilleux élaboré dans quelques cervelles. Mais il n’en sera pas 
ainsi…’ 
64
 Ibid., p. 935. ‘La continuité juridique ne sera pas même violemment rompue par la révolution prolétarienne, si 
la civilisation actuelle a élaboré un système de lois réglant d’une manière prudente les rapports des coopérateurs 
industriels : la partie capitaliste du Code pourra disparaître, comme a disparu le régime féodal, sans apporter 
beaucoup de trouble dans les idées juridiques.’ 
65
 Ibid. ‘…la seconde condition est que l’organisation du travail par la grande industrie soit tellement adaptée 
aux besoins et aux conditions de la production collective que le réalités économiques constituent le pont par 
lequel le passage d’un état à l’autre devra s’effectuer…’ 
66
 Sorel, letter to Croce 9/10/1896, in La Critica 25, 1927, pp. 42-3. ‘Je doute fort que Babœuf mérite l’honneur 
d’avoir innové quelque chose : la lutte des maigres contre les gras était la base de toutes le révolutions dans les 
républiques antiques et dans celles du Moyen-Age ; je ne crois pas qu’il se soit élevé au-dessus de cette 
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Socialism thus is not conerned with addressing social inequalities, but with furthering 
‘industrial and scientific progress’, and this is why the proletariat is the revolutionary agent.  
A second important point follows from Sorel’s longue durée understanding of historical 
transformations. The slow process by which new institutions generate new social relations 
that replace the older ones, what Sorel here calls the ‘theory of preparation’67, will make the 
revolutionary moment a mere formality. The more new social relations are already in place, 
the less cataclysmic will the revolutionary moment be. Conversely, a large amount of 
resistance encountered testifies to a still imperfect radication of the new social forms. ‘…The 
greatest revolution that one can conceive’ underlines Sorel ‘will be peaceful, for it will not be 
faced by forces capable of rising again angainst it.’68 This point is quite important, because it 
signals the marginal role that violence has in Sorel’s understanding of the revolutionary 
transformation: the more violent a revolution is, the less ready is the new socialist society. We 
shall come back to this point later, but it is important to bear it in mind, especially in the light 
of the Reflections on Violence. 
4.3 THE REVISION OF MARXISM 
The encounter with Vico represents an extremely important turning point in Sorel’s 
intellectual trajectory. The shift, at its most fundamental level, is a philosophical and 
epistemological one. By combining Vico’s verum ipsum factum with the assertion that all 
human thought is an historically contingent human production, Sorel completely transforms 
his philosophy of science: rather than basing science on a representationalist model, which he 
previously understood in terms of mapping out deterministic causal relations, he now 
conceives of knowledge in the Vichian way, genetically, and thus the task of science becomes 
that of tracing the origin and genesis of human creations. The ability of the natural sciences to 
make claims about the natural world is put in serious doubt, while, at the same time, the 
search for regularities and laws capable of explaining the social world is condemned as 
epistemologically mistaken.  
                                                                                                                                                        
conception qui tendait à maintenir les cités dans un état à demi barbare. Le prolétariat moderne se trouve être le 
producteur organisé et avoir dans son sein les éléments du progrès scientifiques industriel : il ne ressemble pas 
au petit peuple des villes du Moyen-Age italien. Les résultat des guerres civiles dans les républiques d’autrefois 
one été malheureux presque toujours : si le socialisme ne se dégage des liens qui l’unissent, un peu trop partout à 
la démagogie radicale, il pourrait bien aboutir à des résultat que Marx n’avais pas prévus.’ 
67
 Ibid., p. 936. 
68
 Ibid., p. 935. ‘… la plus grande révolution que l’esprit puisse concevoir sera pacifique, - puisqu’elle ne 
trouvera pas, devant elle, des forces capable de renaitre.’   
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The epistemological shift can be understood by underlining the fact that the Vichian 
conception of knowledge allows Sorel to make sense of the crucial fact of human agency. 
Whereas this very concept had thwarted his early structuralist attempts at social science, now 
agency is not only put at the centre of the human world, of the artificial milieu, but is also 
what guarantees, in virtue of verum ipsum factum, the rational intelligibility of this world. 
This historicist philosophical turn, however forces Sorel to address in some depth for the first 
time the crucial question of how human agency deploys itself over time in the human world. 
For Sorel, historically-relevant agency is not individual, but collective, or to be more precise, 
institutional: human collectivities organize themselves in institutions, and it is only within 
such institutions that social relations exist and develop. But Sorel, crucially, does not give a 
precise criterion regulating the interactions amongst various institutions. This creates an, as it 
were, chaotic social world in which everything potentially interacts with everything else, and 
thus historical questions cannot be tackled methodically, but only on a case-by-case basis, by 
trying to identify the relevant factors and influences which have shaped a precise human 
creation or institution. The social relations produced in various institutions constitute a given 
society, and thus the logic of historical development becomes a question of the vitality of a 
number of institutions and their capacity to produce new social relations capable of 
supplanting the old ones. The study of Vico, in short, provides Sorel with the basics of a 
theory of history: it gives him an epistemological criterion through which the study of the 
historical world of mankind is legitimated. It gives him a theory of society as composed of 
institutionalized collectivities, and provides him with an, albeit rudimentary, theory of social 
transformation through institutional development.  
It is through this understanding of the historical process that Sorel will engage with the work 
of conceptual clarification of Marxism – of which we spoke in the last chapter – elaborating 
these points in order to develop a more theoretically-sophisticated Marxism. As we have seen 
in the previous chapter, Sorel was not cold to some of the main objections directed at 
Marxism in the France of his time. He, too, was unconvinced by the deterministic theory of 
social development through a purely economic struggle. As he had written in his review of 
Say’s Contre le socialisme, the predictive ambitions of Marxism seemed to him to run counter 
the grain of Marx’s historical method, while class struggle was a phenomenon that could not 
be understood in merely economic terms without compromising the scientific value of 
historical materialism.  
 197 
4.3.1 LABRIOLA’S HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 
Sorel’s review of Say’s Contre le socialisme appeared in the Devenir Social in May 1896, 
probably as Sorel was reading Vico’s Scienza Nuova in Michelet’s translations. The study of 
Vico was published in the same Devenir Social in the closing months of the same year: its 
three parts, roughly 30 pages long each, appeared in October, November and December. And 
also in December Sorel wrote a preface for the first French edition of Labriola’s Essais sur la 
conception matérialiste de l’histoire,69 which was to come out at the beginning of 1897. Now, 
this text must be placed in the context outlined in the previous chapter, a context in which 
Marx’s historical materialism was struggling to impose itself as the dominant ideology and 
theory of French socialism, and thus the discussion revolved essentially on the deterministic 
limits of Marxism. Sorel is firmly on the side of the ‘German doctrine’. Not only does he 
ridicule the pretentions of the ‘French spirit’, and the ‘naïve faith in French supremacy’70 
displayed by the French critics of Marxism, but also lauds Labriola’s book as a useful antidote 
to the ‘widespread prejudices’ 71  that characterize the French reception of Marxism. For 
example, Sorel refers to the Jaurès-Lafargue debate of January 1896 and attacks Jaurès’ 
attempt at combining idealism with Marxian materialism by saying that ‘to admit  these 
[Jaurès’] premises is to explain history exclusively through idealism; - it means rejecting 
everything, absolutely everything, of Marx’s doctrine.’72 
                                                 
69
 We have referenced the text in the previous chapter and highlighted that it contained Labriola’s first Marxist 
essay for the Devenir Social, ‘En mémoire du manifeste du parti communiste’, a French translation of his more 
theoretically oriented ‘Del materialismo storico, dilucidazione preliminare’ as well as Laura Lafargue’s 
translation of Marx and Engels’ Manifesto. 
70
 Georges Sorel, ‘Préface’ in Labriola, Essais sur la conception matérialiste. Available at 
http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/labriola_antonio/essais_materialisme_historique/essai_1_En_memoire/labrio
la_en_memoire.pdf last consulted 20/3/2014. ‘Cette manière de considérer les choses [i.e. Marxism] ne va pas au 
génie français, - ou du moins à ceux qui ont la prétention de le représenter.’ 
71
 Ibid., ‘le lecteur français doit se mettre en garde contre les préjugés répandus’ 
72
 Ibid. ‘Admettre ces prémisses, c'est expliquer l'histoire par l'idéalisme et uniquement par l'idéalisme ; - c'est 
rejeter tout, absolument tout, de la doctrine de Marx.’ The Jaurès-Lafargue debate, held on the 12 January 1896 
in Paris constituted an occasion for public confrontation between Lafargue’s Marxist materialism and Jaurès’ 
attempt at conciliating economicism with a French concern for the historical importance of ideals and rights. 
Though, in many ways, in their concern for right and their suspicion of economics, their analyses bear important 
similarities (which would deserve closer examination) Sorel reproaches to Jaurès his insistence on the, as it were, 
historical soteriology that characterizes Marx’s doctrine, which he understands as a grand narrative that brings an 
end to the historical development of humankind in order to realize ‘humanity herself’. As Jaurès writes‘…il y a 
dans l’histoire humaine non seulement une évolution nécessaire, mais une direction intelligible et un sens idéal. 
Donc, tout au long des siècles, l’homme n’a pu aspirer à la justice qu’en aspirant à un ordre social moins 
contradictoire à l’homme que l’ordre présent… Quelle que soit  la diversité des milieux, des temps, des 
revendications économiques, c’est un même souffle de plainte et d’espérance qui sort de la bouche de l’esclave, 
du serf et du prolétaire : c’est ce souffle immortel d’humanité qui est l’âme même de ce qu’on appelle le droit .’ 
Jean Jaurès, ‘L’idéalisme de l‘histoire’ [1896] in Jules Guesde, Jean Jaurès and Paul Lafargue, Le grand débat 
(Paris, Le Temps des cerises : 1994), p. 47. In short, unlike Jaurès, and somewhat unlike Gramsci, Sorel does not 
believe in history as a process of self-realization of humankind, destined to end when this self-realization has 
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The ambition of the text, in short, is that of ‘showing how false and futile are the big 
objections reproached to the Marxist doctrine.’73 And thus, taking as his polemical target 
Rouanet’s 1887 Revue Socialiste article on Marxism and French socialism Sorel sets to 
answer the objections of economic and historical determinism. At first glance, the text appears 
as a straightforwardly ‘Marxist’ one, in the sense that the enemies are Rouanet and Jaurès, the 
allies are Lafargue and, indirectly, Guesde’s POF. In fact, Sorel goes as far as to explain the 
political weakness of French socialism through its theoretical resistance to Marxism: ‘where 
[i.e. in Germany] such ideas [historical materialism] have penetrated in the depth of popular 
consciousness, the socialist party is strong and alive, in other places it is weak and divided 
into sects.’74 
And yet, a closer look reveals another, subtler line of reasoning. Though Sorel does defend 
Marxism, he defends a version of Marxism based on the understanding of history outlined in 
the ‘Étude sur Vico’. The argumentative strategy is that deployed in the review of Say’s 
Contre le socialisme: instead of defending historical determinism and the primacy of 
economics in the social world, he paints these two features of Marxism as being the result of 
misunderstandings and caricatures. The objections are addressed through Sorel’s own 
conceptual vocabulary and the picture painted is that of Marxism as a theory of proletarian 
agency and institutional development. As he succintly puts it: 
‘The problem of modern transformations – from the materialist perspective – is 
based on three questions: 1st Has the proletariat acquired a clear consciousness of 
its existence as an indivisible class? 2nd Does it possess sufficient strength to 
enter into a struggle against the other classes? 3rd Is it capable of overthrowing, 
along with capitalist organization, the entire system of traditional ideology? 
When one follows Marx’s principles… research does not concentrate on what 
society ought to be – but on what the proletariat can achieve in the current class 
struggle.’75 
                                                                                                                                                        
been achieved: history cannot be subsumed under this great movement, but consists in a series of episodes that 
are not strung together by a wider narrative. 
73
 Sorel, ‘Préface à Labriola’. ‘je crois nécessaire de montrer, ici, combien sont fausses et futiles les grandes 
objections que l'on oppose à la doctrine marxiste.’ 
74Ibid. ‘Le socialisme contemporain présente un caractère d'originalité, qui a frappé tous les économistes ; il doit 
ce caractère à ce qu'il s'inspire des idées émises par K. Marx sur le matérialisme historique. Là où ces idées ont 
profondément pénétré la conscience populaire, le parti socialiste est fort et vivant ; ailleurs, il est chétif et divisé 
en sectes.’ 
75
 Ibid. ‘Le problème du devenir moderne, - considéré au point de vue matérialiste, - repose sur trois questions : 
1° le prolétariat a-t-il acquis une conscience claire de son existence comme classe indivisible ? 2° a-t-il assez de 
force pour entrer en lutte contre les autres classes ? 3° est-il en état de renverser, avec l'organisation capitaliste, 
tout le système de l'idéologie traditionnelle ? C'est à la sociologie de répondre. Quand on s’inspire des principes 
de Marx, on peut dire qu'il n'y a plus de question sociale ; on peut même dire que le socialisme (au sens ordinaire 
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In keeping with his understanding of history, the transformation from capitalism to socialism 
cannot be understood as a seizure of power or of the state, nor can it amount to a more 
rational reorganization of the productive forces, but can only be seen as the development of a 
number of new social relations through the institutional development of a new social class. 
Sorel, however, begins by pointing out that ‘Marxist theses have not been understood well in 
France’,76 and the discussion swiftly moves to the terrain examined in the last chapter, the 
accusations of historical and economic determinism that French socialists reproached to 
Marxism. ‘…The great scientific objection to Marx’s doctrine’ writes Sorel ‘is that it is 
accused of leading to fatalism.’77 To start with, Rouanet’s argument that Marx’s determinism 
has to do with the Hegelian lineage of his thought ought to cause one to ‘have reservations on 
the idea that the French author [Rouanet] has of Hegel’s philosophy’.78 Nonetheless it is clear 
that even a ‘superficial reading of Capital’ shows clearly that Marx did not propose what 
Sorel calls an ‘evolutionary apocalypse’.79 The reason for this, of course, has to do with the 
fact that the artificial milieu is a non-deterministic environment shaped by the creativity of 
human agency, and thus the only talk of prediction and law allowed is metaphorical. 
‘Determinism supposes that transformations are connected in an automatic way, 
that simultaneous phenomena form a bloc having a necessary structure, that 
there are laws assuring an ordered necessity amongst all things. We find nothing 
similar in Marx’s doctrine… We do not demand to see in the social world a 
system analogous to that of astronomy; we only demand that one recognizes that 
the interaction of causes generates periods sufficiently long and characterized 
that they can become the object of a reasoned knowledge of the facts.’80 
                                                                                                                                                        
et historique du terme) est dépassé ; en effet, les recherches ne portent plus sur ce que la société doit être, - mais 
sur ce que peut le prolétariat, dans la lutte actuelle des classes.’ 
76
 Ibid. ‘Les thèses marxistes n'ont point été, généralement, bien comprises en France par les écrivains qui 
s'occupent des questions sociales.’ 
77
 Ibid. ‘Le grand reproche que l’on addresse – au point de vue scientifique – à la doctrine de Marx est de mener 
au fatalisme.’ 
78
 Ibid. ‘Il y aurait bien des réserves à faire sur l'idée que l'auteur français se fait de la philosophie de Hégel…’ 
79
 Ibid. ‘…mais une lecture superficielle du Capital suffit pour montrer que Marx n'avait jamais pensé à cette 
apocalypse évolutionniste, qu'on lui attribue si généreusement.’ 
80
 Ibid. ‘Le déterminisme suppose que les changements sont reliés entre eux d'une manière automatique, que les 
phénomènes simultanés forment un bloc ayant une structure obligée, qu'il y a des lois d'airain assurant entre 
toutes choses une nécessité d'ordre. On ne trouve rien de semblable dans la doctrine de Marx : les événements 
sont considérés d'un point de vue empirique ; c'est de leur mélange que jaillit la loi historique qui définit leur 
mode temporaire de génération. On ne demande point de reconnaître dans le monde social un système analogue 
au système astronomique ; on demande seulement de reconnaître que l'entrecroisement des causes produit des 
périodes assez régulières et assez caractérisées pour pouvoir faire l'objet d'une connaissance raisonnée de faits’. 
Notice how, if we examine this passage through the lenses of Sorel’s pre-Vico epistemology, what is being 
stated is that the social world can be the object of a ‘systématique’ rather than of a scientific study. But of 
course, with Vico, the search for deterministic causal relations is abandoned and science becomes something 
else, namely the genetic search for the origin of human productions.  
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Things become more interesting when a second objection, regarding economic determinism, 
is discussed.  Though Sorel dismisses the idea that ‘for Marx, all political, moral, aesthetic 
phenomena are determined (in the precise sense of the word) by economic phenomena’81 as 
‘one of those silly things that have rendered ridiculous the vulgarisers of vulgar 
materialism’82, the question is a bit more complex than this dismissal would suggest. The idea 
that all social, political, moral and intellectual phenomena are just superficial manifestations 
of economic ones is a caricature of a theory about the fundamental role of economic activity 
in the social world. But though the caricature can be dismissed without argumentation, the 
theory cannot. The question concerns the architecture of the social world. Assigning a 
foundational, structural role to economics would equip the social scientist with a reliable 
criterion both to examine a given society and to identify the factors that determine a 
transformation. As we have just seen, Sorel’s social world as described in the ‘Étude sur 
Vico’ lacks any such criterion, as the various spheres of human activity constantly interact 
with each other. Thus, in order to reject the primacy of economics, Sorel has to give 
theoretical dignity to this lack of a hierarchy or ordering amongst the various spheres of 
human activity: 
‘From the fact that all sociological phenomena, in order to be understood, need 
to be connected to their economic support it does not follow that the knowledge 
of the support replaces the knowledge of what is supported. The mediations that 
hold between the economic infrastructure and the superior products are variable 
and cannot be expressed by any general formula. It is thus impossible to speak 
of determinism, for there is nothing that can be determined.’83 
This constitutes a substantial novelty. Whereas in the study on Vico the lack of criteria to 
determine the interactions amongst various institutions and spheres of human activities 
appeared as a mere matter of fact, here Sorel gives theoretical dignity to this insight and 
formulates it explicitly. It is precisely in virtue of this impossibility of finding such criteria 
                                                 
81
 Ibid. ‘Mais on insiste et on dit que, d'après Marx, tous les phénomènes politiques, moraux, esthétiques, sont 
déterminés (au sens précis du mot) par les phénomènes économiques.’  
82
 Ibid. ‘Dire qu'une chose est déterminée par une autre, sans donner, en même temps, une idée précise du mode 
de jonction, c'est dire une de ces bêtises qui ont rendu si ridicules les vulgarisateurs du matérialisme vulgaire.’ 
83
 Ibid. Emphasis added. ‘De ce que toutes les manifestations sociologiques ont besoin, pour leur 
éclaircissement, d'être placées sur leurs supports économiques, il n'en résulte pas que la connaissance du support 
remplace la connaissance de la chose supportée. Les médiations qui existent entre l'infrastructure économique et 
les produits supérieurs sont très variables et ne peuvent se traduire par aucune formule générale. On ne saurait 
donc parler de déterminisme, puisqu'il n'y a rien de déterminable.’ 
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that Sorel can reject economic determinism. In order to understand the origin of this 
argument, it is necessary, however, to look more closely at Labriola’s text.84 
On a general note, the reading of Labriola’s essay on historical materialism 85  reveals a 
number of very important similarities with Sorel’s own understanding of Marxism. Like 
Sorel, Labriola separates the human from the artificial milieu, arguing that ‘History …begins 
when the artificial environment has long been established’86 and goes as far as to condemn 
social Darwinism, i.e. the idea that human history obeys the evolutionary laws that regulate 
natural history, as an ‘epidemic’.87 Like Sorel, he is careful to underline the contingency of 
progress. Not only, writes Labriola, are there parts of the world still living in a regime of 
primitive agrarian communism, 88  but more radically, he argues that it is important to 
understand that ‘progress, which is not only a merely empirical notion, but is also always 
                                                 
84
 When the book came out, it received a number of reviews, the most important ones being those by Charles 
Andler  in the Revue de métaphysique et de morale and Émile Durkheim in the Revue Philosophique. The take of 
both authors is negative, and both seem to miss some of the central aspects of Labriola’s text. For example, 
Andler accuses Labriola of abandoning the determinism of Marx, and concludes by saying that this shows that 
the problem of Marxism is that of ‘se faire illusions sur la portée de la science de l’histoire’ (p. 658). What 
Andler seems not to understand is that the idea of science as a description of causal relations between 
phenomena is not the one on which Labriola is operating. In other words, for Andler, the abandonment of a 
scientistic Marxism is an indication of the shortcomings of Marxism tout court, and he never takes seriously the 
historical methodology outlined by Labriola. As for Durkheim, though this also applies in part to Andler, he 
attributes to Labriola the kind of economic determinism that Labriola so clearly rejects. So he states that ‘il nous 
parait faux qu’elles [the causes of social phenomena] se ramènent, en dernière instance à l’état de la technique 
industrielle et que le facteur économique soit le ressort du progrès.’ despite the fact that Labriola does not really 
say this. Moreover, he insists on the fact that there is a structural social phenomenon, but that it is not economics 
but religion. See Charles Andler, ‘La conception matérialiste de l’histoire d’après M. Labriola’, Revue de 
métaphysique et de morale 5, 1897, pp. 644-58 and Émile Durkheim, ‘La conception matérialiste de l’histoire’, 
Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger 44, 1897, pp. 645-51, retrieved at 
http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/Durkheim_emile/sc_soc_et_action/texte_2_09/conception_histoire.pdf on 
the 15/3/2014. 
85
 We shall refer to the version published in the second French edition of Labriola’s Essais sur la conception 
matérialiste de l’histoire (Paris, Giard et Brière: 1902). 
86
 Ibid., p. 127. ‘L’histoire, selon l’usage littéraire du mot, c’est-à-dire cette partie du processus humain dont les 
traditions se sont fixées dans la mémoire, commence à un moment ou le terrain artificiel est depuis assez 
longtemps formé.’  
87
 Labriola, Essais, p. 124. 
88
 Labriola makes the example of Russia, writing that: ‘Russia must become bourgeois; and, to do this, it must 
first convert land into a commodity, capable of producing other commodities, and at the same time transform in 
proletarians and paupers the former communists of the countryside. However, on the other hand, us in Western 
and Central Europe find ourselves at the opposite point of this developmental path which has only just begun in 
Russia.’. Ibid., p. 146. ‘La Russie doit s’embourgeoiser, et pour cela elle doit, avant tout, convertir la terre en 
marchandise capable de produire de marchandises, et en même temps transformer en prolétaires et miséreux les 
ex-communistes de la terre. Dans l’Europe Occidentale et Centrale, nous nous trouvons, au contraire, au point 
opposé de la série de développement qui commence à peine en Russie.’ 
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contingent, and thus limited, does not hang above human affairs as a destiny, a fate, or as a 
law.’89 In this way both historical teleology and social scientific prediction are invalidated: 
‘It is because of this that our doctrine cannot be used to present the entire history 
of humankind in a unitary perspective, which, mutatis mutandis, would repeat 
the finalist or planned philosophy of history as we find it from S. Augustine to 
Hegel, or, better, from the prophet Daniel to De Rougemont.’90 
In his commentary to Labriola’s essay, which Sorel, as we have seen, had read, Croce picks 
up and develops this point. For Croce, an important consequence of Labriola’s argument is 
that it forbids us to think of Marxism as a philosophy of history in the traditional sense, that 
is, as a ‘conceptual reduction of the course of history’. 91 According to him, though it is 
possible to develop a philosophy of various elements, which appear in the historical flux, such 
as art, or ethics, the conceptual reduction of the course of history itself is impossible, as it will 
lead to ‘a single concept, that of development, emptied of all the proper content of history.’92 
In more prosaic terms, it follows from this impossibility of a philosophy of history that 
‘historical materialism, in Labriola’s version, has abandoned all ambition to establish the law 
of history, of finding the concept to which historical facts, in all their complexity, would be 
reduced.’ 93  It is in this way that Croce interprets Labriola’s historical materialism, and 
judging by his desire to publish Croce’s essay, Sorel also subscribes to this opinion.94 
                                                 
89
 Ibid., p. 148. ‘Mais l’important est de comprendre que le progrès, dont la notion est non seulement empirique, 
mais toujours circonstanciée et partant limitée, n’est pas suspendu sur le cours des choses humaines comme un 
destin ou un fatum, ni comme un commandement.’ 
90
 Ibid. ‘Et à cause de cela notre doctrine ne peut pas servir à représenter toute l’histoire du genre humain dans 
une  perspective unitaire, qui répète, mutatis mutandis, la philosophie de l’histoire à thèse ou finaliste, de Saint 
Augustin à Hegel, ou mieux du prophète Daniel à Monsieur de Rougemont.’ 
91
 Benedetto Croce, ‘Sulla forma scientifica del materialismo storico’ [1896] in Edizione Nazionale delle Opere 
di Benedetto Croce: Materialismo Storico ed Economia Marxistica (Napoli, Bibliopolis: 2001), pp. 18-19. ‘La 
possibilità di una filosofia della storia presuppone la possibilità di una riduzione concettuale del corso della 
storia’. The essay was originally presented as ‘Sulla concezione materialistica della storia’, Atti dell’accademia 
Pontaniana XXVI, 1896, pp. 1-16. 
92
 Ibid., p. 19. ‘Nel suo complesso, il movimento storico non si potrebbe ridurre se non a un sol concetto, che è 
quello di sviluppo, reso vuoto di tutto ciò che è contenuto proprio della storia.’ For the Croce of 1896, a 
philosophy of history is only possible if we connect it to either an idea of God, and see history as His work, or to 
an Hegelian perspective in which the concrete historical elements are already contained in the formal concept of 
development itself. As he continues: ‘L’antica filosofia della storia teneva possibile un’elaborazione concettuale 
della storia, o perché, facendo intervenire l’idea di Dio e della Provvidenza, leggeva nei fatti le intenzioni 
dell’intelletto divino, o perché trattava il concetto formale dello sviluppo come includente in sé in modo logico 
le sue determinazioni contingenti.’ 
93
 Ibid., p. 20. ‘Ora il materialismo storico, nella forma in cui lo presenta Labriola, ha abbandonato nel fatto ogni 
pretesa di stabilire la legge della storia, di ritrovare il concetto al quale si riducano i complessi fatti storici.’ 
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 See Sorel, letter to Croce 1/3/1897 in La Critica 25,1927, p. 43. The passage on Plekhanov that prevented the 
publication in the Devenir Social accused the Russian Marxist of indulging in historical teleology, by 
‘substituting to the omnipresent Ideas the omnipresent Matter.’ Against these misguided attempt, wrote Croce, it 
it is wise to ‘remind the impossibility of any construction of this type, which, when it does not lose itself in sheer 
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But the real innovation that Labriola represents for Sorel is that he furnishes him with a 
theory that formalizes his refusal to formulate a criterion regulating the interactions between 
various institutions and spheres of human activity, and thus to reject economic determinism. 
We had seen, in the past chapter, how the exclusively economic understanding of class 
struggle was a point that came under much criticism in France. It is thanks to Labriola that 
Sorel formalizes an understanding of Marxism that rejects this type of economic determinism. 
The issue can be subdivided into three questions. Firstly, what is the relationship between 
economic phenomena and their corresponding social and ideological forms? Secondly, and 
more decisively, are economic factors the only engine of history, or do social and ideological 
forms possess their own historical strength? Finally, if the answer to the second question is 
positive, are there fixed criteria regulating the interactions between structure and 
superstructure?  
On all points, Labriola’s answers are rather clear. He explains, in his discussion of the 
artificial environment which humankind inhabits, that as soon as the tools which enable 
humans to make their living off nature, i.e. the economy, have developed beyond a certain 
point, more complex social formations arise: ‘meditated plans, political projects… legal 
systems, and then maxims and general abstract principles. In the context of these products… 
as a secondary phenomenon, arise sciences, arts, philosophy, erudition and history as a type 
of literary production.’95 These productions of the human spirit are secondary to the economic 
realm – the sphere of human activity through which men guarantee their existence through the 
extraction of resources from nature –  and cannot be understood as anything else than 
connected to this latter realm of activity. However, this does not lead to the conclusion that 
                                                                                                                                                        
arbitrariness, becomes a superfluous tautology.’ See Croce, ‘Forma scientifica del materialismo storico’, p. 22. 
‘Innanzi alla tendenza a ricostruire una filosofia materialistica della storia, sostituendo alla onnipresente Idea 
l’onnipresente Materia, conviene riaffermare l’impossibilità d’ogni costruzione di tal genere, che, quando non si 
perde nell’arbitrario, si risolve in una pura superfluità e tautologia.’ 
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‘Partout ou le moyens techniques sont développés jusqu’à un certain point… là, toujours et nécessairement, 
apparaissent des desseins prémédités, des vues politiques, des plans de conduite, des systèmes de droit et enfin 
des maximes et des principes généraux et abstraits. Dans le cercle de ces produits et de ces développements 
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standpoint consists in taking these secondary products in isolation from the economic activities to which they are 
inseparably connected, from which they necessarily arise. Some men, ‘especially those who make of their 
erudition a living… found and still find a way of living intellectually merely amongst the secondary and 
reflected products of civilization, and could, and still can, then subject everything to the subjective perspective 
which they inhabit: herein lies the explanation of every ideology.’ See ibid., pp. 136-7. ‘Et, en effet, il est arrivé 
et il arrive que quelques hommes, et surtout les savants de profession, laïques ou prêtres, ont trouvé et trouvent 
le moyen de vivre intellectuellement dans le cercle fermé des produits réflexes et secondaires de la civilisation, 
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conditions : c’est la l’origine et l’explication de toute les idéologies.’ 
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they are ‘mere appearances and soap bubbles.’96 Though secondary, they have their role to 
play in the historical process, for they become part of that artificial environment which 
humankind inhabits, and which modifies humankind itself as it proceeds through history. In 
short, these secondary products shape the artificial environment and thus affect the course of 
the historical development. Though the extraction of means of subsistence from nature is 
mankind’s primary sphere of activity, its production of secondary and more refined elements 
is not an aspect which can be dismissed easily, for it contributes to the shaping of that 
historical and changing artificial environment, which is the locus of human history. 
This crucial point is clarified a few pages later, as Labriola tackles the question more 
thoroughly. The idea that historical materialism consists in ‘attributing prevalence or decisive 
agency to the economic factor’ is erroneous, nothing more than a ‘doctrinal mistake’.97 The 
reason as to why this interpretation of historical materialism is, for Labriola, fundamentally 
incorrect is of a certain importance. As the historian confronts the multiple aspects of reality, 
he faces the need to systematize them, and it is from this need that the belief in ‘historical 
factors’, as Labriola calls them, arises. 98  Thus we distinguish economic factors from 
geographical ones, intellectual factors from political ones and so on. The formation of those 
concepts is perfectly legitimate, as long as we recognize what they are: ‘abstractions, 
according to which the various aspects of a given social complex are, little by little, taken 
away from their being simply parts of a whole, and, increasingly generalized, lead to the so-
called doctrine of [historical] factors.’99  
The point is complex, but rather important. The reason as to why it is a mistake to speak of 
historical materialism as a doctrine stressing the primacy of the economic factor in the course 
of history, is that, for Labriola, there is no such thing as an economic factor outside of history 
books. The creation of factors is due to the fully legitimate intellectual needs of history-
writing or social scientific analysis: but the key insight of historical materialism, for Labriola, 
is that the historical process is a whole, a totality. Historical factors, ‘conceived by abstraction 
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 Labriola writes that ‘This need of narrative configuration constitutes the first, intuitive, palpable, and I would 
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and subsequently isolated by abstraction’, 100  continually and simultaneously act on each 
other, modify each other, so that separating them can only be legitimate from an 
epistemological perspective. Labriola insists greatly on the value of this abstract dissection of 
the historical whole into separated factors: he stresses the utility of this type of enquiry, and 
deems that this method of proceeding is, if ‘much less than the whole truth, much more than a 
simple error’.101 The separation of the historical whole into distinct factors is for Labriola a 
necessary prerequisite to the more mature and holistic conception of historical materialism. 
Historical factors are ‘the necessary product of a knowledge in the process of development 
and formation.’102  
To be sure, with the advent of historical materialism, the need for historical enquiries in, say, 
economics,  art, or any of the other factors, remains. But this need stems from the 
requirements of history-writing. It is the belief in the real, independent, and isolated existence 
of such factors that constitutes, in Labriola’s view, a half-doctrine, an error surpassed by ‘us, 
who posit an absolutely unitary principle of historical interpretation’.103 This notion of history 
as a changing totality is illustrated more clearly in Croce’s commentary:  
Labriola shows how historiography, in its development, had already arrived at 
the theory of historical factors; that is, to the conception that the historical 
process is the result of a series of forces, called physical conditions, social 
formations, political institutions, leaders. Historical materialism goes beyond, to 
the enquiry of the relationship between those factors or, put better, to 
considering them all as parts of a single process.’104 
Now, this plurality of factors understood as parts of a whole is clearly incompatible with 
economism, for it denies the primacy of the economic factor in favour of a holistic 
interpretation of the historical process in which all factors have a role to play.105 Hidden 
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 It might be asked, as an aside, what happens then to materialism in Labriola’s system. Though verbal 
accommodations are always possible, the problem remains: if the historical process is characterised by the 
interpenetration and reciprocal interactions of various spheres of human activity, whose separation is an 
analytical necessity rather than a reality, then it is unclear in what sense the sphere of production, the economy, 
can be called primary.  One possible solution consists in interpreting the secondary nature of non-economic 
spheres of human activity in terms of their dependence on the existence of a relatively stable productive system. 
In other words this means stressing, as Labriola does (see p. 136 of the Essais), that only when the productive 
apparatus is firmly established and the extraction of resources from nature secured that other, non-productive, 
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behind the idea of historical moments as totalities lies a decisive argument against the 
determination of historical change by economical factors: given the continuous and reciprocal 
interactions of the various aspects of the historical whole, it is impossible to establish the 
primacy of one such factor. As Croce writes, the idea that historical materialism amounts to 
the claim that ‘history is only economic history and the rest merely a mask, a shadow without 
substance’ is to be rejected, also because it tends to generate discussions ‘reminding one of 
the proverbial chicken and egg.’106 
Now, Labriola’s arguments, despite his occasional use of ambiguous terminology, are 
profoundly hostile to a way of reasoning in terms of economic structure and ideological 
superstructure, because not only does the superstructure possess a capacity to influence the 
course of history but, more decisively, because historical moments are totalities in which 
factors have what he calls ‘reciprocal action’.107 This means that no single factor acts in 
isolation, and thus no single factor can be thought of as foundational. Economic activity that 
is not influenced by the juridical, moral or political conditions in which it takes place simply 
does not exist. There remains a question as to whether there are general criteria regulating the 
interactions between the various spheres of human activities. Labriola does not, like Sorel, 
state categorically the contingency that regulates these interactions, but his theory of historical 
totalities seems to exclude the possibility of finding such a criterion. In assessing the 
                                                                                                                                                        
spheres of human activity can develop. Before poetry, must come agriculture. But, although Labriola does make 
this point and repeatedly calls intellectual forms ‘secondary’, it is an unconvincing solution, for the primacy of 
economic production – in the sense of extraction of resources from nature for the support of human life – is 
reduced to a chronological event whose consequences would no longer be with us, since, once developed, non-
productive spheres of human activity immediately become relevant factors in the historical process, thereby 
rendering the primacy of the economy a thing of the past. To understand Labriola’s stance, one must understand 
that his is a way of reasoning that is fundamentally alien to the base/superstructure dualism, and consequently to 
the distinction between productive and non-productive spheres of human activity. The result, I believe, is a 
fundamentally different meaning of the notion of production, not understood as the economy, the relationship 
between human beings and nature that the former have to entertain for their subsistence, but as a general term for 
human activity. The primacy of production then would have to be interpreted as a claim about the primacy of 
human agency in history. The attacks on social Darwinism, the references to Vico, all seem to warrant the worth 
of this interpretation.  
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 Croce, ‘Sulla forma scientifica del materialismo storico’, p. 26. ‘Parecchi hanno immaginato che il 
materialismo storico voglia dire: la storia non essere altro che la storia economica, e tutto il resto una semplice 
maschera, un’apparenza senza sostanza. E si affannano poi a cercare quale sia il vero dio della storia, se 
l’istrumento produttivo o la terra, con discussioni che ricordano in ogni punto quella, proverbiale, dell’uovo e la 
gallina.’ 
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 Labriola, ‘Le matérialisme historique’, p. 162. ‘Ces facteurs concourants… on ne les a jamais vus agissant 
chacun pour soi, parce que… ils agissent d’une manière telle, qu’elle donne naissance au concept de l’action 
réciproque.’ 
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relationship between the economy and ‘all the rest’, he writes: ‘the process of derivation and 
mediation is very complex, often nuanced and tortuous, not always decipherable.’108  
There is a final aspect of Labriola’s historical materialism that needs comment, mainly 
because it brings a point already made by Sorel in the study on Vico to its logical conclusion. 
Sorel, let us recall, had argued that what followed from Vico’s principle was the radically and 
inescapably historical character of human ideas: this means, essentially, reducing science to 
its practice. Labriola agrees, and presents a picture in which speculative and scientific activity 
is fully historical, and amounts to the theoretical elaboration of a given experience or set of 
experiences: ‘What is thought, at bottom, if not the conscious and systematic complement of 
experience…’?109 But crucially Labriola specifies that Marxism itself is no exception to this 
rule. Thus Marxism is not a general sociology, but the elaboration of a number of historical 
experiences: ‘The true precursors of the new doctrine [historical materialism] were the facts 
of modern history…’110 
‘Ideas’, writes Labriola, ‘do not fall from the sky’. 111  This means that sociologies and 
historical theories are articulations of experiences, collective practices, and so on. Thus, 
Marxism is not a theory of historical development valid for all times, but the self-
consciousness of an historical subject shaped by a number of historical experiences. It is not 
‘the usual subjective critique directed at things but the discovery of the self criticism inherent 
in things themselves.’ 112 Marxism thus is the intellectual production that arises in capitalist 
societies, or at least in the proletarian class that emerges under conditions of capitalist 
production. The superiority of Marxism vis à vis other social theories lies essentially in its 
historicity: 
‘This intellectual transformation [historical materialism]… reflected, little by 
little, the experience of a new life. This new life, in the revolutions of the past 
two centuries, had, as it acquired the practical and precise consciousness of its… 
preconditions, slowly stripped itself from the mythical, mystical and religious 
layers. Thought, which theorises and subsumes this life, has, equally, gradually 
emancipated itself from metaphysical and theological assumptions… The 
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materialist conception is the high point of this new tendency in the search for 
historico-social laws, for it is not a particular instance of a generic sociology or 
of a general philosophy of the State, law, and history but the solution to all the 
doubts and uncertainties which attend other ways of philosophizing on human 
affairs, and the beginning of their integral interpretation.’113 
4.3.2 ‘REVENONS À MARX’: DETERMINISM AND ECONOMICISM IN MARXISM 
This long examination of Sorel’s engagement with the ideas of Labriola and Vico allows us to 
understand which direction Sorel’s reworking of Marxism was going to take. The Marxism 
that Sorel was going to elaborate had abandoned all pretensions at a social science capable of 
individuating deterministic causal relations, and had moved in a heavily historicist direction. 
The historical process was conceived by Sorel, with the help of Vico and Labriola’s 
arguments, in terms of human agency embedded in institutions, and rejected both the ideas of 
a law of history and of a fixed structure of the social world resting on economics. Writing in 
June 1897 to Croce about a conversation with Charles Andler, who had warned Sorel of an 
impending crisis of Marxism in Germany, Sorel had commented: 
‘I believe that here there are some distinctions to make: for Marxism is far from 
being the doctrine and method of Marx. In the hands of disciples devoid of 
historical knowledge and incapable of sufficient philosophical critique, Marxism 
has become a caricature. “Let us go back to Marx”, here is my motto [devise], 
and I believe this to be the right way forward.’ 114 
Despite the fact that only in this letter, in 1897, Sorel begins to acknowledge the revisionist 
character of his work, we have seen how these tendencies had been present in Sorel’s writings 
at least since his 1895 essay on Durkheim, and that they derived, in the last instance, from his 
belief in the importance of collective human agency in the historical process. The rest of the 
chapter will thus be dedicated to the Sorelian re-elaboration of the arguments sketched so far, 
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in order to give a more complete picture of Sorel’s non-determinist Marxism. The first text in 
which Sorel formulates his Marxism, fully aware of its potentially innovative and unorthodox 
character, is the review of a book by the Italian anarchist Francesco Saverio Merlino, Pro e 
Contro il Socialismo. Sorel’s long review of the book, appearing in the Devenir Social in 
October 1897, consists, more than in an analysis of Merlino’s theses, in a first systematic 
articulation of the key points of Sorel’s Marxism, with particular relevance given to the 
question of historical determinism. 
This question is tackled in terms of the possibility of historical prediction. Does Marxism 
contain a philosophy of history capable of deploying its explicative powers to the future and 
of coming up with predictions on future social developments? In examining the historical 
tendency of capitalist accumulation, Marx describes the succession of property relations 
characterising the emergence and decline of capitalist property: from ‘individual private 
property’ we move to capitalist property which, ‘with the inexorability of a law of Nature’, 
engenders its own downfall and leads to socialized property, the juridical relation expressing a 
socialized mode of production. 115  Commenting on this apparently highly deterministic 
passage, Sorel writes: ‘the third term [socialized property], could have been completely 
different; Marx had reasons to conjecture, with high plausibility, that the future form of 
appropriation will be the one he indicates…’.116 
What makes the last element of this Marxian triad merely a highly probable conjecture and 
not a scientific prediction based on the knowledge of supposed laws of history, is the fact that 
‘…history is entirely in the past; there is no way of transforming it into a logical combination 
allowing us to predict the future.’ 117 Historical understanding is for Sorel the understanding 
of events past: 
 ‘It is only long after events have unfolded [se sont déroulés], when the (often 
unforeseen) consequences have occurred, when the whole shiny and noisy 
apparatus (which hides to the actors of the drama and to the contemporaries the 
                                                 
115
 Marx, Capital, p. 715. 
116
 Georges Sorel, ‘Pro e contro il socialismo’,  Le Devenir Social 3, 1897, p. 874. ‘…le troisième terme pourrait 
etre tout autre ; Marx avait des raisons pour conjecturer, avec une haute vraisemblance, que l’appropriation 
future  serait celle qu’il indique…’ 
117
 Ibid., p. 873. ‘L’hisoire est toute entière dans le passé; il n’existe aucun moyen de la transformer en une 
combinaison logique, permettant de prévoir l’avenir.’ 
 210 
real conditions of their successes or defeats) has fallen – it’s only then that the 
real reasons of human activity appear in the light of the day.’118 
Contrary to the commonly-held opinion that Marxian determinism derives from Hegel, Sorel 
argues that it is precisely Marx’s Hegelian pedigree that ensures the impossibility of 
determinism and prediction.119 This impossibility ‘would have been obvious to Marx, who 
had inherited so many of Hegel’s preoccupations.’ 120 The Hegelian trio of thesis, antithesis 
and synthesis, for Sorel, does not ‘display the demonstrative character of a classical 
syllogism’121: quoting a contemporary philosophical encyclopaedia, he argues that, in Hegel, 
‘the new moment cannot be deduced from the previous one in the manner of a consequence’, 
but instead, it consists of a ‘creative and progressive synthesis’ of materials bequeathed by its 
past.122 For Sorel then, as for Hegel, the owl of Minerva rises at dusk and the future remains 
unknowable. The consequence for Marxism is clear: ‘Thus, as in Hegel there is no 
demonstration in the classical sense; in Marx there is no determinism in the succession of 
historical facts, and thus no predictions.’123 
From here, Sorel moves to an attack on economism. Sorel discusses the point in relation to 
two Marxian references. The first comes from the second part of The Poverty of Philosophy, 
in which Marx asserts that ‘…the hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-
mill society with the industrial capitalist’.124 The second comes from Capital, in which Marx 
speaks of factory legislation as the ‘necessary product of modern industry.’125  Now, the 
peculiarity of these two specific references is not only that they constitute passages in which 
Marx seems to subscribe to economic determinism, but also in that they are two references 
used by Charles Andler in his review of Labriola’s Essais.126 Andler, employing these quotes, 
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came to the conclusion that ‘Marxism is an antiquated doctrine’.127 His argument was that, in 
discussing the relation of the economic structure to the superstructure, one would be better off 
to ‘conclude, like Mr Sorel does, that “it is impossible to speak of determinism, for there is 
nothing that can be determined”. The problem’ continued Andler ‘is that determinism is 
present in Marx’s text.’ 128  Andler’s position is clear: whereas the relations between the 
various spheres of human activity are dominated by ‘contingency’ 129 , Marx provides a 
criterion to examine these relations, and thus paints a different, deterministic, and erroneous 
picture. 
Now, Sorel’s rhetorical strategy is the usual one of separating Marx from Marxism. He casts 
doubt, indirectly, on Andler’s reading of Marx by ‘going back to Marx’, by separating Marx’s 
theses from the mistaken deterministic interpretations. He points out, not without some 
reason, the vagueness of the expressions through which Marx hints at the economic 
determination of social relations. He insists that whereas in Marx the expression ‘mode of 
production’ has a general meaning, ‘certain disciples have understood it in a very narrow 
sense, and have reduced all history to a dry mathematical conception of functions of one 
variable, which would be the coefficient of technological progress!’ 130  The economic 
determination of social relation is, to Sorel, made up of hypotheses that are ‘indemonstrable, 
and useless, I believe, to socialism.’131  
It is important here to stress here the use of the word ‘indemonstrable’, in order to show how 
Sorel believes that economic determinism is scientifically untenable. Beyond the rhetorical 
strategy there is, in other words, a more complex argumentation about history in which Sorel 
puts to good use his reading of Labriola. Commenting on the division of society by Marx into 
two rigidly defined classes, Sorel warns that ‘these are not living capitalists [patrons] and 
workers, but only abstractions borrowed from the historical organism and transformed into 
mechanisms in a process of economical composition. Such scientific masks cannot be 
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entendu l’expression « mode de production » dans un sens très large, certains disciples l’ont entendu dans un 
sens très étroit et ont ramené toute l’histoire à une conception sèchement mathématique de fonctions d’une 
variable, qui serait le coefficient du progrès technologique !’. 
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 Ibid., p. 863.  
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mistaken for... the men who make history.’132 In other words, the division of society into 
capitalists and proletarians is a tool of economic analysis necessary for the isolation of 
economic relations. Economic analysis, writes Sorel, is based on the construction of ‘artificial 
compositions and movements, bearing no resemblance [aucune analogie] with what appears 
in the historical organism.’ 133 In an interesting footnote, Sorel makes a comparison between 
mechanics and economics: both sciences try to establish what Sorel calls conditions of 
‘experimental determinism’ in order to understand the objects they study. But these carefully 
constructed conditions should not be mistaken for real determinism.134 The argument is not 
impeccable, but is understandable enough: the separation of society into capitalists and 
proletarians is a social scientific abstraction, an expressive support, needed to understand the 
mechanisms of a capitalist economy, but this does not imply, for Sorel, that economics are the 
fundamental structure of the social world. 
Sorel goes more deeply into the issue a few years later in an article published in the middle of 
the Bernstein debate, in the revisionist Sozialistische Monatshefte.135 Here Sorel, aside from 
acknowledging his debt to Croce and Labriola and castigating the more deterministic 
interpretations of Marxism,136  reflects in some depth on the question of the relationship 
between economic factors and other aspects of an historical moment. What he gives is an 
almost verbatim repetition of Labriola’s arguments on historical totalities. According to Sorel, 
Marx did not believe that all aspects of a given society are reducible to its productive system: 
on the contrary, ‘Marx always underlined the undeniable relations between economics, law 
and politics – considering these three elements as belonging to a single system.’137 The belief 
in the presence of this ‘single system’ means that for Sorel economic activity does not take 
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 Ibid., p. 872.  ‘… mais on n’a pas pris garde que ce ne sont pas des patrons et des ouvriers vivants, mais 
seulement des abstractions empruntées à l’organisme historique er transformés en mécanismes dans la 
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 Ibid., p. 866. ‘C’est parce que l’économie (comme la mécanique) étudie des œuvres humaines, que l’on doit 
procéder de la sorte, créer des compositions et des mouvements artificiels, qui n’ont aucune analogie avec ce qui 
apparaît dans l’organisme historique.’ 
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 Ibid., p. 867n. ‘Ce déterminisme expérimental est lié à la contingence historique : les découvertes, les 
créations mécaniques, les phénomènes économiques ne forment pas des suites nécessaires : c’est un point 
fondamental.’ 
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 The original article is Georges Sorel, ‘Betrachtungen über die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung’, 
Sozialistische Monatshefte, 2, 1898, pp. 316-22, 367-75 and 428-32. Here we will use the reworked version 
printed in Sorel’s Saggi di critica del marxismo. Georges Sorel, ‘Osservazioni intorno alla concezione 
materialistica della storia’ in his Saggi di critica del marxismo (Palermo, Sandron: 1903), pp. 19-57. 
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 Ibid., p. 19 ‘…due autori italiani (il professor Antonio Labriola e Benedetto Croce) resero un grande servizio 
dimostrando che le idee di Marx non avevano che una lontana rassomiglianza con quelle dei suoi discepoli più 
chiassoni.’ 
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 Ibid., p. 41. ‘Marx dimostra d’aver sempre rilevato le relazioni innegabili fra l’economia, il diritto e la 
politica, - questi tre elementi essendo considerati come facenti parte d’un unico sistema.’ 
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place outside of society, it is not the unsocialized confrontation of man with nature but, on the 
contrary, is influenced by the sum of juridical, ethical and political relations that constitute a 
given society. Put more simply, the economy is not outside of society, but is merely another 
aspect of historical totality.  Consequently, economic determinism is un-Marxist. 
‘Nor do I believe that it is in conformity with a Marxist spirit to decompose facts 
into various elements: economic ones first, subsequently juridical and political 
ones… It is in the form that the distinction can be established, but only for our 
intellectual necessities; in history, as well as in reason, we have unity; but in 
order to carry on a scientific study, it is necessary to establish classifications.’138 
The isolation of historical factors of various kinds is legitimate for scientific purposes, but the 
Marxist must remember the fundamental unity of the historical wholes, and this implies that it 
is impossible to conceive of the economy as an isolated and hence foundational aspect of 
society. For Sorel, Marx, like Hegel, treats the economy as a system of needs, but ‘needs are 
determined by the overall organization of society… Problems of this kind are not exclusively 
economic: they embrace the entire field of social history.’139 
In short, Sorel counters the accusations of economic determinism by making use of Labriola’s 
arguments about the constant interactions that in any given society characterize the relations 
between various spheres of human activity. The impression of determinism is dictated by 
Marx’s fully legitimate need to isolate, for scientific reasons, one of the variables, i.e. 
economics. But this is, for Sorel, very different from making a claim about economic 
determinism. 
The tendency to overstate the role of economic factors, continues Sorel, can be explained 
partially because economic laws, unlike those of the juridical or ethical sciences, have a closer 
resemblance to the laws established by the natural sciences. Thus, the economic world 
appears to be regulated by more rigid necessities than the moral or juridical worlds. The 
reason for this is that the economy, especially the realm of production, is closer to the natural 
milieu than either law or morality are: as such, it presents something similar to the necessities 
that regulate the natural world. As we shall see in a short while, Sorel does not believe that 
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 Ibid., p. 42. ‘Né io credo conforme allo spirito marxista il decomporre i fatti in elementi di varia nature: 
economici gli uni, giuridici e politici gli ultimi… È nelle forme che esiste la distinzione; ma solo per nostro 
intendimento; nella storia come nella ragione si produce l’unità; ma per procedere a uno studio scientifico è 
d’uopo dare delle classificazioni.’ 
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 Ibid., p. 43. ‘…Marx procede come Hegel: l’economia è per lui il sistema dei bisogni; e i bisogni sono 
determinati dall’organizzazione sociale tutt’intera… I problemi di tal genere non sono esclusivamente 
economici: essi abbracciano tutto il campo della storia sociale.’ 
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strong causal relations regulate the economic sphere. However, he does state that the economy 
is a sphere in which humanity is more subject to the determinism of nature. Conversely 
‘moving from the economy to law and politics, our spirit constructs to some extent its 
freedom; we understand perfectly that it would be impossible to deduce law and politics from 
the economy.’140  In other words, the economy here is conceptualized as a point of contact 
between the determinism of the natural milieu and the creative activity characterizing the 
human one. 
Nonetheless, it should be clear that Sorel does not believe that economic activity is regulated 
by the determinism of nature. Despite the fact that it consists in an interaction with nature, 
and that it represents the sphere of human activity that brings humans closer to natural 
necessity, economic activity remains a human phenomenon. It is in another important essay 
dedicated to ‘Necessity and fatalism in Marxism’ that Sorel clarifies this point.141 Marx’s 
insistence on economic phenomena, he writes, is justified because such phenomena bear the 
greatest similarity with natural ones, in virtue of their regularity. More precisely: 
‘We know today that chance does not always operate in the same way; in an 
economy based on free competition it produces the results most similar to those 
it has in the physical sciences. It is here that we find most the indetermination of 
facts combined with the reciprocal determination of tendencies (or systematized 
averages); economy appears as the only social science truly purged of 
psychological elements, that is, of free action…’142 
But the separation between the natural deterministic world and the human one remains. ‘In 
truth’ writes Sorel ‘the economy is governed by chance; the seemingly regular laws  which it 
reveals are only apparent, and have some value only for our use.’ 143 Economic tendencies 
such as capitalist accumulation or the proletarization of the middle classes are, in other words, 
not laws of nature: one must not forget that ‘in the economic order, under a regime of free 
competition, chance gives us averages, susceptible of being systematized in such a way as to 
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 Ibid., p. 44. ‘Passando dall’economia al diritto e alla politica, il nostro spirito realizza la sua libertà in una 
certa misura; e noi sentiamo perfettamente che sarebbe impossibile dedurre il diritto e la politica dall’economia.’ 
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 Georges Sorel, ‘La necessità e il fatalismo nel marxismo’ [1898], Saggi di critica del marxismo, pp. 58-94. 
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 Sorel, ‘Necessità e fatalismo’, p. 78. Emphasis added. ‘Noi sappiamo oggi che l’azzardo non opera sempre 
allo stesso modo; è nella economia della libera concorrenza che esso produce gli effetti somiglianti a quelli a cui 
esso dà luogo nelle scienze fisiche. È là che si trova al più alto grado quell’indeterminazione dei fatti, unita alla 
determinazione reciproca delle tendenze (o risultati medi regolarizzati); questa economia sembra essere la sola 
scienza sociale veramente purgata da ogni elemento psicologico, cioè da ogni azione libera; essa è quindi la sola 
che sia suscettibile di essere trattata matematicamente.’ 
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 Ibid., p. 84. ‘L’economia è in realtà sottomessa all’azzardo; le leggi regolari che essa sembra fornire non sono 
che delle apparenze, non hanno valore che per il nostro uso…’ 
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present tendencies analogous to mechanical processes and capable of being expressed under 
the guise of natural laws.’144 
The arguments remind those deployed in the discussion of Durkheim’s sociology: the objects 
of social sciences are theoretically constructed objects, statistical averages. The consequences 
that Sorel draws are the same ones, namely a separation of the strong causality of the natural 
world from the weak causality of the social world. In stark opposition with the ‘historical 
contingency’ 145  regulating the human world, nature ‘presents us with immutable 
principles’ 146 . Thus, whereas ‘economic laws hide from us a fundamental arbitrariness, 
physical laws are often hidden between an apparent arbitrariness; the former cannot be 
applied to an individual case, the latter cover every possible case.’ 147 Sorel here restates that, 
despite appearances to the contrary, the economy is a social phenomenon and thus is not 
regulated by causal necessities: whereas in the natural world strong causal necessities allow 
scientific analysis to be conducted in terms of general laws, the absence of these necessities in 
the social world prevents the social sciences from formulating such laws. And thus, research 
has to be conducted on a case-by-case basis, through the analysis of specific problems. The 
methods and criteria that allow the social scientist to shed light on a specific question cannot 
be erected to general laws, for there are simply no such laws that regulate the interactions 
amongst the various spheres of human activity in the social world. 
This fact brings Sorel to separate the activity of the natural scientist from that of the social 
scientist. Unlike the former, the latter operates through a work of schematization, 
simplification, what Sorel calls ‘reductions’: the social scientist separates the ‘important facts, 
the dominant traits, the general principles from the confused whole, trying to translate his 
reductions into clear and concise formulas, which then are often mistaken for the necessary 
laws of the historical order.’ 148 These ‘clear and concise’ formulas, however, are rational only 
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 Ibid., p. 83. Emphasis added. ‘Non bisogna mai perdere di vista che è nell’ordine economico e sotto il regime 
della libera concorrenza che l’azzardo fornisce dei risultati medi, suscettibili di essere regolarizzati in modo da 
far risaltare delle tendenze analoghe a dei processi meccanici e atte ad essere espresse sotto forma di leggi 
naturali.’ 
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 Sorel, ‘Pro e contro’, p. 866-7n. 
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 Sorel, ‘Necessità e fatalismo’, p. 84. ‘La natura, al contrario, ci presenta dei principi immutabili’. 
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 Ibid., p. 84. ‘Le leggi economiche ci nascondono l’azzardo fondamentale, le leggi fisiche invece sono spesso 
dissimulate sotto un azzardo apparente; le prime non s’applicano a caso isolato, le seconde s’applicano invece a 
qualunque caso.’ 
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 Ibid., pp. 67-8. Non si riflette in generale che il sociologo e il fisico, mentre pur sembrano servirsi di metodi 
analoghi, procedono invece per vie affatto diverse. Il primo per facilitare le proprie ricerche fa delle riduzioni 
successive, piuttosto che delle astrazioni; separa dall’insieme confuso i fatti importanti, i caratteri dominanti, i 
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insofar as they are connected to the specific problem upon which they try to shed light: 
‘sociological reductions…are made to be used in dealing with specific problems’149 Thus, in 
the absence of general laws, one must always specify the field of application of these 
‘sociological reductions’: ‘In order to avoid all confusion and preserve their scientific status, 
it is necessary to always define the goal for which we formulate them; it is the philosophy of 
action that must enlighten the path of sociology’.150 
4.3.3. THE EPISTEMIC STATUS OF SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
Now, what Sorel does in this passage is in fact rather simple. Having excluded the possibility 
both of finding a law of historical development as well as that of finding a fixed criterion 
regulating the interactions between the various spheres of human activity, he tries to come up 
with a method of preserving some scientific rigour in the absence of laws. And thus he comes 
up with this epistemological rule of thumb, that social-scientific concepts have to always be 
connected to the specific questions that they try to solve. But this epistemological rule of 
thumb is, in fact, a singular instance of a more general understanding of social science, and of 
its relation to historical agency, which Sorel directly derives from Vico and Labriola. 
To understand this rather complex point, we must remember that Sorel, following Vico, 
believes in the historical genesis of all human ideas. The implication of this principle is that 
social scientific ideas also have to be seen as historical human productions –  as connected to 
human agency. As he writes in his 1901 introduction to the Saggi di Critica del Marxismo, 
talking about the history of philosophy: 
‘The formulas that resumed entire systems do not tell us why a system 
triumphed in a given era, nor the reason as to why it was able to influence 
institutions. What is truly valuable [importantissimo] in the history of 
philosophy is what cannot be found in dogmatic theses, i.e. the attitude taken by 
each school in the face of reality. Doctrines crumble, one after the other, like 
sand castles and the history of philosophy resembles the narration of successive 
failures; but this vanity of philosophy only belongs to the dogmatic part, that 
which presented itself as scientifically superior. But there was something that 
was not in vain: the light shed upon their own epoch by the creators of 
                                                                                                                                                        
principi generali, cercando tradurre le sue riduzioni in formole chiare e brevi, che assai spesso sono scambiate 
per leggi necessarie dell’ordine storico’ 
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 Ibid., p. 68. ‘La riduzioni della sociologia e gli schemi dialettici che le riassumono sono fatti per essere usati 
nelle quistioni [sic] particolari…’ 
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 Ibid. ‘Se si vuole evitare ogni confusione e conservar loro un vero carattere scientifico, bisogna sempre 
definire lo scopo in vista del quale noi li enunciamo; è la filosofia dell’azione che deve rischiarare il cammino 
della sociologia.’ 
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philosophical schools, which allows posterity to understand it… Philosophy 
does not belong to the domain of knowledge, but to that of active life…’151 
In other words, philosophies, as well as social-scientific theories, ought not to be understood 
as descriptions of social reality, but as expressions of this same reality. At the same time, 
since social reality is not static but is transformed by human agency, it follows that social 
scientific theories too must be understood as expression of historical agency. This, of course, 
holds for Marxism too. 
It is in the introduction to the Saggi that this point is first developed, although somewhat 
awkwardly, because Sorel phrases this insight in reference to a scientific ideal of detached 
objectivity in which he is no longer allowed to believe, at least since the time of the study of 
Vico. So he writes sentences such as ‘it is necessary to abandon all ambitions to transform 
socialism into a science’, approvingly quotes Croce as the latter writes that it would be better 
to leave to charlatans the idea that ‘science… is the regulator of life’,152  and speaks of 
Marxism in terms of its capacity to generate ‘myths’ and ‘social poems’. 153 But despite the 
awkward language, Sorel is not embracing irrationalism, nor is he separating the strong 
causality of the natural sciences from the weak alternative of the social sciences. Instead, he is 
bringing his historicism to its logical conclusion and asserting that the idea of a social science 
that is not in some way the expression or articulation of a social situation is an impossibility. 
What Sorel is doing, in other words, is spelling out the impossibility of understanding social 
science à la Durkheim, as sitting above society and discovering its fundamental structures. 154 
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 Georges Sorel, ‘Introduzione’[1901] in Saggi di critica del Marxismo, pp. 9-10. Full passage: ‘D’altronde, 
quando si studia la storia della filosofia, si arriva a riconoscere ben presto che le dottrine ebbero a compiere nel 
mondo una parte assai meno importante di quello che appaia sulle prime. Le formole che servivano a riassumere 
i sistemi non ci dicono perché tale sistema ha trionfato in un’epoca determinata, né la ragione per cui ebbe 
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tesi dogmatiche, è l’attitudine presa da ciascuna scuola di fronte alla vita reale. Le dottrine cadono le une dopo le 
altre come castelli di carta; la storia della filosofia appare come la narrazione di deplorevoli e successivi crolli; 
ma questa vanità della filosofia non tocca che la parte dogmatica, quella appunto che si presentava come scienza 
superiore. Vi fu qualche cosa che non fu vana, cioè la luce venuta dai creatori delle singole scuole, che permise 
ai posteri di conoscere la loro epoca; poiché spesso non tanto importa il sapere quel che il mondo potrebbe essere 
seguendo l’uno o l’altro fabbricatore di ipotesi, quanto il veder bene quel che interessa di vedere, per la pratica, 
in un’epoca determinata. La filosofia non appartiene al dominio della conoscenza, ma a quello della vita attiva: 
aver ben penetrato un sistema è aver appreso a ben servirsene.’  
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 Ibid., p. 13. ‘È necessario abbandonare ogni velleità di trasformare il socialismo in scienza; B. Croce ha 
scritto sopra tale questione delle pagine di buon senso. Io applaudo di cuore a questa sua massima: “Lasciamo ai 
chiacchieroni… il proclamare che la scienza (ossia la loro scienza) è la regina dominatrice della vita”. ’ The 
citation comes from Croce’s Materialismo storico ed economia marxistica. 
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 Ibid., pp. 13 and 15. 
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 Let us remember that Durkheim had written that ‘Socialism is not a science… it is a cry of pain… uttered by 
those who feel most acutely our collective malaise.’ Durkheim, Le socialisme, p. 37. Implicit in this criticism is 
the idea that too much involvement with the phenomena under consideration is scientifically inappropriate since 
science presupposes detachment, the separation of the enquiring subject and the object of knowledge.  
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Instead, social science is a socially embedded activity, the expression of human agency, and 
as such cannot be understood in isolation from the social reality it expresses. 
We have seen many times why Sorel does not believe in the possibility of a ‘strong’, i.e. law-
like, science of society: the central role of human agency in the artificial milieu. The point is 
reasserted again in the introduction: 
 ‘…we do not live in a measurable and material reality, as those who dream of 
transforming sociology into a mechanical science think. The present world 
would be, in that case, the only one causing our actions. But as soon as man 
elevates himself above animal life, the present and mechanical reality become 
increasingly less important. Man adapts to a kind of ideal atmosphere, creates a 
world for himself, a future in which to take shelter from the anxieties of the 
present: this sphere of the imagined future is the truly human environment.’155  
Here human agency, always sharply distinguished from the natural world, is characterized in 
terms of poetic imagination, but the point is always the same, namely the impossibility of 
establishing deterministic causal relations, and hence laws. This is the reason why there can 
be no general sociology, and why Marxism cannot be seen as a general sociology but instead 
must be seen as the intellectual production of a specific historical force, namely the workers’ 
movement. This is the fundamental point: the conceptualization of Marxism as the ideological 
production of a new kind of historical experience, that of the modern proletariat. This is the 
deeper meaning of the fact that ‘philosophy does not belong to the domain of knowledge, but 
to that of active life’.156 It is, moreover, also the reason as to why Sorel begins seeing the 
workers’ movement and Marxist theory as two sides of the same coin, two aspects of the 
same phenomenon. 
The clearest indications in this direction are provided by Sorel in the spring of 1902, as he is 
invited as the main speaker to the session on historical materialism organized by the Société 
Française de Philosophie. 157 The society represented the official, institutionalized forum of 
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 Georges Sorel, ‘Les aspects juridiques du socialisme’, Revue Socialiste 22, 1900, p. 398, quoted in Sorel, 
‘Introduzione’, p. 14. French passage: ‘Nous ne vivons pas clans la réalité matérielle et mesurable, comme 
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 ‘Sèance du 20 Mars 1902: Le matérialisme historique’, Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie 2, 
1902, pp. 91-122. 
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French philosophy. It was connected to the Sorbonne and it issued from the same group that 
had set up, less than a decade earlier, the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale. In the session 
of the 20th March 1902, amongst Sorel’s listeners we find Bergson, Charles Dunan, Xavier 
Léon, Edouard Le Roy and many other central figures of French philosophical thought of the 
time.158 Already, the fact that a relative outsider like Sorel could be the main speaker in this 
forum shows us the difficulties that Marxism experienced in its French implantation, while 
the details of the heated discussion give us an idea of the specificity of Sorel’s Marxism when 
compared to the normal understanding of Marx in France. For our purposes, the importance 
of the discussion lies in its showing rather clearly how from the refusal to believe in social 
scientific laws Sorel derives the impossibility of general sociologies and the understanding of 
Marxism as the ideological production of the workers’ movement.  
Sorel’s exposition of historical materialism draws on Andler and Croce, and insists on two 
points: the rejection of economism and the status of Marxism as a synthesis of theory and 
practice along the lines of Labriola and Vico. But he is challenged by Elie Halévy, who 
reproaches him, on these two crucial points, for straying too far from the core of Marxism. 
First Halévy states: 
‘…the terms of “solidarity” and “synthesis” amount to, I fear, a betrayal of 
Marxist thought. They imply a reciprocity of action between the elements 
considered, that Marx, in the name of his historical materialism, would have 
thought inconceivable. According to Marx, the reaction of the “spiritual” onto 
the “material”, and of the “theoretical” upon the “practical”, is an 
impossibility”159 
What Halévy articulates is a Marxism that is equipped with a fixed criterion that regulates the 
interaction between the various spheres of human activity. We have, as the fundamental 
phenomenon, economics: what Halévy calls ‘the material’ or ‘the practical’. The secondary 
phenomena are what Halévy calls ‘the spiritual’ and the ‘the theoretical’, what Labriola called 
the ‘produits et… développments dérivés et complexes’. 160  What Halévy insists is the 
presence of a fixed way in which these two spheres interact, a hierarchical relation in which 
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 Ibid., p. 91n. ‘Etaient présents à la séance: MM. Belot, Bergson, Bernès, Brunschvicg, Coutourat, Darlu, 
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 Ibid., p. 95. ‘En premier lieu, les termes, de « solidarité » et de « synthèse » constituent, je le crains, une sorte 
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 Labriola, ‘Matérialisme historique’, p. 136. 
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the first set of phenomena is primary and the second set secondary. But for Sorel, as we have 
seen, this criterion does not exist: there is no general pattern regulating the interactions 
between the two spheres, everything interacts with everything, and science can only shed light 
on specific problems, but never come up with such a general criterion. 
It should be noticed that on Halévy’s view the revolutionary potential of Marxist theory is 
thus reduced to zero, for the only driver of historical change is the first, economic, type of 
phenomena. We can see how, though strictly speaking the economism of Halévy is capable of 
conceiving Marxism as the self-consciousness of the modern proletariat, it cannot ascribe any 
historical force to this self-consciousness. Historical change is dictated by economic, rather 
than ideological changes. This of course is unacceptable to Sorel, because the very idea of a 
sphere of human activity that somehow is able to develop without being influenced by the 
sum total of juridical, intellectual, and moral relations that characterize wider society is 
nonsensical. 
There is, moreover, an epistemological point worth stressing. Despite the fact that Halévy 
claims to see in all ideological manifestations a reflection of the fundamental economic 
phenomenon, he still conceives of Marxism as a general sociology. And thus, when Sorel 
elaborates his point about how Marxism is not a social science but the theoretical articulation 
of a number of social practices that characterize the proletariat, he claims that he cannot 
understand: 
‘Secondly, I fear that M. Sorel uses the terms “theory” and “practice” in a rather 
obscure way. All historical theories, M. Sorel tells us, have, consciously or 
unconsciously a practical goal (of edification, teaching, etc.): the merit of 
historical materialism is that of having grasped [avoir eu la conscience explicite 
de] this universal fact. It is from here that I cannot understand anymore.’161 
It is normal that Halévy finds it hard to follow Sorel. He enters the discussion with the 
definition of ‘practice’ as coterminous with economics, i.e. the interaction with nature for the 
satisfaction of human needs. Further, he holds Marxism to be a theory claiming that this 
sphere of human activity is the only driver of historical change, and that which determines 
elements such as morality, law, and so on. But given that Sorel rejects this 
structure/superstructure way of thinking about society, it consequently becomes impossible to 
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sens assez obscur. Toutes les théories historiques, nous dit M. Sorel, se proposent, consciemment, ou 
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strictly separate ‘theory’ from ‘practice’. Social theories thus have to be seen also as particular 
forms of agency, as expressions, of a particular kind, of the agency of collectivities. The unity 
of theory and practice consists precisely in avowing that even systems of ideas, such as 
Marxism, are expressions of human activity, and that as such their perspective is not just 
historically situated, but also practical. The conceptual distinction between the sphere of 
economic production and the rest is, in other words, absent from Sorel’s perspective. With 
this in mind, it is not surprising that Halévy would say that Sorel calls ‘practice… that which 
Marx called theory, and vice-versa.’162 More accustomed to public discussion than Sorel, 
Halévy gains the upper hand by referring to the very text by Charles Andler163 that Sorel had 
brought in his support in order to illustrate his own take on Marxism.  
‘It is not like this that one must understand, in an essay defining historical 
materialism, the terms “theory” and “practice”. It is not like this, specifically, 
that M. Andler - to whom M. Sorel often appears to refer to - understands these 
terms. By “theory”, M. Andler understands the complex of ideas through which 
men translate and express their social relations, imposed upon them by their 
economic conditions of existence; by “practice” the invention of working tools 
allowing men to “earn their life [gagner leur vie] with a certain set of tools, and 
through the division of labour which that set requires”… we alter [on fausse] 
Marxism, if by “practice” we mean not “technical activity”, but the propaganda 
of the socialist ideal.’164  
But Sorel cannot accept this sharp distinction between theory and practice, for it amounts to 
establishing a separation between the economy and the rest. The ‘propaganda of the socialist 
ideal’ is itself a form of human activity rooted in an historical experience. The sphere of 
economic production is important, but cannot have the overwhelming importance which 
Halévy claims for it, for this would result in a one-sided historical vision, and would advance 
to the status of social scientific laws connections that, for Sorel, are at best empirical 
correlations between statistically constructed theoretical objects. Rather, following Labriola, 
the historical process is characterized by the rich and complex interaction of various spheres 
of human activity: this fidelity to reality, for Sorel prevents Marxism from formulating 
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illusory laws of history and society. Marxism then is the theoretical elaboration of a social 
force that is not understood in merely economic terms. In a timid reply, Sorel thus connects 
Marxist theory to the working class: 
 ‘The historical interpretation given by Marx and Engels must be used to shed 
light upon the workers’ movement… they [Marx and Engels] tried to justify the 
movement by showing that it can succeed and that the proletariat can accomplish 
its revolutionary mission, which was, to them, the essence of all modern 
proletarian agitation. It is a question of clarifying a social practice, in the same 
way in which a theory of physics sheds light upon an industrial practice. Class 
struggle would not exist without ideas…’165  
It is important to insist on this point, for, together with the rejection of historical determinism 
and that of economicism, it gives us the theoretical structure of Sorel’s Marxism. These three 
ideas – the rejection of historical determinism, the refusal to come up with a general criterion 
regulating the interactions between various spheres of human activity, and the understanding 
of all intellectual activity, Marxism included, as socially embedded – are what define Sorel’s 
Marxism, and constitute the theoretical bases of his more canonically political writings. They 
can all be seen as consequences of Sorel’s attempt to put human agency at the heart of the 
social world, and spell out Sorel’s refusal to see Marxism as an ‘economico-revolutionary 
fatalism’166.  
Historical prediction is an impossibility, and economic analysis is not the analysis of the deep 
and only structure of social development, but at best a scientific abstraction of an infinitely 
more complex social reality. Society itself is a complex web of mutually-interacting spheres 
of human activity in which it is impossible to establish a priority, or a general criterion 
capable of delineating a definitive social architecture. The social scientist can try to enquire 
on specific problems, investigating what influences most a certain phenomenon, but must 
always bear in mind the constant and mutual interaction of the various spheres. Moreover, 
science itself is conceived as a sphere of human activity, and is situated in the social world: 
instead of representing, from a supposedly external perspective, the causal relations regulating 
society, science merely articulates what is implicit in a number of social practices from which 
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it arises. Theoretical activity, in short, can only be understood as one aspect amongst many in 
the social world. After all, it is ‘Marx’s principle’ that states that ‘science must emerge from 
action, the intellectual movement [must] express the movement of reality’.167 
4.4 THE INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROLETARIAT 
If the social world is a world characterized by the deployment of human agency in 
institutional settings, and, furthermore, if the various spheres of human activity that these 
institutions harbour continually interact with each other without a fixed criterion, it follows 
that historical change can only be understood in terms of the production of new social 
relations inside new institutions. We have seen, in section 4.2.4, how Sorel had formulated 
this idea in the ‘Étude sur Vico’. In the concluding part of this chapter we dwell more on this 
question of historical change by focussing on the issue of ethics in socialism. As we have seen 
in the previous chapter, this was an issue that any French Marxist interested in the intellectual 
vindication of historical materialism had to deal with: someone like Sorel had, in other words, 
to show how Marxism was capable of making sense of morality as an important factor of 
historical change and how it was not, as it were, a ‘théorie du ventre’. The understanding of 
Marxism and of the historical process that we have outlined in this chapter, as should be clear, 
gave ample basis to Sorel to speak of such questions, and starting in 1898, Sorel underlined 
these aspects repeatedly, putting them at the centre of his revisionist project of ‘going back to 
Marx’.  
In defending the right of Marxists to speak of ethics and of juridical relations, Sorel gave 
further articulation to his theory of historical change through institutional development. 
Ethics, in particular, came to be seen by Sorel as an indicator of proletarian institutional 
development, i.e. of the readiness of proletarian institutions to take charge of the new society. 
By examining the question of ethics, thus, we are in a position to clarify and further 
characterize Sorel’s understanding of historical change as a process of institutional 
development. Given that, for Sorel, institutions are   the, so to speak, natural habitat of social 
relations, it follows that a new moral vision can only be embedded in new institutions and 
that, conversely, the presence of a socialist ethics becomes an indicator of proletarian 
institutional development. Moving from the abstract to the concrete, we conclude with the 
examination Sorel’s 1898 ‘L’avenir socialiste des syndicats’, a text that sees unions as the 
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quintessential proletarian institutions and that outlines the socialist transformation in terms of 
a widening of the functions of unions, understood not merely as organizations of resistance to 
capitalist exploitation but, more radically, as the embryonic cells of the society to come. 
4.4.1 ETHICS, RIGHT, AND INSTITUTIONS 
Sorel’s concern for morality is an old one. It features in his writings since at least the Procès 
de Socrate, and occupies a central role in his revision of Marxism, in his ‘going back to 
Marx’. That this should be so, as we have stated, is unsurprising, since the accusations against 
Marxists of not understanding morality and law were common currency in the France of the 
time. Moreover, the two closing years of the 19th century are also characterized by intellectual 
conditions favourable to the voicing of such an issue. Those were the years of the Bernstein 
debate, in which the eminent member of the SPD questioned the necessity of the economic 
collapse of capitalism. This, as we shall see more thoroughly in the next chapter, created a 
fertile ground for Marxisms that gave importance to other factors of historical development 
than economics. In the aftermath of the Bernstein crisis, when the polemical battle between 
various reformisms and the orthodoxy came to life, Sorel used this space to publicly proclaim 
his non-determinist Marxism and to stress the questions of proletarian right and ethics. 
But what can ethics and right signify from the perspective of Sorel’s Marxism? A good 
starting point for examining the question comes from the following passage, written in 1899, 
discussing the success of Fourier amongst orthodox Marxists: ‘Marxists’ writes Sorel ‘have 
not generally understood the enormous difference between the perspective of Marx and that of 
Fourier… despite the outlandishness of the hypothesis [of Fourier], they like [its] automatic 
stability because it does not imply any moral notion, and to most democratic socialists 
morality is an abominable monster.’ 168  ‘We can call utopians’, continues Sorel, ‘those 
reformers who cannot explain their projects by appealing to the observation of the social 
mechanism’169. This reference to the ‘social mechanism’ is significant as it sheds light on how 
Sorel approaches the question. Ethics and law are human productions, embedded not only, or 
even principally, in moral maxims and legislative texts, but also, and more crucially, in social 
                                                 
168
 Georges Sorel, ‘Y a-t-il de l’utopie dans le marxisme?’, Revue de métaphysique et de morale 7, 1899, p. 158. 
‘Les marxistes n’ont pas, généralement, bien compris l’énorme différence qui sépare les points de vue de Marx 
et de Fourier ; comme les anciens phalanstériens, beaucoup d’entre eux sont dupes de la mécanique fantastique 
de Fourier ; ils trouvent que le système phalanstérien a une allure physique et par suite matérialiste ; la stabilité 
automatique, malgré l’invraisemblance de l’hypothèse, leur plait, parce qu’elle ne requiert aucune notion 
morale ; et pour un très grand nombre de social-démocrates la morale est un monstre abominable.’ 
169
 Ibid. ‘Nous devons considérer comme utopistes tous les réformateurs que ne peuvent pas expliquer leurs 
projets en partant de l’observation du mécanisme social’ 
 225 
practices occurring within institutions. But ethics and law, as we have seen, are particular 
types of human productions, one that, following Labriola, Sorel sees as higher, derived from 
the more basic economic realm. Though they are capable of influencing the sphere of 
economic production, they are secondary in that they distance themselves from economics, 
and thus exemplify the process through which ‘[the human] spirit regains its freedom and is 
capable again to realize, more or less, its ends.’170  
In an Italian article of 1899 Sorel devotes an interesting analysis to the beginning of chapter 
two of Capital, where Marx writes that one of the conditions of exchange is the presence of a 
contractual relation between the two parties: ‘this juridical relation… is but the reflex of the 
real economic relation between the two.’ 171 Sorel’s analysis of the word reflection – in the 
original German ‘wiederspiegelt’ – is the following: the word must be taken in its 
‘psychological sense…. spirit, stimulated by the economical phenomenon, creates a spiritual 
product’172, i.e. the juridical relation. The best analogy here is an organic one, and it is 
impossible not to be reminded of a footnote in the study on Vico, where Sorel had declared 
that to assert that, in the study of human institutions, moral phenomena are epiphenomenal is 
‘as mistaken as saying that, in psychology, consciousness is epiphenomenal.’ 173 Juridical and 
ethical systems are ‘what we have in our hands, constructed by us, it is our tool, our reasoned 
work; it is… the expression of our freedom’. 174 Not only do these secondary social forms 
embody our freedom in a more complete way, they also have a role to play in the historical 
process. Ethics and right are thus secondary forms, but ones in which human freedom is 
realized more fully.  
The point is that, though Sorel refuses to give a precise architecture of the social world, he 
believes that certain human productions such as ethics and law are more advanced human 
products than others, such as economic systems. The superiority is measured in terms of the 
detachment from the necessity of nature: it is ‘precisely because the economy is a system that 
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displays a greater necessity and some analogy with nature, that Engels places it at the bottom 
of the ladder.’175 But this means something quite precise, namely that the emergence of new 
ethical and juridical forms signals the maturity of an historical movement, of a new social 
form. If we embrace economism, we can safely disregard ethics and law, because the only 
relevant change is one in the productive system. But if we are equipped with a more scientific, 
and for Sorel more truly Marxian, conception of the historical process, we have to conclude 
that they are key elements of an historical transformation, for they show us that the proletariat 
is truly ready to overthrow capitalism: not only has it broken with capitalism at the level of 
economic production, but it has also developed its class life to the point of having developed 
its own moral and juridical forms. 
Sorel’s concern for right and ethics then does not aim at providing a justification of socialism 
in moral terms. The purpose of this insistence is not that of showing that socialism is more 
moral, or just than capitalism. To argue this would mean embracing the un-Marxian 
perspective of natural rights. Instead, Sorel starts from the opposite point of view, from the 
observation that capitalism appears increasingly immoral. What must the historian conclude 
from this? That a new moral sense is emerging, historically, through the development of new 
institutions: the emergence of a proletarian morality and of proletarian juridical relations are 
good indicators that a new society is coming. Morality too, in other words, must be 
understood socially and historically: ‘Morality thus understood is strictly related to the 
institutions of a country, and it is not without reason that the ancients considered morality as 
part of politics.’ 176 The insistence on morality and law then can be understood best if seen 
from the perspective of Sorel’s reflections on the conditions of revolutions, and of his 
understanding of the relations between the economy and other social forms in the historical 
process. 
It is in a conference to the Collège libre des sciences sociales, published in the same year in 
the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, that Sorel articulates his views on the issue. It is 
telling that he begins by a distinction between natural and historical right: ‘the first one, 
inspired by the traditions of the liberal bourgeoisie, dates back to the French Revolution; the 
second, developed mainly under Marx’s influence, derives its principles from the study of the 
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social conditions created by large industry.’177 An appeal to natural right can be politically 
useful, as it gives ‘excellent weapons’ to those who attack the ‘established powers’178, but, 
crucially, it is a sterile appeal: ‘it [natural right] only yields negative results and its action is 
purely destructive: once the day of the revolution arrives, the social group in the best position 
to inherit power restores authority for its own benefit.’179 
The question of morality ought, for Sorel, to be given more centrality in contemporary 
socialism. The political necessities of Marxists, fighting against adversaries who employed 
the language of natural right, have lead them to ‘cover with ridicule all ethical preoccupations, 
and insist solely on the material side of the struggle.’ 180  Of course, Sorel opposes this 
approach, which ‘deserves to be called materialist in the worse sense of the term’.181 Class 
struggle, for Sorel, has an ethical and juridical side, whose origins lie in the social conditions 
of the two opposing classes and in their struggle. He cites the section of Capital  in which 
Marx writes that attempts by unions to limit the working day configure ‘…an antinomy, right 
against right, both equally bearing the seal of the law of exchanges. Between equal rights, 
force decides.’182 Commenting on this opposition between bourgeois and proletarian right 
Sorel adds: 
‘Class struggle revolves around [porte sur] juridical systems; we can say that it is 
a struggle between two principles: a struggle between juridical principles; each 
of the two systems is characterized by the political ideal which the two classes 
have of the role of law, and by the general tendency which results from this idea 
for the economy of the country.’183 
In interpreting this passage, we must remind ourselves that Sorel had clearly distinguished, a 
few pages before, between historical and natural conceptions of rights. Saying that the class 
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struggle is a struggle between juridical principles does not mean that it is a struggle for the 
acknowledgment of the natural rights of the working classes. Instead, it means highlighting 
how in a conflict between different classes, each class has its own conception, rooted in its 
institutional practices, of what rights and morality are, and that this dimension must be 
acknowledged in Marxism. 
The secondary nature of juridical and ethical forms thus allows them to function as indicators 
of the evolution of a form of social life. Once a social group has managed to develop its own 
ethical and juridical frameworks, it means that it has developed its institutions to the point that 
they require such frameworks to function. Ethics and right are thus signs of the historical 
maturity of the proletariat, and it is this development that alone can ensure the successful 
overthrow of capitalism. Again, the fundamental point is that the concern for rights and 
morality must be seen in connection with Sorel’s theory of historical change through 
institutional development, what he had called in the study of Vico the ‘theory of 
preparation’.184 Because Sorel has a nuanced, complex understanding of society, and refuses 
to see it in purely economic terms, it follows that a social transformation must address this 
complexity, and that the revolutionary class must introduce a host of new social relations able 
to sustain a truly new society. If the revolution were a mere transformation of the productive 
system, the juridical, political and moral relations that characterized the old society would still 
exert their influence in the post-revolutionary world. And thus the new society would fall 
back on the old understandings of law and ethics or, alternatively, jumpo into the unknown. 
The French experience here appears decisive in orienting Sorel’s thought. If we go back to the 
‘Éthique du socialisme’, we read: 
‘Our fathers could believe that it was sufficient to overthrow power to allow 
things to take on their natural course, so that the reign of reason may begin. We 
have acquired far too much experience to accept this naïve optimism; the 
succession of authority never remains vacant for too long; tyranny swiftly 
follows tyranny. Socialists do not want to jump again in the unknown.’ 185  
The fundamental thought at work here is one concerning historical continuity. The question 
is: what structures and institutions can a post-revolutionary society rely on? Sorel’s answer is 
that these structures and institutions, amongst which there are ethics and law, must be 
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developed before the revolutionary uprising. Thus, ‘..what was, in the past, secondary for 
utopians and politicians becomes now extremely important: the work of preparation of the 
proletariat.’ 186   This work of preparation must consist in the development of new social 
relations, and cannot be limited to the transformation of the system of economic production. 
Against the evolutionary mechanicism of a specific kind Marxism and its sociological 
formulas, Sorel here deploys a considerably refined sense of history, and of its slow 
unfolding. Sorel’s conception of the revolution is one in which the violent upheavals 
associated with it are, in fact, secondary: 
‘The notion [of the evolution of the revolution] reaches its full development 
when the ethical spirit completely permeates the revolution; violence still 
remains; but it is merely the struggle necessary to make old branches fall, to give 
air to young and vital creations, to ensure the victory of institutions having 
already passed their tests; - it is but the anticipation of the unanimity which will 
unfold incessantly and which will make reforms appear intangible.’ 187 
The obscure expression concerning the ‘ethical spirit’ permeating the revolution can be 
explained as follows. The moral condemnation of capitalism, argues Sorel, is possible once a 
new moral sense has emerged. But since, to follow Labriola once more, ideas do not fall from 
the sky, this new moral sense can only emerge from a new form of social life, that of the 
proletariat and of its institutions. And once a social form has arrived at the point of developing 
its forms of morality and of law, it means that its evolution has reached the peak, that the 
work of preparation is done. Hence, the violence associated with the revolutionary moment is 
a mere formality, an historical detail, for the substantial change, at the level of social life, has 
already occurred. Unanimity is formed easily and reforms do not appear as big changes, for 
the big changes have already occurred, slowly and silently through the work of the 
preparation of the proletariat. 
In conclusion, Sorel’s positions on morality and law can be summed up as follows. Morality 
and law are human productions: they are codes of practical conduct embedded in institutions. 
They are secondary to economic production, and, precisely because of this, they are good 
                                                 
186
 Sorel, ‘Osservazioni intorno alla concezione materialista della storia’, p. 46. ‘Ciò che era in passato 
assolutamente secondario per gli utopisti e per gli uomini politici, diventa oggi importantissimo; è il lavoro di 
preparazione del proletariato.’ 
187
 Sorel, ‘Éthique du socialisme’, p. 289. ‘La notion atteint son entier développement quand l’esprit éthique 
pénètre complètement la révolution ; la violence reste toujours ; mais elle n’est que l’effort nécessaire pour faire 
tomber de vieilles branches, pour donner de l’air à des créations jeunes et pleines de vie, pour assurer la victoire 
à des institutions ayant fait leurs preuves ; - elle n’est que l’anticipation sur l’unanimité qui va se former 
incessamment et qui rendra les réformes intangibles.’ 
 230 
indicators of the evolution and maturity of a class or a people. Once a class has developed its 
own morality, it has reached full maturity: it is already a new society. This has important 
consequences for the question of the socialist revolution: morality and law become 
fundamental indicators of the readiness of the proletariat. Morality and law become indicators 
that the ‘work of preparation’ of the working class is almost complete. This, in turn, means 
that there is nothing to fear from the revolutionary upheaval, for the institutions and codes of 
conduct of the new society, as well as its productive system are already in place. What is left 
to do is a mere formality, namely the shaking of the tree necessary to ‘make old branches 
fall’. 
4.4.2 THE ‘AVENIR SOCIALISTE DES SYNDICATS’ 
As we can see then, the discussion on ethics and morality is connected to Sorel’s 
understanding of historical transformations as processes of institutional development. That 
this idea, despite all its vagueness, was central in Sorel’s Marxism can be explained by 
pointing out that not only he had refused to allow for laws of historical development, but also 
that he had rejected any attempt to explain the social world exclusively in terms of the 
evolution of productive processes. Historical change, thus, could neither be a matter of 
inevitability nor a simple question of productive reorganization: it had to be seen as a question 
of institutional development, and implied transformations at the ethical and juridical level as 
well. Systems of ethics and law do not exist principally in codes and books: they are 
embedded in social practices, that is, they inform the institutional life of the proletariat. 
Consequently, the appearance of new such systems signals the maturity of proletarian 
institutions, and since a society is composed of institutions, they signal the historical 
maturation of the historical agent that will realize socialism, i.e. the proletariat. This means 
that the main political task of the socialist movement becomes that of developing, in every 
possible direction, the institutions of the working class. It is from this perspective of 
institutional development that we can understand Sorel’s interest in trade unions, which he 
saw as the most articulated forms of proletarian institutional life. 
Sorel’s concern for institutions does not, of course, begin with his awareness of the historical 
potential of trade unions.188 On the contrary, it springs, as we have seen, from his theoretical 
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work of conceptualization of the social world in terms that shun economic determinism. The 
great importance attached by Sorel to the institution of family, for example, springs from his 
impression that Marx’s analysis of the social world, because of his interest in economics, 
omitted the historical genesis of too many important things, and thus needed to be completed; 
‘in the last years of his life’, according to Sorel, ‘Marx was struck by the necessity of 
completing his studies with a theory of the family’.189 At any rate, institutions have a crucial 
role to play in developing the social relations that will regulate the future socialist society: 
‘The goal of morality is to direct our conduct; but how do we judge it, and how 
can we confer to it stability? Institutions have always oriented judgment; it is by 
connecting conduct to institutions that we can appreciate the mores of people. 
We are thus lead to attach great importance to proletarian institutions; we 
observe… that institutions are educative; cooperatives are not to be praised for 
their financial results, but by their moral ones, by the habits they develop 
amongst its members.’190 
It is in the pamphlet L’avenir socialiste des syndicats, first published in 1898 in the anarchist 
Humanité Nouvelle, that this connection between revolutionary action and proletarian 
institutions is stated most completely. The essay, in which Sorel argues that labour unions are 
the key to the development of socialism, can be taken as a good example of how the 
theoretical understanding of Marxism to which Sorel subscribed led him to formulate a 
specific political strategy of institutional development. Seen from this perspective, it should 
not surprise us that Sorel’s conception of the role of labour unions is rather broad. Unions are 
not simply tools in an economic struggle of the proletariat against capitalists, necessary to 
secure better working conditions; nor are they meant to act as a kind of electoral reserve for 
the socialist party. Instead, they are the loci of development of proletarian life, the cells of the 
new society. 
                                                                                                                                                        
interest was the historical origin of juridical systems, and his great work, in four volumes, was dedicated to 
fortunes of Roman right in medieval France through a careful examination of the interplay between different 
social actors. It is more than a guess to say that Sorel’s sense for the importance of institutions in the historical 
process owes much to Flach. See Jacques Flach, Origines de l’ancienne France, 4 vols (Paris, Sirey: 1884-
1917). 
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The opening pages of the essay rehash, with copious references to Labriola, the theoretical 
reflections examined in this chapter. Marxism, writes Sorel, is not a theory of economic 
determinism, since even in the smallest social interactions we observe ‘relationships which 
are not simply economical’.191 A society is an ‘organism’ in which various spheres of human 
activity are fundamentally interconnected: 
‘The sociological structure may be called an organism; its different parts enjoy a 
certain freedom, fundamental for grouping them in different scientific systems; 
the rigid coordination often imaged by utopians does not exist; nor should we, 
like certain ultra-Marxists, reduce law and morality to simple ghosts.’192 
In the same way, Marxism does not offer sociological formulas predicting the future 
development of society, given that ‘scientific and mechanical predictions do not belong… to 
the new social science.’193 The crucial question for socialists then is an empirical and practical 
one, namely to understand whether or not the proletariat has accomplished that work of 
preparation described earlier. It is necessary to know ‘whether the preparation is sufficient to 
ensure that the [successful] struggle does not lead to the destruction of civilization.’194 As 
seen in the previous section, the key problem is that of the post-revolutionary society; more 
precisely, on the resources upon which it will draw to sustain its existence. Institutional 
aspects are fundamental, for a society, be it old or new, can live only through institutions. 
‘Had the Church been merely a philosophical school, preaching a morality of 
purity, it would have, doubtless, disappeared like countless other sects; [but 
instead] it was a society, working to develop amongst its members new juridical 
relations, and governing [itself] according to a new constitution. The day in 
which the edict of Milan proclaimed tolerance, the emperor consecrated, in fact, 
the existence of a hierarchy stronger than the imperial one, and instituted a State 
within the State… the French revolution gives us a[nother] very clear example: 
what strikes us is not the large and noisy storm but the conservation of a system 
developed at length within the bourgeois class.’195 
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The revolutionary perspective can only be thought after the manner of these historical 
examples: a laborious work of preparation bringing the revolutionary subject to the point 
where it already controls society, de facto if not de jure. More precisely, the class life of the 
proletariat must develop until it constitutes a new society, equipped with all the resources 
needed for the continuation of civilization: a system of production, a legal framework, an 
ethical outlook and so on. The political strategy envisaged by Sorel is, in short, that of 
institutional development, and it consists in a struggle to ‘empty the bourgeois political 
organism of all life, and to move all the useful elements it contained in a proletarian political 
organism…’.196 
Sorel dedicates the lengthy opening section to an attack of the claims to leadership of the 
workers’ movement advanced by intellectuals. His argument is directed against what he calls 
the ‘théorie des capacités’, i.e. that the leadership of movements ought to be reserved to those 
who are more qualified: hence, intellectual workers ought to lead manual ones.  For Sorel, the 
class origins of intellectuals are bourgeois: they thrive upon political activity and their 
interests lead them to transform the socialist struggle into a purely parliamentary one. They 
may be of some help in Germany, where the workers’ movement has constituted a ‘solid 
organisation, amounting to something like a bureaucratic state necessitating its paid 
functionaries.’197  But, and this is the crucial point, ‘…intellectuals, in Germany, join the 
socialist party as employees, not as bosses…’, whereas in France ‘they claim the right to 
dictatorial power in case of [parliamentary] success.’ 198  Sorel’s point here is that if the 
proletariat is to emancipate itself, it must constitute itself independently through its struggle 
as a class. If it allows itself to be directed by people outside of its class already from the start, 
the results will be dire. 
                                                                                                                                                        
juridiques nouvelles et gouvernant d’après une constitution nouvelle. Le jour où l'édit de Milan proclama la 
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The purpose of the attack on intellectuals then is that of highlighting the centrality of 
proletarian self-emancipation: ‘…if the worker accepts the leadership of people alien to the 
productive community,  - he will always remain incapable of governing himself, he will 
always remain subject to an external discipline.’199 The transformation of the proletariat into a 
class capable of overthrowing the capitalist system must ‘happen through an internal 
mechanism; it is within the proletariat, through its own resources, that a new right must 
emerge.’200 This self-emancipation, as we have seen, is synonymous with the creation of a 
proletarian society: new means of production, new juridical relations, a new morality, created 
through the development of new institutions.  Parliamentary activity must be subordinated to 
this goal: ‘What one must demand is that public authorities grant the concessions necessary to 
proceed to this transformation of the people by the people: it is with this goal that workers 
enter the electoral arena.’201 It is important to notice that, despite the anti-intellectual and anti-
parliamentary passages, Sorel does not completely condemn parliamentary engagement. He 
merely insists that it be subordinated to the development of the proletariat as a class, for this 
is the way that leads to the institutional development of proletarian life, and hence to the 
completion of the ‘work of preparation’ necessary to accomplish a revolutionary 
transformation of society. 
Sorel gives an interesting example of a juridical victory of the proletariat. Class struggle, he 
states, also manifests itself in juridical forms. The workers’ resistance to the economic 
oppression of capitalism leads them to organize themselves in unions, and to fight back 
through the union against the bosses. In this clash between two organised collectivities, Sorel 
underlines the juridical contrast between two different principles, and sees in this clash the 
birth of the future juridical system. Justice, ‘as formulated in liberal codes, knows only the 
isolated worker’, 202 and thus regulates the relationship between employer and employee on 
this individualist principle of a contract between two parties. This juridical understanding – 
the ‘theory of freedom of work’203 –reflects the social experience of the capitalist who moves 
in isolation. ‘But to the unionized workers, these theories are false; the whole of the workers 
                                                 
199
 Ibid., pp. 305-6. ‘… si l’ouvrier accepte le commandement de gens étrangers à la corporation productive, - il 
restera toujours incapable de se gouverner, il restera toujours soumis à une discipline externe.’ 
200
 Ibid., p. 307. ‘La pensée de Marx ne peut être douteuse : la transformation doit se faire par un mécanisme 
intérieur ; c'est dans le sein du prolétariat, c'est au moyen de ses ressources propres, que doit se créer le droit 
nouveau.’ 
201
 Ibid., p. 307. ‘Ce qu’il faut demander aux pouvoirs publics c’est d’accorder des facilités pour procéder à cette 
transformation du peuple par lui-même : c’est dans ce but que les ouvriers entrent dans l’arène électorale.’ 
202
 Ibid., p. 432. ‘Le droit, tel qu’il est formulé par les codes libéraux, ne connaît guère que l’ouvrier isolé.’  
203
 Ibid. ‘… telle est la théorie que les tribunaux appliquent sous le nom de le théorie de la liberté du travail.’ 
 235 
forms a body whose interest is one; no one can abandon the cause without being considered a 
traitor.’ 204  
Here we have a struggle between two juridical principles: the individualist one of the 
capitalists versus the collective one of the workers. As soon as the union gains the right to 
entertain talks with the capitalist, as soon as the legal system recognises the legitimacy of the 
negotiations between unions and bosses, there is a victory of the collective principle. The law 
‘recognizes, implicitly, the existence of this solidarity [amongst workers]: from the strictly 
individualist standpoint there is no conciliation to be attempted: the strike has broken all 
juridical relationship between the boss and each of his workers. Only individual contracts 
existed before the strike, but how can they give rise to obligations binding the boss to a 
collective body with which he has not signed any contract?’205 What we have here is ‘a 
system of new rights, developed through struggles and countless difficulties’.206 Workers can 
be proud of ‘having created, in the disorganised proletariat, a new organisation independent of 
all bourgeois institutions.’207 
This juridical victory constitutes however merely an example of a process of institutional 
development which is wider. Juridical victories like the one illustrated above are significant 
principally as indicators of the developments of labour unions into the cells of the new 
society. From this perspective, Sorel’s words on the question of unions and social security are 
particularly significant. He interrogates himself, taking his cue from the English experience, 
on the desirability of getting unions to set up basic welfare measures, such as pensions for old 
workers, health and unemployment safeguards and so on. He acknowledges that one has to 
carefully weigh the practical consequences of imposing such measures, and yet he is clear that 
in principle this is the way forward. Without these developments unions are reduced to a mere 
oppositional role, and to impose on them this role means ‘opposing a formidable barrier to the 
development of the proletariat; it means putting it at the mercy of the influence of bourgeois 
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demagogues; it means preventing it from elaborating the principles of a new right in line with 
its way of life; it is, in one word, to deny to the proletariat the possibility of becoming a class 
for itself.’208 The development of welfare networks within unions is for Sorel an important 
aspect of  the work preparation of the proletariat. 
If they are to become the cells of the new socialist society, then proletarian institutions must 
provide new solutions and ways of dealing with the classical problems of modern society. The 
decision-making process of unions, for example, contains the germ of a political principle for 
the society of tomorrow.209 Equally interesting for Sorel, if not more so, are new forms of 
institutionalization of sexual relations, with the creation of new juridical forms for the union 
of couples. Going back to his analogy with the history of Christianity, Sorel stresses that ‘one 
of the first instances of the new-born canonical law seems to be Pope Callixtus’ decree 
authorizing Christian unions in cases in which imperial law forbade rightful weddings.’210 
Connecting himself to Durkheim’s work on suicide, Sorel, in a tentative section of the essay, 
suggests that fully developed workers unions may constitute an effective remedy to this social 
condition, emphasizing their positive role in the fight against working class alcoholism.211  
What interests us here is not the validity of Sorel’s views on questions of marriage, 
alcoholism, or political representation. What is significant in the Avenir is that it represents a 
thorough attempt to articulate an argument outlining the genesis of proletarian social forms 
from the experience of proletarian collective life, that is, through the growth of proletarian 
institutions. ‘All institutions’ writes Sorel, ‘have developed in the same way: they do not issue 
from the decisions of great statesmen, nor from the calculations of intellectuals [savants]; they 
constitute themselves by embracing and condensing all aspects of life. How could the 
proletariat escape this necessity of constituting itself?’212 Sorel’s concern is the establishment 
–  here and now – of new social relations, the ‘work of preparation’ of the proletariat, the 
development within and through proletarian institutions of all the structures needed for a 
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society to function. This institutional development can only happen organically and slowly, 
with the necessary historical times. Failure to accomplish this work will severely limit the 
revolutionary potential of a successful socialist insurrection. 
The conclusion to this unusually optimistic essay consists, then, in an exhortation to preserve 
the class basis of proletarian institutions. The growth of the ‘political and juridical capacity’ 
of the proletariat depends on its capability to ‘remain exclusively working class’. 213 
Parliamentary struggle is not dismissed, but given a secondary role: what matters is the 
development of a society within society, slowly growing into a social organism capable of 
sustaining itself without bourgeois assistance. The slow work of eradication of bourgeois 
social forms can only take place in the midst of the class whose social conditions, created by 
capitalism, represent a radical novelty. This productive class, like all revolutionary historical 
agents, must develop its autonomous institutions, and socialism can only be understood as the 
culmination process through which the institutions of the working class achieve their 
historical triumph. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
With this chapter on Sorel’s Marxism, the first part of the thesis comes to its conclusion. We 
have attempted to trace Sorel’s intellectual trajectory from his early engagement with the 
philosophy of science up to the understanding of Marxism outlined in this chapter. What we 
have tried to show is how much Sorel’s engagement with Marxism was shaped by the 
problem of freedom, determinism, and science as we have outlined it in the first chapter. It is 
thus necessary to take a step back and briefly go through the line of reasoning developed thus 
far. 
In the first chapter, we have examined Sorel’s early epistemology, and insisted that it resulted 
from a desire to vindicate the objectivity and certainty of science, while at the same time 
safeguard the theoretical possibility of free human agency. That this problem should arise is 
explained by the deep connection, present in Sorel’s work in a central way – at least until his 
discovery of Vico –  between the validity of science and determinism. Science could be 
vindicated only if it managed to produce laws, and these laws were possible only if the world 
which science studied was deterministic, characterized by strong, necessary, causal relations. 
Despite, or perhaps precisely because he was immersed in a climate in which this ideal of 
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science was being increasingly questioned, Sorel’s first epistemological attempts are 
characterized by the ambition of safeguarding the certainty and objectivity of science. 
Nonetheless,  Sorel did not wish to embrace an all-encompassing deterministic cosmology, 
for this would have resulted in denying the possibility of human freedom. Moreover, these 
cosmologies had an understanding of the workings of scientific activity that Sorel knew to be 
excessively simplistic, and revealing of a deep ignorance of the realities of scientific 
endeavour. 
In order to address these problems Sorel came up with a theory of science that managed to 
safeguard both the objectivity of science and its ability to make substantial claims about the 
natural world and human freedom. Sorel insisted greatly on the fact that the practice of 
science requires what he called expressive supports, which he defined as man-made 
conceptual tools that allowed the scientist to conduct experiments. This led him to emphasize 
the role that the historical and social influences of various kinds had in scientific practice: 
human activity forged, creatively and historically, a number of concepts and ways of 
proceeding that were essential to the practice of science. At the same time, experiments 
guaranteed science against the contingency of its practice: whereas the tools through which 
we practice science are man-made, what we discover in experimental settings is not. 
Experiments were thus conceptualized as the moment when a contact with the natural forces 
is possible, even if it is mediated by constructed expressive supports. Already in this first 
epistemology – articulated most thoroughly in the ‘Ancienne et nouvelle métaphysique’ – we 
see the sharp distinction between the natural realm of determinism and necessity, and the 
artificial human and historical realm of freedom and agency. 
It was the interest in the social sciences that provided Sorel with the problem that was, 
eventually to change his epistemology and theory of science. The scientific study of the 
human world was impossible in the context of the epistemology outlined above, for the 
human world was already characterized in terms of free agency rather than causal relations. In 
the absence of causal relations, what science, in terms of laws and regularities, could be 
produced from the domain of human agency? And so, after some initial attempts to square the 
circle, Sorel – thanks to his contact with Labriola and Croce and his reading of Vico – began 
to adapt his understanding of knowledge, and consequently, of science. Knowledge was 
conceptualized in Vichian terms, not as the representation of an alien reality but as the 
understanding of the process through which human agency develops and produces its 
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creations. The epistemological change is substantial, and radicalizes the historicist tendencies 
that were already present in Sorel’s work.  
But the importance of this philosophical shift lies in that it determined the way in which Sorel 
understood a body of thought that, in the France of the 1890s, was theoretically 
underdeveloped and little understood: Marxism.  The context gave to Sorel the freedom 
necessary for a conceptual elaboration of Marxism along historicist lines and away from the 
deterministic social science that it claimed to represent, at least in France. Historical 
determinism, to start with, was out of the question, since the human world was characterized 
by creative agency rather than by unchanging laws. Economic determinism was equally 
banished from the Marxism that Sorel developed and defended. With the help of Labriola, 
Sorel conceptualized a social world in which the different spheres of human activity 
constantly interact with each other, leaving no space for a hierarchical understanding of 
society in terms of structure and superstructure. This meant that, stripped of its fatalistic and 
deterministic features, Marxism came to represent for Sorel only the ideological production of 
the rising social force, i.e. the industrial proletariat. Ideology and social reality were, 
according to Sorel’s interpretation of historical materialism, two sides of the same coin, that 
of an emerging social force whose historical mission was the revolutionary transformation of 
the capitalist order. 
We come to the core of Sorel’s Marxism by asking the question of how this revolutionary 
transformation will happen. Sorel’s opposition to economism prevented him from 
understanding the process as a merely economic one: a society is composed of various 
spheres of human activity, and the change in one does not necessarily imply change in others. 
More radically, it is inconceivable, given the complex understanding of the social world 
elaborated by Sorel, that one could come up with a single driver of historical transformation. 
The way in which human agency deploys itself historically, is for Sorel, through institutions. 
Institutions are the habitat of social relations, and they are the spaces in which new social 
relations emerge. Precisely because institutions harbour all kinds of social relations – be they 
moral, economic, political or juridical – they are defined somewhat vaguely. But Sorel is 
much less vague in making them the engine of historical transformation: only in institutions it 
is possible to create a new society capable of, in Sorel’s words ‘empt[ying] the bourgeois 
political organism of all life, and …  mov[ing] all the useful elements it contained in a 
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proletarian political organism…’.214 The defining feature of Sorel’s Marxism thus is that of an 
ideology connected to an emerging historical force, whose success cannot be assured by 
economic reforms, nor by the insurrectional strategy of the seizure of state power, but only 
through a slow process of institutional development. 
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PART II: FROM BERNSTEIN TO SYNDICALISM 
 242 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO 
 
‘Si l’ « idée » revêt une part dans la formation de tout point de vue politique 
spécifique, elle possède cependant un étonnant pouvoir d’adaptation à des 
positions diverses…’1  
In the first part of this work we deployed our arguments at a high level of abstraction, 
remaining, with some exceptions, within the limits and methods of intellectual history. The 
argument we have outlined essentially individuates a conceptual problem which is deemed to 
be central to Sorel’s thinking between 1888 and 1898: that concerning the tension between a 
strong conception of science based on determinism and capable of discovering strong causal 
relations between phenomena, and Sorel’s belief in the free, productive, and creative 
character of human agency. The tension, as we have highlighted, was already present in the 
earliest epistemological texts, and Sorel’s protracted and thorough engagement with the 
problem constituted a philosophical apprenticeship of fundamental importance. We have seen 
how it was the attempt to conceptualize social science – a scientific study of the human world 
– that led Sorel to finally abandon the ambition of combining the strong conception of science 
with the belief in creative agency: working under such premises would have yielded the 
conclusion that social science was a search for stable causal patterns within a set of 
phenomena whose deepest nature was, in virtue of the creativity of human agency, 
unpredictability and transformation. 
Much of Sorel’s Marxism, as presented in the preceding chapter, must then be understood as 
an answer to this question of social science, and historical materialism is, for Sorel, a 
rationally defensible way of making sense of the historical world of humankind.2 Out of the 
two irreconcilable elements – a deterministic conception of science and the free agency of 
human collectivities – it is the latter that becomes predominant, while the former is gradually, 
somewhat ambiguously, but eventually clearly abandoned. Sorel’s refusal to accept not only 
historical teleology, but also any fixed criterion capable of illuminating the architecture of the 
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social world must be seen as a choice in the direction of free human agency. The idea of a 
necessary course of the historical process, as well as that of a fixed, ahistorical, relationship 
between various spheres of human activity would amount, for Sorel, to a denial of the 
freedom of human agency. And this, ultimately, is why Sorel’s historical materialism does not 
speak of laws, but of methodological principles, why it denies that the future is a legitimate 
object of enquiry for the social scientist, and finally why it cannot but see itself as the 
intellectual articulation of the historical experience of a precise social formation: the modern 
proletariat. 
From a more philosophical point of view, Sorel’s Marxism is characterized by the rejection of 
historical and economic determinism and by its self-understanding as a historically situated 
ideological production expressive of the agency of an historical subject. The conception of 
historical change that emerges from this understanding of Marxism is dominated by the 
sensitivity to longue durée processes of institutional development. It is important to highlight 
the connection between these two aspects of Sorel’s historical thought. Precisely because 
Sorel refuses to explain the human world in terms of laws, he has to explain it in terms of 
agency, and the notion of institutions is an attempt to answer the question of how collective 
agency deploys itself through history. Institutions are forms of collective life that harbour and 
develop social relations: the complexity that Sorel attributes to society – the resistance that it 
offers to explanations in terms of laws – is reflected in the vagueness with which institutions 
are defined. Given, however, that a society in its entirety is made from the sum total of its 
institutions, historical transformation is a question of institutional change. The transition from 
capitalism to socialism is thus the process by which proletarian institutions develop and play 
an increasingly central role in society, marginalizing and desiccating progressively their 
bourgeois alternatives. Violence, as we have highlighted, plays a marginal role in this longue 
durée understanding of historical transformation, which is marked by an almost obsessive 
concern with continuity. Violence, in fact, acts as a negative indicator: the greater the 
violence associated with an historical transformation, the less ready the new society will be. 
From this follows a simple and clear imperative for the workers’ movement: ‘the entire future 
of socialism resides in the autonomous development of workers’ unions.’3 
 
                                                 
3
 Sorel, ‘Avenir socialiste des syndicats’, p. 445. ‘Pour résumer toute ma pensée en une formule, je dirai que tout 
l’avenir du socialisme réside dans le développement autonome des syndicats ouvriers’. 
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The second part of the thesis will be, essentially, dedicated to explaining how, from the 1898 
socialism of slow, gradual, longue durée institutional transformation in which violence is 
marginal Sorel arrived at the syndicalist theory of violence for which he is most known, 
formulated between 1905 and 1908. It is one of the central assumptions of this thesis that the 
conceptual framework outlined above – that is to say the fundamental concepts through which 
Sorel thinks about the historical world of mankind in general, and socialism in particular – do 
not change fundamentally after 1898. Sorel’s belief in the historical genesis of human 
thought, and hence of the inescapable subjectivity, i.e. genetic connection to actual social 
practice, of social science, his understanding of historical transformation as a process of 
institutional development and the birth of new social relations all remain substantially 
unaltered. What does change, however, is both the context in which these arguments are 
deployed, and crucially, Sorel’s increasing awareness not only of context in general, but more 
specifically of a precise historical transformation: the second industrial revolution. What 
brings Sorel from the Avenir socialiste des syndicats to the Reflections on Violence is, in other 
words, not a theoretical evolution but, instead, his increasing understanding of the social, 
political, and economic transformations associated with the emergence of increasingly 
complex productive processes and his gradually emerging conviction that these dynamics are 
deeply unfavourable to proletarian institutional development.  
In the second part of the thesis we shall then attempt to develop two parallel stories: on the 
one hand, that of the emergence and affirmation of modern large-scale capitalism in France, 
and partially in Germany, along with the political and social transformations that 
accompanied the rise in importance of the new productive forms. On the other hand, we shall 
tell the story of Sorel’s gradual understanding of the evolution of this new economic phase, 
and of the social consequences of the economic transformation. This will necessarily imply a 
partial shift in the focus of our analysis, away from intellectual history and into political and 
economic history. However, this is a shift that is made requisite by Sorel’s own trajectory. In 
the absence of substantial theoretical transformations, at least in the field of Sorel’s social and 
historical thought, only the incorporation of these new elements is capable of explaining the 
emergence of Sorel’s syndicalism. It is only when Sorel has come to the conclusion that the 
actual development of capitalism is highly unfavourable to the development of autonomous 
proletarian institutions that he can assign to violence the role that it has in the Reflections. 
Without insisting on this aspect, any interpretation of the theory articulated in the Reflections 
on Violence is vulnerable to mastodontic errors of judgment. 
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Before briefly outlining the following chapters and showing how they lead to an explanation 
of the syndicalism articulated in the Reflections on Violence, a few points have to be clarified. 
To start with, we must outline that beginning in 1898, Sorel’s interests undergo a noticeable 
shift away from issues of epistemology and social theory and toward the direction of politics, 
economics, and the examination of current affairs and transformations. Whereas until 1898 
Sorel’s work had been dominated by the question on the possibility of social science, after 
that year his work essentially revolves around another, more empirical one: which conditions 
are conducive to the institutional development of the proletariat? Without ceasing to be 
interested in philosophical issues, his attention will thus be caught by more worldly matters, 
and this will slowly give him the awareness of the European political and economic context 
that he previously lacked. The developments he witnessed were, of course, partially 
responsible for this shift in attention, in the sense that it would be hard to find someone 
indifferent to the transformations that France was undergoing at the time: the political crisis 
of the republic in the affaire Dreyfus, the divisive struggles between various factions of a not 
entirely marginal socialist front, industrial developments, the rise of new forms of working 
class institutions and new capitalist associations, and so on. Despite this change in emphasis – 
from epistemology to current developments –one thing remained constant: the belief that the 
institutional development of the proletariat constituted the only possible revolutionary option. 
And thus, as his awareness of current developments grew, the question that became most 
important to him was which circumstances, and which political strategies were most 
conducive to proletarian institutional development. To this question, Sorel provided many 
answers, but he never changed his mind about the importance of working-class autonomous 
development. 
A second and more important point concerns Sorel’s understanding of capitalism, and of its 
role in bringing about socialism. Sorel’s insistence on the fact that the socialist revolution 
could not be a merely economic transformation, but instead, it needed also to be seen as the 
advent of a new society in political, ethical, and legal terms, should not lead the reader to 
think that economics were irrelevant to his analysis. It is true that, for reasons that we shall 
examine in a short while, it is only after 1902 that Sorel will devote serious attention to the 
question of capitalism and its development. Nonetheless, it is necessary to outline that even 
before 1898 Sorel had a precise conception of capitalism, of its shortcomings, and of its role 
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in bringing about the socialist transformation. The relation that Sorel establishes between 
capitalism and socialism is an intimate one, and any examination of his understanding of 
capitalism must start with the obvious and absolutely fundamental fact that capitalism 
furnishes to Sorel his revolutionary subject: the modern proletariat. Sorel was extremely 
suspicious of conceptions in which the revolutionary subject is understood merely in terms of 
poverty and oppression. Poverty and oppression, to start with, are not specific features of 
modern industrial capitalism. Understanding the revolutionary subject in terms of these 
categories meant, for Sorel, seeing socialism as the timeless struggle between plebeians and 
patricians, between popolo grasso and popolo magro, between, to use Machiavelli’s 
language, popolo and grandi. Historically, this kind of social struggle was regressive, as it 
tended to leave the medieval cities within which it occurred in a ‘semibarbaric state’. 4 
Moreover, it was a way of understanding social conflict closer to what Sorel called the 
‘démagogie radicale’ than to Marx’s views. The defining feature of the modern proletariat, for 
Sorel, does not lie in its state of oppression, but rather in its intrinsically progressive character 
linked to its, as it were, avant-garde position in the world of production: ‘…the modern 
proletariat is an organized productive force [le producteur organisé], and has within itself the 
seeds of scientific and industrial progress.’5  It is the proletariat’s proximity to the most 
scientifically advanced forms of production, and hence its inherent historical progressivity, 
that, as we shall repeatedly see in what is to follow, make of it the revolutionary subject par 
excellence.  
One of the central aspects of the proletariat’s institutional development consists, in fact, in its 
ability to develop the capacity to direct autonomously the productive apparatus of an 
advanced capitalist economy. It is important here to recall what Sorel had written in the study 
of Vico. In an advanced capitalist economy, ‘the organization of labour in large industry 
[will] be so well adapted to the needs and the conditions of collective production that 
economic realities will constitute the bridge’ to the new society. 6 Insisting on the theme of 
historical continuity, Sorel argued that although the private property of the means of 
production will be abolished, socialism will not dissipate the productive heritage of 
capitalism: in fact, it is the necessities of an advanced capitalist economy that will lead to the 
                                                 
4
 Sorel, letter to Croce 9/10/1896 in La Critica 25, 1927, p. 42 
5
 Ibid. ‘Le prolétariat moderne se trouve être le producteur organisé et avoir dans son sein les éléments du 
progrès scientifiques industriel : il ne ressemble pas au petit peuple des villes du Moyen-Age italien.’ 
6
 Sorel, ‘Étude sur Vico’, p. 935. ‘la seconde condition est que l’organisation du travail par la grande industrie 
soit tellement adaptée aux besoins et aux conditions de la production collective que le réalités économiques 
constituent le pont par lequel le passage d’un état à l’autre devra s’effectuer…’ 
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socialisation of the means of production. There is, from this perspective, an interesting 
passage in the Avenir socialiste des syndicats, in which Sorel comments on the future of 
intellectuals, white collar workers and managers after the socialist transformation. What he 
argues essentially is that, thanks to the  development of the capacities of the proletariat, 
intellectuals and white collar workers will find themselves unemployed, for the direction of 
production will be the task of the working class itself. As he puts it, ‘the socialisation of the 
means of production would result in a grand lockout’.7 The anti-parliamentarian arguments 
developed by Sorel have to be seen in connection with the importance that he attached to 
proletarian control of economic production in the socialist society. The administration of 
complex productive systems requires capacities that the proletariat cannot develop as long as 
it is under the leadership of the progressive burgeoisie. Only experiences of proletarian self-
government can prepare the working class to the direction of the future society. Bourgeois 
socialists are, after all, expressions of a declining bourgeois class and resemble the ‘Romans 
of the decadent period, so different from our proletarians. Whereas the former lived at the 
expense of society, modern society lives at the expense of the proletariat.’8  
It might be useful to point out the economic connotations that inform Sorel’s use of the 
language of decadence. What makes the bourgeois class  decadent and the proletariat 
progressive is their position in the sphere of production: whereas the latter class is immersed 
in the world of production and is at the forefront of economic activity, the former is not. It is 
because of this that the socialist revolution, waged by a class placed at the forefront of 
industrial and scientific progress, will be a progressive revolution. Capitalism then is not seen 
by Sorel mainly in terms of alienation and dehumanization. These Marxist categories are 
marginal to Sorel, who, as an engineer by training and profession, could not remain 
indifferent to the wonders of human productivity and to the spectacle of ever increasing 
productive forces. Socialism will abolish the private ownership of the means of production 
but, as stated before, this will be done in order to further, to not slow down, the rhytm of 
productive expansion. Socialism, in Sorel’s understanding of it, would then not only inherit 
the productive forces of capitalism, but enhance them and continue down the path of 
productive expansion. The stance is, in other words, a productivist one, in which productive 
expansion and industrial progress are crucial factors that allow the rise of a proletariat fit for 
                                                 
7
 Sorel, ‘Avenir socialiste des syndicats’, p. 305. ‘Ainsi donc la socialisation des moyens de production se 
traduirait par un lock-out prodigeux…’ 
8
 Ibid. ‘…on pourrait encore les rapprocher des Romains de la décadence, si différents de nos prolétaires, vivant 
aux frais de la société, tandis que la société moderne vit au frais du prolétariat.’ 
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the direction of the post-capitalist world. This spells an important consequence, namely that 
the development of capitalism is a crucial factor in generating the preconditions for the 
socialist transformation.  
It is here that we get to the heart of the question. The idea that capitalism generates the 
preconditions for the socialist transformation, of course, is not Sorel’s own. The reference is 
Marx himself, who, in describing the historical tendency of capitalist accumulation outlined 
the standard Marxist scheme for describing the transition from capitalism to socialism as a 
progressive story of productive expansion. ‘One capitalist’ writes Marx ‘always kills many’.9 
The logic of productive expansion in conditions of free competition, argues the German 
philosopher, leads to an increasingly severe battle for the control of the means of production, 
and to the ‘expropriation of many capitalists by the few.’10 The productive process, in the 
meantime, becomes more complex and socialized, condemning the artisan and the individual 
labourer, much like the mass of small capitalists, to historical extinction and, crucially, 
pauperization. In parallel thus ‘grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation’11 
of those without capital. But together with oppression grow consciousness and organization, 
transforming the proletarians into not only an increasingly large social reality, but also into a 
class ‘disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist 
production itself.’ 12  The contradictions grow until they reach breaking point: an already 
socialized productive system expels the remaining capitalists and socializes ownership of the 
means of production. ‘This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private 
property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.’13 
Now, in order to make sense of Sorel’s post-1898 developments it is important to underline 
that his understanding of the transition from capitalism to socialism is based on this Marxian 
scheme and, crucially, that the years between the fin de siècle and the First World War are 
those in which this scheme becomes, if not obsolete, at least very problematic. Roughly 
speaking, we can say that, at the European level, while the development of the ‘co-operative 
form of the labour process’, and the ‘conscious technical application of science’ 14  to 
productive processes that Marx had envisaged did occur, and shaped European – and 
                                                 
9
 Marx, Capital, p. 714. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Ibid., p. 715. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Ibid., p. 714. 
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American – capitalism, arguably well into the 20th century, the social polarization that Marx 
thought would result from these developments was largely avoided. Still remaining at a very 
general level, the potentially destructive conflict between labour and capital was mediated by 
a force whose absence in Marx’s scheme is striking: the state. The state not only facilitated, in 
various countries, the process of productive expansion and coordination that characterizes the 
second industrial revolution, but also, by addressing the social consequences of this capitalist 
development, substantially moderated the class conflict that would have resulted from it. 
It is this process of productive expansion and inclusion of the working classes into advanced 
capitalist societies that will be central to the second part of the thesis. It is the discrepancy 
between the Marxist expectations of increasing conflict and revolution, and what really 
occurred that constitutes the background to Sorel’s path to revolutionary syndicalism. Now, 
the study of this process is rather complex. Firstly, it varies greatly according to the national 
economies under consideration, and secondly its chronology is vast, and again, susceptible to 
important national variations. Furthermore, though at its beginnings it merely consists in a 
transformation of productive processes, its consequences are far reaching and touch the 
sphere of legislation, social structure, politics, and ideology, greatly complicating the overall 
picture. This is why it must be made clear that the focus of this work is not on the process 
itself, which is excessively vast and complex, but on its role in orienting Sorel’s reflection.  
Despite these difficulties, a number of more precise considerations can be offered. To start 
with, a point about chronology. Despite national differences, it is safe to assert that the 
closing two decades of the 19th century represent only the beginning of a process whose peak 
was reached after the First World War, and that dominated advanced capitalist and socialist 
countries for much of the 1930s and 1940s. In Germany, the rise of big business and attendent 
social consequences occured much earlier, and with greater intensity than in France. This 
chronological difference, in fact, is crucial for the development of Sorel’s thought. 
Nonetheless, it still remains true that what Sorel and his generation were witnessing was 
merely the birth of a new world, characterized by new economic, productive, social, and 
political conditions.  
Secondly, it will be wise to outline some aspects of this process in order to clarify what we 
are going to deal with in the remainder of the thesis. We take the emergence of big business – 
firms who control various stages of the supply and distribution chain of a given product, who 
require management in order to function, and whose size, both in terms of both capital and 
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workforce, is consequently large – as our analytical starting point. We then point out how a 
functional capitalist system based on this kind of firms requires in order to function a degree 
of organization and cooperation that distinguish it from the earlier, small-scale, competitive 
capitalism. Cooperation is required at an intra-firm level, in order to coordinate the various 
activities of these industrial giants. Cooperation, as a matter of historical record, also happens 
at an inter-firm level. The growth in scale and complexity of the firms of the second industrial 
revolution is characterized by cartels and mergers: tools through which horizontal and vertical 
integration are realized and which contribute to the increase in complexity of productive 
forms. Cooperation and organization also characterize the other side of the productive world, 
namely the working class; unions, cooperatives, and socialist parties can legitimately be seen 
as instances of organizational developments within the working class.  
Finally, but most importantly, the model does not function without at least a minimal degree 
of coordination between the two sides of the productive world, capital and labour, and it is 
here that the role of the state becomes important. On the one hand, the agency of the state 
facilitates the process of productive organization on the capitalist side, mostly through the 
protection of national markets and the legalization of mergers and cartels. On the other hand, 
essentially through the development of social legislation, the agency of the state integrates 
parts of the working classes into the national framework. Thus, by lending its protective hand 
and, at times, organisational expertise to emerging large businesses, and by slowly including 
the working classes and their institutions into the national community, the state allows the 
new and emerging capitalism to stand on more solid and inclusive social and political bases. 
Historically speaking then, we witness industrial expansions through the development of big 
business, we observe the rise of modern and organized working classes, and we see how, also 
through the mitigating influence of the state, these two elements fail to produce the 
catastrophic conflict widely expected by Marxists. This produces, amongst other things, a rise 
in industrial output and in the living standards of the working class, socialist parties integrated 
in the national political system, and an economic life characterized by a greater degree of 
coordination amongst economic actors.  
Now, in the following chapters we shall essentially describe Sorel’s gradual realization that 
this process – already occurring in France and Germany – was not conducive to the outcome 
he most desired, namely the development of an organized working class capable of leading 
society in the future. The complex nature of the transformations, the fact that Sorel was 
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observing them from within and, most importantly, in their initial stages, can account for a 
number of changes of opinion and misunderstandings on his behalf. The first aspect of the 
process that we investigate in some depth is the integration of the socialist parties of France 
and Germany into the political mainstreams of the respective countries. We show how Sorel’s 
initial approval of this transformation was accompanied by the historically erroneous belief 
that more integration into the political life of the nation could be conducive to the 
development of autonomous proletarian institutions. That Sorel could reconcile a commitment 
to socialist reformism with the condemnation of politics and with the insistence on proletarian 
institutional growth displays, we argue, France’s backwardness when compared to Germany 
in the processes outlined before. Whereas in Germany the integration of the working classes 
in the national framework was at an advanced state, and thus the SPD was already a social 
democratic mass party focussed on the search for electoral results, in France the process was 
in its initial stages, and socialist parties were in the midst of the transition. It is this that 
explains what we call Sorel’s ‘instrumental reformism’, i.e. the belief that parliamentarism 
and reformism could be conducive to the development of revolutionary proletarian 
institutions. After 1902, however, Sorel began that the transformations that were occurring 
would have placed the working class increasingly at the centre of the bourgeois order, and 
began to reflect this question,  indentifiying the state as one of the great forces responsible for 
this turn of events. 
Sorel’s deep-rooted hostility towards the state certainly helped him become aware of statist 
agency, in putting the state on the analytical map. Nonetheless, the sources of Sorel’s post-
1902 hostility towards the state are partially different from his previous, mostly liberal, 
reasons for being suspicious of the state. The problem with the state is not merely that it 
oppresses individuals, that it is ‘Socratic’ or that it resembles Jesuit institutions. After 1902, 
the problem with the state becomes that its economic and social policies thwart the 
historically progressive conflict between capital and labour. The pursuit of social peace not 
only thwarts the proletariat’s ability to build its own institutions, but, possibly more 
fundamentally, it hampers the development of capitalism, sending European civilisation on 
the quietist path hostile to productive expansion and ushering in an era of economic – and 
consequently morel – decadence.15 This is the diagnosis elaborated by Sorel between 1902 
                                                 
15
 The language of decadence, as we have hinted at above, for Sorel is always connected to production and to 
economic expansion and progress. It is this point that Zeev Sternhell appears to miss most blatantly in his 
otherwise perceptive and informed reading of Sorel’s work. Blinded by rhetorical powers of Sorel and 
establishing connections between this Sorelian rhetoric of decadence and other similar discursive registers that 
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and 1905, and this diagnosis is the basis of the arguments developed in Sorel’s most infamous 
book, the Reflections on Violence.  
This is why, if one had to come up with a slogan to summarize the path that led Sorel to 
syndicalism, then ‘the discovery of the state’ would be a very good one. It is on the state that 
Sorel put a great deal of responsibility for the creation of a stale capitalist economy, devoid, in 
his eyes, of conflict, and for destroying the possibility for the socialism he envisaged. It must 
be noticed how this kind of hostility towards the state is importantly different from the 
classical Marxist accusation that the state is nothing but a ‘committee for managing the 
common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’. In fact, the problem for Sorel is that the state is not 
such a committtee: if it were but a bourgeois tool, there would be no problems, for the class 
conflict necessary for the coming of socialism would be safeguarded. The state, for Sorel, is a 
third independent variable that by mediating the conflict between bourgeoisie and proletariat 
fundamentally alters the game and undermines the historical conditions necessary for the 
socialist transformation. If the state were a tool of a progressive bourgeoisie, the 
preconditions for socialism would be fulfilled. But the state has altered, together with the 
proletariat, also the bourgeoisie, transforming it into a regressive force more preoccupied by 
social peace than by economic and productive expansion. Under these conditions, the 
Marxian scheme is invalidated, and socialism can only be hoped for as an historical miracle, 
rather than as a rational consequence of historical conditions. But it is here that violence 
comes back into play: proletarian violence and class isolationism can, perhaps, produce a 
reversal of the historical trend. This, as we shall try to show, is the fundamental plea of 
Sorel’s Reflections on Violence. 
In the next two chapters, then, we are going to tell the story of Sorel’s progressive awareness 
of the obsolescence of the Marxian analysis of capitalist development in terms of social 
polarization, and of his gradual articulation of syndicalism as a Marxist response to the new 
                                                                                                                                                        
were found in the right wing groups of the time, Sternhell never quite sees that the decadence of which Sorel 
speaks is first and foremost an economic decadence. Of course, since Sorel does not believe in economics as the 
structure of society, he is led to talk about other forms, most notably moral ones, of decadence: we must 
remember that the social world is for Sorel characterized by the constant interpenetration between different 
spheres of human activity. But the reading according to which ‘history, for Sorel, was finally not so much a 
chronicle of class warfare as an endless struggle against decadence’ (p. 38 of Sternhell’s Birth of fascist 
ideology), though cleverly phrased, cannot be correct unless we attribute to this concept of decadence a 
predominantly economic and progressive meaning according to which decadence mainly means the slowing 
down of the process of deployment of human productive forces. This, Sternhell, never quite does, and the 
resulting analysis suffers quite a bit from this, especially the parts on the Reflections. Much more negative 
considerations apply to the misunderstanding of the epistemological status of myth. See Zeev Sternhell et al., 
The birth of fascist ideology, pp. 36-91. 
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circumstances. In telling the story of these economic, social, and political transformations our 
main point of reference will be France. Nonetheless, frequent digressions on Germany are 
necessary, if only because a large part of the socialist discussion of these issues arose from the 
SPD. In fact, the temporal discrepancies between German and French developments – in 
Germany the process happens earlier – account for a lot of Sorel’s hesitations on these issues. 
In chapter five, we are going to deal with the incorporation of the political forces of socialism 
into the political mainstream of France and Germany; while in chapter six we are going to be 
more concerned with the economic side of things, with the rise of cartels, protectionism, and 
labour legislation, as well as with Sorel’s diagnosis of the situation in the extremely important 
but often neglected Insegnamenti sociali dell’economia contemporanea.16 Chapter seven will 
be dedicated to Sorel’s syndicalist solution as outlined in the Reflections on Violence. 
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 Georges Sorel, Insegnamenti sociali dell’economia contemporanea. Degenerazione capitalista e 
degenerazione socialista (Palermo, Sandron: 1907). 
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CHAPTER FIVE: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN GERMANY AND FRANCE 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter four we have examined Sorel’s Marxism and the consequences that derived from 
this particular understanding of the doctrine for the development of the workers’ movement 
and for the understanding of the socialist transformation. Though we have privileged a more 
analytical approach in order to shed light on the conceptual architecture of the system, it must 
not be forgotten that, as we shall see in this chapter, this understanding was articulated in a 
particular context characterized by great theoretical effervescence generated by the social 
democratic turn of the German and French socialist parties. In 1898 the Bernstein controversy 
erupted at the heart of the SPD and caused much discussion in Marxist circles all over Europe 
and in gatherings of the International. It was unleashed by a series of articles in Die Neue Zeit 
in which no less prominent an SPD member than Eduard Bernstein openly questioned the 
validity of the Marxian analysis of capitalist development in terms of an increasing, and 
eventually self-destructive, social and economic polarization. In his Die Voraussetzungen des 
Sozialismus, a systematized version of the earlier articles, hastily printed in the spring of 
1899, Bernstein pointed out how talk of a catastrophic collapse of the capitalist economy 
seemed to be unrealistic in the present conditions, and urged socialists to abandon this manner 
of thinking about the social transformation. Bernstein also pointed to problems with the 
deterministic Hegelianism that for him still held too central a place in Marx’s system. 
The strength of the controversy that followed from Bernstein’s texts can only be partially 
explained by his prominence within the SPD: its true force lay in the fact that Bernstein’s 
theses seemed to offer a more convincing rationale for the activities of the party than 
traditional Marxist doctrine. In other words, a social democratic political practice predated, in 
Germany, and to a lesser extent also in France, its theorization by Bernstein’s pen. At least 
since the repeal of the anti-socialist laws in 1890, the political activity of the SPD largely 
consisted in an extremely successful search for electoral results in a broadly speaking 
democratic framework. This success, in turn, had deeper structural causes. Germany’s 
extremely rapid industrial and economic expansion through the emergence of large scale, 
technologically advanced, labour and capital intensive businesses, created an electoral base 
for a party capable of representing the immediate interests of workers. At the same time, the 
substantial integration of the working class into the Imperial polity, managed through 
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Bismarck’s pioneering social legislation of the 1880s, sapped its revolutionary potential and 
concentrated its energies on the struggle for better working conditions and more rights. In this 
context, the success of a social democratic party appears unsurprising.  
It is this context that is central to this chapter. While in Germany, despite a number of 
congress defeats, the de facto social-democratic nature of the SPD was Bernstein’s best ally, 
in France the debate occurred in a different situation. The long-term process with which we 
are faced is, in fact, rather similar to that experienced by Germany, and it is characterized by 
the growth in comparative importance of large industrial concerns, accompanied by a gradual 
integration of the growing industrial proletariat into the social and political structures of the 
republic. But neither the scale nor the timing of these structural processes matched the 
German experience. The intensity and rhythm of industrial expansion were feebler, and 
though the new productive forms emerged in the French context, they did not have the 
predominance they assumed in the German economy. Moreover, these developments not only 
occurred on a smaller scale in France, they also occurred later. Though we shall not analyse in 
this chapter the economic and social dimensions of this process, the examination of the 
political forces of the French working class seems to confirm this interpretation. Much like 
the SPD’s trajectory consisted in a transition from an illegal party of revolution into a 
successful electoral machine, one of the key processes that characterize the political 
organizations of French socialism in the last twenty years of the 19th century, and beyond, is 
what we here call ‘republicanisation’ – an increasing integration into the representative 
institutions of the republic. Unification is the other important parallel between French and 
German socialism. In 1875 the SPD was born of the fusion between two organisations; in 
1905, the founding of the unified party of French socialism – the Section Française de 
l’Internationale Ouvrière – put over twenty years of squabbles and failed attempts at 
unification to an end. 
As these dates suggest, whereas in Germany the process of integration of the working classes 
into the national framework was by 1898 substantially completed, French socialism was in 
those years in the middle of this double process of unification and republicanisation. As we 
shall show in this chapter, between 1898 and 1902 there were very real political choices to be 
made in France, and this constitutes an important difference with Germany, where a return to 
illegality and revolutionary intentions was inconceivable. Strongly influenced by the political 
dynamics set in motion by the Dreyfus affair, the contrast that arose in France was a clash 
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between an old Guesdist guard that, fearful of losing its hegemony over the unified party that 
was to come, had reverted to its old insurrectionist discourse, and a new reformist force, the 
so-called socialistes indépendants, who worked for the unification of the socialist front under 
a more republican and less Marxist banner through a combination of reformist politics and 
doctrinal polemic. 1  In 1899 one of their leaders, Alexandre Millerand, became the first 
socialist to ever participate in a European government when he entered Pierre Waldeck-
Rousseau’s cabinet of republican defence as trade and industry minister, much to the 
disapproval of the old Guesdist guard. 2  Discussions of revisionism, ministerialism, and 
unification characterized the following years of failed attempts at socialist unity, strongly 
colouring these years with the contrast between Jaurès’ and Millerand’s republican and 
reformist socialism and Jules Guesde’s and the POF’s integral Marxism preaching 
disengagement from bourgeois institutions and bourgeois quarrels such as the affaire Dreyfus. 
As we shall argue throughout the present chapter, the fact that these political choices were 
possible in France but not in Germany should be seen as an indication that the structural 
conditions which imposed a social democratic mass party in Germany were far less prominent 
in the hexagon. 
One of the great puzzles of Sorel’s trajectory is that, in contrast with the working class 
autonomy that he had articulated in his Avenir socialiste des syndicats, and in apparent 
complete opposition to his later, post-1902, syndicalist evolution, between 1898 and 1902 he 
fully embraced the social democratic turn of French socialism. On the one hand, he praised 
Bernstein on every occasion he could, and on the other, underlined the advantages of a 
socialist party capable of achieving results in the political arena over what he saw as the sect-
like and doctrinally stale Guesdist alternative. In this period we find, in other words, not only 
Sorel as a convinced Dreyfusard, but also Sorel as a reformist socialist, advocating alliances 
with the progressive sections of the bourgeoisie, declaring with approval that ‘socialism in 
France becomes more and more a workers’ movement within a democracy’, and in general 
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 Much of the disapproval, of course, was instrumental and testified the struggle between the two groups for the 
control of the future unified party. Nonetheless, the presence of Gaston de Galliffet, the fusilleur de la commune, 
responsible for the repression of the popular republic in 1871, in Waldeck-Rousseau’s government constituted an 
excellent target for Guesdist scorn. 
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advocating greater involvement of socialists in the political life of the Republic.3 It to the 
explanation of this apparently enigmatic reformist parenthesis that this chapter is dedicated.  
A few considerations, which we shall develop in the chapter, allow us to make sense of what 
at first sight appears as an unexplainable volte-face. To start with, it is important to underline 
Sorel’s still essentially theoretical perspective on these developments. It is true that the affaire 
Dreyfus constituted the central political experience of Sorel’s life, and it is also true that, after 
1898, his attention will be increasingly drawn to analyses of French society and to current 
affairs. Nonetheless, between 1898 and 1902, Sorel remained essentially a theorist, 
preoccupied with the development of a social science based on Marxian methodological 
principles. One of the main consequences of this theoretical focus was that Sorel was led to 
give great importance to the issues of Marxist theory raised by Bernstein’s writings and to 
focus on aspects which were, as a matter of fact, rather marginal to the debate. Though the 
central ideas of Sorelian revisionism were already in place before the Bernstein controversy 
erupted, it is between 1898 and 1899 that Sorel, comforted by the presence of an important 
heterodox voice, articulated his revisionist ideas on morality, historical necessity, and 
economic determinism in a number of important theoretical essays. 
While the revisionist controversy opened up the polemical space that Sorel needed, and 
skilfully exploited, to give full articulation and publicity to his understanding of Marxism, this 
concern for theory produced a somewhat distorted view of the issues at stake. A tendency to 
treat political and economic developments as examples to use in the elaboration of essentially 
theoretical arguments can lead to the misunderstanding of the significance of such 
developments. Sorel, in other words, partially saw the social democratic transformation of 
French socialism and the increasing socialist involvement in republican institutions as the 
affirmation of an understanding of Marxism closer to his own one, based on the impossibility 
of social scientific prediction and on the paramount importance of proletarian institutions. 
What he reproached to Jules Guesde’s POF then was not so much its refusal to fully embrace 
republican politics, but the stale, doctrinaire, and fatalistic Marxism on which Sorel 
understood this rejection of reformism to be based on. A perfect example of this dynamic is 
given by Sorel’s treatment of the theory of capitalist collapse, which, following Bernstein, he 
argued had been falsified by empirical evidence. Instead of wondering how the formation of 
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proletarian institutions was going to be affected by the new social and economic conditions, 
Sorel used this empirical falsification essentially in order to show the futility of any kind of 
social scientific prediction.  
Secondly, and most importantly, we must stress that, as suggested above, the structural 
conditions that guaranteed the SPD’s success as a mass party and as an electoral force were 
less marked in France than they were in Germany. As we shall see better in the following 
chapter, the processes of economic and social organization that accompanied the rise of big 
business in Germany were present in a less conspicuous manner in France. This had an 
important consequence, which was that Sorel could ignore, or at least downplay, these aspects 
in his advocacy of reformism. It is, so we shall argue, this French backwardness which 
explains what is the most important – and perplexing – feature of Sorelian reformism, namely 
that he advocated it instrumentally, as a step needed to allow the development of strong and 
independent proletarian institutions. In other words, precisely because he fundamentally 
misunderstood the process of integration of the working classes into the social and political 
life of the republic, Sorel did not see reformism as incompatible with the revolutionary 
commitment to the overthrow of capitalism. On the contrary, he embraced reformism 
precisely because he thought it was the strategy that was most conducive to the development 
of proletarian institutions and thus to the eventual emergence of the new socialist society. We 
have seen in chapter four how Sorel’s conception of the socialist revolution was characterized 
by the theme of historical continuity, and how this transformation was envisaged as a long 
term process of proletarian institutional growth: this should clarify how it was possible for 
him to see in socialism’s passage to ‘its maturity [when] it gives birth to a political party [as 
opposed to a sect]’ a fertile perspective for the growth of proletarian institutions.4  What 
characterizes Sorel’s reformist texts more strikingly then is the instrumental character that he 
attributes to parliamentary involvement. The focus is unfailingly on proletarian institutions, 
and the task of political representatives is that of developing legislation capable of enabling 
the transformation of the disorganized proletariat into a class with organizational and moral 
capabilities sufficient to take control of the current society. 
It was only in 1902, with the electoral affirmation of the bloc des gauches – a coalition that 
owed its force and unity to the political conditions generated by the affaire Dreyfus – and 
                                                 
4
 Sorel, ‘Préface à Colajanni’, p. iii ‘…enfin dans sa maturité il [le socialisme] donne naissance à un parti 
politique, c’est-à-dire qu’il devient une force se combinant avec d’autres forces alliées ou antagonistes pour 
administrer les affaires…’ 
 260 
with the coming into effect of the policies of Émile Combes’ government, the successor of 
Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau’s government of republican defence, that Sorel began to see that 
socialist reformism and proletarian institutional growth were in fact incompatible. It is only, 
in other words, in the post-Dreyfus climate that Sorel began to understand that the process 
which had brought parts of French socialism into the republican family had, in fact, 
effectively integrated the working classes into the political, social, and economic structures of 
an advanced capitalist system, sapping not only their revolutionary potential, but also 
preventing their institutional development: but this, we shall deal with in the following 
chapter. 
The present chapter is divided in two sections: in the first, we examine the Bernstein 
controversy and Sorel’s engagement with it, while in the second we focus on France and 
highlight the instrumentality of Sorel’s support for reformism. We begin by highlighting not 
only Sorel’s predominantly theoretical engagement with Bernstein, but also a number of 
disagreements between the two on the role of political parties and trade unions. These 
disagreements are important because they allow us to show not only how under the 
Bernsteinian banner Sorel developed and argued for his own ideas, but also because they 
highlight the compatibility that Sorel believed existed between theoretical revisionism, 
political reformism, and proletarian institutional development. It is this compatibility that we 
try to bring out in the second section, in which we deal with Sorel’s French reformist texts. 
We argue that such texts have to be placed in the context of a contrast internal to French 
socialism between the old Guesdist guard and the new and more republican vision of 
socialism that was making progress under the leadership of Jean Jaurès. The awkward 
Guesdist attempts to maintain a fading hegemony over political socialism as well as the 
particular circumstances, strongly influenced by the affaire Dreyfus, in which this conflict 
occurred led Sorel to see the intransigent and theoretically orthodox Guesdist option 
negatively. More strikingly perhaps, we show how Sorel saw, not entirely incorrectly, the 
Guesdist return to the Marxist rhetoric of the 1880s as an opportunistic move dictated by 
political calculations. Marxist orthodoxy came to be seen by him as the language of 
politicians, whereas theoretical revisionism and practical reformism appeared to him as the 
language and practice of the working class. This led him to see in the Jauressian line of 
political involvement in republican politics as a step in the right direction. But this direction 
remained a revolutionary one of proletarian institutional development. 
 261 
5.2 THE BERNSTEIN CONTROVERSY 
As early as the autumn of 1896, Eduard Bernstein had begun to denounce the dangers of what 
he called ‘another kind of utopianism’.5 Not very different from the utopianism castigated by 
Marx and Engels a generation before, this error consisted, for Bernstein, in drawing a ‘heavy 
line’ between the present capitalist order and the future socialist one, in imagining the 
transition from the former to the latter in terms of an ‘abrupt leap’, and assuming that 
‘…everything that takes place in the former is mere patchwork, palliative and “capitalist”’. 
The precarious and ultimately ineffective nature of all socialist action under a capitalist 
regime meant that all depended on the ‘abrupt leap’, on the catastrophic collapse of 
capitalism: ‘Miracles’ he sarcastically added ‘are not believed, just assumed.’ 6  In the 
following three years, through a number of articles and a book, Bernstein further articulated 
his views.7 He questioned the pattern of capitalist development in terms of self-destructive 
social polarization that was at the heart of the Marxist doctrine of the SPD, and argued that 
‘Social Democracy should neither expect nor desire the imminent collapse of the existing 
economic system’.8  
Much of the force behind Bernstein’s writings derived, more than from their intrinsic 
argumentative strength, from the fact that they articulated an existing and consolidated social 
democratic practice within the SPD. When Bernstein, for example, declared that ‘the 
prospects of this [socialist] struggle do not depend on the concentration of capital in the hands 
of a diminishing number of magnates’9, he was, as we shall try to show, in fact giving voice 
to the unspoken assumption that underlay the vast majority of the activities of the SPD. 
Moreover, there were solid structural reasons for this social democratic practice of the SPD. 
The willingness and effectiveness of the German bourgeoisie in moderating the social 
consequences of unbridled capitalism, in fact, has made an observer look upon the Marxism 
of the SPD as an historical mystery: ‘…as soon as we get a glimpse of the truth’, wrote 
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Joseph Schumpeter in 1942, ‘we find it still more difficult to understand how in that 
unplutocratic environment [Imperial Germany] it was possible for the greatest of all socialist 
parties to grow up on a purely Marxist program and on a Marxist phraseology of unsurpassed 
virulence…’10  
Although we shall not attempt to solve this puzzle, we shall insist on the fact that, given that 
the practice of the SPD – and, for that matter, of the POF too – was de facto social 
democratic, Bernstein’s writings did not really determine any abrupt change in the daily 
activities of the party. Instead, the debate found its true animators in the ‘intellectual 
revisionists for whom party doctrine was not a matter of indifference… It was they who 
talked about a party crisis and shook their heads about the future of the party.’11 Sorel falls 
perfectly within this category. In examining the story of his involvement with the Bernstein 
controversy, we shall highlight how the principal issues at stake were, for Sorel, theoretical 
rather than political and how Bernstein’s heterodox work, to him, represented a vindication of 
his own heterodoxy. It was this theoretical enthusiasm that made him a supporter of 
Bernstein. Sorel rather skilfully used the polemical space generated by the controversy in 
order to develop and spread his own revisionism, which was, however, not entirely similar to 
Bernstein’s. We shall briefly point out some of the main differences between Bernstein’s 
revisionist reasons and Sorel’s own, both at a theoretical and at a practical level. But the main 
point we shall establish is that Sorel found in the intellectual context of the controversy a 
fertile environment for the development of the Marxism that we have examined in the 
previous chapter. 
5.2.1 THE GERMAN BACKGROUND TO THE CONTROVERSY 
The contradiction outlined above between social democratic practice and Marxist ideology 
predated Bernstein’s articles. While vociferously ‘pretending to fight ruthless exploitation and 
a state that was the slave of slave drivers’, the SPD had, after the repeal of the anti-socialist 
laws in 1890 found a confortable space in the institutional framework of Imperial Germany.12 
The Erfurt program of 1891 already combined a catastrophic prediction of capitalist 
development in terms of social polarization with the conviction that ‘the struggle of the 
working class against capitalist exploitation is necessarily a political struggle’, and the 
                                                 
10
 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy [1942] (New York, Harper & Row: 1950), p. 
342. 
11
 Ibid., pp. 347-8. 
12
 Ibid., p. 342. 
 263 
willingness of the party to understand its political role in essentially legal and parliamentary 
terms immediately created perplexities.13  On the one hand, we had a number of young 
radicals such as Bruno Wille and Hans Müller that demanded a more revolutionary practice 
and advocated a break with the ‘political’, legalistic, and parliamentarian line of the party. 
After having been disparagingly labelled by Engels himself as politically naïve and 
theoretically uninformed, they were expelled from the party at Erfurt in 1891.14 On the other 
hand people like Georg von Vollmar, a prominent Bavarian member, suggested that the 
newfound legality ought to reorient party activity towards concrete improvements of the 
living condition of its electoral basis, at the expense of the Marxist theory. Like the young 
radicals, Vollmar was defeated at Erfurt, but his weight in the Bavarian constituency 
prevented his expulsion. 
This same weight, a few years later, brought the agrarian question to the forefront. Vollmar 
had guided the Bavarian SPD to electoral success in the local elections of 1893 by promoting 
a program of defence of the interests of farmers and small landowners.15 Given the social 
composition of Bavaria, this made a lot of electoral sense: at the same time, it highlighted 
clearly the contrast between the electoral strategy of a party within a broadly speaking 
democratic institutional framework and its Marxist analysis of social development. As 
Kautsky had been keen to point out after Erfurt, agricultural development would have 
followed the logic of capitalist accumulation, effectively turning small landowning peasants 
into an historically doomed class. To appeal to their support by promising to protect their 
interests would for Kautsky have ‘arouse[d] illusions that could not be realised.’16 Vollmar 
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and the Bavarians were defeated once more at the Breslau congress of 1895, but the tension 
between Marxist principles and social democratic practice was there for all to see. 
The concessions made to electoral activity enabled by the repeal of the anti-socialist laws, of 
course, partially explain the success of the SPD’s social-democratic practice. Entering 
electoral competition imposes a number of constraints related to the capture of votes beyond 
the traditional proletarian reservoir, as we have seen in the case of Vollmar’s concessions to 
small landowners: ‘once a Socialist party enters into the vote-catching game, that magic 
figure, 51 percent, tends to obscure other considerations.’17  Moreover, it is important to 
underline how successful the SPD’s electoral practice was. The figures for national elections 
are as follows:18 
Elections 1890 1893 1898 1903 1907 1912 
Votes 1.427.300 1.786.700 2.107.100 3.010.800 3.259.000 4.250.400 
Seats 35 44 56 81 43 110 
% of votes 19,7 23.3 27.2 31.7 29.0 34.8 
Some qualifications have to be made. On the one hand, despite already being the first German 
party in terms of votes in 1890, the SPD never managed to secure a parliamentary majority 
and form a government. On the other the role of the Reichstag in the institutional architecture 
of the Kaiserreich was far more modest than that of the Chambres des députés in the French 
republic. Nonetheless, the electoral success is still nothing short of exceptional, and 
constitutes the extremely important background to Bernstein’s writings. There are, naturally, a 
number of structural features of Imperial Germany that explain this extraordinary success.  
The main factor to consider is the specific character of the German prosperity of the late 
1890s. In the later part of the 19th century, and especially after 1895, the German economy 
experienced a spectacular growth that conferred to it a position amongst the world’s leading 
capitalist countries: ‘During the years between 1870 and World War I, Germany, like the 
United States, quickly surpassed Britain in industrial output and captured an increasing share 
of Britain’s international and even domestic markets.’19 The German context, far more than 
the French, and probably even more than the British one, was a fertile environment for the 
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development and success of the productive forms typical of the second industrial revolution. 
In the closing of the 19th century, German economic growth was fuelled by the success of 
large scale, technologically advanced, capital and labour intensive, businesses in industries 
such as chemicals, metals, industrial machinery and electrical goods. The specificity of these 
new industries lay in their organisational complexity. The scale of the capital and the 
workforce required in the new industries led them to deal with many aspects of the economic 
process. Rather than dealing only with the productive side – the manufacturing of goods – 
they expanded their activities into both distribution and into the extraction of the raw 
materials required, i.e. into mining. In doing so, they departed from the earlier, smaller scale, 
model of familial capitalism and gave birth to what Chandler defines as ‘a new economic 
institution, the managerial business enterprise’.20 The complexity of these firms highlighted 
the necessity of important managerial structures, capable of coordinating the various 
economic activities.21 But the coordination required by these new industrial forms was not 
limited to the rise of management at an intra-firm level: it included both inter-firm forms of 
economic coordination, achieved through cartelization, and the coordination with that other 
side of the productive world, namely the working class. 
It is this latter aspect that is more fundamental to our argument. Peter Gay has argued that it 
was this German economic expansion that ‘broke the Marxists’ back’, suggesting that 
‘prosperity could have been fitted into the Marxist system with some stretching’.22 This is 
correct up to a point. To start with, the dynamics of the second industrial revolution fully 
belonged to the Marxist system and, in fact, were central to it. Contrarily to what Gay asserts, 
Marx had not merely ‘never denied that capitalism was capable of increasing the total national 
income’. He had written with an almost prophetic precision of the advent of the ‘cooperative 
form of the labour process’ and of the introduction of the ‘conscious technical application of 
science’ to industry.23 The problem thus was not prosperity, but the lack of polarization, i.e. 
the inclusion of the working and the middle classes into the enjoyment of this prosperity. This 
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is why cartelization and protectionism, alongside the welfare state, are the crucial elements in 
our analysis. As forms of economic organization and coordination at a national level24 , 
cartelization and protectionism thwarted the monopolistic tendencies of the new capitalism; 
while Bismarck’s social legislation of the 1880s provided a strong rebuttal to the Marxist 
prediction of increasing proletarian misery. 
In these circumstances, the success of a workers’ party promising tangible improvements of 
the living and working conditions of the proletariat through electoral result and political 
struggle appears understandable. It was this electoral success, grounded in the German 
economic expansion in the direction of managerial and cooperative capitalism, reined in by 
welfare legislation, that constituted the background to Bernstein’s writings. In fact, the 
spectacular electoral progression of the SPD had brought Friedrich Engels himself to voice in 
1895 opinions that closely resembled those of Bernstein. 25 
In the introduction to the French edition of Marx’s The class struggles in France, Engels 
argued that the diminishing prospects for the success of a military insurrection, and the 
‘intelligent use which the German workers made of the universal suffrage’ both 
fundamentally altered the character of the revolutionary transformation. 26  ‘The time of 
surprise attacks, of revolutions carried through by small conscious minorities at the head of 
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masses lacking consciousness is past.’ 27  Instead, the ‘decisive “shock force” of the 
international proletarian army’ consisted in the ‘two million voters whom [the SPD] send to 
the ballot box.’ 28  In a triumphant tone Engels underlined repeatedly how ‘the state 
institutions… offer the working class still further levers to fight these very institutions’ and 
commented on the ‘irony of world history’, which had determined that ‘the parties of order… 
are perishing under the legal conditions created by themselves.’29 In fact, the only task of 
socialist parties was ‘to keep this growth going without interruptions’ and the ‘one means by 
which the steady rise of socialist fighting forces’ could be interrupted was ‘a clash on a grand 
scale with the military.’ 30  Socialists, continued Engels, would be wise to avoid the 
provocations of the bourgeoisie and focus on electoral growth: as the example of ‘another 
party of overthrow’, i.e. the Christians in the Roman empire, showed, legal repressions would 
only contribute to the reinforcement and eventual triumph of the oppositional party.31 
Now, as Lucio Colletti has remarked, ‘Engels had written of a revision of tactics; Bernstein 
objected that this… revision necessarily implied a revision of strategy, a revision of the 
premises of theoretical Marxism.’32 What gave to Bernstein the conviction that such a step 
was necessary was then the increasing discrepancy not only between revolutionary ambitions 
and electoral activity, but also between the theory of capitalist development in terms of 
polarization and the reality of the emergence of managerial and cooperative capitalism. As we 
have outlined above, it was the absence of polarization that invalidated most spectacularly a 
doctrine based on the ‘increase of insecurity of … existence’ of the ‘proletariat and the 
sinking middle classes’ in parallel with the ‘gigantic growth in the productivity of human 
labour’.33 Incorporating in his work some liberal critiques to Marxist economy such as those 
of Julius Wolf or Gerhard von Schulze-Gavernitz, Bernstein disputed the validity of those 
predictions. 34  As the experience of the debate on the agrarian question had shown, the 
polarization of society into an increasingly small capitalist class and an increasingly large and 
dejected proletarian one was not happening, nor was the middle class being torn apart by the 
progress of industry. In the light of this, Bernstein proposed to adjust principles to the practice 
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of the SPD, to abandon the belief in the prophesized catastrophic collapse of capitalism, and 
concentrate on the development of socialism within the framework of a democratic 
institutional arrangement. 
This denial of the automatic self-destruction of capitalism, coming as it was from one of 
Europe’s most respected socialist theorists could not go unnoticed. According to Leszek 
Kolakowski, ‘…scarcely any important socialist writer failed to join…’ the attack on 
Bernstein.35 It is necessary to insist that the force of Bernstein’s critique, more than in his 
philosophical analysis of the nefarious effects of Hegel on Marx36, rested on it being an 
articulation of a consolidated political practice within the SPD, and a perceptive 
understanding of the wider German economic trend. Capitalism was not behaving in the 
predicted way, and the SPD had already stopped acting on the assumption of an increasing 
social polarization of wealth and on the expectation of a catastrophic collapse of the system. 
Bernstein called attention to this fact, opening up a gigantic polemical space in which to 
rethink Marxism. 
5.2.2 SOREL AND BERNSTEIN: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
It might be plausibly argued that Bernstein’s impact as a revisionist outweighed his one as a 
reformist: in other words, his imprint on the world of Marxist theoretical elaboration probably 
was larger than the one he had on the politics of the SPD and the International. The 
consolidated electoral and social democratic experience of the German party meant that 
Bernstein did not have to demand a substantial change of direction. In other countries, and at 
the international level, this was less true. In France, for example, the embracement of 
revisionism carried with it serious political choices on the collaboration with a ‘bourgeois’ 
executive. But in Germany, the theoretical debate held sway, and it soon spread to the rest of 
Europe.  
As we have shown in chapter four, Sorel’s dissatisfaction with the oversimplified, economic 
centred, deterministic Marxism of the time dates back to at least May 1896, when he 
conceded a number of important points to critics of Marxism in his review of Léon Say’s 
Contre le socialisme. This explains why, when news of the debate began arriving in France, 
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Sorel almost immediately sided with the revisionists. But before entering in the details of 
Sorel’s engagement with the controversy, it is important to underline how the shared 
conviction of the need for a revision of Marxism does not imply agreement as to the form of 
the revision. The polarizing dynamics of a controversial exchange contribute to blur many of 
the differences between two who agree on the main points of the controversy, and, moreover, 
at times such as the one in question different principles find the same political outcome. 
Nonetheless, it is important to underline the differences that separated Sorel’s revisionism 
from Bernstein’s.  
The most fundamental of differences is at a philosophical level. In the opening sections of 
Bernstein’s Preconditions of socialism, we read the following definition of the materialistic 
conception of history: 
‘To be a materialist means first of all to assert the necessity of all events. 
According to the materialist theory, matter moves of necessity in accordance 
with certain laws; there is therefore no cause without its necessary effect and no 
event without a material cause. However, since the movement of matter 
determines the formation of ideas and the directions of the will, these too are 
necessitated, as are all human events… The application of materialism to the 
interpretation of history therefore means asserting… the necessity of all 
historical events and developments.’37 
Now, it is true that in the remainder of the chapter Bernstein develops arguments attempting 
to moderate and qualify this brutal determinism. And yet, the passage still betrays an 
understanding of social science diametrically opposed to Sorel’s one. For Sorel, historical 
materialism consists in the understanding of the mutual interactions amongst the various 
spheres of human activity, and it is free human activity that determines the course of history. 
Necessity is a banished word in Sorel’s social world, replaced by agency.  It is in virtue of 
this unbelief in historical necessities that Sorel was substantially immune to the empirical data 
that Bernstein amassed against the theory of social polarization.  
The theoretical importance that both Bernstein and his orthodox opponents attached to the 
mistaken prediction of social polarization and catastrophic collapse could not have 
preoccupied Sorel excessively. The statistical demonstration of social polarization becomes a 
decisive theoretical argument only in a context in which Marxism is seen as a predictive 
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science of social development. 38  Only then do its predictive shortcomings become 
problematic. But Sorel’s refusal to include the future in the fields of social scientific 
knowledge meant that a predictive failure was in the nature of sociological research. This, of 
course, is not to say that Sorel ignored the discrepancy between the Marxian scheme of 
capitalist development and actual capitalist development. As we shall see, this discrepancy 
will be important in shaping Sorel’s syndicalism after 1902. But it does mean that this 
discrepancy could not have the theoretical importance it had for both Bernstein and most of 
his foes. After all, prediction, for Sorel, is not a social scientific activity. 
Considering the heterodox sources of Sorel’s Marxism, it is not that unsurprising to see that it 
differed from Bernstein’s on such a fundamental point. To these philosophical disagreements, 
we must add a number of more precise and specifically political and tactical differences, 
which we shall examine in a short while. In the end, it is true, the differences remained 
insufficient to compromise the general agreement between Sorel and Bernstein. Even when, 
after 1902, Sorel’s revisionism developed in a syndicalist direction opposed to Bernsteinian 
social democracy no polemic ensued. Sorel acknowledged the differences and continued to 
look upon and write about the leader of revisionism with a certain admiration. Nonetheless, as 
we are about to see, important differences separated the two revisionisms. 
In November 1897 the Devenir Social added to its usual book review section – the revue 
critique – a new space dedicated to the world of various European socialist journals, the revue 
des revues. Hubert Lagardelle wrote about the Revue Socialiste, while the Pole Kazimierz 
Kelles-Krauz, under the pseudonym ‘Es.’, reported the salient debates in the Neue Zeit.39 
Already in those initial publications, Kelles-Krauz had begun reporting summarily on 
Bernstein’s ‘Problems of socialism’ series. 40  In February 1898, Kelles-Krauz continued 
reporting on the debate between Bernstein and Belfort Bax, giving a summary of the latter’s 
‘Colonial Policy and Chauvinism’ and, probably beginning to see the potential importance of 
the debate, wrote that Bernstein’s full reply ‘promises to be interesting’.41 When the full reply 
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came, published in Die Neue Zeit at the end of January 1898, Kelles-Krauz in April produced 
an extensive summary, translating the salient pages for the French reader.42 It was in this 
second reply that Bernstein first gave an ample overview of his more general revisionist 
theses. He argued that socialists had much to fear from a capture of the state under current 
economic conditions, since they ‘could not abolish capitalism by decree and could not indeed 
manage without it’, stated further that ‘there can be more socialism in a good factory act than 
in the nationalisation of a whole group of factories’, and famously remarked that the final goal 
of socialism ‘whatever it may be, is nothing to me, the movement is everything.’43 
Sorel read the article with enthusiasm sufficient to consequently send a personal letter to 
Bernstein in May 1898, a few weeks after reading Kelles-Krauz’s French translation in the 
Devenir Social. ‘The article’ writes Sorel ‘is so important and concurs so precisely with the 
results of my research that I take the liberty of asking for some clarifications, as I fear I might 
over-interpret your theory in a subjective manner.’44 Sorel outlines what are, for him, the 
main points of Bernstein’s stance: the abandonment of the theory of catastrophic collapse, the 
importance of capitalist vitality for socialism, an indifference towards ‘the formulas that 
define the socialist goal’, and finally the imperative to ‘actualize socialism in the frame of 
contemporary society, through the elevation of the working class.’45 Sorel introduces himself 
to Bernstein as a fellow revisionist, saying that ‘it is clear that for Marx socialism is not a 
dogmatic theology’, and, making reference to his long review of Merlino’s Pro e Contro il 
socialismo, confessing that he had ‘not revealed all my ideas, for it seemed impossible to 
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present a thesis similar to the one you have since expressed in a journal with orthodox 
aspirations.’ 46 And yet, he is always cautious not to conflate Bernstein’s theses with his own 
ones. At many points, he excuses himself for possibly interpreting Bernstein in an excessively 
‘Sorelian’ way, for ‘letting myself get carried away by my own ideas’, and for possibly 
‘exaggerating your personal tendencies.’47 
It is probably in order to find out the actual extent of their mutual agreement that Sorel sent to 
Bernstein a copy of his Avenir socialiste des syndicats.48 It is in the exchange over the Avenir 
that we start to see a number of more precise differences between the two. In a letter from 14 
June 1898, the only surviving from Bernstein to Sorel, the German socialist replies to Sorel 
and gives him his comments on the Avenir. The letter is a very good example of the 
relationship of Bernstein’s ideas to Sorel’s own, characterized by a general agreement that is 
counterbalanced by a number of precise differences of opinion. As long as the discussion 
remains focused on the need to reform Marxism, the agreement is vocal and unproblematic; 
when the issues of political engagement and trade unionism arise, Bernstein distances 
himself. The opening sets the tone:  
‘I don’t think that we agree on every point of Marxist theory and practice, but I 
believe that we approach such questions with the same state of mind… 
acceptance of the fundamental principles of [Marxist] theory, rejection of rushed 
and simplistic conclusions. For me… socialism is scientific as long as it gives up 
on absolute truth, that is, as long as it remains research.’49  
Despite what Bernstein characterizes as minor disagreements, the great point of contact 
between the two is in the rejection of a certain Marxist dogmatism, and consequently in the 
shared conviction that Marxism is not a closed and unalterable system of thought. Bernstein 
goes on to illustrate his doubts over the planned direction of an industrial world that does not 
resemble the one pictured by Marx and Engels, and insists on the fact that, ‘…if things do not 
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march towards this large social cataclysm previously expected, socialists ought not to 
complain, and [I believe] that it would be a grave mistake to base our program of action on 
this old theory of the social catastrophe.’ 50 
But on two points – the role of the party and of unions in the socialist struggle – Bernstein 
points out clear differences between himself and Sorel. In the Avenir, let us recall, Sorel had 
subordinated parliamentary struggle to the institutional development of the proletariat: the 
only purpose of a socialist political party was that of creating, through its parliamentary 
activity, the legal space necessary for the proletariat to develop its own institutions. Bernstein 
is not completely won over by Sorel’s theory. On the one hand, he finds Sorel’s mistrust of 
politics exaggerated, and on the other, conversely, he finds his enthusiasm for unions 
misplaced. ‘I gather from your pamphlet’ writes Bernstein ‘that you are no politician, and 
neither am I. But you abhor politics, and I do not yet share this opinion.’ 51  Bernstein 
acknowledges that political engagement has its risks, in that it can ‘lead to radicalism more 
than to socialism, to the corruption of the masses more than to their moral elevation’.52 
Nonetheless, politics remain ‘a powerful means of intellectual education and the awakener of 
public consciousness. Thus I see my duty in the attack not of the thing in itself [politics] but 
of the exaggerated importance that is attached to it.’53 In the same way in which politics is not 
quite just a bourgeois degeneration, proletarian institutions, and unions in particular, are not 
the only way forward for socialism: ‘I do not completely share your opinion on unions; I 
believe they are too victims of many errors and temptations, and I see in them but one element 
or force of the future socialist society.’ 54 
A similar tone of benevolent though very real criticism characterizes Bernstein’s review of 
Sorel’ Avenir Socialiste des syndicats, published a month later, in July 1898, in the Neue 
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Zeit.55 Again, politics is the key point: ‘Mr Sorel’, writes Bernstein, ‘has a profound hatred of 
politics and politicians that can only be understood by one who has lived long in countries of 
deep rooted parliamentary regimes.’56 Though Bernstein distances himself from this hatred by 
stating that Sorel ‘throws the baby out with the bathwater’, he nonetheless concedes that 
Sorel’s concerns are real enough, and that it would be a mistake to dismiss them as 
reactionary, and further that there is a real risk that political struggle degenerates into the 
personal struggle between professional politicians.57 And yet, it is important to underline how 
these disagreements, in truth quite important, sink, in the context of a shared intellectual battle 
against the orthodoxy, to the level of what Bernstein describes in his letter as ‘limited 
criticism’. 58 Given the predominantly intellectual, theoretical vitality of the controversy, this 
is unsurprising: in spite of disagreements over politics or unions, both Sorel and Bernstein 
agree on the fundamental point: the need for a revision of Marxism and for an open minded 
approach to Marxist theory. ‘We both travel in the same general direction’, Bernstein seems 
to say, e più non dimandare. 
5.2.3 THE APPROPRIATION OF A POLEMICAL SPACE 
This blurring of the differences of opinion on unions and on parliamentary involvement 
should, however, not go unnoticed, as it allow us to spot how, through most of the revisionist 
controversy, Sorel developed and publicized positions that were not quite identical to 
Bernstein’s. As we have stated before, the polemical space opened up by Bernstein was vital 
for the development of Sorel’s Marxism, as indeed Sorel himself admits. In his initial letter to 
Bernstein, let us recall, he had written, speaking of his review of Merlino’s book, that he had 
had a certain timidity in fully articulating the extent of his revisionism, fearing orthodox 
reproach: ‘today’ he confesses to Bernstein, ‘protected by your authority, I would not have the 
same timidity.’ 59  And indeed this is confirmed by looking at the dates in which Sorel 
publishes the texts that articulate his own Marxism. As we have stated, the opening text of 
Sorelian revisionism – the review of Merlino’s Pro e contro il socialismo – was published in 
October 1897. The Avenir socialiste des syndicats was published a few months later, between 
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March and May 1898. Although these texts already contain all the main ideas, their proper 
articulation will come later, in a number of important theoretical essays published at the 
height of the Bernstein controversy between the summer of 1898 and that of 1899.60 It was, in 
short, thanks to the polemical space opened up by Bernstein that Sorel’s revisionism could 
flourish.  
And yet, the very real differences between Bernstein and Sorel did not magically disappear in 
the controversial context in which they first emerged. One of the main differences, of course, 
is one of concerns: whereas Bernstein was reasoning as one of the leaders of a party that was 
facing an unexpected change – or lack of change – of the circumstances that surrounded it, 
Sorel spoke as a social theorist trying to come up with a valid understanding of a science of 
the social world. But, as we have seen, there were more precise disagreements over party and 
unions that separated the two. The fact that these differences continued to play a central part 
in Sorel’s writings from the period leads to the conclusion that what characterizes Sorel’s 
involvement in the Bernstein controversy is the intelligent exploitation of a polemical space in 
order to develop and publicize ideas which were, in fact, his own. If we examine the texts in 
which Sorel deals more explicitly with the ‘crisis of Marxism’, and with the Bernsteindebatte, 
we detect a very precise rhetorical and argumentative strategy. What Sorel does is frame his 
texts in a Bernsteinian way through the use of copiously publicized but summarily examined 
Bernsteinian tropes: in most of these texts there are vocal and very visible references to issues 
such as the theory of capitalist collapse, the question of social and economic polarization, or 
the difference between revolutionary theory and social democratic practice. Having entered, 
through this framing, the polemical space of the controversy, Sorel unfailingly proceeds to 
articulate his own Marxism: thus we have the subordination of political activity to proletarian 
institutional development, rejections of the predictive ambitions of Marxism, and so on. 
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It is in May 1898 that Sorel enters the revisionist controversy with an article on the ‘crisis of 
scientific socialism’ in Filippo Turati’s Critica Sociale, one of the most important Italian 
socialist publications. The tone of the article was so forceful that Turati felt the need to add a 
few pages of response at the end, in order to clarify that the journal had published Sorel’s text 
‘for one reason above all: that is, that it may not be stated that we have been afraid’.61 Sorel’s 
opening is worth citing: 
‘Even when a school of thought is undergoing a decomposition, it is difficult for 
it to understand the true nature of the transformation it undergoes; the more it 
moves away from its original spirit, the more it clutches to the dry branches of 
dogmatism. This could not but occur to Marxism too, the day in which its 
supporters were forced to abandon their purely communist principles in order to 
look for support amongst small owners, shopkeepers and, in general, the 
suffering classes.’62 
It is noteworthy that Sorel identifies the origin of the crisis in the discrepancy between 
Marxist principles and the struggle for electoral success that characterizes a party in a 
democratic institutional framework. The obvious references are to the experience of the SPD, 
and to a lesser extent, of the POF. He then speaks of the empirical falsification of the social 
polarization that capitalist development should have brought. It is necessary, he writes, ‘to 
find the courage to declare the bases of the collectivist project as false… the bronze law of 
salaries, the law of capitalist concentration, the law of correlation between economic and 
political power have all been falsified by experience.’63 The opening is, with its focus on the 
political and theoretical consequences of an unexpected social and economic development, 
straightforwardly Bernsteinian. 
And yet, the consequences that Sorel draws from these ‘Bernsteinian’ premises are essentially 
theoretical ones. The unexpected development of capitalist economies is used to prove the 
poverty of Marxism as a predictive social science. Why, asks Sorel, do socialists cling on so 
desperately to these outdated analyses of economic evolution? It is, he answers, because they 
believe that in those conceptions rest the claims of socialism to a scientific status. But 
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predictive ability, for Sorel, is not central to social science, or at least not to its Marxian 
version: ‘…from a Marxist perspective, science is merely an abstract expression of a given 
way of exerting our power upon things.’ The point is then not that the prediction of social 
polarization and capitalist collapse has been falsified, but that any prediction of social 
development is unscientific and un-Marxian. This is because ‘we act only on the present, we 
have no other data but those of the present, we only know the conditions of today…How shall 
we then call those maximal programmes? I do not see why we should not call them utopias.’64 
It is because of the unscientific nature of any prediction that socialism should, for Sorel, 
abandon the idea of the social catastrophe and stick, instead, to the true spirit of Marxism by 
looking at the real movement, the organized proletariat, the only yardstick against which it is 
possible to judge a specific proposal as socialist or not. The fact that the ‘law of capitalist 
concentration’ has been ‘falsified by experience’ is then quite irrelevant for the purpose of 
Sorel’s argument, because any plan of action based on social scientific prediction is 
scientifically mistaken. Instead of focussing on Marx’s predictive mistakes, socialists, in 
order to ‘understand contemporary facts’, ought to stick to Marx’s ‘methodological 
principles’: 
‘He [Marx] tells us that the essence of socialism is the formation of a class spirit 
in the proletariat, which organizes itself starting from societies of resistance. As 
this spirit takes shape, socialism will be increasingly able to weight upon politics 
and to reform law. This work is utterly independent from the social catastrophe, 
an idea that has often obsessed socialism and that has ended by hypnotising 
Marxists.’65 
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 Ibid., p. 135. The long passage reads: ‘ Ma, sotto l’angolo visuale Marxista per lo meno, si può attribuire a 
questi piani un valore scientifico?  La scienza non è per Marx che  l’espressione astratta di una maniera 
determinata di esercitare il nostro potere sulle cose. Io non posso credere che l’avvenire dei programmi massimi 
sia una delle cose sulle quali noi esercitiamo il nostro potere. Noi non agiamo che sul presente, non abbiamo altri 
dati che il presente, non conosciamo altre condizioni che quelle d’oggi. I programmi minimi sono anche, troppo 
spesso, più estesi che i limiti della nostra azione possibile. ; essi superano dunque quello che noi possiamo dire 
di scientifico sulle questioni sociali. E come chiameremmo dunque i programmi massimi?  Io non vedo  perché 
si rifiuterebbe loro il nome di utopie.’ In the passage Sorel draws on the distinction between ‘minimal’ and 
‘maximal’ programmes: in the first ones, socialist parties articulated their short-term demands, while in the 
second ones they sketched the transformations associated with the future socialist society. Sorel remarks that 
even the minimal programmes are often beyond the reach of collective action, and thus labels both types of 
programmes as un-Marxist, unscientific, and hence utopian. 
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 Ibid., p. 138. ‘Ma bisogna prendere le mosse, per comprendere i fatti attuali, dai principi metodologici posti da 
lui [Marx]. Egli ci fa sapere che l’essenza stessa del socialismo è la formazione dell’anima di classe nel 
proletariato, che si organizza cominciando dalle Società di resistenza. Gli [sic] è a misura che quest’anima si 
forma, che il socialismo pesa sulla politica e riforma il diritto. Questo lavorio è affatto indipendente dalla 
catastrofe, l’idea della quale ha ossessionato parecchie volte il suo spirito e ha finito per ipnotizzare i marxisti.’ It 
might be noted that Sorel uses the expression ‘class spirit’ – anima di classe – instead of the canonical ‘class 
consciousness’ – coscienza di classe. He explains in this way in a footnote: ‘It is known that Marx uses the 
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The impossibility of social scientific prediction leads, as we can see, directly to the 
organization of the proletariat. This is the only proper goal of a socialist organization, and its 
realization is ‘utterly independent’ from any development of capitalism. It is in passages like 
this one that we appreciate the different concerns that animate Sorel and Bernstein. Whereas 
for the latter, a party leader and organizer, the evolution of German capitalism and society is 
fundamental in the argument for revisionism, for the former, at least in 1898 a 
philosophically-oriented social theorist, this empirical falsification of the Marxist prediction is 
mostly an example of the absurdity of predictive social science. Proletarian institutional 
development remains the priority, and Sorel does not (yet) interrogate himself on whether 
different paths of capitalist development have an impact on the possibility of this 
organization. He remains focused on theoretical questions. 
The same argumentative strategy, moving from a commentary on the implausibility of the 
collapse of capitalism to a reflection on the scientific status of Marxism, and on the centrality 
of the workers’ movement to it, can be found in another article on the ‘crisis of socialism’ 
published by Sorel in December 1898 in the French Revue politique et parlamentaire. Sorel 
this time begins by explaining how a mistaken scientific ideal has led French socialists to 
place undue emphasis on the notion of social catastrophe. The infancy of French Marxism, he 
explains, occurred in the context of a naïve understanding of science: the first ‘scientific’ 
socialists believed ‘science to be a set of formulas to which everybody ought to conform.’ 66 It 
is from this scientistic framework that the theory of the social catastrophe can become the 
cornerstone of the whole Marxist building: ‘[socialists] attached great importance to a law of 
social development from which the necessity of the great catastrophe could be deduced…’67 
Needless to say, the scientific ideal is mistaken for Sorel and, moreover, the predictions have 
been falsified: as Bernstein and Merlino concur, one must reject the catastrophic conception 
of socialism and ‘give up on the hope of an imminent revolution’.68 
But once again Sorel moves from Bernstein’s rejection of the predictions of social catastrophe 
to issues closer to his own Marxism. This time, the problem is that the catastrophic 
conception has given excessive importance to the role of the political struggle. The 
                                                                                                                                                        
expression class consciousness, but this term has been used incorrectly so many times in French that it has lost 
all meaning in our language.’. 
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 Georges Sorel, ‘La crise du socialisme’, Revue politique et parlementaire 18, 1898, p. 598. 
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 Ibid., p. 599. ‘On attachait une grande importance  à une loi du développement  historique d’ou se déduisait la 
grande catastrophe…’ 
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 Ibid., p. 600. ‘M. Bernstein s’est rallié aux idées de M. Merlino ; lui aussi, rejette la conception 
catastrophique ; il a déclaré qu’il fallait renoncer à l’espoir d’une révolution prochaine.’ 
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expectation of the social catastrophe has lead socialists to forget the development of the 
working class, and to attempt the conquest of the state: 
‘As long as a catastrophe was expected in the near future, it was important to 
place as many socialists as possible in public functions… one could hope, in this 
way, to preserve the organised forces of government and use them, after the 
revolution, to destroy the economic organisation of capitalism. But if a socialist 
government is neither probable nor, as Bernstein states, desirable, one wonders 
what would be the use of this conquest of public powers… Would it not be an 
old conception deserving to be abandoned just like the catastrophic notion?’69 
We see how, despite framing his article in a revisionist mold, Sorel insists on points that are 
not only specific to his own understanding of Marxism, but on the very aspects of his 
Marxism that had perplexed Bernstein. Highlighting how an excessive focus on the conquest 
of the state is dangerous in a country like France, since ‘where formidable authoritarian 
traditions exist, that which makes the State more powerful is a danger to the people’,70 Sorel 
proceeds to outline the predictable remedy: the development of ‘proletarian associations: 
cooperatives, unions, mutualities’.71 
Perhaps the most striking article from this perspective is the one published in 1900 on the 
debate within the SPD in the Revue politique et parlamentaire. 72 In this text, we not only see 
the usual Sorelian appropriation of a polemical space for the development of his own 
Marxism, but also a rather strong condemnation of parliamentary politics for their own sake. 
The revisionist Sorel, while advocating the tactical importance of parliamentary activity, still 
manages to vocally highlight the dangers of parliaments. It is here that Sorel’s ability in 
reconciling theoretical revisionism and tactical reformism with a clear commitment to a long-
term revolutionary goal emerges most clearly. It is significant, for example, that in a text that 
ends with a long paean to Bernstein, Sorel could write that ‘… the reformist politics of Mr 
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 Ibid., p. 608. ‘Tant que l’on attendait une catastrophe prochaine, il était fort important de faire parvenir 
beaucoup de socialistes aux fonctions publiques ; on pouvait ainsi favoriser le succès de la révolution sociale ; 
on pouvait espérer, par ce moyen, conserver les forces organisées du gouvernement et s’en servir, après la 
révolution, pour démolir l’organisation économique du capitalisme. Mais si le triomphe d’un gouvernement 
socialiste n’est ni probable, ni désirable (comme l’affirme M. Bernstein), on se demande à quoi peut bien servir 
la conquête des pouvoirs publics, dont on a fait tant de bruit dans les manifestes socialistes. Ne serait-ce pas une 
vieillerie à remiser avec la notions catastrophique ?’  
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 Ibid., pp. 608-9. ‘Dans notre pays, où existent des traditions autoritaires si fortes, tout ce que augmente le 
pouvoir de l’Etat est un danger pour le peuple.’ 
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 Ibid., p. 609. ‘Le garanties les plus efficaces que l’on puisse constituer contre le despotisme et la corruption 
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mutualités.’ 
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 Georges Sorel, ‘Les dissensions de la socialdémocratie en Allemagne: à propos des écrits de M. Bernstein’, 
Revue politique et parlementaire 25,1900, pp. 33-66. 
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Bernstein must not be judged by the material importance of the reforms, but by the moral 
consequences that they can have for the future.’73 In other words, the point of reformist 
politics and of the parliamentary involvement necessary to secure them remains the 
institutional development of the working class, both in terms of ‘morality’ and in terms of 
organizational capabilities. In other words, Sorel does not see Bernsteinian revisionism as 
reconciliation with the bourgeois order, but as functional to the long-term revolutionary goal. 
The goal of the parliamentary struggle then is not the transformation of the workers’ 
movement into a political force, but, instead, the facilitation of the institutional development 
of the proletariat. Sorel, in fact, argues that the reason as to why the SPD leaders cling so 
desperately to their Marxist revolutionary phraseology is that this phraseology is fundamental 
to their careers as professional politicians. The German party, the glorious SPD, the light of 
European socialism, is described by Sorel as ‘an organisation of workers directed by forceful 
orators; an oligarchy of demagogues lording over the working class, suggesting books for the 
workers to read, the candidates to vote for at elections, and making their living from their task 
of directors of the people.’ 74 On Sorel’s reading, Kautsky and Bebel are the ‘politicians’, 
whereas Bernstein’s reformism is the way forward for the growth of the institutions that will 
constitute the new society. Politics for its own sake, for Sorel, leads to the most undesirable of 
outcomes, namely ‘to the constitution of an oligarchy of intellectual masters whose 
profession is the government of the proletarian world.’75 
But politics and reformism are necessary, though not for their own sake. The necessity of 
politics is dictated by the immaturity of the proletariat, who, in the present circumstances, is 
still unable to lead the productive forces of society. The real question for Sorel is ‘to what 
extent the proletariat has formed superior, solid and complete economic organisations in order 
to be able to begin the struggle against current civilisation.’76 Unfortunately, the situation is 
one in which ‘producers-proletarians are not in the condition of governing production: they 
                                                 
73
 Ibid., p. 55. ‘… la politique réformiste, à laquelle se rallie M. Bernstein, ne doit pas être jugée par 
l’importance matérielle des reformes, mais par les conséquences morales que celles-ci peuvent avoir pour 
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 Ibid., p. 42. ‘La socialdémocratie est, en dernière analyse, une organisation des travailleurs sous la direction 
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métier de gouverner le monde ouvrier.’ 
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 Ibid., pp. 51-2. ‘Nous sommes ainsi amené, à chercher dans quelle mesure le prolétariat a constitué dans son 
sein des organisations économiques supérieures, solides et complètes, de manière à pouvoir entrer en lutte avec 
la civilisation actuelle.’ 
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form a people for whose benefit it is possible to orient the national economy, but through 
whom it is not possible to reach any results.’77 And so, the point of Bernsteinian reformism is 
exclusively presented from the perspective of class development, as the useful means to arrive 
at an independent, self-governing and strong proletariat. In other words, the Bernsteinian 
perspective defended by Sorel in the article is actually rather Sorelian. Political struggle is a 
necessary evil, whose positive outcome will be an organized and independent proletariat who 
will not need the direction of a bourgeois party, because it will be able to weigh in society 
directly through its institutions. But in a context in which these institutions are still 
underdeveloped, legislative concessions obtained through parliamentary struggle are 
necessary. 
‘Workers begin to understand that the social reforms that can be realised by a 
democratic government (even if they seem insignificant to theorists) still go well 
beyond the sphere of action of popular [i.e. proletarian] institutions… Time is 
needed, for the proletariat can make good use of reforms only when it improves 
itself. Its moral and intellectual formation marches slowly.’78 
And, more explicitly: 
‘The social question, conceived in a Marxist sense, consists in knowing if the 
governed class develops itself intellectually and morally to the point of shedding 
the guardianship imposed so far on it. The true Marxist considers all 
contemporary questions in relation to the development of consciousness within 
the proletariat… he gives more importance to the improvements in [proletarian] 
economic administration than to political revolutions.’79 
A few general points can be gathered from this examination of Sorel’s involvement with the 
Bernstein controversy. To start with, the differences between Bernstein and Sorel, though 
they were obfuscated by their shared battle against the orthodoxy, remained real enough. 
These differences ranged from philosophical ones regarding historical materialism, to more 
tactical ones on the role of the party and the unions in the socialist struggle. When Sorel 
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 Ibid., p. 52. ‘Ainsi nous aboutissons à cette conséquence peu rassurante que les producteurs-prolétaires ne sont 
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intellectuellement er moralement, de manière à pouvoir se passer de la tutelle qui lui à été jusqu’ici imposée. Le 
vrai marxiste considère toutes les questions contemporaines dans leur rapports avec le développement de la 
conscience dans le prolétariat… il attache beaucoup plus d’importance aux perfectionnements de 
l’administration économique qu’aux révolutions politiques.’ 
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discovered Bernstein’s writings, he did not abandon his ideas. Quite on the contrary, he used 
the polemical space generated by the revisionist controversy in order to develop and further 
them, both at the level of social theory and social science and at the level of socialist strategy. 
Under an ostentatious Bernsteinian banner, Sorel was in fact advocating his own Marxism, 
consisting politically of the subordination of parliamentary struggle to the task class 
development, and philosophically in the rejection of the predictive ambitions of Marxism. 
And thus, Sorel could reconcile theoretical revisionism, tactical reformism, and the 
commitment to the development of a proletarian revolutionary force through the growth of 
proletarian institutions. It is the latter aspect which is more important, i.e. the reconciliation of 
political and parliamentary tactics with the commitment to the long-term goal of realizing 
socialism through the development of autonomous proletarian institutions. For Sorel, not only 
were these two aspects not antithetical, but they were correlated, in the sense that the former 
was a prerequisite of the latter.  
5.3 REFORMISM IN A CHANGING REPUBLIC 
It is this conviction that socialist reformism is compatible with the institutional development 
of the proletariat that characterizes most profoundly Sorel’s writings and positions from the 
period. A successful parliamentary practice, he holds, can be conducive to the reinforcement 
of proletarian organisations, and it is from the evolution of such organisations that the 
socialist society will result. Though he is aware of the dangers of parliamentarism, he does 
not believe that electoral successes can transform the worker’s movement into a full blown 
social democratic force, and consequently he does not see, as he later will, involvement in 
republican institutions as part of a process of domestication of the revolutionary potential of 
the working class. The reasons as to why he believes in this compatibility are many, and we 
have suggested some above. On the one hand, this belief in instrumental reformism can partly 
be explained by underlining the overly theoretical perspective from which he approached the 
Bernstein controversy. On the other, more fundamentally, the differences between the 
industrially advanced German economy and the French one, reflected in the difference 
between a modern mass party like the SPD and its smaller French alternatives, were bound to 
obscure to Sorel the deeper processes of working class integration reflected in certain political 
developments. A third reason must be added, and it is on this reason that we shall dwell in the 
following sections. 
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If this belief in the connection between reformism and proletarian institutional development 
emerges intermittently, though rather clearly, in Sorel’s interactions with Bernstein and in his 
writings over the revisionist controversy, it is in the French context that it must be examined 
more closely. Sorel’s reformist texts of the period have to be put in a narrower context, and 
seen as interventions in a debate about involvement in republican institutions that is 
substantially internal to French socialism. Whereas in Germany the revisionist debate erupted 
in the midst of an organized and successful mass party, confortable in its role within the 
Imperial framework, in France it found a divided socialist camp in the midst of a transition 
towards unification and more integration into the republican framework. Although after 1892 
almost every current of French socialism – anarchists excluded – had accepted, with varying 
rationales, the legitimacy of legal and parliamentary forms of struggle, this process of 
republicanisation suffered, in the last years of the century, a significant setback.  
In an attempt to preserve their fading hegemony over French socialism from the threat of new 
reformist leaders such as Jaurès and Millerand, the old Guesdist guard reverted its politics and 
rhetoric to the revolutionary Marxism of the 1880s. In doing so, Jules Guesde’s party 
effectively disowned over five years of its own political practice. Moreover, both the issue 
over which the Guesdists decided to break with the reformist socialistes indépendants and the 
timing of the break proved disastrous. The break occurred over the affaire Dreyfus, and the 
Guesdists decided to disengage from the battle for the revision of Dreyfus’ trial precisely at 
the moment in which public opinion swung decisively in its favour. The entrance of 
Alexandre Millerand in Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau’s cabinet of republican defence further 
entrenched the division between reformists and Marxists. Much in the same way in which the 
POF’s disengagement from the Dreyfus affair had played in the hands of Jaurès, the Guesdist 
condemnation of Millerand’s supposed betrayal found little support in the French working 
class, and further contributed to the isolation of the POF. Guesde, Lafargue, and the POF 
leadership thus appeared to many observers, and to a sizeable number of its own militants, as 
doctrinal extremists out of touch with reality, preaching class purity in a moment of danger of 
republican institutions and downplaying what many saw as a considerable victory, a socialist 
minister in a republican government. Other observers, Sorel included, saw only too well that 
the Dreyfus question was a mere casus belli, that the real battle was for the hegemony over a 
unified socialist party that was clearly in the making, and were unimpressed by the cynicism 
of the strategy. In examining the arguments used by Sorel to articulate his reformism, we can 
see all the dissatisfaction with the suicidal strategy followed by the Guesdists in the years 
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between 1898 and 1902. In those years reformism, however conceived, was the default option 
for the many socialists that wished to distance themselves from a discredited Guesdism, and 
Sorel embraced it. 
Before fully developing the argument – with the help of two digressions, one on the 
republicanisation of French socialism up to 1898 and another on the clash between reformists 
and Guesdists during the affaire Dreyfus – it is necessary to spend some words on why we 
have chosen this interpretation. In accounting for Sorel’s revisionism, there is a tendency in 
Sorelian scholarship to give an excessive importance to the events associated with the 
Dreyfus affair an to their aftermath. The policies of Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes – the 
most obvious political outcomes of the affaire – are credited with conclusively convincing 
Sorel of the intrinsic corruption of parliamentary democracy and, consequently, of 
determining his abandonment of reformism in favour of syndicalism. The argumentative line, 
at times, seems to be that Sorel’s support for reformism was simply dictated by the Dreyfus 
emergency: Pierre Andreu, to mention the most blatant example, writes that ‘the Dreyfus 
affair will falsify and bend Sorel’s natural evolution, delay the development of his thought for 
many years, without however being able to properly alter it.’80 Though most historians do not 
go this far, the tendency to use the importance of the Dreyfus events as an explanation of 
Sorelian reformism is common enough. To give another example, John Stanley, in his 
Sociology of Virtue, in speaking of Sorel’s post-1902 phase – a phase in which, according to 
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achieving a socialist society, but primarily as a defence of the individual from arbitrary control’ (Jennings, Sorel, 
p. 87). This might be so, but it does not say anything about the reformism of those years, i.e. about Sorel’s 
conviction that parliamentary entrance was the right step in the development of socialism. But though Jennings 
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all’interno, o peggio, accettare di essere, in qualsiasi modo, regolate dallo Stato.’ 
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Stanley, Sorel ‘brought his distrust of politics to its logical conclusion’ – writes that ‘the 
historical event that precipitated this period was the Dreyfus affair’.81 
This interpretation is problematic because it cannot satisfactorily account for the central 
element of the reformism that Sorel advocated between 1898 and 1902, namely its 
instrumental character. As we have seen, Sorel’s distrust of parties, parliaments, and 
politicians precedes the 1902 victory of the bloc des gauches. The temporary support that 
Sorel gives to parliamentary socialism is based on the idea that legal reforms can favour the 
development of proletarian institutions, institutions with a markedly revolutionary character. 
It is difficult, however, to highlight this instrumentality without putting Sorel’s reformism in 
the context of socialist unification and republicanisation outlined above, without showing that 
reformisms could be many and that most of them were animated by disillusion with the 
opportunistic Marxism of the Guesdists. At the same time, if we downplay the instrumentality 
of Sorel’s reformism, we have an unexplainable ‘democratic’ phase of an otherwise 
thoroughly anti-parliamentarian and revolutionary thinker. Thus, as the examples above 
testify, there is a risk of explaining this odd ‘democratic’ phase by appealing to the deus ex 
machina of the exceptional circumstances associated with the Dreyfus events, producing 
narratives characterized by stark and unconvincing breaks.82  
This is why we deal with Sorel’s fin de siècle reformism, as well as with the affaire, by 
putting them firmly the context of the process of gradual integration of the French working 
class and of its political organisations in the framework of the third republic. It is only by 
focusing on the question of socialism that it is possible to avoid presenting Sorel’s writings of 
the period as parentheses dictated by exceptional circumstances. What we suggest is that 
Sorel embraced reformism partly because the revolutionary alternative, represented by a 
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 Much of this tendency probably arises from an excessive reliance on Sorel’s autobiographical accounts of the 
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Marcel Rivière: 1919), p. 173). Or again, in the same year, ‘le premières agitations dreyfusardes m’avaient fait 
augurer que le socialisme gagnerait beaucoup à acquérir la claire conscience d’être un mouvement ouvrier dans 
une démocratie ; la liquidation de la révolution dreyfusienne devait me conduire à reconnaître que le socialisme 
prolétarien ou syndicalisme ne réalise pleinement sa nature que s’il est volontairement un mouvement ouvrier 
dirigé contre les démagogues.’ (Sorel, ‘Mes raisons’, p. 268.) And yet, beyond presenting the affaire as a 
decisive event in his change of opinion, what Sorel stresses in passages such as these two is his unchanging 
concern for the development of proletarian institutions. Though the affaire certainly influenced Sorel, it did so 
only by orienting his thought on the question of what circumstances were most favourable to the institutional 
development of the proletariat. 
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declining party and by an orthodox Marxism that Sorel had long rejected, was impracticable. 
This cannot explain entirely how Sorel could see reformism instrumentally, as a tool of 
proletarian empowerment and eventually of revolution.83 The ascendancy of more reformist 
currents in French socialism can be seen as part of a wider process of working-class 
integration into French institutions that has important economic and social aspects. But those 
aspects will be dealt with in the next chapter.  
5.3.1 REPUBLICANISATION AND UNIFICATION: FRENCH SOCIALISM UP TO THE 
AFFAIRE DREYFUS 
The question of involvement in republican institutions, and of whether one should see the 
socialist struggle as a revolutionary or as a reformist one, had been a recurring point of 
conflict in French socialism at least since the early 1880s. A first important episode, relevant 
to what will happen at the end of the 1890s, occurs already in the 1880s with the clash in the 
Parti Ouvrier between Guesdist Marxists and the followers of Paul Brousse, polemically 
labelled the ‘possibilists’ in virtue of their general propensity towards reforms within the 
existing capitalist system. The clash eventually led to a split in the Parti Ouvrier at the Saint-
Etienne congress of 1882, with the Guesdist minority leaving and organizing a separate 
congress at Roane. Though the issues that generated the split range from doctrinal 
incompatibilities to the rivalry between two groups competing for party control, it is the 
stance towards political participation in republican institutions that characterized the cleavage 
most evidently. Given the size of the Parti Ouvrier at the time, the election of parliamentary 
representatives was not a realistic option, and so participation in bourgeois institutions meant 
something else, namely socialist involvement in local administrations and municipalities. It is 
mainly over this question that the ‘fundamental opposition between revolutionaries and 
reformists’ first developed. 84 
When Benoit Malon, a theorist closer to Brousse than to Marx and future founder of the 
Revue Socialiste, wrote his book on the workers’ party in 1881, before the split, he was 
careful not to appear too divisive and asserted the compatibility between Marxists and other 
socialists, i.e. between reforms and revolutions. ‘The great mistake of pure revolutionaries’ he 
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wrote ‘is that of presenting reforms and revolutions as antagonistic pursuits.’85 Instead, he 
went on to argue that only reforms can prepare the revolutionary spirit, for without reforms 
the oppressed lose even the capability of thinking about a social upheaval: ‘reforms are the 
mothers of revolutions.’86 Nonetheless, reforms do not, as ‘pure reformists’ would have it, 
‘take away the raison d’etre of the revolution.’87  The need for the revolutionary uprising 
remains, and in arguing for it, Malon cited none other than Karl Marx, before concluding that 
socialists ought to be ‘reformists and revolutionaries at the same time.’88 This attempt at 
conciliation was however less marked a year onwards. In his follow up to the Nouveaux Parti, 
Malon is much less kind to those he now calls the ‘sectarian Marxists’, and ‘a minority… that 
could not accept its minoritarian status and that is not afraid of breaking the party in order to 
try to conquer again… a lost hegemony.’ 89 Despite the fact that doctrinal ecumenism still 
characterized Malon’s book, tensions were mounting, as these declarations by the leader of 
the possibilists just before the Saint-Etienne congress testify: ‘Ultramontanes cannot obey the 
law of their country because their leader is in Rome. Marxists cannot obey the party’s 
decisions, because their leader is in London. One does not reconcile the workers’ Party with 
Marxist fanaticism.’90 
As we have highlighted, involvement in republican institutions was a question of participation 
in municipal politics. To the Broussists, the socialist control of French communes and 
municipalities and the beginning of a gradual program of ‘socialization’ of public services 
through small-scale municipal action was an effective way of realizing socialism. If we go 
back to Malon’s Nouveaux Parti, the central place attributed to communes and local 
institutions is striking: for Malon, the ‘Parti Ouvrier was not mistaken in attributing great 
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importance to the capture of municipalities.’ 91 The most interesting part of the book, in fact, 
is constituted by the integral citation of the socialist municipal program, a program ‘inspired 
by Brousse’.92 In it we read of the importance of making the ‘municipality mistress of its 
public services’ by socializing – i.e. municipalizing – ‘the monopolies of the great companies 
(omnibuses, trams, water, gas, etc.)’, by establishing ‘municipal industries’ able to provide 
work to unemployed workers and, in this way, ‘embarking on the path that leads from the 
regime of private property to that of public property’.93 
More than one thing in this approach was liable to be the target of Marxist criticism. In 1883, 
after the split had occurred, Jules Guesde outlined why municipal socialism was alien to 
Marxism. The idea that socialism can be gradually realized through bourgeois institutions 
meant disregarding Marx’s analysis of the importance of capital in bourgeois society. In his 
Services publics et socialisme, Guesde brought this and other arguments to discredit the 
gradualist theory of ‘public services’.  The ‘final goal’ of socialism, he stated, is a self-
sufficient society, rather than a state distributing the good it produces to its citizens. 94 Beyond 
this dependency on the bourgeois state, Guesde pointed out the inability of municipal 
socialism to make sense of large industrial production – ‘great industry could disappear 
tomorrow’ he wrote in a sarcastic passage, ‘and western civilisation would be just as ready for 
communism’. 95  All in all, the main argument was the standard one deployed against 
reformists, namely the impossibility of reforms within a capitalist political system. The 
socialisation of the public services delivered by municipalities was, for Guesde, dependent on 
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the ‘socialization of the means of production and exchange’, that in turn was dependent on the 
‘expropriation of the capitalist class – the business of revolution.’96 
This digression on the quarrel over municipal socialism is important not only because it 
displays rather clearly the Guesdist distrust of the time towards involvement in republican 
institutions, but also because it allows us to better understand the relevance of the shift that 
occurred at the beginning of the 1890s, and more precisely with the local elections of 1892 
and the national ones in the following year. 97 It is during these years that the Guesdist stance 
changed completely and moved towards a far more conciliatory position over involvement in 
the republican framework. One of the most striking aspects of this transformation is the 
importance that local institutions and municipalities suddenly come to have in the Guesdist 
party. At the Lyon congress of November 1891, in preparation for the local elections that 
were going to be held in May of the following year, the party decided to complement its 
general programme with a ‘common programme of immediate demands that fall within the 
scope of municipal powers’, advocating welfare measures for children and old people and 
instituting a municipal institutional framework favourable to salaried workers and to their 
unions. 98  The success at the local elections – the Guesdists held the municipalities of 
Commentry and Narbonne and conquered Monluçon, Rubaix, and Caudry – further 
encouraged the move towards more involvement in the republican institutions. During the 
campaign for the 1893 national elections, for example, the adjective ‘Français’ was ‘silently’ 
added to the acronym of the Parti Ouvrier’. 99 But it is the success of the various socialist 
candidates at the 1893 national elections that we can take as a watershed separating the old 
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revolutionary Guesdists from their new republican selves, transforming the Guesdists from ‘a 
simple ideological force’ into ‘a party, the first properly structured French political party’.100  
The 1893 developments, of course, ran in parallel with what was happening on another scale 
in Germany. The increasing and increasingly successful involvement in electoral competition 
determined a gradual but sure distancing of socialist parties from both insurrectionism and 
political isolationism, and marked the affirmation of the political practice that Engels had so 
clearly outlined in his 1895 preface to Marx’s Class Struggles in France. In stark contrast 
with the 1880s, participation in republican political life was now seen by Guesde as ‘the lever 
with which we shall lift an entire world, the world of labour freed forever from bourgeois 
domination.’101  It is true that differences with the Broussists still remained, and that the 
Guesdists specified with sufficient clarity the instrumental nature of their political 
involvement. Nonetheless, the shift remained quite significant, partly because with it we see 
the rise of a number of political phenomena typical of the transformation from a doctrinally 
coherent small-scale organisation to a mass party, however small. For example, we see the 
effort to muster support outside of the traditional proletarian electoral reservoir. Much like in 
Germany Georg von Vollmar had insisted on the importance of gathering agrarian support, at 
the 1892 Marseilles congress in preparation of the 1893 national elections the Guesdist 
‘Congress decides to complete the general Party programme with the following agricultural 
programme destined to rally agrarian workers to socialism’. 102  We have, moreover, the 
forming of tactical alliances in specific constituencies with radicals and republicans, as well 
as a more vocal attitude on issues that were at the centre of the public debate, such as 
colonialism, protectionism, or the Panama scandal.103 
With the new situation came new challenges and new actors. With the slow installation of 
socialists at the heart of the republican institutions, the question of socialist unity became 
more pressing. At the same time, the parliamentary success had added at least one important 
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current, that of the so-called independent socialists, to the landscape of French socialism, 
further complicating this quest for unity. Though before 1893 the label of independent 
socialist was used vaguely to indicate those not clearly ascribable to an organization or 
current, after 1893 it increasingly came to indicate a precise group of MPs originally 
federated in the loosely structured Fédération des socialistes indépendants, set up before the 
1893 elections.104 Of overwhelmingly bourgeois social extraction, labelled by Lafargue, in the 
middle of a clash that we are about to examine as ‘multi-coloured independents of a 
sentimental, picturesque, and integral socialism’, the independents effectively constituted an 
ideological bridge between social republicanism and Marxism.105 While their action cannot be 
entirely reduced to parliamentary activity, it was parliament that made the independent 
socialists: without the dynamics set in motion by the socialist entrance in parliament, and 
without the Guesdist inability to deal with such dynamics, it is highly unlikely that this 
current would have come to have the importance it had. 
Between 1893 and 1898 the parliamentary group of Union Socialiste represented the main 
example of socialist unity. But this ‘entente au sommet’ was not the expression of a coherent 
political project, and the looseness of the criteria that regulated the entrance to and the 
functioning of the group allowed Jaurès and Millerand to emerge and, consequently, gave to 
them the political visibility and credibility that they needed in order to become an important 
force within French socialism. The Guesdist refused to ‘define the borders of the 
[parliamentary] cartel’ and to set up the parliamentary group along consistently collectivist 
lines. ‘The POF, drunk on its successes, sacrifices quality to quantity: the Groupe d’Union 
Socialiste, without programme nor precise conditions of access, is open to anyone wanting to 
join…’. The group functions in the absence of ‘a precise statute’ and there is no ‘voting 
discipline’. Under these conditions, ‘the revolutionary socialists, Guesdists and Vaillantistes, 
are drowned under the mass of independent socialists and radical-socialists.’106 It was perhaps 
the instrumentality with which the Guesdist approached the parliamentary business, coupled 
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with their inexperience, that led them to this mistake, the first of many errors that eventually 
played into Jaurès’ hands.107 
Partially in virtue of their inexperience, partially in virtue of the fact that they were more 
concerned by other revolutionary groups than by the rise of the reformists, and partially 
because they were convinced that the future of the party would mirror the present of the SPD, 
and thus that electoral successes and a less insurrectionary attitude were the way forward, the 
Guesdists allowed the parliamentary socialistes indépendants to take the initiative on the 
question of socialist unity. After another successful round of municipal elections on the 3rd 
and 10th May 1896, a gathering – a banquet, in fact – of the representatives of a large number 
of socialist currents was held at Saint Mandé, on the outskirts of Paris. Alexandre Millerand’s 
speech opened the gathering: 
‘Citizens, the same cry has risen from all the battlefields in which socialist 
France has met capitalist reaction: union! Let us end doctrinal quarrels, let us 
forget internal divisions! Against the common enemy, one heart, one spirit, one 
action!’108 
In the rest of the speech Millerand outlined a number of rather vague and reformist-sounding 
elements meant to unite all the socialist currents under a unitary, though rather broad, church. 
In outlining his minimal programme for a socialist unification, Millerand carefully painted the 
Marxian ‘expropriation of the expropriators’ in republican terms, giving an important role to 
the state, and underlining repeatedly that the socialisation of the means of production would 
only happen when a certain industry was ready for it. He spoke to small land-owners and 
artisans, to the ‘few privileged ones who still hold the instruments of production in their 
hands and who reap the entirety of the product of their labour’, reassuring them that socialism 
‘does not threaten them in the slightest’ since their ‘fragmented property could not be the 
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object of a social appropriation’.109 He stressed the uselessness of violence – ‘récourir à la 
force, et pour qui, et contre qui?’110  – pledged allegiance to the Republic and declared 
uncompromisingly the recourse to universal suffrage as the sole weapon that the party was 
going to use.111 Finally, he outlined the three points on which to erect the edifice of socialist 
unity:  
‘Intervention of the State in order to move from the capitalist to the national 
sphere different categories of means of production as they become ready for social 
appropriation; - conquest of public powers through universal suffrage; - 
international workers’ collaboration.’112 
Despite some reservations, a substantial degree of internal disagreement, and a number of 
quite severe contrasts with the independents over the direction of the newspaper La Pétite 
République, the Guesdists substantially went along for the ride, and embraced Millerand’s 
minimal platform. The proletarian base appeared, at times, rather unconvinced by the new 
allies and the new direction of the party. In a letter written to Guesde, ten Parisian female 
militants asked whether a socialist union that had as its consequence the representation of the 
people by ‘a string of lawyers without a cause, all more or less millionaires’ was a good idea. 
113
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platform must be placed in a wider European context in which the SPD was moving in the 
same direction: Engels’ ‘reformist’ preface to Marx’s Class Struggles in France dates from 
little over a year before Millerand’s speech. That the quest for unity required the adoption of a 
wider and more republican platform did not worry the Guesdists too much. It is true that there 
were substantial differences between Guesdists and followers of Millerand, as the former still 
kept the possibility open, in case of a suspension of universal suffrage, of going back to the 
revolutionary option. 115 But they underestimated the dangers of these differences, as they 
were confident that increasingly large electoral successes would, in the long run, resolve most 
of the problems associated with socialist unity and that they would keep ideological and 
political control of the new-born unified socialist party. When, as we are about to see, they 
realized that the new party was probably not going to be set up along sufficiently Marxist and 
collectivist lines they attempted a change of direction, and reverted to their older rhetoric of 
opposition to the republic in a bid to preserve their identity and base against the possibility of 
a socialist party that was going to be republican far more than socialist. But this attempt 
failed, largely in virtue of the fact that it occurred in a very particular context, that of the 
affaire Dreyfus. 
5.3.3 THE AFFAIRE DREYFUS AND THE MILLERAND CRISIS 
As we can see, the difference between the Guesdists of the early 1880s and the POF after 
1893 is rather clear. By 1898 the POF, an almost fully legal and parliamentary party, entered 
a turbulent phase of the political life of the third republic convinced, despite the concessions 
made to Millerand at Saint-Mandé, of maintaining its hegemony over a growing socialist 
front. But the particular political circumstances associated with the Dreyfus affair provided 
the terrain on which Jaurès, Millerand, and the socialistes indépendants could launch their 
offensive, and the Guesdists did not manage to respond well. 
The political dynamics unleashed by the judicial case of captain Alfred Dreyfus represent a 
central moment in the political history of the third republic, and the affaire arguably 
constitutes the central political experience of Sorel’s life. That this should be so is 
unsurprising, if we underline the fact that the affaire at some point became something far 
larger than the simple judicial misadventure of an army captain unjustly accused of treason. 
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After 1898, the case had grown to the level of a national schism, opposing the army, a rising 
anti-Semitism, the most reactionary sections of the French clergy against the defenders of 
republican government. 116  Given the obstinacy of the military authorities, the battle for 
Dreyfus’ innocence could not be won in a military court. And thus it ended up being fought 
on the terrain of political lobbying, of newspapers, and of public opinion. It is here that 
Dreyfus won, but it is also here that the affaire set in motion a series of political 
developments whose ultimate significance was the creation of the political cultures that 
characterized the France of the first half of the 20th century. To give an idea of the depth of 
the division created by the affaire as well as of its symbolic importance, it will be sufficient to 
say that when in 1945 Charles Maurras was condemned for high treason and expelled from 
the Academie Française, his comment was: c’est la revanche de Dreyfus! 
The events begin in 1894 in the Section de Statistique, the intentionally misleading name 
given to the counter-espionage bureau set up in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war with 
the aim of monitoring German activity. In September 1894 the Section intercepts the 
document at the centre of the affaire: an anonymous memoir – the bordereau – addressed to 
Maximilian von Schwartzkoppen, the military attaché of the German embassy in Paris, 
revealing the existence of a mole amongst French officers. After a rushed investigation, 
Alfred Dreyfus is identified as the culprit and is presented with the option on an honourable 
suicide, to which he replies: ‘I am innocent. Kill me if you wish.’ 117 The evidence presented 
at the military trial, however, is not conclusive and the prosecution has to rely on the 
testimony of Colonel Hubert-Joseph Henry – a member of the Section de Statistique – who 
identifies Dreyfus as the mole on the basis of a conversation with an unnamed informant 
which he claims to have had a few months earlier. Refusing to name the informant, Henry 
offers his word of honour as the only guarantee of veracity, and on the basis of this evidence 
Dreyfus is found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment in Devil’s Island, French Guyane, 
where he arrives on the 15th of April 1895. 
Mathieu Dreyfus, Alfred’s brother and Alsatian industrialist, begins in the meantime enquiries 
to prove his brother’s innocence, and hires the journalist Bernard Lazare as a private detective 
and opinion maker. In March 1896 Georges Picquart, the new head of the Section, discovers 
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through the ‘usual way’ the existence of another spy, Ferdinand Walsin Esterhazy. 118 Having 
placed him under surveillance, he notices striking similarities between Esterhazy’s 
handwriting and that of the bordereau. Convinced of Dreyfus likely innocence, Picquart 
begins to suggest to his superiors the idea of indicting Esterhazy and of revising the 
judgement of the Dreyfus trial. But the suggestions are met coldly, and Picquart is invited to 
remain silent. Colonel Henry categorically refuses the idea of Dreyfus’ innocence, and goes 
as far as producing a fabricated piece of evidence in which Dreyfus is ‘shown’ to be the 
German spy. This piece – the faux Henry – will be crucial to Dreyfus’ eventual acquittal.  
Lazare’s and Mathieu Dreyfus’ efforts, in the meantime, begin to yield results: in November 
1896 the pamphlet Une erreur judiciaire: la vérité sur l’affaire Dreyfus is distributed secretly 
to a number of public figures, MPs, and journalists. In the same months, the newspaper Le 
Matin publishes a copy of the bordereau, and Mathieu commissions and displays posters 
juxtaposing the document to Alfred Dreyfus’ handwriting.119  Sensing the possibility of a 
disaster, the military hierarchy at the end of the year relieves Picquart of his duties as head of 
the Section, and sends him to Algeria in an attempt to minimize the risk that he outs to the 
public the result of his enquiry on Esterhazy. In June 1897 however Picquart is allowed to 
return to Paris, and he confides the results of his enquiry, together with a number of important 
documents to an Alsatian friend, the lawyer Louis Leblois. A month later, Leblois speaks to 
another, more influential, Alsatian, the vice president of the Senate Auguste Scheurer-
Kestner, who begins a lobbying campaign amongst government and politicians.  
It is at this point that the judicial aspects become secondary and the weight of the issue on 
public opinion increasingly strong. The details of a late October meeting between Scheurer-
Kestner and the war minister Billot are leaked to Le Matin, and the question becomes de facto 
public: in November 1897, ‘the affaire becomes the Affaire’. 120  The leak provokes the 
reaction of the right-wing press, which begins attacking Scheurer-Kestner. On the 16th, 
Mathieu Dreyfus publicly accuses Esterhazy, while at the same time Émile Zola has begun 
writing pro-Dreyfus articles in Le Figaro. 121  In January 1898, a military court acquits 
Esterhazy of any wrongdoing, while it condemns in the same trial Picquart to 60 days of 
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incarceration. In the following days Zola publishes his J’Accuse! in the Parisian L’Aurore, 
directed at the time by Georges Clemenceau. The bold dreyfusard text filled with precise 
accusations against various army figures, sells over 200.000 copies in a single day, effectively 
kick starting the process of political mobilisation and polarisation of public opinion. Zola is 
immediately pursued for libel. The country, in the meantime, experiences a wave of anti-
Semitic riots, some of considerable size. Far from being spontaneous, the riots are animated 
by rightist political groups, testifying the dynamics of political mobilization set in motion by 
the affaire. 122 Parisian meeting halls are filled by nationalists rallying to the defence of the 
army against the ‘Jewish syndicate’.123 
The early engagement of French socialism with the affaire was characterized by indifference 
and mild hostility to Dreyfus, reflecting its old attitude of utter distance from the bourgeois 
world and its republic. Even Jean Jaurès had, after Dreyfus’ first condemnation in 1894, 
stressed that the death penalty was the norm for soldiers guilty of treason, and denounced the 
magnanimity shown to the bourgeois captain.124 With the events of late 1897 and early 1898, 
the socialist attitude changed. The reactionary threat had become evident, and the army was 
an easy target for socialists, who, POF included, began questioning the methods of military 
courts and demanding a retrial.125 And yet, in July 1898, after a round of national elections 
that had seen socialism progress despite the fact that both Jaurès and Guesde had lost their 
seats126, the Guesdists completely changed their stance on the affaire: on the 24th of July, the 
direction of the party declared that ‘proletarians have nothing to do with this battle, which is 
not their own’, effectively disengaging the POF from the affaire. 127   
The explanation of this sudden change of direction has to do more with socialist unification 
than with the Dreyfus affair. After the loss of his seat in the May elections, Jaurès had 
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forcefully taken the initiative in his hands both on the question of socialist unity and over the 
affaire. While on the one hand he had already begun a battle for the revision of the trial that 
was to progressively grow in intensity, and that was going to establish him as a political 
leader of national calibre, on the other he had started campaigning in the Petite République128 
to accelerate the process of socialist unification, which culminated with the organisation of an 
informal public meeting – ‘un punch socialiste’ – to discuss the question.129 In that meeting, 
held at the Tivoli-Vauxhall in the 10th arrondissement, Jaurès showed clearly how he 
connected the Dreyfus question to that of socialist unity: ‘Since Reaction has formed a bloc’ 
he argued ‘Revolution must form a bloc…’130 The intensity of the double Jauressian initiative 
put the Guesdists on their guard. Already at Saint-Mandé the party had accepted, not without 
some internal opposition, a mild and rather republican platform for socialist unity. The 
elections had not been the spectacular success they expected and, moreover, support for 
Dreyfus was not a popular option: had not Jaurès lost his seat also as a result of his 
embracement of this unpopular cause? It was perhaps time to distance oneself from Jaurès and 
from his insistence on a unity that would have meant further derogation from a Marxist line 
that had already been substantially watered down at Saint-Mandé. As Guesde argued in his 
famous public confrontation with Jaurès in 1900, to follow Jaurès would have meant ‘leading 
the proletariat to follow… that rifle-loving bourgeoisie of 1871! Not that, comrades. At that 
point the workers’ party shouted: stop there!’131 
But the timing of this change of direction, effected in order to regain the upper hand over the 
reformists’ initiatives, proved terrible. The trial of Zola had ended in the condemnation of the 
writer, who had fled to England, but had resulted in the revelation to the public of a crucial 
piece of evidence, the faux Henry. On the 7 July 1898, the anti-dreyfusard war minister 
Cavaignac had read this document to the chamber of deputies in the context of an eloquent 
speech that was to establish conclusively Dreyfus’ culpability. The chamber had voted 
unanimously for the divulgation to the public of the speech: this effectively put the faux 
Henry, a fabricated piece of evidence, in the public eye. Jaurès immediately attacked the new 
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evidence, but at this point he was abandoned by the POF, who, as we have seen, disengaged 
from the affaire in late July. In August, however, a military enquiry discovered the forgery: 
Henry confessed and, when imprisoned, he committed suicide. After the suicide, public 
opinion swung decidedly towards the need for retrial: thus, ‘fearful of rowing against the 
current, Guesdists disengage [from the affaire], but just as the judicial details become 
clearer… the tide of public opinion changes.’132 
In the autumn of 1898 and in the first half of 1899, as the strength of those pushing for a 
revision of the trial mounted, the political stakes surrounding the case grew exponentially. A 
gifted young journalist, Charles Maurras, spun Henry’s forgery as a patriotic act, portraying 
the colonel as a victim who, though guilty of ‘a forgery, but only one’, had paid with his life, 
with his French blood, for the defence of the nation.133 The anti-Semitic La Libre Parole set 
up a public subscription, the monument Henry, to help Henry’s widow; the vitriolic anti-
Semitism that accompanied the donations is a good thermometer of the political 
temperature.134 When, in February, the anti-Dreyfusard president of the republic, Félix Faure, 
died, he was replaced by Émile Loubet. This unleashed an attempted coup d’état at the hands 
of Paul Déroulède and the right-wing Ligues des Patriotes. The insurgents however failed to 
secure the support of the army and thus the situation was resolved in the space of an 
afternoon. Tensions grew as the country awaited the decision on the revision of the trial. On 
the 3rd of June, the Court of Cassation finally ruled that the retrial was to go ahead. The 
nationalist camp was indignant, and Loubet himself was attacked with a cane by a baron, 
Fernand de Christiani, in a series of incidents that saw clashes between police and riotous 
aristocrats. A week later, the republican left responded with a large demonstration of 100.000 
people at the Hyppodrome de Longchamps. Though the demonstration was relatively calm, 
the next day Edouard Vaillant demanded, at the Chambre des députés, explanations from 
Prime Minister Dupuy over police violence.135  
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Vaillant’s speech, however, soon departed from the Longchamps events in order to deal 
directly with the elephant in the room, the defence of the republic. What the events of 
Longchamps had shown was not only that ‘socialists are the true defenders of the Republic’ 
because they see it as the ‘necessary instrument of working class emancipation, as well as the 
preliminary stage of the social republic that they want to establish’. These events, and the 
preceding ones, had also shown the extent of the threat with which the republic was faced. 
Parliament needed to have ‘full confidence’ in its ‘government, its functionaries, its police 
forces’: France, in other words, needed ‘a strong government of republican action and 
defence’ capable of standing up decisively against the ‘conspiracies of reaction’ and the 
‘threats of the counter-revolution against the Republic’. 136 In the ensuing discussion Dupuy 
took full responsibility for the actions of the police at Longchamps, and demanded a vote of 
confidence for his government, which he did not succeed in winning. The way was now open 
for the government of republican defence demanded by Vaillant, and it materialized on the 22 
of June, headed by Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau. 
The logic of the new cabinet was that of uniting all the forces that were prepared to defend the 
republic in order to form a politically stable government able to face the nationalist threat.137 
This is why it needed, as war minister, a strong army figure such as Gaston de Galiffet, and 
this is why it offered a ministerial post to Alexandre Millerand, whose acceptance made him 
the first European socialist to participate in government. Though many socialists 
organizations had, as correctly pointed out by Vaillant in his speech, enthusiastically endorsed 
the battle against the right wing, Millerand’s entrance into government became occasion for 
further divisions inside the socialist camp, with the Guesdists being the most proactive 
organization in condemning the ‘ministerialist’ error. By polemically exploiting the presence 
of General Galiffet, ‘le fusilleur de Mai’, the Guesdist strategy began with a tactical 
abstention in voting for confidence in the new cabinet, and continued with the issuing of a 
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public manifesto in July, condemning both the entente with Galiffet and, more in general, the 
participation of socialists in a bourgeois governments. The manifesto, strongly denouncing 
those who had damaged the ‘interests and honour of socialism’, asserted that the ‘socialist 
party, a class party, could neither be nor become a party of government without committing 
suicide.’138 
Now, as should be clear, the logic behind this public and vocal condemnation of 
ministerialism was that of distancing the POF from the republican socialist line that Jaurès 
and Millerand were ably putting into practice. In other words, it appears that more than 
involvement in government, the fear was of seeing French socialism becoming a mild left-
wing republicanism, of seeing over twenty years of Marxist propaganda and organizational 
work go wasted. Much like the abrupt disengagement from the affaire Dreyfus that the POF 
had effected a year before, the condemnation of ministerialism must be seen as an attempt at 
imposing a Guesdist line to the future unified socialist party. Much like that disengagement, it 
was too little and too late: after having accepted municipal socialism and after having 
supported the Saint Mandé platform, the U-turn did not appear credible, and left even the 
Guesdist base somewhat disoriented. After having marched slowly but steadily for twenty 
years towards more integration in republican political life, the strength with which the POF 
condemned Millerand’s governmental involvement appeared illogical and bizarre. The subtle 
distinctions between municipalities and parliaments, who ‘open up as the result of the 
workers’ external pressure… and allow us to enter them as enemies’, and ministries who 
‘open up only from within, when their bourgeois holders have an interest in letting one of us 
in’, appeared to many socialist militants as mere sophistries.139  
An important aspect of this change of direction that is that it consisted of a return to the anti-
republican Marxism of the 1880s. Talk of the ‘bourgeois’ character of republican institutions, 
of the importance of class struggle, of the futility of attempts at reform under a capitalist 
regime, and, finally, of revolution and insurrection, made a comeback in Guesdist discourse. 
When, in 1900, after two years of tensions and conflicts, Guesde publicly debated with Jaurès 
in Lille, this revolutionary rhetoric was at the centre of his speech. He asserted that class 
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struggle ought to be ‘the rule determining our conduct every day, every minute’, and that if it 
were possible, as it was for Jaurès, to temporarily leave it aside, then class struggle would 
become ‘like the paradise of Catholics and Christians, which is placed so far away, so outside 
of everything worldly, that it does not influence everyday life… reduced as it is to a simple 
act of faith operated in the void.’140 He then proceeded to describe Jaurès’ rallying to the 
defence of the republic as a dangerous ‘abandonment of the class perspective’.141  
‘It was sufficient that the socialist party quit momentarily its class perspective… 
that it risked going all the way down this slippery slope. To obtain individual 
justice and reparation, it mingled with the enemy class, and now there it is, in a 
common government with this class. And they sell it to us as a triumph of the 
proletariat, as an indicator of socialist strength, this class struggle that has become 
class collaboration, this new form of cooperative, uniting in the same cabinet a 
socialist, who should fight for the overthrow of capitalist society, and a majority 
of other people whose only goal is the conservation of this society.’142 
From the exclusive preoccupation with class struggle and the supreme prohibition of alliances 
with the bourgeoisie, it was but a very small step to the impossibility of reforms, for ‘nothing 
has changed and nothing can change in the present society, as long as capitalist property will 
not have been suppressed and replaced by social property’.143 Consequently, the ‘exclusive 
task’ of socialists is that of ‘recruiting and enlarging the brigades that will have to… capture 
the bourgeois Bastille as its feudal predecessor has been captured in the past’.144 Given that 
‘…class struggle forbids negotiations between classes’, 145  revolution remains the only 
legitimate goal for a socialist party: ‘We are and cannot but be a revolutionary party, for our 
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emancipation and that of humankind can only be achieved through revolution.’146 As Sorel 
had observed in 1898, ‘…the more it moves away from its original spirit, the more it clutches 
to the dry branches of dogmatism.’147 
5.3.4 SOREL’S REFORMISM 
In examining Sorel’s support for socialist reformism, we must then take into account the fact 
that it was developed in this context, characterized by the clash between Jaurès’ successful 
and popular line and the POF, whose untimely attempts to regain a fading hegemony through 
the resuscitation of its revolutionary rhetoric of the 1880s had left even its own base 
perplexed. The return to talk of revolution and the condemnation of Jaurès and Millerand as 
class traitors appeared, as we have stated, inexplicable to militants who had seen the same 
party approve the participation in national and local elections, and who had accepted the 
Saint-Mandé platform. As Claude Willard explains, ‘the parliamentary and electoral 
orientation that the POF had adopted after 1892-1893, and the endorsement of the Saint-
Mandé platform had warmed hearts to ministerialism and reformism…’.148 It is important, 
moreover, to underline how this Guesdist shift, where it implied a return to the Marxist 
phraseology of the origins, gave them a widespread reputation as doctrinal extremists, 
concerned more by the coherence of their doctrine than by the welfare of workers. Even a 
trade unionist member of the POF and personal friend of Jules Guesde, Raymond Lavigne, 
could write in private correspondence with Guesde that ‘You may have saved the party from 
the perspective of its theoretical importance, of its, dare I say, academic interest, but you have 
lost it materially… you live superbly in the clouds of the pure Idea, but you are not at home in 
everyday human existence.’149 
A theoretical heterodox himself, a convinced supporter of the importance of proletarian 
institutional development, Sorel could not be expected to side with a party whose doctrine he 
had always thought to be a caricature of Marxism and whose political conduct during the 
affaire consisted essentially in a retreat from the parliamentary strategy that they had pursued 
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in the last years. What bothered Sorel was, of course, not so much the sudden change of 
direction – whose political logic he understood only too well, and condemned150 – but the 
choice to abandon the possibility to pass legislation whose influence on French society could 
have, potentially at least, contributed to the process of proletarian institutional development. 
And thus, in examining Sorelian reformism, we must not only insist on the fact that for him 
reforms obtained through parliamentary involvement were compatible with proletarian 
institutional development, but also that his texts are written under the spectacle of a political 
party who flees from the possibility of government in the name of a Marxism that Sorel found 
scientifically objectionable. 
Already before the crucial year of the affaire Dreyfus and the Millerand crisis, we can detect 
in Sorel’s writings a number of general exhortations to socialists to secure reforms capable of 
guaranteeing the development of proletarian institutions. ‘What is the purpose’, wondered 
Sorel in January 1898, ‘of all the efforts made to elect socialist deputies to parliament if they 
do not adapt to the environment, and they do not bring home a single practical reform?’151 
The uneasiness with which Marxist delegates engaged in parliamentary activity was seen by 
Sorel as a form of utopianism and as the logical consequence of a deterministic understanding 
of Marxism that led to political fatalism. Rather than doing as the orthodox do and elaborating 
‘a program for the world of tomorrow, one must be able to exist in the present society; it is 
necessary to push forward achievable reforms, and it is necessary to collaborate to the work of 
improvement.’152 
It is, however, the explosion of the Millerand crisis that is the background to Sorel’s most 
reformist analyses. A few weeks before the fall of the Dupuy government, Sorel wrote a long 
analysis on the evolution of French socialism from the 1880s for the Italian La Riforma 
Sociale.153 Despite appearances to the contrary, the text is not an historical analysis, but an 
intervention on current affairs, as becomes clear when Sorel argues with clear polemical 
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 Georges Sorel, ‘La crise du socialisme’ p. 607. ‘…il ne s’agit plus de se mettre en mesure de reconstruire la 
société et d’élaborer un programme pour le monde futur ; il faut savoir vivre dans la société actuelle ; il faut 
s’efforcer de faire aboutir les réformes possibles ; il faut collaborer aux améliorations.’ 
153
 Virtually every one of Sorel’s most incisive interventions on French current affairs occur, in this period, in 
Italian publications. 
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intent that political powerlessness goes hand in hand with the obsession for doctrinal purity: 
‘When a party is weak and cannot exert a serious influence on social reality… it soon 
becomes a church, concerned with dogmatism. It becomes intransigent and divides itself in 
sects that claim to possess the only truth.’ Moreover, because of its powerlessness to exert an 
influence on the course of events, it begins to ‘expect success not as the result of an evolution 
conforming to historical precedents, but as a miraculous event.’ 154 It is easy to see that Sorel’s 
political target is the POF, whereas his theoretical one is the determinist Marxism to which 
Guesdists had, however instrumentally, returned.  
The belief in the collapse of capitalism and in the revolutionary uprising that will follow are 
equated to the irrational belief in historical miracles, and their most negative consequence is 
that they leads socialism away from the only thing that constitutes its essence, namely the 
organized proletariat. ‘It is clear’ he writes ‘that workers are much more interested in practical 
reforms than they are in theories… Theorists, on the other hand, are more intransigent’.155 
The argument is that involvement in political life brings socialism into social reality, and thus 
is to be preferred to doctrinal purity preached in isolation. ‘When the leaders of parties, rather 
than fighting amongst themselves in congresses of theorists, were faced by electors… they 
tried to outline achievable reforms; they were not regressing; they were returning on the real 
terrain of the economy, which they had left in order to engage in poor metaphysics.’156 
It is the POF’s return to the insurrectionist rhetoric of the 1880s that, for Sorel, constitutes the 
real regress, because it signals the return to a position of marginality in which doctrinal 
coherence is all that can sustain the forces of socialism. Thus, if there is a positive 
consequence to the clashes between reformists and Guesdists, as he wrote in October 1899, it 
is that this clash has given ‘to the vast majority of workers the opportunity of showing that 
doctrinal [literally: dogmatic] disputes did not interest them.’157 The distinction, mentioned 
                                                 
154
 Georges Sorel, ‘L’evoluzione del socialismo in Francia’, La Riforma Sociale 9, 1899, pp. 512-13. ‘Quando un 
partito è debole e non può esercitare un'influenza seria sul movimento sociale e non è adatto alle condizioni 
generali non tarda a divenire una chiesa, fa della dogmatica, è intransigente, si divide in sètte che pretendono 
tutte di possedere l'unica verità, non aspetta più il successo da un'evoluzione conforme ai precedenti storici, ma 
da un avvenimento miracoloso.’ 
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 Ibid., p. 518. ‘È chiaro che gli operai sono molto più preoccupati di riforme pratiche che di teorie… I teorici 
sono al contrario molto più intransigenti.’ 
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 Ibid., p. 524. ‘Quando i capi dei partiti, invece di trovarsi in lotta nei congressi con i teorici, si trovarono in 
contatto con gli elettori, tornarono ai punti antichi di vista e cercarono di determinare delle riforme eseguibili; 
essi non retrocedevano; ritornavano sul vero terreno dell’economia, che avevano abbandonato per fare della 
cattiva metafisica.’ 
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 Sorel, ‘La scissione socialista in Francia’, p. 869. ‘La scissione… ha fornito nel tempo stesso alla grandissima 
moltitudine degli operai l’opportunità di affermare che le dispute dommatiche non li interessavano.’ 
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above, operated by Guesde between the legitimacy of participation in parliaments and 
municipalities and the illegitimacy of governmental involvement is dismissed by Sorel as 
‘petty arguments.’ 158 
It is in a couple of texts from December 1899 and January 1900 that Sorel outlines most 
clearly his understanding of the social democratic transformation of French socialism. 
Reflecting on the consequences of the affaire Dreyfus, he accuses the Guesdists not only of 
doctrinal extremism, but of having neglected their fundamental task, which is the one of 
helping the development of the proletariat and its institutional growth. The problem of the 
Guesdists is that for them ‘…everything is subordinated to electoral victories…’ 159  By 
focusing on these victories, they neglect the proletariat: ‘The socialist absence in social work 
is saddening: they have displayed a guilty indifference towards anti-alcohol propaganda. The 
few exceptions, like Rouanet and Fournière, are independent socialists who have long lived 
outside organized parties, and for whom Lafargue and the other doctors of catastrophist 
socialism have only but disdain.’160 It is because of their excessive electoral focus that they 
neglect the real movement: ‘…showing that reforms do not make the world perfect does not 
enlighten the people [i.e. the working class], and does not make it more capable of governing 
the economy… but it does provide applause in public discussions, and that is what matters to 
those who look for votes.’161 
It is important to underline that though Sorel sides with the reformists, he accuses the 
supposed ‘revolutionaries’ of being excessively concerned by electoral and political 
calculations. This, as will be remembered, is exactly what Sorel had accused Kautsy and 
Bebel of in his writings over the Bernstein controversy. The ‘reformist’ Sorel, in other words, 
continues to see politics more as a danger than as an opportunity. The achievable reforms, 
then, have only one purpose: that of helping the working class in its institutional 
development, whose completion will allow it to shed the tutelage of party leaders. 
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 Ibid. ‘…meschine ragioni date da Guesde nella circolare, che egli ha diretta ai suoi aderenti.’ 
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 Georges Sorel, ‘Socialismo e democrazia: conclusione sulla faccenda Dreyfus’, Rivista Critica del Socialismo 
1, 1899, p. 965.  
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 Ibid., pp. 965-6. ‘L’astensione dei socialisti nelle opere d’insegnamento è davvero desolante: essi hanno 
mostrato una colpevole indifferenza  per la propaganda anti-alcolica: se alcuni fanno eccezione, come Fournière 
e Rouanet, sono degl’Indipendenti, che da lungo tempo vivono al di fuori dei partiti organizzati e per i quali 
Lafargue e altri dottori del socialismo catastrofico non hanno mai abbastanza disprezzo.’ 
161
 Ibid., pp. 966-7. ‘Facendo critiche amare alla società attuale e mostrando l’insufficienza delle riforme a 
rendere perfetto il mondo, non s’illumina il popolo, non lo si rende più atto a governare l’economia, non si fa 
nulla per migliorare la propria sorte; ma si ottengono sempre grandi trionfi nelle pubbliche riunioni; ed è ciò che 
preme a coloro, che vanno a caccia di voti.’ 
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After having shown, not incorrectly, how electoral considerations were central in determining 
Guesdist behaviour during the affaire, Sorel begins to articulate a three-stage model of the 
evolution of political movements, which he applies to socialism in order to show why 
reformism is the way forward. Initially, socialism is utopian: it is a ‘theory of human society 
constructed according to reasoned observation.’162 At this stage, ‘Socialism is still only a way 
of giving a precise form to the lamentations generated by human misery; the utopian 
formulates his criticisms at an imperfect social order by outlining an ideal regime…’163 In the 
second stage, socialism becomes a philosophy of history, a supposedly scientific prediction 
on the inevitable course of social development. Here, its historical weight and ability to be a 
force in society are greatly increased, for ‘philosophies of history have always exerted an 
enormous practical influence on multitudes. The terrifying predictions that can be read at the 
end of the synoptic Gospels have had a much greater influence than the Sermon of the mount 
and the theology of the Greek Fathers.’164  But it is in the third stage, when ‘Socialism 
becomes a feeling, acting like a living force in the world in order to transform institutions in a 
direction favourable to the working classes’ that the full historical maturity is reached.165 It is 
in this third stage that 
‘…we are brought back to real society. Reforms are implemented as the forces of 
socialism develop to the point of being able to influence legislation. Socialism is 
not postponed in its entirety to a symbolical future; it is in the present. Utopias are 
replaced by hypotheses capable of having practical consequences and by partially 
realizable projects. In a word the evolution of society becomes socialist, thanks to 
the participation of all political forces of democracy.’166 
Guesdists, orthodox Marxists, the vast majority of the SPD, for Sorel had failed to understand 
the latest evolution of socialism: the evolution from doctrinally pure sect to historical force 
and political party. The scheme that brings socialism from utopia to sect, and from sect to 
                                                 
162
 Ibid., p. 972. 
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 Ibid., p. 974. ‘Nella prima fase di questa evoluzione il Socialismo non è ancora che un modo di dare una 
forma alle lagnanze, che provocano le umane miserie; l’utopista ci dice le sue proteste contro un ordine sociale, 
che egli giudica cattivo, descrivendoci un regime ideale…’ 
164
 Ibid. ‘Il secondo momento è il più importante, perché le filosofie della storia hanno sempre esercitato 
un’influenza pratica enorme sulle moltitudini. Le predizioni terribili, che si leggono alla fine degli Evangeli 
sinottici hanno avuto più influenza del Sermone della montagna e della teologia dei Padri greci.’ 
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 Ibid., p. 973. ‘c) Il Socialismo è uno stato d’animo, che agisce come una forza viva nel mondo per 
trasformare le istituzioni in un senso favorevole alle classi operaie.’ 
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 Ibid., p. 974. ‘Nel terzo momento siamo ricondotti nella società reale; le riforme si operano nella misura, in 
cui le forze socialiste sono abbastanza sviluppate per avere un’azione efficace sulla legislazione. Il Socialismo 
non è più in blocco rigettato in un futuro simbolico; esso è  nel presente; le utopie sostituite da ipotesi capaci di 
agire sulla pratica e da progetti parzialmente eseguibili, il divenire sociale è socialista, grazie al concorso di 
tutte le potenze politiche della democrazia.’ 
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party, will be repeated almost verbatim a few weeks later, in another important reformist text, 
the ‘Préface à Colajanni’. We read: 
‘Far from being a regress, as certain socialists would have it, the evolution that we 
are witnessing is progress. It is the passage from the sectarian to the political 
spirit, from abstract speculation to real life. At the beginning, socialism appears as 
a philosophical doctrine without much influence on society; it then becomes a 
sect, confident in the possession of truth; it aims at revolutionizing the world, at 
reforming it through dictatorship, at imposing on it programs derived from 
philosophical doctrines; the sect worries little or not at all about practical reforms; 
finally, in its maturity, it gives birth to a political party, that is, it becomes a force 
capable of combining with other forces, whether allied or antagonistic ones, in 
order to administer business, improve legislation and direct the State. A sect can 
isolate itself; isolation is even a condition of its doctrinal purity; a political party 
cannot but exist when it is mixed to general life, if it is an organ within an 
organism. Socialism becomes, increasingly, in France, a workers’ movement in a 
democracy.’167 
This long passage is worth citing in its entirety for it articulates rather clearly the logic behind 
Sorel’s reformism, which is a logic of increasing inclusion of socialism in French society. The 
liberal Sorel goes as far as indicating the direction of the state as a legitimate socialist goal.168 
But what is most striking is not this analysis of the growth of a political movement in terms of 
its increasing ability to control or at least exert an influence over a number of social 
structures. As we have seen, this is not only chimes with the transformations that were 
occurring to German and French socialism at the time, but also is quite coherent with Sorel’s 
longue durée understanding of historical transformation in terms of institutional 
development. 169  As institutions develop, isolationism ceases. What is truly striking, and 
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 Georges Sorel, ‘Préface’ in Napoleone Colajanni, Le Socialisme (Paris, Giard et Brière: 1900), pp. iii-iv. 
‘Loin d’etre un recul, comme le pensent quelques socialistes, lévolution, que nous voyons se produire, constitue 
un progrès : c’est le passage de l’esprit sectaire à l’esprit politique, de la spéculation abstraite à la vie réelle. A 
l’origine, le socialisme se présente comme une doctrine philosophique sans grande influence sur la société ; - il 
devient ensuite une secte, qui croit posséder la verité ; elle aspire à revolutionner le monde, à le réformer par la 
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organisme. Le socialisme devient, de plus en plus, en France, un mouvement ouvrier dans une démocratie.’ 
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 This however should not be interpreted in a centralist manner. For Sorel, the specificity of democratic 
government consists in the fact that in it ‘political struggle is dispersed; it is not a question of conquering a 
fortress, but of acting on the entire society in order to modify all of its aspects: from this it follows that 
democratic tactics are favourable to local institutions and to the federation of groups.’ Sorel, ‘Socialismo e 
democrazia’, p. 978. 
169
 As a side point, it might be worth making explicit that one of the great examples on which Sorel shapes his 
historical thinking and his understanding of the evolution of political movements is Christianity in its first few 
centuries of existence. The second one is the revolution of 1789. 
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deserves attention and analysis is the fact that this is combined with a belief in the importance 
of working class autonomy against party direction. 
‘The working classes are still quite distant from possessing sufficient capabilities 
[textually: culture]  to exert an overwhelming action upon the transformation of 
society and to put it on the path of material and moral progress. The working 
classes are so unable to lead other classes that they are themselves led, in virtually 
every country, by what is called the intellectual proletariat…The necessity for a 
purely working-class leadership of the working class world could not have been 
proclaimed in a better way [than by Marx] and I never cease to warn the workers 
against the intellectual proletariat who lives from politics. As long as the workers 
will not be liberated from this tutelage, they will not be able to direct 
democracy.’170 
This is the most important aspect of Sorel’s reformism. The fact that political reformism and 
involvement in the French institutions is advocated in order to free the working class from 
what Sorel sees as its political masters deserves closer attention. It is indeed this belief in the 
compatibility between reformism and working class institutional development that 
characterizes Sorelian reformism most profoundly. 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
What makes Sorel’s conciliation of reformism with revolution striking is that the 
developments that he was witnessing were part of a wider process of integration of the 
working classes into two advanced capitalist societies of the second industrial revolution. In 
other words, the socialist move towards the political mainstreams of France and Germany that 
we have examined were expressions of a process that was to conclusively reject the 
possibility of the development of a working class civilization in the midst of the bourgeois 
one. What makes this Sorelian position understandable is the fact that in France this process 
was still far from complete. It is, in fact, instructive to compare the SPD with the French 
socialist galaxy, to compare the German experience with the French one, because it furnishes 
the best explanation for Sorel’s trajectory in the period between 1898 and 1902. 
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 Sorel, ‘Socialismo e democrazia’, p. 980. ‘Per esercitare un’azione preponderante sul movimento sociale, per 
condurlo nelle vie del progresso materiale come del progresso morale, le classi operaie sono ancora lontane dal 
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 To make ourselves clearer, we can suggest a bold counterfactual. No German observer of the 
time could have – and this emerges in Sorel’s discussions with Bernstein – adopted Sorel’s 
stance of instrumental reformism to the extent to which Sorel adopted it. No German socialist 
could have seriously believed that by moving the party more into the political and 
parliamentary arena it would have been possible to create the conditions for the development 
of autonomous working class institutions. Nobody in Germany could have taken as seriously 
as Sorel did the idea that more political involvement was conducive to a situation in which 
politics would not be needed anymore, for the working class institutions would have been 
strong enough not to need parliamentary representation.171 So why could Sorel reconcile these 
two aspects, which as time went on became increasingly at odds with each other? We have 
amply shown how the commitment to proletarian institutional development arose naturally 
out of his understanding of Marxism. So the question is: how could he think that this 
development was going to be brought about by reformism? 
We can start by adducing minor biographical reasons. The first and most obvious one is an 
appeal to the exceptional circumstances of the Dreyfus affair, and the superimposition of 
reformism with Dreyfus’ cause, which probably helped to give to Sorel’s reformism an 
additional layer of conviction. We can then move to point out that Sorel was still essentially a 
theorist in 1898, and tended to see Jaurès as the French Bernstein and Guesde as the 
representative of the out-dated determinist Marxism of the SPD. But already this aspect leads 
to more general, structural explanations.  
The fact that Sorel could theorize and discuss Marxism from his house in Boulogne sur Seine, 
without having to join one of the many French socialist organisations betrays an important 
difference with Germany in terms of working class organization, and consequently of general 
economic and social conditions. To a German economy dominated by big business the French 
responded with a well-balanced and more antiquated productive system, in which agriculture 
and small businesses played an important part. To the industrial workers of the large German 
factories, the French opposed a proletariat of bakers, masons, and artisans of various kinds. 
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 Of course, Engels’ preface to The Class Struggles in France might constitute a valid counter example to this 
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incompatible could very well be thought of as reconciliable. Bernstein’s ambition of constructing socialism from 
within a democratic political system then should not be too easily dismissed as naive or hypocritical. 
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To a Bismarckian welfare system that had begun in the 1880s, the French responded with 
smaller and more timid attempts at social legislation, and beginning only in the 1890s. To the 
German mass party, the French responded with a cluster of different organisations, some of 
which were so alien to the logic of modern industrial capitalism that they believed that 
insurrection was a realistic revolutionary possibility.172 In opposition to German unity and 
successful social democratic practice, the French experienced recurring divisions over the 
question of involvement in the republican system. With such differences between the two 
countries, it is unsurprising that Sorel could not understand that the developments that were 
occurring in France would not have led to the prosperity of working class institutions, but 
instead to the integration of these institutions into the republican framework. 
Our analysis in this chapter has largely focussed, especially in the case of France, on political 
developments, ignoring the examination of the French economy, of French welfare state, and 
of French labour. It is in the next chapter that we shall examine these elements, because they 
became central to Sorel’s reflections on the conditions of socialism only after 1902. It is this 
avoidance of economic and social factors that furnishes the best argument in favour of our 
argumentative line. The economic and social issues that were at the centre of the Bernstein 
debate were largely ignored by Sorel until 1902. As we have seen, he chose to engage with 
the controversy at a predominantly political and theoretical level. But as France increasingly 
reflected the German situation, most notably politically with the rallying of the working 
classes to the banner of the Republic, Sorel began to pay closer attention to economic 
phenomena such as cartels, protectionism and welfare measures. It is from his analysis of 
these new phenomena that eventually his syndicalism would arise. 
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calculated to fight back Jaurès’ political offensives. 
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CHAPTER SIX: A NEW STRATEGY FOR A NEW CAPITALISM 
‘But, generally speaking, the Protective system in these days is conservative, 
while the Free Trade system works destructively. It breaks up old nationalities and 
carries antagonism of proletariat and bourgeoisie to its uttermost point. In a word, 
the Free Trade system hastens the Social Revolution. In this revolutionary sense 
alone, gentlemen, I am in favour of Free Trade.’ 
Karl Marx, 18471 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The most important change in Sorel’s political thought at the beginning of the new century is 
the abandonment of the reformism and commitment to parliamentary methods that, as we 
have seen, had characterized his stance in the previous years. In a relatively small number of 
years, parliamentary socialism went from being a method capable of securing legal reforms 
that would enable the proletariat to organize itself into autonomous institutions, to becoming 
the single greatest danger faced by the workers’ movement. Thus, with the beginning of the 
new century the awkward synthesis of revolutionary ambitions and reformist methods came 
to an end, and Sorel began moving in a direction that was to bring him to the syndicalism of 
the Reflections. It is this transformation that we examine in this chapter. 
There are a number of reasons for this change of opinion on the merits of parliamentary 
reformism. A conventional interpretation that needs to be dismissed is that of a return to the 
origins generated by a disillusion with the political affirmation of the republicanism that had 
emerged from the affaire Dreyfus. The shortcomings of this narrative are two-fold: on the one 
hand it does not acknowledge the instrumental character that reformism had always possessed 
for Sorel, and on the other it portrays this reformist phase and the subsequent syndicalist 
evolution as reactions to an exceptional event, the Dreyfus affair, which becomes a 
problematic explanatory deus ex machina.2 It is true that Sorel’s post-1902 worries about 
parliamentary socialism remind one closely of his 1898 Avenir socialiste des syndicats, a text 
in which he had argued that the ‘first rule of its [the proletariat’s] conduct must be “to remain 
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 Karl Marx, ‘Speech on the Question of Free Trade’ [1847] in Marx Engels Collected Works, vol. 6 (London, 
Lawrence and Wishart: 1976), p. 465. 
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 For example, Jeremy Jennings writes that though Sorel ‘had been conscious of the potentialities of the 
syndicats and of strike action for some time… it took the traumatic experience of the Dreyfus affair for him to 
conclude that the two combined might possibly lead to the seizure of economic power.’ Jennings, Sorel, p. 119. 
Pierre Andreu, as we have seen the previous chapter, equally portrays Sorel’s evolution as a linear one in which 
the reformist phase of 1899-1902 is merely a parenthesis dictated by the exceptional Dreyfus circumstances. See 
Andreu, Notre Maitre, p. 102. 
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exclusively working class”’.3 It is also true that the policies of the republican governments of 
Waldeck-Rousseau and, even more so, Émile Combes profoundly disturbed Sorel. But, as has 
been shown in the previous chapter, Sorel had never quite abandoned his understanding of 
socialism as a society based around the institutions of the emerging proletariat. Parliamentary 
reformism was but an instrument, and one whose dangers Sorel never forgot, to realise 
revolutionary goals. There can be, in other words, no return to original positions that Sorel 
had never abandoned. Another shortcoming of this ‘return to the origins’ narrative is that it 
outlines Sorel’s evolution through overly sudden and excessively radical breaks. Although the 
political circumstances generated by the affaire were indeed exceptional, they did not 
transform Sorel into someone convinced that the goal of socialism was the conquest of a more 
confortable position for the working class within the existing system. As we have shown, 
reformism was instrumental: reforms secured through parliamentary activity would have 
furthered the development of institutions capable of bringing about a radical transformation of 
society. In the same way, though Sorel intensely disliked the policies of the triumphant 
republicanism of the opening of the century, his syndicalism is not just an elaborated form of 
hatred for the ‘Jacobinism’ of Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes’ cabinets. Though it might 
appear superficially as such, Sorel’s syndicalism is not merely an opposition, waged in the 
name of liberal principles, to the authoritarian progressivism of the republican governments of 
the time. 
Instead, we must start from the assumption that Sorel remained a revolutionary socialist, and, 
however revisionist and heterodox, a Marxist. His central question remained that of what 
conditions could lead to the development of proletarian institutions, i.e. institutions arising out 
of the experience of production in an advanced capitalist economy. It is the answer to this 
question that changed: whereas until 1902 he had thought that parliamentary involvement 
could serve this goal, after that year he came to believe not only that this was mistaken, but 
that parliamentarism was positively damaging to the institutional development of the working 
class. Sorel’s hope in the instrumentality of parliamentary involvement disappeared, or to put 
it differently, his belief in the conduciveness of this tactic to the growth of proletarian 
institutions crumbled. The question must then be: why did this happen? And what brought 
Sorel to these new conclusions?  
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The militant republicanism of the policies of Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes’ governments 
did play a role. As we shall explain at the beginning of the present chapter, the stability and 
effectiveness of these two governments were exceptional when compared to the traditionally 
weak third republic cabinets. The common cause against the forces of reaction not only gave 
to Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes strong parliamentary majorities, but also a clear political 
line, i.e. the defence and consolidation of republican institutions. These tasks were carried out 
forcefully, in ways that could not but hurt Sorel’s liberal sensitivity. The republicanisation of 
the army, the battle against the Catholic Church, and the republican rhetoric which 
accompanied these policies were to Sorel examples of that ‘public force at the disposal of 
sects’, which he had always disapproved of.4 He moved, accordingly, like other intellectuals, 
from Dreyfusism to disillusionment with the authoritarian outcome of what had begun as a 
battle for the defence of the rule of law and individual rights.  
But these are secondary aspects to the explanation of his syndicalism. The cause of more 
important Sorelian perplexities was the effect of these developments on socialism and on the 
working class, i.e. the fact that these developments had channelled the political forces of 
socialism in a direction that was favourable to greater proletarian integration in the republican 
system. This was why he became an opponent of socialist reformism and of the man who 
symbolized it, Jean Jaurès. Political socialism had not cleared up the legal and institutional 
obstacles that prevented the working class from developing its own institutions and becoming 
a class for itself, conscious of its historical force and mission. From 1902 onwards, Sorel 
became convinced that the only development that could arise from parliamentary engagement 
would be, instead, a strengthening of those obstacles, creating a state of perpetual dependency 
of the working class upon bourgeois elites. Political socialism had not remained faithful to its 
role of enabler, a facilitator of proletarian class development. On the contrary, it had taken 
centre stage and had effectively relegated the institutional growth of the real movement to a 
secondary role.  
In the previous chapter we have argued that the idea that parliamentarism could be conducive 
to a longer-term revolutionary goal betrayed a fundamental misunderstanding of the social 
and political dynamics of advanced capitalist societies at the turn of the century. We have 
suggested that not only Sorel’s political inexperience, but also, and more importantly, the 
state of relative backwardness of the French when compared to the German system could 
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account for this belief. Throughout a short examination of the electoral successes of the SPD, 
we have argued that they can be explained by a wider structural process of economic growth 
characterized by the increasing organization of economic and social life. Crucially, through 
the agency of the state, this organizational development allowed increasingly larger parts of 
the German proletariat to access the German prosperity of those years, creating the perfect 
conditions for the success of a social democratic party such as the SPD. The growth in 
complexity and in the socialisation of the productive process did not, in other words, have 
polarizing consequences, but yielded instead an organized and relatively stable national 
capitalism.  These issues were central in the Bernstein controversy; but they were issues that 
Sorel did not engage with in much depth, despite his many writings as a revisionist. Now, one 
of the consequences of the French political developments described above was that of 
opening Sorel’s eyes to these questions. What the militant republicanism of the new century 
did, we argue, was to act as a trigger, opening Sorel’s eyes to wider social and economic 
processes. As early as 1902, Sorel began questioning the significance of the latest trends in 
capitalist development, dedicating important analyses to phenomena such as cartelization, 
protectionism, and social legislation.  
These analyses, grounded in a newfound awareness of the importance of the conditions of 
capitalist development for the institutional growth of the proletariat, constitute the absolutely 
fundamental but often little-acknowledged backbone of Sorel’s syndicalism. They also 
constitute one of the greatest differences between his pre-1898 texts and his later syndicalism, 
between, in other words, the ‘Avenir socialiste des syndicats’ and the Reflections on violence. 
Whereas in 1898 Sorel had underlined the centrality of class, i.e. of the proletariat as 
historical agent, to Marxian socialism, after 1902 he was working on more empirical 
questions, examining current economic and social conditions in order to assess the likely 
progresses and setbacks of this historical agent. Although the processes of economic 
organization and of nationalisation of the working class were occurring in France with less 
intensity than in Germany, Sorel began to notice them and to reflect upon them. By 
confronting the capitalist society he observed with the one described by Marx, Sorel came to 
the conclusion that the only environment in which truly revolutionary proletarian institutions 
– i.e. institutions that were truly separated from the bourgeois world, and that were capable of 
harbouring new social and economic relations – could flourish was a capitalism characterized 
by free competition, relentless technological innovation and hostility between proletarian 
producers and bourgeois entrepreneurs. But instead of this capitalist utopia, Sorel and his 
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generation were witnessing the advent of managerial capitalism, characterized by industrial 
and commercial cooperation, the mitigating force of the state expressing itself in protectionist 
and social legislation, and the consequent integration of the disruptive, but to Sorel 
historically progressive energies of both the working classes and the capitalist elites into a 
national system capable of keeping class conflict under control. 
This meant, essentially, that historical conditions for socialism were not ripe, that capitalism 
and the bourgeoisie had not yet accomplished their historical mission. Even worse, Sorel 
understood that they were not even going in the right direction. To him, the economic 
evolutions he was witnessing were signs of capitalist decadence, of a bourgeoisie that had 
given up on its historically progressive role, and had forged an alliance with the state, which 
Sorel, unlike most Marxists, always understood as an independent variable, rather than as a 
tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie. These being the historical conditions, no proletarian 
institution capable of emancipating itself, no matter how slowly or gradually, from the 
bourgeois order was to be expected. In a context characterized by the need for increasing 
coordination between various economic actors and forces, working class institutions would 
perhaps be able to carve out a space for themselves, but would not become the cells of the 
socialist society to come. 
It is only by understanding Sorel’s economic diagnosis of the situation that a large number of 
the arguments presented in the Reflections on violence become intelligible. As we shall show 
in the following chapter, the role that Sorel assigns to violence in his most famous book is far 
more limited than generally assumed, and consists essentially in the hope that proletarian 
violence can reawaken the progressive forces of the bourgeoisie, and thus reinstate the healthy 
capitalism that is the economic and social precondition of socialism. It is because of this 
dependency of the arguments in the Reflections on the economic analyses of 1902-1905 that it 
is necessary to examine them in some depth. 
6.2 A CHANGE OF DIRECTION: SOREL AFTER THE AFFAIRE 
The first manifestations of a new direction in Sorel’s thinking appear at the beginning of the 
new century, in the years in which it becomes clear that the republic will pass the Dreyfus test 
and resist the insurrectionist assaults of the reactionary camp.  In this phase of consolidation 
of republican institutions in French society, we see Sorel slowly beginning to realize a fact 
that in the previous chapter was identified as crucial in explaining his turn away from 
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reformism, namely the impossibility of promoting a strategy of instrumental reformism. 
Indeed, Sorel’s endorsement of parliamentary methods was instrumental: political activity in 
bourgeois institutions was necessary to clear up the legal obstacles to proletarian self-
organisation. This self-organisation, in turn, was revolutionary and did not seek integration in 
the bourgeois system. This is why the call to engage in political activity was, for Sorel, quite 
compatible with invectives against the leadership of party officials. Legal reforms and the 
parliamentary involvement that they required were a tool in the development of autonomous 
proletarian institutions. Reformism was a step in the right direction because it signalled the 
progression of socialism from a small doctrinal sect to a true historical force, an historical 
force whose evolution was in the direction of a proletarian civilisation characterised by new 
institutions and new social relations.  
The abandonment of reformism then must be understood as the realization of the 
impossibility of instrumentality, the realization of the fact that collaboration with the 
bourgeoisie and proletarian class development were incompatible goals. It is in the post-
Dreyfus years, when strong and stable republican governments dominate the French political 
landscape and begin the work of republicanisation of French society, that Sorel begins to be 
aware of this fact.  
6.2.1 LIBERAL DOUBTS AND THE REPUBLICAN TRIUMPH  
At the end of June 1899 Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau requested the confidence of the Chambre 
des députés for his government. Interrupted repeatedly as he was giving his speech, he tried to 
explain the logic of a cabinet whose political composition, stretching from the socialist 
Millerand to the ‘fusilleur de la Commune’ Gaston de Gallifet, left many perplexed. ‘It is true 
that on a large number of political points and on a large number of economic issues, each of 
us has diverging views…’ he began to answer, but was soon interrupted: ‘All that unites you’ 
shouted a nationalist deputy ‘is the Dreyfus issue!’ Waldeck-Rousseau continued: ‘But each 
member of my cabinet would declare, as I do, that in the presence of an interest superior to all 
our disagreements, in the presence of the defence of the Republic… we have only one 
sentiment and only one will.’  ‘The will to save Dreyfus!’ repeated the nationalist deputy. 
Waldeck-Rousseau then pointed out that everybody understood why such a politically broad 
government was being instituted. And when the right-wing deputies provocatively demanded 
that he explain his motives again, the new prime minister won the applauses of socialists and 
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republicans with his answer that the goal of the government was ‘to unite all republicans in 
order to face all reactionaries.’ 5 
The vote of confidence secured in that parliamentary session inaugurated a rather particular 
phase in the political life of the Third Republic: a period of almost six years – from June 1899 
until January 1905 – of politically stable and remarkably effective governments, whose 
agenda, as can be guessed from the above parliamentary discussion, revolved around the 
defence and consolidation of republican institutions. Real enough, though probably slightly 
magnified, the reactionary threat that the affaire Dreyfus had revealed as a powerful force in 
French politics and society had compacted the various republican parties, socialists – with the 
Guesdist exception – included. This republican unity had given to Waldeck-Rousseau the 
political strength necessary to act resolutely against the threat of a reactionary insurrection.6  
As is sometimes the case, these exceptional parliamentary conditions reflected exceptional 
conditions outside of parliament. In those years we can observe the enormous growth of civil 
society organisations and institutions mobilized in favour, or against, the republic: republican 
and anti-republican leagues, popular universities, and so on. Of this social and political 
mobilization, we shall merely say that it deployed itself following the binary logic of the 
moment: ‘the points of disagreement’, wrote Madeleine Réberioux about the motley world of 
republican associations, ‘are masked by the necessity of fighting the common enemy’.7 In 
those years, to declare oneself a socialists or a radical only indicated one’s first name: ‘the 
                                                 
5
 Journal Officiel du 27/6/1899, Chambre des députés, séance du 26 Juin 1899, p. 1678. The full exchange 
between Waldeck-Rousseau, who is presenting his cabinet, and the various deputies who interrupt him reads as 
follows. ‘Oui, il est parfaitement vrai que, sur un très grand nombre de points de politique, sur un très grand 
nombre de questions économiques, chacun de nous a des vues divergentes…(Exclamations à droite. – 
Interruptions.) M. le vicomte de Montfort. Parfaitement ! C’est alors la concentration poussée jusqu’à 
l’absurde ! M. le président. Permettez d’achever messieurs. M. Le Hérissé. Vous n’êtes d’accord que sur la 
question Dreyfus ! (Bruit.) M. le président du conseil. Mais chacun d’eux déclarerait aussi, comme je le 
déclare, que, s’agissant d’un intérêt supérieur à toutes nos querelles, s’agissant de la défense de la République… 
(Applaudissements à gauche et sur divers bancs à l’extrême gauche.) A droite. De Dreyfus ! M. le président du 
conseil. … nous n’avons qu’un même sentiment et une même volonté. A droite. Laquelle ?   M. Le Hérissé. 
Sauver Dreyfus ! M. le président. Monsieur Le Hérissé, vous ne cessez d’interrompre. Voulez-vous que je vous 
rappelle à l’ordre ? M. le président du conseil. Le Gouvernement n’a pas dissimulé à la Chambre, je suppose, 
dans quel but précis il se formait. A droite. Lequel ? M. le président du conseil. Ce but, - vous demandez une 
fois de plus lequel, - c’est de réunir tous les républicains pour faire face à tous les réactionnaires. 
(Applaudissements à gauche et sur divers bancs à l’extrême gauche).’ 
6
 Though this term, the ‘reactionary threat’, is to be found abundantly in the sources of the period, it is somewhat 
misleading, because the nationalist and anti-Semitic forces were profoundly different from classical reactionary 
political forces. Both in their ideological discourse and, more interestingly, in their repertoire of political 
mobilization, these forces represented one of the first instances of a modern insurrectionary right wing. 
7
 Réberioux, République radicale, p. 48. ‘… toutes ces sociétés de pensée apparaissent étroitement emmêlées et 
les points de désaccord sont dissimulés par la nécessité de combattre l’ennemi commun.’ 
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family name was republican’.8 When, in May 1902, French electors were called to renew their 
parliament, the choice they faced was, again, a binary one between continuity or rupture with 
Waldeck-Rousseau’s policies of republican defence. The electoral victory of the bloc des 
gauches, the republican alliance of socialists, radicals, and moderates, was clear and beyond 
contestation: it was this electoral success that gave to Waldeck-Rousseau’s successor, the 
radical Émile Combes, the possibility of pursuing the republicanisation of France with 
renewed energy. 
Although the label of ‘republican defence’ generally covers the entire period between 1899 
and 1905, it is a label that best describes the first, mostly defensive phase of the period, 
roughly coinciding with Waldeck-Rousseau’s cabinet. In those years the threat to republican 
institutions seemed imminent, and lessons from France’s experiences in the 19th century 
provided strong warning to not underestimate the possibility of insurrection. Waldeck-
Rousseau’s first measures thus focussed on avoiding the possibility of a coup d’état, which 
led him to concentrate on the army - hence, the ministerial choice of Galliffet. An old army 
man, Galliffet had demonstrated his distaste for military coups during the Boulanger crisis, 
and thus was the perfect candidate to dissuade an army under constant attack from the 
Dreyfus camp from any insurrectionist temptations it might entertain. A few days after being 
nominated, in June 1899, Galliffet immediately sent a strong signal by sending into early 
retirement the general de Négrier, second in command and guilty of having complained to the 
troops about the attacks of the dreyfusard press against the army. But the Superior War 
Council constituted Galliffet’s main target. An army institution that after decades of weak 
republican cabinets, had effectively become the army’s governing body, the Conseil 
Supérieur de Guerre was the object of three ministerial decrees in the autumn of 1899, which 
stripped it of all powers regarding promotion and supervision of army staff, bringing the army 
under strict ministerial control, and reducing the Council to a simple advisory role. The role 
of the army, Galliffet had made clear, was that of faithfully serving the democratically elected 
government.9 
The republican victory at the 1902 elections, and the installation of Émile Combes’ cabinet 
signalled the beginning of a new phase. Legitimated by the popular vote and resting on a 
                                                 
8
 Ibid. ‘Comme le dit un des rapporteurs au congrès de mai 1904, lorsque les conférenciers se déclarent radicaux, 
radicaux-socialistes ou socialistes, ce ne sont que « des prénoms : le nom de famille est républicain »’. 
9
 See Jean-Charles Jauffret, ‘Un sabreur au gouvernement: le général de Galliffet, ministre de la Guerre’ in 
Olivier Fourcade, Éric Duhamel and Philippe Vial (eds), Militaires en république 1870-1962 : les officiers, le 
pouvoir, et la vie publique en France (Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne : 2000), pp. 223-33. 
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coalition in which radicals dominated, the new government accelerated the processes of 
republicanisation of French institutions and society begun by Waldeck Rousseau. After the 
successful defence of the republic, it was time for republicans to go on the offensive. As Sorel 
wrote about the 1902 elections, ‘the anticlerical policy of the government has been approved 
by a landslide victory; if the ministry…’, he added, ‘were to abolish freedom of teaching, it 
would encounter no difficulty.’10 The republicanisation of the army begun by Galliffet was 
taken cumbersomely to its extreme by his successor, general André. With the help of France’s 
masonic lodges, a system had been set in place to check on the political and religious opinions 
of army officers in order to accelerate the promotion of good republicans and hinder that of 
anybody suspected of excessive Catholicism or antipathy towards the republic. When the 
system of delation was discovered and the affaire des fiches erupted, Combes himself was 
forced to resign, bringing the six years of militant republicanism to an end. But the most 
important front on which Combes pursued the republican agenda was the religious one, 
engaging in a long and successful battle against the Catholic Church. The anticlerical 
struggle, which characterized most evidently Combes’ governmental action, led to the break 
of diplomatic relations with the Holy See in 1904 and to three seminal laws – the 1901 loi des 
associations, subjecting religious congregations to the legal requirement of being recognised 
by the republic through a complex procedure, in the absence of which they were de facto 
outlawed, the 1904 law forbidding religious congregations from teaching, and the 1905 loi de 
séparation cutting all public support to organized religion – which drastically reduced the 
influence of organized religion in French society. 
Sorel’s reaction to these developments was overwhelmingly negative, and this had important 
consequences for his political and intellectual evolution. As we have stated above, as a liberal, 
Sorel could not but find the situation worrying: the persecution of the Church and of the 
enemies of the republic was to him a republican version of the raison d’état that he had 
condemned in engaging in the battle for the revision of Dreyfus’ trial. Now, it is important to 
point out that not only Sorel had fought the battle for the revision of the trial, but also that he 
had fought it in the name of the protection of the rule of law and of the individual rights that it 
guaranteed against oppressive institutions such as the army. 11 This explains why the political 
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 Georges Sorel, ‘I risultati delle elezioni francesi’, Rivista popolare di politica, lettere e scienze sociali 7(10), 
1902, p. 263. By ‘freedom of teaching’ Sorel means the freedom of Catholic schools to continue their work. 
‘…la politica anticlericale del governo è stata approvata da un vero plebiscito, se il ministero, profittando della 
sua vittoria, volesse fare sparire la libertà di insegnamento, non troverebbe nessuna difficoltà.’ 
11
 Sorel had signed a pro-Dreyfus petition appearing in the Temps of the 16 January 1898,demanding the 
protection of ‘legal guarantees of citizens against all arbitrariness’. Beyond the defence of individual rights, one 
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outcome of this battle could only leave him profoundly disillusioned and rather embittered. 
Expressing, before the 1902 elections, his most candid opinions about French developments 
in an Italian publication, Sorel compared the affaire and the oppositions that it had generated 
to ‘a commercial struggle between two rival advertisement firms’, or to the ‘circus of the late 
Roman Empire.’12 The idea that the factions in the struggle could be animated by ‘principles’ 
and by ‘the noblest forces’, had revealed itself after the trial to be mere ‘illusion’: ‘Once 
things quietened down, it was clear that all the ideological apparatus was very artificial, and 
that politics was a truly dirty thing.’13 Feelings of this kind were, of course, not unique to 
Sorel. In 1910, writing about the period, Sorel’s friend Charles Péguy famously articulated 
similar views, complaining about the degradation of the republican ideal into a series of 
factional squabbles.14  
This disillusionment was based on two interconnected and important aspects of Sorel’s 
political identity: on the one hand, his distrust of politics, and on the other his liberal fear of 
the state. It was reflections on these issues that allowed Sorel’s disillusionment to give birth to 
more interesting reflections on the relationship between proletarian institutions and 
parliamentary socialism, and between class and party. In other words, beneath what appears to 
be the disillusionment of an old man nostalgically remembering the political battles of his 
youth and condemning the present generation for being ‘uniquely concerned with its material 
interests’,15 there is something more interesting and fertile. Beneath a growing preoccupation 
                                                                                                                                                        
of the motivating factors behind Sorel’s initial support of Dreyfus appears to have been the dislike he had for the 
military circles that, as an old polytechnicien and thus military engineer, he had known for most of his 
professional life. In a letter to Guglielmo Ferrero dated 10/2/1898, he writes of the ‘immoralité profonde de 
l’armée’ and argues that the ‘affaire Dreyfus ne me semble cacher qu’un seul mystère: le mystère de 
l’immoralité et de l’imbécillité des Etats-majors.’ See Mario Simonetti, ‘Georges Sorel e Guglielmo Ferrero tra 
“cesarismo” borghese e socialismo’, Il Pensiero politico 5(1), 1972, pp. 134-6. The sources come from a more 
thorough examination of Sorel’s dreyfusard trajectory carried on by Michel Prat in his ‘Georges Sorel et la 
décomposition du dreyfusisme’ in Michel Leymaire (ed.), La postérité de l’affaire Dreyfus (Lille, Presses 
Universitaires du Septentrion: 1998), pp. 15-30. 
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 Georges Sorel, ‘La Francia prima delle elezioni’, Rivista popolare di politica, lettere e scienze sociali 8(5), 
1902, p. 122. ‘Sotto molti rapporti il processo Dreyfus si può paragonare ad una gran lotta commerciale tra due 
case rivali di pubblicità; e sotto altri rapporti, poi, rassomiglia alle contese del circo durante il Basso Impero.’ 
13
 Ibid. ‘Fino al processo… vi erano molti che credevano, con tutta sincerità che i partiti politici… fossero diretti 
dalle forze più nobili e dai principi. Queste illusioni non hanno potuto conservarsi finito il processo; quando il 
rumore è stato estinto, si è visto che tutto questo apparecchio ideologico era molto artificiale, e che la politica era 
veramente una cosa sporca.’ 
14
 In his famous formula, ‘Tout commence en mystique et finit en politique…L’intérêt, la question, l’essentiel 
est que dans chaque ordre, dans chaque système la mystique ne soit point dévorée par la politique à laquelle 
elle a donné naissance.’ Charles Péguy, Notre jeunesse [1910] (Paris, Gallimard : 1993), pp. 115-116.  
15
 Georges Sorel, ‘Due anni di anticlericalismo in Francia’, Rivista popolare di politica 10 (10), 1904, p. 261. In 
the passage Sorel compares the Dreyfus struggle to the struggle of his youth between monarchists and 
republicans, which he describes as‘equally proud and unable to understand the ability of politicians… united in 
their reciprocal admiration and disdain for the Bonapartists, which appeared to them as representing the 
corruption of politics’. ‘...c’era una rimarchevole analogia  tra gli uomini che attendevano la monarchia del 
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for the policies of Combes and Waldeck Rousseau’, there begins to take shape a reflection on 
the extent to which these developments threaten the autonomy of the working class. Slowly, 
Sorel begins to wonder whether the fundamental process that is occurring is not one of 
working class integration into the bourgeois world. This is the logic behind remarks such as 
that made in 1902 about the fact that ‘the spirit of French socialism moves further and further 
away from the Marxist one, and it comes ever closer to Jacobin traditions, filled with hatred 
against the Church’,16 and this is what motivates him, a few years later, in the context of the 
affaire des fiches, to describe with ‘deep sadness’ the ‘enthusiasm that it [French socialism] 
displays towards denunciation’ and to condemn habits that belong more to the ‘special taste 
for police’ of Jacobinism rather than to Marxian socialism. 17   
6.2.2 SOCIALISM AND THE TRIUMPHANT REPUBLIC 
The point then is not simply that Sorel had begun to associate parliamentary socialism to what 
he saw as the authoritarian republicanism of Combes and Waldeck-Rousseau, though this is 
certainly the case. The point is that he had begun to reflect on the reasons and consequences 
of this association, and had begun to notice and point the finger at the assimilation of already 
fragile working class institutions into the republican system, and to denounce the 
incorporation of proletarian thought into the dominant bourgeois ideology. In December 1901 
Sorel wrote a preface for Ferdinand Pelloutier’s Histoire des Bourses de Travail. The text is, 
overall, rather theoretical, and apparently more concerned with Marxist sociology than with 
the latest political developments. Nonetheless, after many pages in which Sorel illustrates, 
with examples taken from the history of socialism, a psychological interpretation of Vico’s 
theory of corsi and ricorsi storici, he begins to reflect on the consequences of the success of 
parliamentarism in French socialism. He suggests, in a nutshell, that the contact with 
republican institutions and with its centralist and statist traditions could have damaging 
effects on the political ideas of the working class:  
 ‘In our country the belief in the necessity of central authorities…also depends on 
our historical tradition; we are told so extensively… that royalty established 
French unity, that we come to believe that the process of the emancipation of the 
proletariat will have to follow the same path. To constitute a government capable 
                                                                                                                                                        
Conte di Chambord e quelli che aspiravano a restaurare la repubblica: egualmente fieri ed incapaci di 
comprendere le abilità dei politicanti, questi difensori delle idee si stimavano reciprocamente e disprezzavano i 
bonapartisti che a loro sembrava rappresentassero la corruzione politica... la generazione attuale... non pensa che 
ai suoi interessi materiali.’ 
16
 Georges Sorel, ‘La lotta anticlericale in Francia’, Rivista popolare di politica, 8 (18), 1902, p. 519. 
17
 Georges Sorel, ‘La restaurazione giacobina in Francia’, Rivista popolare di politica 11 (3), 1905, pp. 74-5. 
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of gradually subjugating all dissident groups: here is the ideal to which an 
imitation of bourgeois routine was [sic] bound to lead. It would be impossible to 
make educated bourgeois newcomers to socialism understand that things can 
develop differently; but there are many people in the proletarian world that reject 
bourgeois historical theory and who think that the development of the proletariat 
could very well follow a completely opposite path to that followed by the 
bourgeoisie. I believe that only those people have an exact understanding of the 
future of socialism.’18   
The proletariat must break with the French centralist tradition and think boldly about 
constructing a genuinely new world based on its own experience rather than moulded by what 
Sorel calls ‘imitations of the bourgeois traditions’. 19  It is easy to see that this sudden 
preoccupation for the dangers of authoritarian centralism reflects the French political 
experience of the time, but it is perhaps more noteworthy to underline the importance that 
Sorel attributes to the ideological aspect of a process of working class assimilation that he is 
beginning to be aware of. 
It is in the Italian articles mentioned above that we can find more articulated analyses of the 
transformation that Sorel begins to believe is occurring in French socialism. What should be 
underlined, to repeat, is not so much Sorel’s liberal distrust of state-sponsored repression, but 
the emerging idea that a vital republicanism is a threat to the autonomy of the working class, 
because it tends to its assimilation in the existing society, and, hence, to its dissolution. 
Parliamentarism becomes the cornerstone of this process of assimilation: ‘Today socialism is 
reaping the fruits of an excessively cunning policy that it has followed, Guesdists included, 
for too long: everything has been sacrificed to parliamentary successes, and socialism must 
now submit to the normal conditions of electoral competition…’20 This criticism, implicitly a 
self-criticism, of the socialist line chosen in 1892-3 and confirmed at Saint-Mandé brings 
Sorel to underline the fact that electoral practice destroys the class specificity of socialist 
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 Georges Sorel, ‘Préface’ in Ferdinand Pellouttier, Histoire des bourses de travail (Paris, Schleicher: 1902), pp. 
54-5. ‘Dans notre pays la croyance à la nécessité des autorités centrales… dépend aussi de notre tradition 
historique ; on nous raconte si amplement, dès notre jeunesse, que la royauté a fondé l’unité française que nous 
en arrivons à croire que le processus d’émancipation du prolétariat devra suivre une voie analogue. Constituer un 
gouvernement qui, peu à peu, arrive à soumettre tous les groupes dissidents, voilà l’idéal auquel devait conduire 
l’imitation de la routine bourgeoise. Il serait impossible de faire comprendre aux bourgeois lettrés devenus 
récemment socialistes que les choses puissent se passer autrement ; mais il y a dans le monde ouvrier beaucoup 
de personnes qui n’acceptent pas la théorie historique bourgeoise et qui pensent que la formation du prolétariat 
pourrait bien se développer suivant un plan tout opposé à celui que la formation de la bourgeoise a suivi. Je crois 
que ces personnes sont les seules qui aient une intelligence exacte des conditions de l’avenir du socialisme.’ 
19
 Ibid., p. 58. 
20
 Sorel, ‘I risultati delle elezioni’, p. 264. ‘Si raccolgono oggi i frutti d’una politica troppo abile seguita da molto 
tempo, dagli stessi guesdisti; si è tutto sacrificato ai successi parlamentari; bisogna che il socialismo ora si 
sottoponga alle condizioni normali della concorrenza elettorale…’ 
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parties. The very word ‘socialism’ has ‘lost all precise meaning after the time of the Dreyfus 
trial, when the partisans of revision declared themselves socialists in order to have their 
speeches applauded by workers.’21 But if socialist parties have ceased being class parties, 
what are they now?  
 ‘The socialism of our new politicians is unoriginal and is merely the 
reproduction of the utopianism before 1848. Like our forefathers, we now 
believe we have found an infallible method for making society harmonious; 
Jaurès reasons as if Marx had never existed. We can say of socialism today what 
Engels stated about utopianism: bourgeois movement, doctrine of salons.’22 
In addition to invectives, Sorel also offers analyses as to why the parliamentary line leads to 
the destruction of the proletarian character of socialism, and thus of its revolutionary 
potential. On the one hand, the necessities of electoral competition encourage socialism to 
look for the votes of all who might have a grievance, thereby reducing the influence of the 
working class within the socialist party itself. On the other, and this is a reflection on the 
French situation, socialists remain numerically weak, and are thus forced to follow the lead of 
the stronger bourgeois parties, who are consequently in a position that allows them to 
manipulate socialism for their own conservative purposes. ‘Waldeck-Rousseau has displayed 
an ability matching that of the Bonapartist ministers in evoking the red spectre: when the 
bourgeoisie gave the impression of being rebellious, he became the workers’ friend and 
allowed them to organize demonstrations with a slightly revolutionary appearance; later, 
when he deemed that the revolutionary workers could become dangerous, he struck them 
down rapidly and forcefully.’23  
Even those measures that, instinctively, would appear to be proletarian victories can become, 
in the present context, mere concessions made to the working class according to a 
conservative logic of political and social stability. A slow juridical evolution had sanctioned 
in 1884 the legality of the professional associations that had been outlawed during the 
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 Sorel, ‘Francia prima delle elezioni’, p. 123. ‘…la parola socialista.. ha perduto ogni significato preciso dopo 
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revolution and tolerated through the second empire.24 This law, which effectively made trade 
unions legal, had been the work of Waldeck-Rousseau. For Sorel, the law had been enacted 
‘in the hope of organizing workers’ corporations under the control of his [Waldeck-
Rousseau’s] party…’25 The fact that bourgeois parties enact laws that could, in theory, lead to 
the self-organization of the proletariat, should according to Sorel be understood as a 
conservative move: ‘It was necessary to show to the workers that the government cares for 
them… Social legislation was thus drafted in order to give to the workers an idea of the 
positive feelings that the government harbours for them more than to be of some use to the 
workers.’ For Sorel, bad intentions animate these laws, which are not ‘what they should be if 
one really had the intention of improving the conditions of the people that one pretends to 
protect’, and he goes as far as to say that ‘certainly many deputies that have voted for these 
laws [in the chambre des députés] subsequently do everything in their power to prevent the 
Senate from approving them.’26 
Directed by an elite of progressive bourgeois, social legislation becomes not only a 
conservative force preventing the emergence of the new society, but also a factor of moral 
degradation of the working class: ‘The implementation of these workers’ laws has been 
conducted in order to flatter the least noble feelings of human nature’.27 Envy, desire to be 
incorporated in the bourgeois world, delation of bosses to public authorities are the feelings 
that Sorel opposes to those that the proletariat ought to cultivate: 
‘Negative passions always dominate man when they are not kept in check by an 
ardent faith in the value of great moral principles. When workers are genuinely 
socialists, they only see in their employer a representative of the capitalist order, 
and they believe that things cannot be different; their hostility against the person 
transforms itself and is swallowed up by the sentiment of class struggle. The 
industrial police organised by the government leads the proletarian soul in the 
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opposite direction: the noble feeling of class struggle is lost and replaced by the 
cowardly desire of aggravating the wealthy; from socialism, we move to 
demagogy.’28 
It is important not to be too distracted by the emphasis on the morality of disinterested 
struggle. What should be emphasized is that Sorel is speaking about class-consciousness in 
canonical Marxian terms: this noble feeling of hostility is after all grounded in the knowledge 
that proletarian and bourgeois interests diverge, that ‘things cannot be different’. It is a 
feeling, in other words, that is grounded in class, and class defined in a rather orthodox 
Marxist manner. This is why Sorel begins to underline that class struggle, and the feelings 
associated with it, require a vital capitalism in order to be sustained. Where capitalism is 
imperfect, we have demagogy. ‘Demagogy, whose progresses we observe on a daily basis, 
threatens France’s future; the interest of capitalists would be that the socialist movement 
could go back on its proper path, for socialism desires ardently the industrial progress that 
demagogy tends to block.’29 
Sorel’s conclusion is that no hope can be placed on what happens inside parliament, but that 
‘the entire future of the country depends on what happens outside’ of it.30 He wishes that the 
distasteful spectacle of everyday political trafficking will ‘disgust’ the workers enough that 
they will desert organisations and unions that function for the maintenance of a national order, 
which is as damaging to socialism as it is to a truly progressive capitalist bourgeoisie. He 
confidently expresses the belief that ‘Today’s unions, whose leaders are increasingly tied to 
the government, will disappear and the space will open up for the reorganisation of truly 
socialist unions.’31 The problematic point, for Sorel, is precisely this successful attempt, on 
behalf of the government, to reconcile interests that should be antagonistic. The integration of 
the workers’ organizations into a bourgeois system in which productive concerns are 
secondary to the imperative of maintaining social peace is a conservative development that 
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constitutes for Sorel constitutes the greatest danger faced by socialism. In such a situation, 
‘intelligent workers are disheartened; masses allow themselves to be led like flocks of sheep; 
the leaders of the unions are happy to be treated like equals by the minister; and the ministry 
uses the unions to scare off the conservative MPs.’32 
6.3 A DIAGNOSIS OF THE NEW CAPITALISM 
Between 1902 and 1905 this Sorelian analysis of the transformation of French socialism 
became noticeably wider. To the ever-present distrust of parliamentary politics and of party 
officials, Sorel added long term reflections on the significance of a number of economic and 
social transformations that were able to explain more structurally the reasons of the 
dominance of party over class, of parliamentary organizations over proletarian institutions, 
and of the process of dissolution of the working class. These thoughts, revolving essentially 
around the evolution of French capitalism, found expression in two seminal articles from 
1902, and received more substantial elaboration in later monographs, amongst which the 1905 
Insegnamenti sociali dell’economia contemporanea stands out in terms of articulation and 
coherence. These economic and social analyses of contemporary capitalism, partial as they 
were, not only identified very real and important historical processes, but more importantly 
managed to frame with extreme precision the new problems that Marxian socialism was 
facing at the turn of the century. They constituted, as we have repeatedly argued, the 
backbone of Sorel’s syndicalism in the Reflections on violence, and, for the historian, they 
still represent the necessary background reading to that text: if in the Reflections Sorel 
proposes a solution, it is in the Insegnamenti that he outlines the problem. The two texts, as 
we shall argue more forcefully in the next chapter, develop a single line of argument. 
The question in the background of these analyses is the following: why has the proletariat 
succumbed so easily to the bourgeois and parliamentary elements within socialism? Why has 
the historical agent, the working class, not made significant, let alone sufficient steps in its 
process of historical evolution? Why is it the case that we are very far from envisaging a 
productive apparatus fully run by workers? Why have institutions capable of developing the 
organisational, administrative, juridical, but also ethical capacities of the proletariat not 
arisen? The answer given by Sorel, summarily, is that this is because the bourgeoisie has 
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abandoned its progressive historical mission, i.e. because the economic life of France was 
characterized by conditions of very imperfect capitalism. Sorel centres his analysis on three 
aspects: protectionism, cartelisation, and social legislation, highlighting repeatedly that the 
taming of the competitive logic of international market capitalism destroys the structural 
conditions necessary for the emergence of proletarian institutions. Despite being centred on 
what Sorel correctly sees as new economic and social conditions, Sorel’s analysis is not, and 
could never have been, that of an economic determinist: he constantly highlights the 
ideological and institutional consequences of these new economic facts, and attributes to them 
what we could call substantial historical force.  
Thus, where lies the imperfection of the French bourgeoisie and of French capitalism? It lies, 
to start with, in the obsessive desire for social peace and harmony propagated by republicans 
and socialists alike; it lies in an economically conservative protectionism enforced with the 
goal of sheltering national businesses from international markets, rather than with the 
ambition of industrial concentration and growth; it lies in a top-down welfare state that keeps 
the working class in a state of dependency that prevents it from developing its capabilities. 
Finally, on the ideological side, the limitations of contemporary capitalism can be seen in the 
abandonment of Marxism and laissez-faire economics – two theories that, for Sorel, found ‘in 
the same economic conditions the causes of their success’ – in favour of reformism and 
protectionism. 33 As we have argued above, despite their limitations, Sorel’s analyses 
intercepted important historical transformations. They suffered, arguably, from the French 
perspective from which they were developed, and consequently at times they tend to paint the 
emergence of managerial and organized capitalism in excessively conservative colours. This 
partly underestimated the fact that they coincided, especially in America and Germany, with a 
tremendous productive expansion. At any rate, the task of this chapter is not to pass judgment 
on these analyses, but merely to situate them in their economic and social context – which is 
done in the first section – and to outline how they modified Sorel’s socialism and directed it 
towards the syndicalism that was to characterize the Reflections on violence, which we do in 
the following two sections.  
6.3.1 TRENDS IN FRENCH ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LIFE (1890-1914) 
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The standard view of the French economy in the decades before the Great War is of a country 
in a state of backwardness when compared not only to the British economic superpower, but 
also to the emerging economies of the United States of America and of Germany. Throughout 
the thesis, we have underlined aspects of this backwardness, especially with reference to 
Germany. However, it is now time to offer a more in depth analysis of the evolution of the 
French economy in the closing decades of the nineteenth and in the opening years of the 
twentieth centuries.  
It is important to begin by saying that the French backwardness vis à vis Germany or Britain 
is not generally understood simply in terms of brute economic output. Quite naturally, data 
about domestic product, its growth, various indicators of capital formation and investment, 
are fundamental in assessing this backwardness. Nonetheless, such data is traditionally used 
to outline an argument according to which one of the main sources of French backwardness 
was France’s inability to develop modern productive forms, i.e. the Chandlerian businesses 
described in the previous chapter and characterized by organisational complexity, horizontal 
and vertical integration, and industrial gigantism. France’s economic backwardness, in short, 
would amount to a failure to fully enter the second industrial revolution, and in a productive 
system characterized by small-scale firms in a time in which American and German 
businesses were inaugurating the golden era of modern industrial capitalism.34  
The picture appears to be, generally speaking, correct. Even if, as we are about to see, there 
are some caveats to add to this image of French industrial backwardness, there is little doubt 
about the fact that France was not at the forefront of the second industrial revolution. Its 
economy, at the turn of the century, was not dominated by what Marx called the ‘co-operative 
form of the labour process’, nor by the ‘conscious technical application of science’ to said 
process.35 Les us recall the list of the members of the organizing committee of the socialist 
congress of Le Havre in 1880 cited in chapter three, and let us remember the prevalence of 
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‘boulangers’, ‘bijoutiers’, ‘cordonniers’ and other similar artisanal profiles. Despite, or 
possibly because of, great conservative fears about l’exode rural, the population was still 
predominantly rural. In 1896, only 39% of French lived in an urban centre with more than 
2000 inhabitants.36 Agriculture, despite a number of crises, still occupied a central place in the 
hexagon’s economic and social fabric. In 1891, 44,6% of the workforce was agricultural, as 
opposed to the 27,9% employed in industry, those percentages remaining essentially 
unchanged in 1911, with, respectively, 41,2% and 29,7%.37 But even these meagre figures of 
industrial employment need to be treated with care, and examined in the context of the kind of 
businesses that dominated, numerically, the French industrial world. In 1896, 49,2% of 
French firms employed a single person, 21,8% had two employees, and only 12% of firms 
had more than five.38 As Rolande Trempé has argued, the industrial landscape was still in part 
constituted by myriad small workshops, ‘une poussière d’ateliers’, a situation more congenial 
to artisans and craftspeople than to modern industrial workers.39 
And yet, there are a few caveats that modify this image of French industrial backwardness. 
The prevalence of small firms does not imply the absence of large Chandlerian ones, and the 
fact that these latter firms constituted a minority in the French industrial landscape does not 
mean they can be ignored. In fact, as Michael S. Smith has suggested, the period between 
1880 and 1930 was a crucial one in which the French economy developed ‘a high level of 
technological, entrepreneurial, and organizational expertise, as well as an array of large 
business enterprises (either private or state-owned) that could serve as a vehicle in the 
application of the new technologies.’40 Despite the fact that an 1881 survey of the largest 
French firms in terms of capital shows that ‘industrial enterprises [and thus technologically 
advanced, Chandlerian firms] were largely outdistanced in scale by transportation companies 
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and public utilities’, their importance grew over time.41 Starting with 1896 ‘a certain tendency 
towards concentration begins to emerge. The average size of firms has risen from 5,5 to 6,1 
[employees], and those that have grown faster are large firms.’42 Geographically concentrated 
around the Lyon and Saint-Etienne region, and on the northeastern axis running from Le 
Havre to Mulhouse, large, second industrial revolution firms played a significant-enough role 
in the French economy to modify the image of French backwardness sketched above.43 
The fact that in 1896 only 12% of French firms employed more than five employees should 
then be taken as an indication of the resilience of pre-second industrial revolution productive 
forms, rather than as revealing the weakness of big business. It is arguably in the very nature 
of Chandlerian enterprises to be few in number, and to tend to concentration and oligopoly. It 
is by looking at the data on the employment of the industrial workforce that, in spite of the 
low number of large firms, we can have a clearer idea of both their strength and of the sectors 
in which they flourished. Data for 1906 reveals that the largest part of the industrial workforce 
(40,2%) was employed in firms of more than 100 people, although only 7,4% in firms of over 
500 employees.44 Whereas industries such as food (62%), clothing (58%), or wood (58,5%) 
were dominated by firms with less than 11 employees, the prevalence of big business was 
most obvious in metallurgy and mining, sectors in which, respectively, 77,7% and 82,7% of 
the workforce was in firms of over 500 employees. Technologically advanced industries such 
as chemistry, rubber, or paper, too were the preserve of relatively large firms, with over 100 
employees.45 
It is worth spending a little more time on these emerging big businesses, mainly because we 
have characterized them, so far, predominantly in terms of size. But with size, it should be 
emphasized, came new, more rationalized Taylorist forms of organizing labour, which 
minimized the role of the skilled worker in favour of managers and of unskilled workers. 
Size, in fact, is a pertinent indicator of these new methods, since in the French context ‘the 
                                                 
41
 Claude Fohlen, ‘Entrepreneurship and management in France in the nineteenth century’ in Mathias and 
Postan, Cambridge economic history of Europe. Vol. 7, pp. 362-3. The metallurgical giant Le Creusot, for 
example, was only eighteenth. 
42
 Trempé, France ouvrière., p. 252. ‘Depuis 1896, un certain mouvement de concentration s’est dessiné. La 
taille moyenne est passée de 5,5 à 6,1 et ce sont les grands qui ont crû le plus vite.’ 
43
 For the data about the geographical connotations of large industry see the map in Trempé, France Ouvrière, p. 
258. 
44
 Trempé, France Ouvrière, p. 253. This implies, of course, that 32,8% of the workforce was in firms ranging 
from 101 to 500 employees. These data confirm the overall balance of the French economy. Small firms (1 to 10 
employees) gave work to 32,2% of the industrial workforce, whereas medium sized firms (11 to 100 employees) 
to 27,6%. 
45
 Ibid. 
 333 
division between the old ways and the new largely coincided with the distinction between 
large and small.’46 Beyond size and labour organization, other aspects allow us to classify a 
number of French firms, mostly metallurgical ones, as classically Chandlerian ones. In 1884 
the Loi relative à la création des syndicats professionels had abrogated the penalties that were 
hitherto associated with economic association. By legalising ‘associations patronales’, the law 
effectively opened the way for the economic organization and concentration typical of the 
second industrial revolution. Oligopolistic business associations, such as the Comité des 
Forges, effectively and rather successfully stabilised the metallurgical market, lobbied 
governments, and, through the organisation of comptoirs (sale cartels), went as far as ensuring 
‘that high prices for metal products would be maintained by limiting the expansion of 
productive capacity’.47 Though they were aided by the rising economic protectionism of those 
years, they fought against social legislation, and, as the war approached, they had evolved into 
fully bureaucratized economic centres, in spite of the smokescreen of their ‘libertarian 
doctrine’.48 
The picture of the French economy that emerges from this overview is that of a balanced 
productive system, characterized by the persisting importance of agriculture and, as far as 
industry is concerned, by the curious mix of craft-based productive methods with, especially 
after 1896, emerging big business, concentrated in some precise geographical areas and 
occupying sectors such as metallurgy or chemistry. Despite this balance, then, there were 
processes of industrial modernization occurring. Though, on the one hand, the resilience of 
older, artisanal, productive forms and firms was more marked in France than in Germany or 
the United States, on the other hand, as we have seen, big business did exist and generally 
behaved – in terms of horizontal and vertical integration49, of productive methods, and of 
guiding through oligopolistic practices, the national economy towards greater organization – 
like typical second industrial revolution Chandlerian firms.  
It is fundamental to underline that the republican élites had mixed feelings about the rise of 
these new productive realities, and that, more precisely, they were greatly worried by the 
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potentially nefarious social consequences that they could engender: on the one hand, the rural 
exodus, and on the other the rise of a politically organized and contentious working class. 
Socialists, despite their divisions and their numerical weakness, and despite the fact that, by 
the turn of the century, they had effectively joined the republican cause, had entered 
parliament for the first time already in the early 1890s, and this could not but worry the 
republican establishment. As modernity advanced and the new productive forms grew in 
importance, so did worries about the question sociale and exode rurale, with these worries 
coming to dominate the republic’s social and economic response to these transformations. 
As Richard Kuysel has argued, industrial modernization was feared more than welcomed, as 
‘few saw any need to hurry headlong after industrialization and urbanization as the British, 
Germans, and Americans had done.’50 Protection of the rural world and containment of the 
social consequences of big business were the republican priorities, and they were achieved 
through what could be called, with the due proportions and differences, Bismarckian policies, 
i.e. economic protectionism and social legislation. By the mid 1890s, ‘a broad political and 
social consensus… dictated that public policy should try to maintain an equilibrium among 
industry, commerce, and agriculture and attempt to insulate France from the distress and 
upheaval that had struck other nations bent upon rapid economic advance.’51 One of the 
champions of this policy of economic stability was Jules Méline, who, in 1891, had defended 
his proposal for a system of protective tariffs by stressing that the French peasant ‘loves life 
in the open air and it is only as a last resort that he goes to labour in a workshop’: rural 
depopulation, this ‘worrying phenomenon’, arises only when the landowning peasant ‘has lost 
all hope of making a living out of it [the land]’.52 
Clearly, the other side of this desire for rural protection was the fear of the mounting socialist 
threat. Rural depopulation was worrying because it contributed to the creation of an urban and 
industrial proletariat that, when politically organised, could become problematic for the 
already precarious stability of the republic. In his tellingly titled Le retour à la terre, Méline 
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himself had argued that a strong agricultural sector, capable of absorbing large amounts of 
workforce, would be the best safety net against the unemployment generated by 
mechanization and industrial progress. Warning his readers about the dangers of ‘rushing 
blindly’53 toward industrial progress, Méline argued that ‘social crises often have as their 
cause simply a bad distribution of work’: the self-evident solution was, thus, a slow and 
managed return to the land. 54  But to counter the social consequences of industrial 
modernization, the republic did not limit itself to preserving the economic balance between 
industry and agriculture. It also had to implement a number of legislative measures that could 
protect the industrial proletariat against market excesses. And thus, health and safety 
regulations in industrial workplaces were made legally binding by the law of the 12th of June 
1893; on 15 July of the same month, state-guaranteed medical assistance (Assistance 
Médicale Générale or AMG) for those in need was enacted; on the 9th of April 1898 we see a 
landmark law according compensation to workers in case of accidents occurring in the 
workplace, and this without the requirement of an onus of proof of the fault of the employer. 
With the law of 30 March 1900 working hours for women and minors were reduced to a 
maximum of 11 per day, while in 1910, with the law of the 5th of April, Léon Bourgeois 
succeeded in passing a pensions law. 
The effectiveness of these welfare measures is disputed, especially because these attempts to 
rationalize and nationalize social protection were met with resistance by local élites who 
wished to safeguard their role as providers of welfare to local workers and communities.55 But 
this is beside the point. What matters is that such an attempt to tame the social consequences 
of industrialization was made, and that this conservative economic policy was the expression 
of the coalition that dominated French politics from 1899 to 1905. It was, in other words, the 
republican bloc, ranging from  radicals to reformist socialists, that most thoroughly pursued 
policies of social peace. These initial attempts at a welfare state were, in other words, 
implemented by ‘advocates of increased state intervention on behalf of workers, such as 
Alexandre Millerand [a socialist] and Léon Bourgeois [a radical-republican]’.56 
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It is indicative of the affirmation of this new socioeconomic consensus that the liberal 
economic orthodoxy that had governed French mainstream opinion from the time of the 
Second Empire had begun, by the 1890s, to be challenged, and that it was being slowly 
replaced by various discourses about national unity and solidarity. In the 1880s, Bismarckian 
interventionism was anathema to the French liberal opinion: writing in 1884, Léon Say, one 
of the strongest opponents of the protectionist loi Méline had described Bismarck’s policies as 
those of ‘a self-professed conservative socialism’, argued that the scheme of compulsory 
social insurance ‘is an enterprise against which reason protests’, and that such developments 
would soon lead to the point in which a civil servant would become ‘a figure with the duty of 
supervising the businessman in his dealings with employees and clients.’57 And yet, by the 
turn of the century, Say’s opinions had become those of a minority. Ideas of national 
solidarity had replaced them, as the republican-socialist bloc enacted welfare policies in a bid 
to counter the social consequences of industrial modernization.  
It is a writer with impeccable liberal credentials, Vilifredo Pareto, who offers us the best 
image of the marginality of economic liberalism in the France of Waldeck-Rousseau and 
Combes. Writing in 1900 about the ‘socialist danger’, Pareto argued that socialism was more 
or less inevitable. Why was this the case? Was it the case that the proletariat was ready to 
overthrow the bourgeois order? Not at all, suggested Pareto: the danger did not come from the 
enemies of the bourgeoisie, but from the bourgeoisie itself and its newfound social vocation. 
‘Go and tell frankly to a bourgeois that, according to your theory, his home and 
revenues [rentes] need to be confiscated. He will, perhaps, still have enough 
energy and good sense to reject your theory. But let a Christian socialist, a 
representative of the ethical school, a partisan of “solidarity” appear, and he will 
carefully listen to them.’58  
For Pareto, the combination of protectionism, social legislation, and an ideology of national 
solidarity was the gateway to socialism, whose future triumph was assured by the fact that 
even the bourgeoisie, deluding itself that it could appease the forces of the proletariat by 
yielding to some of their demands, was working towards it. He argued: 
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‘There are people who imagine that they can disarm their enemies through 
cowardly complacency; they are wrong. The world always belonged to the 
strong, and will still belong to them for a long time. Men respect those who 
command respect. Those who turn themselves into lambs will always find a wolf 
ready to devour them.’59  
6.3.2 MECHANISMS OF ASSIMILATION: PROTECTIONISM, WELFARE, AND ECONOMIC 
ORGANISATION 
But if Pareto thought that the economic and social policies of the republic were leading to 
socialism, Georges Sorel, who agreed with many points of Pareto’s analysis, did not. In fact, 
as early as in 1902 he had begun thinking the exact opposite, namely that the social turn of the 
republic was the greatest obstacle to the emergence of the working class as an historical force. 
We have seen, in the first section of this chapter, his doubts about the reformist turn of 
socialism. It is now time to examine in more depth a number of texts from 1902 in which 
Sorel starts to elaborate on these doubts, widening the scope of his analysis to include the 
latest economic and social developments occurring in the France of the time.  
The first of these important texts appears in the spring of 1902 in the Revue Socialiste and is 
tellingly titled ‘Idées socialistes et faits économiques au XIXe siècle’.60 As would be expected 
from a Marxist writing in a publication such as the Revue Socialiste, the piece consists of a 
defence of Marxism against other understandings of socialism. What is most interesting in the 
text is Sorel’s attempt to understand and defend Marxism historically, by connecting its 
successes and its crises to a number of changing economic and social conditions. It is through 
these analyses, which are fundamental to his syndicalism, that Sorel manages to specify with 
greater precision what are the conditions under which the proletariat can emerge as a 
revolutionary historical agent. Accordingly, the difference between Marxism and utopian 
socialism is described as an historical one, as a difference between the economic and social 
conditions in which the two understandings of socialism were elaborated. Whereas the 
socialism of, say, Fourier or Owen, belonged to ‘Rousseau’s kingdom’, Marxism was 
elaborated in ‘the century of the men of steel, the era of hardened people who ridiculed 
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philanthropy and were proud of their force’.61 The first important remark made by Sorel 
concerns the Marxist revolutionary subject: 
 ‘Modern socialism concerns itself with proletarians and uses this term to 
indicate not the poor, but the man who, not being in possession of the 
instruments of his own subsistence, lives on the salary earned in a factory; the 
proletarian is a living instrument in the great whole of the forces organised, 
according to a scientific plan, by the industrialist.’62 
What Sorel argues is, essentially, that the revolutionary subject of Marxism – like Marxism 
itself – is not ahistorical, but flourishes under a precise set of economic and social conditions. 
The success of utopian socialism and of its tendency to devise plans for the reorganization of 
society and industry, according to Sorel, is to be connected with the fact that in the first half 
of the nineteenth century capitalism was unable to generate and organize new productive 
forces. Before 1848 ‘the high bourgeoisie was stuck in antiquated ways of thinking about 
industry… it did not understand that the function of modern capitalism is that of rampantly 
developing all the productive forces of the country’.63 Consequently, the task of industrial 
growth and modernization was left in the hands of the state, and progress ‘became a question 
of… strengthening governmental forces in order to accomplish what a helpless capitalism 
could not achieve; it was necessary to cover France with railroads…’64 Neither Marxism as a 
theory, nor the proletariat as an historical force and revolutionary subject, would be 
conceivable before the great explosion of productive forces after 1848, when ‘large-scale 
capitalism had become conscious of its force’.65 This period, which Sorel brings to a close 
towards the 1890s, is characterized by a capitalism capable of mobilizing increasingly larger 
productive forces with only minimal assistance by the state, whose role is reduced to the 
maintenance of order and the removal of obstacles to trade: it is in this period when, parallel 
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to the ascendancy of Marxism, ‘The slogan of laissez faire, laissez passer became a universal 
maxim,  – a new ideological superstructure exactly fitting the new economy.’66  
The conditions under which the proletariat flourishes as a revolutionary force are 
characterized by the absence of centralized economic direction, and by the free development 
of capitalist competition. Marxism understands that the conditions of production that will 
characterize the future socialist society cannot arise out of a plan for the democratic 
reorganization of a factory or a workshop, but, instead, will realize themselves ‘automatically 
through the interplay of those forces that animate capitalism: the pursuit of greater profit leads 
businessmen to create what the most stubborn creators of systems had tried, to no avail, … to 
come up with.’67 It is not, thus, an economy directed by the state that can create the economic 
preconditions for socialism, but only the seemingly chaotic interactions between actors in a 
competitive market. Accordingly, a revolutionary working class cannot emerge in the absence 
of the kind of bourgeoisie created by these competitive conditions. 
 ‘It is not the State that can prepare the economic conditions of the new regime. 
It is only capitalist necessity; here is a fundamental thesis of Marxism, and those 
who do not admit this capitalist fatality are not Marxists. Capitalism shapes 
society in two ways: 1st it creates the modern workshop, which will become the 
collectivist workshop; 2nd it forces the working classes to organize themselves 
and leads them, through the struggle that the capitalists wage against them, to be 
able to emancipate themselves.’68 
This is rather straightforward Marxism. Sorel’s references are Capital and the Critique of the 
Gotha Programme, which he cites copiously and passionately, underlining with care the anti-
statist elements, such as Marx’s objection to the Lassallean idea that ‘with state loans one can 
build a new society just as well as a new railway.’69 Sorel’s contribution consists in the 
historicization of these Marxian theses, in his underlining that the world in which Marx lived 
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was characterized by a strong capitalism capable of pushing class division to its extreme, of 
developing new productive forces, and, last but not least, of destroying a large number of 
antiquated social relations such as nationalism.70 In fact, according to Sorel it was Marx’s 
historically grounded faith in the destructive powers of capitalism that led him to 
‘oversimplify’ the process through which the proletariat becomes a class for itself, conscious 
of its situation and of its mission, armed with its own institutions.71  
This brings us to a crucial point of Sorel’s argument, which is the suggestion that the current 
situation is rather different from that of the 1850s: ‘We now know that things do not happen 
quite as straightforwardly as Marx supposed in 1847. The capitalist movement has not 
developed with the speed that he attributed to it…’72 This is what the crisis of Marxism is 
really all about for Sorel. It is not a theoretical crisis, but an historical one: ‘controversies 
between various theorists’ cannot explain it, and its causes must be sought in the 
‘transformations that have occurred in society’. 73  Capitalism has become weaker; 
consequently, the state has taken a more central role in the evolution of the productive 
processes and thus both industrial progress and the development of a revolutionary proletariat 
have come to a halt, or at least have substantially slowed down. What Sorel is referring to, as 
will become clear in a short while, are the republican policies of containment of the social 
consequences of industrialization outlined in the previous section. 
Switching from the economic level to the ideological one, Sorel suggests that the crisis of 
Marxism is generated by the same developments that have determined the crisis of liberal 
political economy: 
 ‘The more we examine the objective conditions upon which Marxist economics 
rests the more we find that it resembles manchesterian economics. We have 
already seen that it presupposes a complete juridical separation between 
capitalists and workers, [that it presupposes] the fatality of capitalist 
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development and the indifference or powerlessness of the state; these are the 
three great principles of classical economics…’74 
Sorel treats the vitality of competitive markets and the emergence of the working class as 
intimately connected phenomena: ‘when capitalism has become so rich and that it is carried 
forward by the general conditions of markets, there is a truly absolute separation between 
capitalists and workers.’75 But the conditions of the early twentieth century do not work in 
favour of this ‘truly absolute separation’. If the organisation of the working class proceeds 
from above and not from below, it will suffer the decisive influence of the dominant social 
relations, with the consequence that it will lead to proletarian assimilation rather than to its 
autonomous institutional growth. Sorel cites a declaration by Millerand in which the trade and 
industry minister, speaking to the Chamber of Commerce of Saint-Etienne, had reassured its 
audience about the fact that all his proposals of social legislation were always going to 
carefully consider ‘the repercussion that it could have on the interests of the businessmen.’76 
This declaration is not only an indication of the dependency of capitalists on the state, but also 
of the fact that the concessions made from above are just that, i.e. concessions, and that they 
cannot give birth to genuinely new, and hence revolutionary, institutions. 
Protectionism is a key aspect of this transformation. Citing the third volume of Capital, Sorel 
stresses the ‘revolutionary character of commerce’, and its ability to destroy, amongst other 
things ‘old productive forms’. Free trade is important to all those who ‘care above all about 
the progress of productive forces and have little sympathy for the idyll of the old ways.’77 
With this in mind, the French protectionist turn, inaugurated in 1892 by the loi Méline, signals 
what Sorel ironically calls the French ‘return to Thomas Aquinas in economic matters’.78 On 
the one hand, this protectionism shelters a feeble capitalism from the threat of international 
competition, with negative consequences in terms of technological progress and of productive 
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growth. On the other hand, more importantly, protectionism fosters nationalism by 
encouraging national solidarity at the expense of international class solidarity: tariff barriers 
are an attempt to ‘preserve, in the economic realm, the separation that politics has established 
between nations.’79 Protectionism is the sign of a capitalism that needs the state, and thus of a 
bourgeoisie that will be led to embrace principles of national solidarity over those of 
economic efficiency and technological progress. It is this spirit of national solidarity enforced 
by the state that is perhaps most damaging to the socialist cause, because it pools together, 
through concrete institutional arrangements and structures, interests that a progressive 
historical development would establish as antagonistic. This ability to unite the interests of 
capitalists and of proletarians in the name of the nation is carried through by social 
legislation: ‘there is, between the history of protectionism and that of social legislation a 
remarkable parallel.’80  
Of course, both social legislation and protectionism can have progressive variants. Social 
legislation is necessary for the revolutionary organisation of the working class.  
Protectionism, Sorel concedes, can lead to industrial progress, such as in the case of the 
United States. But such progressive variants of these economic and social phenomena are 
those associated with expansive capitalism. Thus, in the same way as there are ‘two types of 
protectionism: one useful to strong peoples with growing population and wealth, - the other 
useful to discouraged, lazy ones with a declining population’81, there are ‘two kinds of social 
policy; a progressive and a retrograde one.’82  The criteria through which Sorel distinguishes 
the two kinds of protectionism and social legislation are those of productive expansion and, 
above all, class separation. When protectionism leads to the expansion of productive forces, it 
is progressive, when it shelters individual capitalists from the competitive logic of global 
capitalism, it is conservative: ‘Marxists could never, under no circumstances, associate 
themselves with projects destined to impede or slow down the progress of the productive part 
of the economy’.83 Social legislation, in the same way, is progressive when it is conducive to 
the self-organization of workers with the aim of class struggle. But when it is drowned in the 
practice and rhetoric of national solidarity, it is conservative, for it locks the new-born 
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institutions and social relations to older and more powerful ones, decisively thwarting their 
potential for innovation and social change.  The collaboration between workers and capitalists 
in the direction of business ‘tends to mix what socialism had tried to keep apart, what Marx 
had believed was irreducibly separated’.84 
But what is the role of spontaneous, i.e. non-state driven forms of economic organization in 
all this? To the question of cartels, Sorel dedicates another important 1902 article, largely 
based on Paul de Rousier’s work on the phenomena, and examining the United States, 
Germany, and France. 85 The central question is whether cartels have to be seen as historically 
progressive or regressive, and throughout the article Sorel is careful in maintaining a certain 
ambivalence of judgement. Resurrecting the distinction between progressive and regressive 
protectionism, he argues that the significance of cartels can likewise be either regressive or 
progressive. There are, Sorel underlines, great differences between apparently similar 
phenomena occurring in different countries, and therefore the phenomena of economic 
organization that go under the names of cartels, trusts, and comptoirs can signify different 
things. But the criteria that the Marxist must use to express his judgment on the significance 
of such developments are clear. Cartels are progressive if they bring out new productive 
forces: ‘nothing characterizes the Marxist spirit better than the preoccupation about the 
progress of productive forces.’86 Cartels, thus, can serve a historically progressive function 
when they contribute to the development of industrial capitalism, when they allow 
competitive interaction between individual capitalists to develop on a larger scale and on the 
international stage, and, in sum, when they are ‘means of forcing capitalists to bring 
productive forces to a higher economic level and to develop them beyond the demand that 
manifested itself in a national economy. There can never be too many productive forces in a 
country marching towards socialism; cartels provide means for the creation of a better base 
for socialism’.87 
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But if cartels can be a sign of a vital capitalism, and of a progressive historical dynamic, they 
can also be signs of the exact opposite. The expression ‘quietist economy’ is the one used by 
Sorel to describe an economy characterized by price fixing, by proportionality between 
production and consumption, by macroeconomic management either on behalf of the state or 
on behalf of business associations, and by the inevitable slowing down of the development of 
new productive forces and technological innovation. When cartels break the competitive and 
innovative dynamics of capitalist competition, they become regressive, and not too different 
from medieval guilds: 
‘… it is certain that even during the capitalist era there are remnants of the past 
and practices, contrary to the general development of capitalism. It is possible 
that certain businessmen believe that it is in their interest to generate scarcity, 
but it is an exception utterly opposed to the spirit of capitalism, which constantly 
tends towards the revolutionising of productive forces, forcing everyone to 
produce more and cheaper goods. I admit that some capitalists entertain the idea 
of making profits by closing the market; but the immanent laws of capitalism 
almost always oppose themselves to this wish for a quietist economy.’88 
It is important to note that for Sorel the ‘quietist’ economy is a managed and a national one. 
On the one hand, the desire to shelter individual capitalists from global competition cannot be 
done without protectionism, but with protectionism comes price fixing, which submits 
international trade ‘to the arbitrary will of a corporation of producers, and this domination 
could often be unfavourable to the progress of productive forces.’ 89  Now, whether the 
national economy is directed by a ‘corporation of producers’ or by the state, the result is 
equally negative for a Marxist. Both corporatism and state socialism are characterized by the 
‘ambition of introducing reason in spheres dominated by necessity and randomness’, i.e. of 
introducing an element of planning and organisation into the competitive interplay of market 
forces.90 This reasoned organisation is for Sorel historically regressive and cannot but hinder 
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the historical movement leading to socialism, which, to repeat, requires fierce competition 
between capitalists.91  The problem, it must be underlined, is one of working class self-
organization: only in the presence of these competitive conditions can the self-organization of 
the working class avoid being subsumed under national structures. Thus, whenever 
cartelisation introduces conciliation and agreement where there previously was competition, 
there are good reasons to be concerned.  
It is important to stress that the objections Sorel makes against a planned economy are 
empirical rather than principled. The preference accorded to a competitive capitalism over a 
managed one, in other words, is justified on the basis that the former provides, by separating 
working class from bourgeois interests, a better environment in which the self-organization of 
the proletariat can occur. Without stressing this, it is quite easy to be left perplexed by quotes 
such as the following one: 
 ‘The problem which must occupy the minds of socialists is the following: to 
what extent do these new industrial realities accelerate the progress of 
productive forces? […] It is thus nonsensical to see cartels as a way of making 
production proportionate to consumption, to see them as the instrument of a 
conscious economic harmony. Doubtlessly, they can also be this, and the 
agrarian party sees them in this way; but their role, in progressive countries, is 
rather different.’92 
The salient points of Sorel’s analysis, as developed in the two articles examined, are 
conducive to pessimistic conclusions. For a start, the vitality of cartels, even when they play a 
progressive role and lead to technological innovation and productive expansion, shows that 
capitalism has not come to its final days, and that thus socialism is not imminent. 
 ‘The results obtained by cartels show that capitalism is not moribund, that it is 
still capable of generating many productive forces and that consequently its 
historical mission is not accomplished: this is a fact of considerable importance, 
                                                                                                                                                        
taken literally. See Sorel, ‘Necessità e fatalismo nel Marxismo’ in his Saggi di critica del Marxismo, pp. 78-84 
as well as section 4.3.2 of the present work. 
91
 Sorel argues, for example, that falling commodity prices, which some cartels fight against, are ‘important 
signs of the progressive movement’. ‘Syndicats industriels’, p. 174. ‘L’avilissement des prix contre lequel les 
cartells s’organisent sont, dans les grandes industries en voie de progrès, une des manifestations essentielles du 
mouvement progressif.’ 
92
 Ibid., p. 180. ‘Le problème qui doit retenir l’attention des socialistes est celui-ci : dans quelle mesure les 
nouvelles combinaisons industrielles accélèrent-elles le progrès des forces productives ? C’est un problème de 
statistique et d’ordre tout à fait matériel. C’est donc faire un énorme contresens que de considérer les cartells 
comme un moyen de mettre la production en rapport avec la consommation et comme un facteur d’un équilibre 
délibéré. Sans doute ils peuvent être cela et les agrariens les considèrent surtout à ce point de vue ; mais leur 
rôle, dans les pays progressistes, est tout autre.’ 
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because it shows that the moment of looking for the juridical elements that 
announce the dawning of the new society has not yet arrived. ’93  
Even if wishing to maintain some optimism, one has, in other words, to admit that the work of 
industrial progress and destruction of old social relations and institutions that capitalism must 
perform is incomplete. The bourgeoisie has not yet created the world in its own image of 
which Marx and Engels spoke. But there are other, more worrying developments, indicating 
not only that the evolution of capitalism is incomplete, but that it is advancing, at least in 
France, in a conservative direction most unfavourable to the emergence of the working class 
as a revolutionary subject. Capitalism appears to have betrayed its logic of international 
competition, and to have rather embraced national and oligopolistic tendencies. Cartels often 
are mere corporative structures which prosper under a protectionist regime that ‘invokes the 
principle of national solidarity’,94 forging institutions and social relations based on the nation 
rather than on class. Socialism, however, presupposes a world in which collective solidarities 
develop around economic interests, and in which the hostility is between those who own the 
means of production and those who are forced to sell their labour. The logic of national 
solidarity therefore destroys the class specificity of the proletariat by integrating the worker 
into a number of nationally grounded institutions. In both cases, the proletariat is not yet 
ready to inherit the capitalist world. Its institutions are still in their infancy and, what is more 
worrying, they are faced by historical conditions leading to their dissolution rather than to 
their triumph. 
6.4 INSEGNAMENTI SOCIALI DELL’ECONOMIA CONTEMPORANEA 
Despite the fact that, in these 1902 texts, Sorel’s tone is still mildly interrogative, it would not 
take him long to understand that the most important conclusion to draw from the various 
processes of social and economic organization he studied was that the global capitalism which 
had inspired Marx was being replaced by a national one that tended to assimilate Marx’s 
revolutionary subject, the industrial proletariat, into national frameworks. This important 
realization gave birth to new questions. How can the class specificity of the proletariat be 
maintained? How will proletarian institutions arise if powerful economic and social forces 
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 Ibid., p. 179. ‘Les résultats obtenus nous démontrent que le capitalisme n’est pas moribond, qu’il est encore 
capable de produire beaucoup de forces productives et que par suite sa mission historique n’est pas finie : c’est là 
un fait d’une importance considérable, parce qu’il nous démontre que le moment n’est pas venu de chercher 
quels sont les éléments juridiques qui annoncent actuellement l’aurore du monde futur.’ 
94
 Sorel, ‘Socialisme et faits économiques’, p. 520. ‘Le protectionnisme invoque le principe de la solidarité 
nationale’. 
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lead to the dissolution of this class? How can such an historical subject affirm itself when it is 
constantly brought under the supervision and control of statist and national institutions? 
Though most of these questions will only find their answers in the Reflections on violence, it 
is in the Insegnamenti sociali that Sorel first attempts to solve them, trying to understand how 
these transformations affected the possibility of the emergence of a revolutionary working 
class. 
The book never found a French publisher, possibly because it is a text consisting essentially 
of a revised and enlarged edition of the two articles examined in the previous section. Despite 
the fact that it was published in Italy only in late 1906, it was written before, between 1903 
and 1905, probably mostly in 1904. The introduction to the Italian edition is dated ‘March 
1905’, and in July of the same year its conclusions were published, in their original French, 
by the Mouvement Socialiste.95 The fact that the bulk of the volume consists of the repetition, 
often word by word, of ‘Socialisme and faits économiques’ and ‘Syndicats industriels’, does 
not diminish the importance of the text. To start with, the economic analyses are widened in 
scope and made more thorough. But most importantly, they are better framed from a Marxist 
angle. In other words, the question of what these developments signify for Marxism, and for 
the historical possibility of a revolutionary working class, is articulated at greater length and 
put at the centre of the analysis. It is this sustained reflection on the possibility of a proletarian 
civilisation in the context of an increasingly national capitalism that makes the text absolutely 
fundamental reading for a correct understanding of Sorel’s syndicalism, and, more 
specifically, of the Reflections on violence. Aware of a changing context, Sorel here began to 
articulate the strategies that could counter the powerful forces which worked against the 
constitution of an international, class-based, revolutionary subject.  
As one commentator has argued, without unfortunately finding too large an audience, ‘the 
Insegnamenti is especially interesting when viewed as a sort of Grundrisse or draft for his 
[Sorel’s] most renowned work… the Reflections on violence’. 96  Though, as we have 
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 See Sorel, Insegnamenti sociali, p. 6 and Georges Sorel, ‘Conclusions aux « Enseignements sociaux de 
l’Economie moderne »’, Mouvement Socialiste 7, 1905, pp. 289-99. This text is reprinted in the Cahier de 
l’Herne dedicated to Sorel, at pp. 270-5. 
96
 John Stanley, ‘Introduction’, in Sorel, Social foundations, p. 5. Despite the existence of the translation, we 
shall use the original – a translation itself, from the lost original French text into Italian – throughout the 
analysis. On the Italian translation, it must be stated that Sorel was far from happy with the work of Vittorio 
Racca: the volume, he confided to Croce, was ‘ni bien traduit, ni surtout bien corrigé’. See Sorel, letter to Croce 
1/10/1906, La Critica 26, 1928, p. 95. In the years following publication, Sorel many times attempted to rewrite 
the text in order to organize it better and secure a French edition, but to no avail. See Jeremy Jennings, ‘Georges 
Sorel, Social foundations of contemporary economics’, Cahiers Georges Sorel 4, 1986, pp. 166-70. 
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repeatedly argued and will continue to argue in the next chapter, the two texts are strictly 
connected, the relationship between the Insegnamenti and the Reflections is not that of a draft 
to a polished version. Instead, it is the relationship between diagnosis and prescription, 
between examining the terrain and outlining how one is going to move within it.  
6.4.1 CORPORATISM, STATE SOCIALISM, AND WORKING CLASS TUTELAGE 
The argumentative strategy that Sorel employed in the Insegnamenti is the same historical one 
that we have seen at work in the economic articles examined above. In other words, Sorel 
connects specific political, ideological, and theoretical options to precise social and economic 
conditions that characterized different periods of the nineteenth century. He begins by 
underlining the historical magnitude of the socialist transformation. Socialism is not simply a 
transition from individual to social property, nor does it consists in the seizure of the existing 
institutions of power: rather, it is an historical transformation of much greater magnitude, one 
that rests on the possibility of the separation of the proletarian social and economic world 
from the bourgeois one, and on the ability of the proletariat to develop new institutions, social 
relations, and ideas. To use Gramsci’s pertinent expression, socialism requires the 
‘progressive acquisition of the consciousness of [the proletariat’s] historical personality’.97  
This possibility, however, largely depends on precise conditions: it requires a vital capitalism, 
characterized by merciless competition, productive expansion, and technological innovation. 
Only in these conditions will the proletariat be able to emerge as an historical force and to 
realize socialism, because these conditions will tend to generate what Sorel calls an 
‘insolidarity’ between classes, and leave to the proletariat the space required for its 
institutional growth, which amounts to the construction of the socialist society. Plans for the 
organization of such society are thus moot, for this society will realize itself from below: 
‘new institutions will emerge out of the organizations that the proletariat will create in its 
preparation for the social wars; from revolutionary syndicalism will emerge the masterless 
workshop; a new right will emerge progressively as the class that carries the destiny of the 
future becomes capable of directing itself independently, of understanding its own activity 
and of managing production.’98 
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 Gramsci, Quaderni, p. 333. 
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 Sorel, Insegnamenti, p. 15. ‘… le istituzioni nuove usciranno dalle organizzazioni che il proletariato avrà fatto 
in vista delle guerre sociali; dal sindacalismo rivoluzionario si passerà all’officina funzionante senza padroni; un 
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The bulk of the Insegnamenti consists of a long and multifaceted analysis of the economic 
and social conditions that characterize advanced European societies at the opening of the 
twentieth century. In this, Sorel highlights how such conditions do not lead to this separation 
of the working class from the bourgeoisie, nor do they facilitate the development of 
proletarian institutions. Instead, they tend to the ideological, social, and economic integration 
of the working class into the existing order, thereby removing the heart of the Marxist 
doctrine, i.e. the self-conscious historical agency of the proletariat. As we have stated before, 
most of this analysis is a literal repetition of the two texts examined above, and thus we shall 
not dwell on it excessively. The aspects examined are the same – protectionism, social 
legislation, and cartels – and the conclusions on the regressive character of these 
developments is, equally, the same: any attempt to break the competitive logic of international 
capitalism, and to introduce elements of economic and social planning, if carried out by, 
through, and under currently existing institutions is regressive, as it magnifies social forces 
that tend towards the assimilation of the proletariat into the existing bourgeois order. What 
Sorel highlights with greater care, however, are not only the various mechanisms through 
which this assimilation occurs, but also the dependency of these mechanisms on two 
macroeconomic regimes: corporatism and state socialism. 
For example, Sorel notices the convergence of opinion between conservatives and democratic 
socialists on the question of cartels. Conservatives applaud cartels because they see them as 
‘collective lordships, similar to medieval communes… policing the economic terrain that 
belongs to them and receiving tributes from those who utilise their services.’ 99  Some 
socialists – he later refers to Kautsky – have an equally positive opinion, because they see 
cartels as a step towards a planned economy brought under state control: ‘they believe that the 
state will, at times, be forced to fight these feudal powers, and that it will need to destroy 
them in order to enlarge itself… the State would [thus] not have to create a communal 
economy, for it would find it already made, and would only have to adapt it.’ 100  Both 
conservatives and socialists, however fail to realize that cartels ‘organize themselves to 
                                                                                                                                                        
diritto nuovo ne uscirà a misura che la classe che porta i destini dell’avvenire diverrà più capace di dirigersi in 
modo indipendente, di comprendere essa stessa la sua attività e d’amministrare la produzione.’ 
99
 Ibid., p.297. ‘Per i feudali i cartells sono delle signorie collettive come lo erano i Comuni del Medio Evo: 
queste signorie hanno dominio eminente, esercitano la polizia sopra il terreno economico che loro appartiene e 
percepiscono delle imposte sopra tutti coloro che hanno bisogno di ricorrere ai loro servizi.’ 
100
 Ibid., p. 298. ‘Molti socialisti vedono con piacere il progresso dei cartells, perché essi pensano che lo Stato 
entrerà, qualche volta, in lotta con queste potenze feudali e ch’esso sarà costretto a distruggerli per ingrandirsi… 
lo Stato non avrebbe da creare, esso stesso, un’economia comune, la troverebbe preparata e non avrebbe che da 
adattarla.’ 
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eliminate economic anarchy, the fatality that dominates producers, and to lead industrial life 
towards rational planning…’101 With the important exception of America, Sorel detects in the 
behaviour of cartels what he calls ‘anticapitalistic vices’. 102  Cartels tend to economic 
management, and their decisions are characterized by a ‘light-hearted complacency that is 
rather contrary to the true tendencies of capitalism.’103 Because they limit competition, and 
tend towards monopoly or oligopoly, they generate arbitrary powers and introduce ‘feudalism 
into the industrial world, for the prosperity of businesses would not depend anymore on 
technology, on commercial prowess, or on capital size, but mostly on the rank occupied by 
the owner in the social hierarchy.’104  
Now, such reasoned planning and ‘anticapitalistic vices’ would yield either corporatism or 
state socialism. In the first case, ‘There would be a State for coal mines, one for blast 
furnaces, one for mills… and, finally, the Estates General of metallurgy. This organization 
would be very similar to that of the ancien régime, and it is evident that it is at least inspired 
by ideas of the past.’105 Under this arrangement, ‘it would be impossible to deny the workers 
a place in these industrial Estates General’. But what would these representatives do in such 
an assembly? They would ‘demand sacrifices to the owners’ threatening them with the ‘force 
that derives from the possibility of striking.’ 106  They would partially obtain what they 
demand, but at the immense cost of, on the one hand, slowing down economic and 
technological progress, and, on the other, of pooling their interests together with those of the 
owners and thus abdicating their progressive historical role. Corporatism thus leads neither to 
economic progress nor to proletarian socialism, and the (German, for Sorel) idea of an 
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 Ibid., p. 314. ‘…essi si organizzano… per far scomparire l’anarchia economica, la fatalità che domina i 
produttori, e condurre la società industriale su una via ragionata…’ 
102
 Ibid., p. 322.  
103
 Ibid. ‘…si trovano nei cartells difetti che si manifestano negli affari controllati da vicino dallo Stato; vi si 
genera una certa soddisfazione spensierata molto opposta alle vere tendenze del capitalismo.’ 
104
 Ibid., pp. 323-4. ‘Così il regime dei cartells tende ad introdurre nell’industria una specie di feudalità, poiché 
la prosperità delle imprese non dipenderebbe più dalla scienza tecnica, dall’abilità commerciale o dalla forza in 
capitali, ma soprattutto dall’ordine che i padroni occupano nella gerarchia sociale.’ 
105
 Ibid., p. 315. ‘Vi sarebbe uno Stato delle miniere di carbone, un altro degli alti forni, un altro dei laminatoi, 
etc. e infine degli Stati-generali della metallurgia. Questa costituzione ricorderebbe molto quelle dell’ancien 
régime, ed è evidente ch’esse, almeno, sono ispirate da idee analoghe a quelle di altri tempi.’ 
106
 Ibid., p. 316. ‘Evidentemente non si potrebbe rifiutare di dare un posto in questi Stati Generali di un’industria 
ai rappresentanti operai… I sindacati operai andrebbero là allo scopo di domandare sacrifici ai padroni, e con la 
minaccia di impiegare la forza che risulta dallo sciopero, costringere questi ad accettare…’ 
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industrial parliament resembles ‘medieval diets, in which diplomatic discussions between 
delegates yielded compromises between various interests.’107 
On the other hand, cartels could be seen, as they are by many socialists, as a step towards a 
centrally directed economy under the control of a democratic state. But even this solution is 
profoundly unsatisfactory for Sorel, who is extremely suspicious of any attempt at economic 
organization that starts from existing institutions, preferring to leave the administration of 
production in the hands of the proletarian institutions to come. However, leaving aside the 
fact that the administrative capabilities of the proletariat were seen by Sorel as being too 
distant from the level required to administer an advanced economy, planning does not appeal 
to Sorel, mostly because of the fact that it does not appear to him as being conducive to 
growth: ‘the experience of cartels shows that the difficulties of central planning would be 
enormous.’108 This surfaces most clearly in the critical manner with which he deals with 
Kautsky’s plans of socialist economic administration articulated in his Social Revolution.109 
The adaptation of production to consumption outlined by Kautsky is dismissed on the basis 
that ‘consumption is variable’, and Kautsky’s reasoning sarcastically labelled as ‘a beautiful 
tautology’. 110 Crises of capitalism, concedes Sorel, are problematic, but ‘it is not by dreaming 
about the circumstances of patriarchal life in a fossilized past that it will be possible to reason 
on how to alleviate evils which are the side effect of the spirit of initiative.’111 
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 Ibid., p. 318. ‘Il progetto d’una rappresentanza generale della produzione e del consumo… ci viene dalla 
Germania, e là è completamente al suo posto perché i parlamenti di questo paese … [sono] delle diete al modo 
del Medio Evo, nelle quali si impegnano delle discussioni diplomatiche tra plenipotenziari e che arrivano a 
stabilire dei compromessi tra i vari interessi.’ 
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 Ibid., p. 326. ‘…trovo che l’esperienza dei cartells ci prova che le difficoltà d’una gestione centralizzata 
sarebbero enormi.’  
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 Karl Kautsky, The Social Revolution [1902] (Chicago, Charles Kerr & Co: 1903) available at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/1902/socrev/ , last accessed 14/9/2014. The text, originally a series of 
two lectures delivered in April 1902 at the Amsterdam and Delft Socialist Reading Circle, was translated from 
German by Camille Polack for the Mouvement Socialiste, in which Sorel read it. See Karl Kautsky, ‘Reformes 
sociales et révolution sociale’, Le Mouvement Socialiste 4, 1902, pp. 1537-45,1633-48, 1748-53 and 1835-91; 
Karl Kautsky, ‘Le lendemain de la révolution sociale’, Le Mouvement Socialiste 5, 1903, pp. 203-20, 309-28 and 
385-418. The repeated critical references that Sorel makes to Kautsky’s text are interesting : the Frenchman saw 
the German theorist not only as a convinced supporter of state socialism, but also, targeting Kautsky’s precise 
plans of social organisation developed in the second part of his text, as a good example of the kind of utopianism 
and hollow planning that flourishes in the absence of a strong and organised proletariat.  
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 Sorel, Insegnamenti, p. 325. ‘Basta assegnare ad ogni fabbrica ciò che essa deve produrre; si obbietterebbe 
inutilmente che il consumo è variabile: ma esso varia in ragione delle alternative dell'attività e del riposo 
industriale; ora si suppone che si sopprimeranno queste alternative; dunque tutto essendo regolare, sarà facile 
avere ovunque una produzione regolare. Ecco una bella tautologia.’ 
111
 Ibid., p. 326. ‘… non è sognando le condizioni della vita patriarcale d’un passato fossilizzato, che si potrà 
ragionare sopra i mezzi d’attenuare mali che sono la controparte dello spirito d’iniziativa.’ 
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Both under corporatism and under state socialism it remains true, then, that ‘industry suffers 
when it is governed through the principles of the State’.112 What Sorel means by this is that 
the solution to the ills of capitalism does not consist in the erection of structures capable of 
limiting its progress. On the contrary, the solution to those ills can only come from the class 
that emerges when capitalism triumphs, that is from the organized proletariat. The 
competitive market conditions in which capitalists operate – what Sorel calls the world of 
capitalist fatality – give birth to ‘the emerging world of freedom; organised workers arise 
against disunited capitalists; those who aspire to a socialist society without masters revolt 
against masters who have created conditions for an extraordinarily rich society.’ 113  The 
emergence of the proletariat depends on the vitality of capitalism, and this is why the 
‘anticapitalistic vices’ of cartels and the evolutions towards corporatism or state socialism are 
damaging to socialism, because they destroy the conditions capable of giving birth to new 
proletarian institutions. The problem, in other words, is not exclusively one of economic 
organisation versus economic anarchy, but also one of class-consciousness and class 
organization. In the absence of a strong, conscious, and institutionally organized proletariat, 
all attempts towards economic organisation will have regressive consequences and lead to the 
dissolution of the working class. 
6.4.2 MARX’S SHORTCOMINGS AND THE ‘SPIRIT OF SEPARATION’ 
It is here that the weaknesses of Marx’s thought manifest themselves most evidently for Sorel. 
Essentially, Marx made three interconnected mistakes. To start with, he took capitalism for 
granted, and had an excessive faith in its ability to destroy older social relations and to create 
a world dominated by the competitive logic of markets. This led him to underestimate the 
influence that other forces, most notably the state and its institutions, could exert over 
capitalism, leading him to ignore the possibility that they might radically transform 
capitalism. Finally, because of his excessive faith in the power of global capitalism, he was 
led to underestimate the complexity and difficulty involved in the formation the proletarian 
revolutionary subject, believing that an organized and conscious working class would arise 
almost automatically: 
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 Ibid., p. 324. ‘…l’industria soffre per essere governata secondo i principii dello Stato.’ 
113
 Ibid., p. 391. ‘A questo mondo della fatalità crescente si oppone il mondo della libertà in via di formazione; 
di fronte ai capitalisti disuniti, sorgono i lavoratori che cercano di raggrupparsi; contro i padroni che creano le 
condizioni di una società prodigiosamente ricca, si rivoltano coloro che si orientano verso una vita socialista 
senza padroni.’ 
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‘The spirit of class struggle does not arise mechanically from conflicts over 
salary; experience teaches us that these conflicts can be resolved in a way 
conducive to social peace and inspiring solidarity between classes. In order to 
produce and, above all, to maintain the spirit of separation it is necessary to 
have institutions capable of generating and developing it; on this point, Marx’s 
thought is severely deficient.’114  
Once again, the crux of the question lies in the enormous distance separating the world in 
which Marx lived from that of the beginning of the twentieth century. The ‘experience’ that 
teaches contemporaries that the conflicting interests of salaried workers and capitalists can be 
reconciled through a corporatist economy under statist supervision, accompanied by an 
ideology of national solidarity between classes was not available to Marx. The German 
philosopher understood society in a binary way, as characterized by the opposition between 
the anarchic competition of the capitalist world and the reasoned organization of the 
proletarian one. The state was seen by him as incapable of being anything else but a puppet of 
the bourgeoisie; ‘Lassalle, on the contrary, saw the state as an independent force, capable of 
breaking capitalism; his model was Prussia, in which the tradition of Frederick the Great was 
still alive…’115 The experience of the end of the nineteenth century proves Lassalle right and 
Marx wrong, and not just on the question of the state: ‘Marx thought that the working class 
was the only class capable of uniting itself, and that it would face a capitalism increasingly 
divided by competition; but now we see that capitalists organize themselves too in a 
methodical way.’116  
The consequence of this capacity for capitalist self-organization is that workers ‘ask 
themselves how they might ever be able to replace the formidable organization of the 
bourgeoisie. They become fearful and… incline towards reformism or State socialism.’117 
There are, in short, ‘a number of general causes’ that have transformed socialism from the 
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 Ibid., p. 182. ‘Lo spirito della lotta di classe non si produce automaticamente in causa di conflitti che hanno 
luogo per il salario; l’esperienza ci insegna che questi conflitti possono essere risolti in modo da produrre la pace 
sociale e di mettere in rilievo la solidarietà delle classi. Perché lo spirito di separazione si produca e, soprattutto, 
si mantenga, occorrono delle istituzioni capaci di generarlo e svilupparlo; è su questo punto che l’insegnamento 
di Marx è più difettoso.’ Though we cannot pursue this connection in detail, Sorel’s ‘spirito di separazione’ is 
the reference for Gramsci’s ‘spirito di scissione’.  
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 Ibid., p. 393. ‘Lassalle, al contrario, vedeva nello Stato una forza libera, capace d’infrangere il capitalismo; 
egli pensava alla Prussia, in cui la tradizione di Federico il Grande sussisteva ancora.’ 
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 Ibid., p. 337. ‘Marx aveva creduto che la classe operaia fosse la sola capace di unificarsi, e che essa 
troverebbe davanti a sé un capitalismo sempre più diviso dalla concorrenza; ora succede che i padroni 
s’organizzano essi pure, in modo metodico…’ 
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 Ibid., pp. 336-7. ‘…essi fanno tristi riflessioni sulla debolezza dei sindacati ch’essi rappresentano, e si 
domandano come essi potrebbero sostituirsi a una organizzazione altrettanto formidabile di quella della classe 
borghese. Essi diventano timidi e in conseguenza… comincia a prodursi in loro una tendenza verso le idee 
riformiste o verso il socialismo di stato.’  
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historical movement of proletarian self-organization into the struggle for the conquest of 
power under presently existing institutions. 118  These causes should by now be familiar: 
protectionism, ‘which generates notions of solidarity [amongst classes]’ and has convinced 
socialist MPs that the right strategy is that of ‘appealing to the benevolence of the State in 
favour of their poor electors.’119 Cartels, that have ‘reinforced the notion of solidarity’ and 
have given birth to the introduction into economics of ‘methods borrowed from politics’ that, 
as we have seen, favour the reconciliation of conflicting economic interests in the same way 
as medieval diets did. When this reconciliation yields economic benefits, then parliamentary 
socialism has pretty much won the battle against Marxism. Workers would need ‘a heroic 
courage not to profit from the partial concessions that power can grant. Giving prominence to 
the electoral struggle means conceding to reformists the most essential aspect of their 
tactic.’120 
These developments have precise ideological consequences that further reinforce the state of 
inferiority in which the proletariat already finds itself. The social duties that flourish under a 
proto-corporatist regime presuppose a social hierarchy, and silently assume that the only 
redemption for the proletariat consists in the charity that the bourgeoisie bestows upon it. In 
Sorel’s striking words: ‘bourgeois magnanimity is a certificate of working class 
inferiority’.121 These are, to Sorel, corrupting tendencies that ‘accustom’ the proletariat to 
‘take the existence of a superior class as the starting point of all its reasonings’.122  It is 
superfluous to add that the material benefits deriving from these measures do not contribute to 
the historical development of the proletariat, and that in a socialist society without masters 
‘there can be no place for such notions of social duties’.123 Thus, while on the one hand 
‘capitalists become increasingly soft, and are each day more aware of the necessity of 
accomplishing their social duty’, workers, on the other hand, ‘appeal to the good sentiments 
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 Ibid., p. 395. ‘Delle cause generali hanno precipitato questo movimento di degenerazione, e reso molto 
difficile un ritorno alle antiche idee.’ 
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Mettere in primo ordine la lotta elettorale, è concedere ai riformisti la parte più essenziale della loro tattica.’ 
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 Ibid., p. 38 ‘La magnanimità della borghesia è un brevetto di inferiorità dato alla classe operaia’. 
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 Ibid., p. 35. ‘… corromperebbe il pensiero popolare fino alle sue radici, abituandolo a prendere per base dei 
suoi ragionamenti l’esistenza d’una classe superiore.’ 
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 Ibid., p. 31. ‘In una società socialista pienamente sbarazzata dei padroni, non può più esservi posto per queste 
antiche nozioni di doveri sociali; se ciò non apparisce perfettamente evidente a molte persone, è che poco 
numerosi sono ancora quelli che concepiscono una società senza padroni.’ On Menger and social duties see ibid., 
pp. 23-30. 
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of their masters, beg them for higher salaries and accept that their leaders present them as 
children that need to be treated with lenience.’124 These profound historical transformations 
were all unforeseen by Marx, who lived in an era in which ‘the progress of capitalism 
smashed… all the obstacles that laws, family traditions, local and ethnic reasons could oppose 
to it…’125 and whose theory ‘completely ignores the continuous enlargement of the modern 
State, that progresses in parallel with the enlargement of capitalism.’126 
Sorel insists a great deal on the fact that these developments unforeseen by Marx initiated the 
degeneration of Marxism, which has currently abandoned the idea of proletarian institutional 
development in favour of that of the conquest of the existing institutions of power. Marxism 
has become ‘the theory of a new [17]93’ and has embraced the belief in ‘the magical power of 
governmental force’.127 These developments make the maintenance of the spirit of separation 
an imperative far more important than it could have been in Marx’s time, when powerful 
historical forces worked for the maintenance of this spirit. And thus the question becomes that 
of how to resist institutional and ideological assimilation in the absence of the necessary 
institutional and economic conditions. 
6.4.3 STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE 
Sorel retains the minimum optimism required for the elaboration of a number of strategies of 
proletarian resistance to assimilation. One should, clearly, be aware of the transformations 
that work against the constitution of the proletariat as a revolutionary agent, and reflect 
seriously on their consequences. But for Sorel, the class antagonism that animates capitalism 
has not fully vanished: ‘it matters little that the revolution did not occur as Marx expected, as 
long as the organization of the workshop does not change so much as to eradicate what Marx 
saw as essential to it. As long as the work contract is a sale, and this sale occurs in a free 
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 Ibid. ‘ I capitalisti divengono più arrendevoli, e sono ogni giorno più penetrati della necessità di compiere il 
dovere sociale; il grande ostacolo che incontrerà oramai il socialismo proverrà dal dovere sociale. I lavoratori 
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dell’autorità e di servirsene per cambiare il mondo.’. In the following page Sorel argues that as soon as soon as 
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in which socialist deputies would play an increasingly important role, with the result that ‘in the present day 
Marx’s principles have been completely replaced by a mixture of Lassalleanism and democratic appetites.’. 
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market, average wages follow Ricardo’s theory, and classes remain independent from each 
other.’ 128  At the same time, despite this cautious optimism on the permanence of a 
fundamental clash of interests between salaried workers and owners of the means of 
production in contemporary capitalism, new developments cannot be ignored, and they call 
for a number of countermeasures, essentially for a new strategy capable of dealing with a new 
capitalism. The main challenge is that of how to ensure class separation in an environment in 
which the proletariat ‘does not look with contempt upon bourgeois civilisation, but with 
admiration and envy and aspires to think with the ideas of the ruling class.’129 
It is, and it is fundamental to underline this, as an answer to this question that Sorel begins to 
reflect upon violence. What is the role of violence in revolutionary transformations?  
‘… its value is wholly negative and destructive; it is necessary to halt a certain 
social development and allow a new one to emerge, but this is all it can achieve. 
Our academic socialists, fully immersed in the ecclesiastical spirit, mistake 
themselves when they attribute to violence the power of putting into practice the 
consequences of dogmas formulated by theorists.’130  
Violence, thus, can generate neither the proletarian society nor any kind of new society. Only 
institutions can give rise to new social conglomerations. However, its destructive role makes 
violence interesting in the present context, because it can fight against the assimilationist 
tendencies that characterize capitalist societies at the opening of the century. Violence is an 
instrument of class separation, an instrument that becomes important when a corporatist and 
statist capitalism fails to produce the class antagonisms that are essential to an historically 
progressive capitalism. Acts of violence, together with revolutionary strikes, can be useful, 
and whenever they occur, ‘the essential question is to determine how much the acts of 
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 Sorel, Insegnamenti, pp. 393-4. ‘Importa poco che la rivoluzione non si sia prodotta come Marx supponeva, 
purché l’organizzazione dell’opificio non si modifichi a tal punto da far sparire ciò che egli vi aveva osservato di 
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129
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l’invidia e l’ammira; aspira ad assimilarsi le idee della classe dei padroni.’ See also Sorel’s ‘L’esprit petit 
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 Ibid., pp. 41-2. ‘La violenza ha avuto una parte completamente preponderante; ma noi vediamo quale è il suo 
valore; esso è tutto negativo e distruttivo; essa è necessaria per arrestare uno sviluppo e per permettere ad uno 
nuovo di nascere, ma è questo tutto quello che può fare. I nostri socialisti universitari, che sono imbevuti di 
spirito ecclesiastico, si ingannano quando attribuiscono alla violenza il potere di mettere in pratica le 
conseguenze dei dogmi formulati dai teorici.’ 
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violence of strikers have pushed back the idea of social duty.’131 It is also extremely important 
to underline that Sorel assigns to violence the status of an, as it were, emergency measure, 
rather than seeing it as an essential requirement of any revolutionary transformation: ‘acts of 
violence are the most effective means of maintaining class separation in the absence of 
sufficiently strong and independent institutions, constituted in the womb of the proletariat, 
capable of guaranteeing this separation.’132 As we shall see in a few pages, this argument will 
receive a longer elaboration in the Reflection. 
Sorel returns constantly to what he sees as Marx’s greatest shortcoming, i.e. the superficiality 
with which he dealt with the problem of class formation. The success of socialism depends 
entirely on the growth in complexity of the proletarian social organism, i.e. on the existence 
of a wide and diversified set of proletarian institutions capable of harbouring the vast array of 
human activities that make up what we call civilisation.133 To separate this class from the 
dominant institutions and to allow it to develop this wealth of new and complex social 
arrangements is an enormously difficult task, and is a task that is made even more difficult by 
the assimilationist tendencies examined by Sorel. And yet, Marx ‘spoke as if the socialist 
idea, spread amongst workers engaged in a corporatist struggle against their bosses, would be 
sufficient to produce the organization of the proletariat…’134 As we have seen before, Sorel 
concedes that Marx’s ideas were formed under the influence of a different capitalism from 
that which dominates Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century, and thus his 
negligence can be partially understood. But even in conditions of a vibrant and historically 
progressive capitalism class-consciousness does not arise automatically: ‘the socialist feeling 
is extremely artificial, and Marx’s great fault was that of not insisting on this point’.135 
Sorel’s awareness of the changing capitalism of the early twentieth century, thus, brings him 
to consider the problem of class-consciousness as an incredibly important and urgent one. 
Under a certain type of capitalist regime, this consciousness is implanted in and supported by 
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 Ibid., p. 55. ‘…la grande questione non è di sapere qual vantaggio materiale può avere guadagnato una 
corporazione; l’essenziale è di determinare in quale misura l’idea di dovere sociale è stata respinta dalle violenze 
degli scioperanti.’ 
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 Ibid. Underlining mine. ‘…le violenze sono il mezzo più efficace per mantenere la separazione delle classi 
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proletariato, per assicurare questa separazione.’ 
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 In particular, the socialist society will need to develop insitutions capable of harbouring the progresses of law 
and of science. See Insegnamenti, pp. 56-72.  
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autonomous institutions; but in conditions of protectionism and national solidarity things are 
more complicated, for the autonomy of these institutions is constantly and systemically 
threatened. This is the emergency situation that might call for violence as a means of 
establishing class separation. Despite his awareness of the difficulties, Sorel does not quite yet 
give up on the historical possibility of proletarian socialism: ‘It is not yet possible to affirm 
that Marxism is dead; but it is time to examine more closely the means that can allow the 
development of the revolutionary proletariat.’136  
The list of prescriptions with which Sorel ends the Insegnamenti constitutes a mix of short 
and long-term measures. On the short term, the imperative is the maintenance of proletarian 
autonomy and resistance to the assimilationist forces of the state. Thus he advocates, for 
example, the abandonment of parliamentarism in order to preserve the class specificity of the 
socialist movement, and urges socialists ‘not to present themselves as the party of the poor, 
but as that of workers.’137 He calls for socialist abstention from ‘institutions created by the 
State and by the bourgeoisie’ and, echoing the conclusions to the ‘Avenir socialiste des 
syndicats’, suggests that workers ought to ‘lock themselves up in workers’ unions [camere del 
lavoro] and concentrate proletarian life around them.’ 138 In the long term, the hope is that of 
reinstating a virtuous and historically progressive dynamic capable of creating productive 
expansion, technological innovation, and, of course, that ‘insolidarity’ between classes that 
constitutes the most fertile environment that emerging proletarian institutions could ever hope 
to find. Thus, in addition to the violence highlighted above, he recommends the rejection of 
any ‘measure that might slow down industrial activity, even when it might momentarily 
benefit workers’139 Resistance to assimilation and the creation of an environment capable of 
fostering class separation: these are, as we shall see, the central themes of the Reflections on 
violence. 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
Before continuing, it might be worth offering a quick synopsis of the steps taken in this 
chapter. We have begun by examining how Sorel progressively came to see the post-Dreyfus 
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republican consensus in a negative way. We have suggested that the spectacle of an efficient 
republican state determined to cleanse French society of its reactionary foes and to reinforce 
republican institutions opened Sorel’s eyes to the effects that such a state could have on the 
working class. We then have dedicated the last part of the chapter to an examination Sorel’s 
analyses of the new capitalism, focussing on the questions of protectionism, social legislation, 
and economic organisation. We have highlighted that Sorel believed, rather correctly as a 
matter of historical record, that these developments produced assimilationist consequences for 
the working class, i.e. that they worked against the emergence of autonomous proletarian 
institutions arising from the experience of production in an advanced capitalist regime. We 
have thus underlined how the problem of class separation – of resistance to such tendencies – 
became central in Sorel’s thought and how, despite his awareness of the extremely difficult 
conditions in which the proletariat found itself, he tentatively outlined a number of strategies 
capable of protecting its class specificity. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE REFLECTIONS ON VIOLENCE 
‘La lotta di classe effettiva richiede la classe che la combatta e che la sappia 
combattere. Per fare la lotta di classe occorre innanzitutto la classe: ecco un’umile 
verità che i Lapalisse del socialismo internazionale pur mo’ cominciano a intuire.’ 
Il Divenire Sociale, 1905.1 
‘Cosa si può contrapporre, da parte di una classe innovatrice, a questo complesso 
formidabile di trincee e fortificazioni della classe dominante? Lo spirito di 
scissione, cioè il progressivo acquisto della coscienza della propria personalità 
storica, spirito di scissione che deve tendere ad allargarsi dalla classe protagonista 
alle classi alleate potenziali…’ 
Antonio Gramsci, 19302 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION  
In the final chapter of the thesis we examine Sorel’s most infamous book, the Reflections on 
violence. As we have highlighted in our introduction, this is the text on which a vast array of 
substantially misleading readings of Sorel, both contemporary and past are based. More than 
about Sorel, the Sorelian legend examined at the beginning of this thesis is a legend about the 
Reflections on violence, and thus it is necessary to examine this text in some depth. In what 
follows we shall try to read the Reflections in light of the two lines of enquiry that we have 
pursued throughout the thesis, i.e. the epistemological and Marxist themes. It is, however the 
latter aspect which sheds more light on this very complex text. The Reflections, we shall 
argue, are Sorel’s attempted solution to the problem of working class organization that he had 
begun analysing in the Insegnamenti, and they outline a number of possible strategies for the 
preservation of a revolutionary subject arising out of the experience of production in a 
capitalist economy. The background against which the Reflections should be read, in other 
words, is Sorel’s analysis of the mechanisms of assimilation that he had outlined in the 
Insegnamenti, and which he largely repeats in the Reflections. But, as many other Sorelian 
texts, the Reflections goes in many different directions, and thus it will also be necessary to go 
back, especially in the interpretation of the concept of myth, to the epistemological 
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 Il Divenire, ‘Torniamo alla vita!’, Il Divenire Sociale 1, 1905, p. 3. ‘Real class struggle requires a class to fight 
it and able to fight it. To engage in class struggle what is required, first and most, is the class: here is a humble 
truth that the representatives of international socialism are just now beginning to understand.’ 
2
 Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere, vol. 1, p. 333. 
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considerations on social sciences that had characterised his first and decisive engagement with 
Marx.  
By incorporating this very complex and at times perplexing text into the wider context of 
Sorel’s intellectual trajectory, we shall attempt to dissipate much of the obscurity which still 
surrounds it, trying to emphasize what is perhaps the source of most misunderstanding, 
namely that it is a series of considerations on class, class consciousness, and class formation, 
rather than a book about revolution. We shall begin with a number of preliminary remarks, in 
order to then move on to an analysis of the first section of the text, in which Sorel clearly 
circumscribes the argument for violence, assigning to proletarian violence precise limits, and 
more importantly an expected outcome. We then deal with the dynamics of class formation 
that can result from the immediate task of resistance to assimilation, and, in the longer term, 
through the experience of production in the context of a historically progressive capitalism. 
We conclude with a section in which we explain the notion of myth by connecting it to 
Sorel’s understanding of Marxist social science. 
7.2 PRELIMINARY REMARKS  
In this introductory section we do two things. First, we outline the general argument of the 
Reflections, i.e. we try to bring out the fundamental line of reasoning that animates the text - 
the bass note of the argument. We argue that the Reflections, also because of chronological 
reasons must be read as intimately connected to the analysis of the destruction of the class 
identity of the proletariat that Sorel had developed in the period between 1902 and 1905. If 
this hypothesis is accepted, it follows that the Reflections is a book about class rather than 
about revolution, and this, it is believed, gives to the reader a fundamental interpretative key 
to the text. Secondly, we briefly outline the complex editorial history of the book. We suggest 
that the greatest difference between the first Italian, and the 1908 French version, which has 
since become the standard reference for scholarly studies, is that the latter text is 
characterized, and perhaps burdened, by the addition of a number of secondary issues and 
questions, which tend to obscure its central argument. In the latter versions of the book we 
find, for example, references to John Henry Newman’s Grammar of Assent and to Bergson’s 
just pusblished L’Évolution Créatrice, references that would sit awkwardly in the 
straightforward Marxist framework that characterized the first Italian version of the 
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Reflection.3 What we suggest is that, in preparing the text for the French edition as a book, 
Sorel sought to bring its content to bear on a number of philosophical, epistemological, and 
religious discussions that were central to the French intellectual context of the early twentieth 
century. Simply, he added more layers to the text, transforming a relatively straightforward 
reflection on class identity into the complex text that we have come to know.  
7.2.1 A BOOK ABOUT CLASS, NOT REVOLUTION 
The background against which the Reflections on violence should be read and examined is the 
diagnosis of capitalist evolution as outlined by Sorel in the seminal 1902 articles, and at 
greater length in the Insegnamenti sociali. As we have seen, Sorel had become aware of the 
transformations that were occurring in advanced European capitalist societies, and had 
identified a number of important differences between mid-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
century capitalism, which according to him, explained the state of crisis in which Marxism 
had fallen. The defining traits of the new capitalism were its moderation, its ability to work 
with institutions, especially national ones, with which it should have normally entered into 
conflict, and most importantly its tendency to absorb the working class into bourgeois 
institutions and ideologies, and thus to blur the conflict between salaried workers and owners 
of the means of production that Marx had seen – and Sorel still saw – as essential to a vital 
and historically progressive capitalism. This process of working class assimilation was 
particularly problematic for Sorel, who had always conceived of socialism as the society 
resulting from the triumph of a precisely defined historical subject – the modern proletariat. 
The realization of socialism was seen, accordingly, as a slow process of institutional 
evolution, a process in which the social relations, ideas, economic, administrative and 
political forms that regulated the life of proletarian institutions would have gradually imposed 
themselves upon the existing order. We have repeatedly emphasized this longue durée 
understanding of the socialist transformation in Sorel’s writings, but it is necessary to go back 
to it in order to understand the questions and issues that are at the heart of the Reflections.  
As early as his study on Vico in 1896, Sorel had argued that the proletarian revolution would 
not be a work of historical destruction, but instead, as is any historical transformation of 
considerable magnitude, it would be characterized by a remarkable continuity. The 
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 This reference to the Évolution creatrice was added in the third edition of 1912, see Sorel, Reflections, p. 133n. 
The Bergson invoked by Sorel throughout the text, however, is the Bergson concerned about freedom and 
determinism with which he had engaged already in the late 1880s and early 1890s – it is the Bergson of the 
Données, rather than that of the Évolution. 
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revolutionary upheaval would only arrive when the ‘work of preparation’ of the proletariat, 
i.e. its slow process of institutional growth, was completed, thereby sanctioning and giving an 
official, de jure, stamp to institutions and social relations which would have long been, de 
facto, dominant in society. The revolution would be, in other words, an historical detail, for 
the real transformation would have already occurred, silently and subterraneously.  Pushing 
this insight to its logical conclusion, he had stated that ‘the greatest revolution that one can 
conceive will be peaceful, for it will not be faced by forces capable of rising again against it.’4 
It is thus not only the revolutionary upheaval that is unimportant in this longue durée 
understanding of the socialist transformation, but also violence which, it must be underlined 
forcefully, functions as a negative indicator of the ripeness of the historical conditions for 
socialism: the greater the violence required, the less developed the structures of the new 
society. A few years later, Sorel admitted that a revolution without violence was perhaps 
impossible, but did not change its marginal and secondary importance when compared to the 
longue durée process of institutional development: ‘Violence’ he wrote in 1899 ‘still remains: 
but it is merely the struggle necessary to make old branches fall, to give air to young and vital 
creations, to ensure the victory of institutions having already passed their tests.’5  
The sudden centrality that violence assumes in Sorel’s socialist thought cannot then be 
understood as a radical change of opinion on its role and on the possibilities that it can open 
up. To argue this, in the absence of a substantial explanation, would be hermeneutically 
adventurous to say the least, and it is more correct to believe, instead, that violence remains a 
secondary factor when compared to the process of institutional development. Violence, in 
other words, does not become capable of creating a new socialist society: its character, as 
Sorel repeated in the Insegnamenti, remains ‘wholly negative and destructive’. 6 But then why 
dedicate so many writings to a reflection on violence? The answer has already been implicitly 
given in the previous chapter, and has to do with Sorel’s newfound awareness of the difficult 
circumstances facing the European working class in the opening of the new century. As we 
have shown, Sorel had begun to understand the power of a number of social and economic 
forces that tended to the dissolution of the class identity of the proletariat. Powerful 
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 Sorel, ‘Étude sur Vico’, p. 935. ‘… la plus grande révolution que l’esprit puisse concevoir sera pacifique, - 
puisqu’elle ne trouvera pas, devant elle, des forces capable de renaitre.’   
5
 Sorel, ‘L’éthique du socialisme’, p. 289. la violence reste toujours ; mais elle n’est que l’effort nécessaire pour 
faire tomber de vieilles branches, pour donner de l’air à des créations jeunes et pleines de vie, pour assurer la 
victoire à des institutions ayant fait leurs preuves ; - elle n’est que l’anticipation sur l’unanimité qui va se former 
incessamment et qui rendra les réformes intangibles.’ 
6
 Sorel, Insegnamenti, p. 42. ‘esso [the value of violence] è tutto negativo e distruttivo’.  
 365 
mechanisms of assimilation of the working class into the bourgeois order were at work, and 
this was extremely problematic as it countered the constitution of the proletariat into a 
conscious revolutionary subject, halting the historical process of institutional growth that 
would eventually have led to socialism. Under a parliamentary regime, under a protected and 
increasingly planned economy, and in an ideological climate of national solidarity, the 
proletariat could never have developed its own autonomous institutions. Consequently, 
socialism would have become unrealizable: without the real movement, i.e. without the 
proletariat as an historical agent, deploying this agency in a process of institutional creation 
and development, Sorel’s socialism lost its cornerstone. The main avenue to socialism, in 
other words, was blocked, and these exceptional conditions called for exceptional 
countermeasures, amongst which violence stood out. These measures would have had to, on 
the one hand, foster a successful practice of resistance to assimilation, whereas on the other, 
in the longer term, they would have had to be conducive to the restoration of historically 
progressive processes of class separation and productive expansion, which were the 
necessary, though insufficient, conditions for the birth of durable and vital proletarian 
institutions.  
The Reflections, to repeat once more, are a series of solutions to the problem diagnosed in the 
Insegnamenti. Under, so to speak, ‘normal’ conditions of international, competitive and 
expansive capitalism these reflections would be unnecessary, for historical conditions would 
work in favour of the emergence of the working class as an historical agent and as a 
revolutionary subject. But in these unforeseen conditions, the maintenance of class separation 
becomes an imperative life or death question, and violence an extremely useful tool. This 
brings us to a decisive point, namely that the central problem of the Reflections is not that of 
revolution, but that of class. The questions of how to conquer power, of how to overthrow the 
existing order are very marginal in the Reflections: what animates the text is the problem of 
how to prevent the dissolution of the ideological and institutional identity of the proletariat. In 
a very general but absolutely fundamental way, the Reflections are an emergency manual, 
written with a recently acquired understanding of the existing mechanisms of assimilation, for 
the preservation of the revolutionary subject in a hostile environment. The scope of 
application of its arguments is, consequently, circumscribed to this specific, though important, 
problem of class preservation and formation. 
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A great number of interpretative mistakes on the Reflections come from believing that it is a 
book concerned with revolution, and, consequently, that the strategy of intransigence which it 
outlines – a strategy to be pursued through violent resistance informed by the myth of the 
general strike – is a revolutionary strategy, i.e. a strategy for the realization of socialism. But 
it is so only very indirectly. Socialism is far off, in the mists of the future, since it will arise 
out of presently non-existent or underdeveloped institutions. The Reflections is a book about 
class, about the collective subject whose development will yield socialism. The longue durée 
understanding of socialism as an historical process of proletarian institutional development is 
not challenged by the arguments of the Reflections: it is merely integrated and completed by a 
series of considerations on how to prevent, in the here and now, the destruction of the 
revolutionary subject. Thus, given the focus on class, and given the fear of its dissolution, 
what Sorel outlines in the Reflections are essentially a number of what we could call 
dynamics of class formation: i.e. dynamics capable of maintaining the separation between 
bourgeoisie and proletariat in the very difficult context of early twentieth century capitalism. 
In the presence of a number of mechanisms and processes that tend to reduce the conflict 
between sellers and purchasers of human labour, in the absence of strong working class 
institutions, how can the class identity of proletarian institutions be maintained? Sorel’s 
answer is that this can be done through a syndicalist epic punctuated by occasional acts of 
violence and informed by the revolutionary myth of the general strike. The Reflections are 
thus a manual for the development of the spirit of scission. But the necessity of this spirit of 
scission is not absolute, but topical. It is not an ahistorical requirement of every revolutionary 
movement, but, on the contrary, it is dictated by precise historical circumstances that tend to 
the destruction of the class identity of the proletariat. 
7.2.2 PHILOLOGICAL PRECAUTIONS 
Despite the general aim being sufficiently clear, the Reflections remain for a number of 
reasons, on which we shall dwell here, a complex and difficult text requiring some 
introductory precautions. Such precautions must start by acknowledging that, more than a 
book, the Reflections is a series of articles written and revised over a number of years. To give 
an anecdotal but still significant indication, we can say that there are 17 essays that preceded 
to the 1908 edition, which is the final product of two rewritings of a series of articles that 
Sorel originally published in Italy between 1905 and 1906. The Italian version was 
immediately followed by a substantially revised French one, appearing in the Mouvement 
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Socialiste in 1906, and, after more than a year, by a third, monographic, version published by 
Pages Libres in 1908. In the following editions, the text continued to change with the 
inclusion of additional references, and of three appendixes added respectively in 1910, 1913, 
and 1920.7  Even leaving the appendixes aside, the fact remains that the Reflections is a 
philologically complex text, written three times over a period of three years between 1905 and 
1908. The fact that the writing and revision process developed over such a long period makes 
for a very layered text, and it would be unwise to ignore this stratification. Without any 
ambition to exhaustiveness, we shall try to outline the editorial history of the Reflections in 
order to first give to the writing its correct chronology, and secondly to highlight how 
different concerns made their way into the successive rewritings of the original Italian 
version. 
The bulk of the Reflections on violence was written between 1905 and 1906 in two connected 
series of articles published in France and Italy in that period. The original core is the Italian 
version, a series of articles appearing in the syndicalist journal Il Divenire Sociale between 
October 1905 and April 1906, and collected in a book prefaced by Enrico Leone under the 
title Lo sciopero generale e la violenza.8 The book contains all the eight Italian articles that 
constituted the original ‘Reflections on violence’ series, and has a chapter structure slightly 
different from the one that will characterize the text that has been passed on to posterity. The 
text is structured by three broad argumentative lines: a reflection on the historical role of 
violence, developed in the first three chapters, a comparison between revolutionary and 
integrationist strike practices, and a number of considerations on the ethics of proletarian 
scission, which Sorel calls the ethics of violence and the ethics of the producers. With very 
slight and largely insignificant alterations, this is the structure that will characterize the 1908 
text. The first, and not unimportant thing to notice about the Italian articles is the dates in 
which they were written. The opening essay of the series, ‘La lotta di classe e la violenza’, 
appeared in the Divenire Sociale in October 1905. 9  This publishing date is extremely 
important because it gives chronological corroboration to our claim that there is an important 
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 The first appendix, ‘Unité et Multiplicité’, appeared in the second edition of the Reflections, the first one 
published by Marcel Rivière, and was written in September 1909. The second appendix is called ‘Apologie de la 
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8
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9
 Georges Sorel, ‘La lotta di classe e la violenza’, Il Divenire Sociale 1, 1905, pp. 294-8 and 313-15. 
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continuity between the Insegnamenti and the Reflections. The preface to the Insegnamenti, as 
we have seen, is dated March 1905, that is, seven months before the publication of the first 
article on class struggle and violence. If we consider a lag between writing and publication, 
we can assume that Sorel wrote at least the first three articles on violence straight after having 
finished the examination of the new capitalism in the Insegnamenti in the summer of 1905.  
While the Italian series of the ‘Reflections’ was still being written and published, Sorel began, 
in January 1906, to republish the articles in their original French for the Mouvement 
Socialiste. With the exception of a short introduction, the beginning of the series merely 
consisted in a republication of the Italian material without substantial alteration.10 Thus, the 
first three articles of the series, which substantially correspond to the first three chapters of the 
1908 text, are the original versions of the Italian articles. But when Sorel began to deal with 
the questions of revolutionary and political general strike and of the ethics of violence and 
production, he substantially widened the Italian text and changed the chapter structure. 11  
A detailed comparison of the two versions will not be attempted here, though it is a work that 
still needs to be done, and that probably will shed much light on certain key aspects of the 
text. But it is still necessary to give a general idea of how and why the text changed. 
Essentially, what we see is a widening of the scope of the arguments: whereas the Italian texts 
answered a set of questions grounded in the socialist world, the French ones try to occupy a 
wider intellectual field, and enter a number of more philosophical debates. Sorel himself gives 
an important indication of the general direction in which the revisions to the Italian texts go. 
Introducing the first substantially revised essay in the Mouvement Socialiste, he writes that he 
has taken particular care in developing ‘above all those [sections] which have affinities with 
M. Bergson’s philosophy, for this philosophy is still relatively unknown to the wider public 
and it has a great importance for all reasoning relating to social facts.’12 This remark is 
extremely important for two reasons. On the one hand, it signals Sorel’s desire to be taken 
seriously in the French context from the social scientific point of view, and thus it reveals the 
existence in the French versions of the Reflections of a secondary, but important, thread 
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revolving around questions of social scientific method. As we shall see later on, this sub 
thread is crucial for a correct understanding of Sorel’s notion of myth.  
On the other hand, more importantly, the reference to Bergson signals Sorel’s attempt to 
make his text relevant to a number of philosophical, epistemological, and religious debates 
that were animating French intellectual life around the time. Speaking at a very general level, 
the philosophical context was characterized by the same cleavages that we have examined in 
the first chapter, that is to say it still consisted in an important way of a discussion about free 
will, determinism, and the limits of science. In addition to this, a second, related, discussion 
had become topical, a discussion that was made more politically charged by the climate of 
anticlericalism of those years, namely that of the relationship between science and religion. If 
one were to describe the main cleavage animating French philosophy in those years, one 
would have to speak of a movement of critique, spearheaded by Bergson and a number of 
disciples such as Eduard Le Roy, against what were perceived as the excessively rationalistic 
tendencies that dominated the French university. It is Bergson himself who, writing in 1905 in 
the Revue Philosophique, offers a very clear definition of the philosophical stakes of these 
various debates about science and religion: ‘The need for a more truly empirical philosophy – 
closer to the immediately given than was the traditional philosophy elaborated by thinkers 
who were predominantly mathematicians – is felt in every country and by many thinkers.’13  
Sorel was deeply engaged in these debates, for they represented the continuation of the 
epistemological line of thought that had characterized his beginnings as an intellectual. As 
was hinted at in the fourth chapter, the pragmatist and historicist tendencies of his 
epistemology had become more marked after his encounter with Vico’s verum ipsum factum. 
The movement of his epistemological thought had subsequently been characterized by a 
gradual abandonment of the strong ideal of science that he had previously defended, and by 
the attempt to construct a viable theory of science as an historical and artificial epistemic 
enterprise. 14  We can only speculate as to why Sorel decided to amend the text of the 
Reflections to include this epistemological and scientific dimension; but it is certain that he 
did so, as both French versions are characterized by a greater emphasis placed on questions of 
science and by a more thoroughly developed critique of the epistemic ambitions of certain 
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understandings of social science. This can not only be ascertained by the proliferation of 
Bergsonian references, but, much more convincingly, by pointing out that the expression 
petite science, by which Sorel means an excessively deterministic and rationalist 
understanding of scientific enquiry, is entirely absent from the Italian essays. We can thus 
conclude that the later versions of the Reflections are characterized by the addition of this 
important argumentative layer. In addressing the French public, Sorel moves within an 
intellectual landscape with which he is more familiar, and he insists on philosophical and 
epistemological questions that he knows to be topical. It is fundamental to understand that, 
however important, the sub thread about science and epistemology constitutes an additional 
secondary line of thought, something added later to a text that remains essentially concerned 
with processes of class formation and dissolution. It is by underlining this stratification that 
the book can be more easily understood. 
The addition of this second, epistemological and social scientific, layer to the original Italian 
text is an example of a wider tendency that characterizes the French rewritings of the 
Reflections, a tendency that could be summed up by saying that Sorel’s self-consciousness as 
an author grows. This self-awareness is most evident in the introductory ‘Letter to Daniel 
Halévy’ – a text dated July 1907, and thus, significantly, written well after the completion of 
the writing of the Reflections – in which Sorel seeks to present himself and his views to a 
broader public than his usual socialist audience, for ‘the readers of this book will be 
bewildered if I do not submit a kind of defence that will better enable them to see things from 
my own point of view.’15 In the text, an exercise in self-representation and a self-portrait for 
public display, Sorel casts himself ostentatiously as an intellectual outsider sheltered from 
hollow adulation, thus not running ‘the risk of becoming my own disciple’.16 The desire to 
present himself in a particular way emerges perhaps most clearly in a rare instance of literary 
vanity in which he suggests that he is the unnamed target of Viviani’s attacks on 
syndicalism.17 But beyond literary vanity, Sorel’s awareness of the public for which he is 
writing is most evident in the attempt, outlined just above, to cover a wider intellectual space 
and to intervene in the philosophical, epistemological and religious debates that animated 
French intellectual life of the early twentieth century. As we have stated above, though we are 
not going to attempt this, an exhaustive comparison between the three versions of the 
Reflections would shed much light on this dynamic.  
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For our purposes, it is sufficient to underline that there are differences between the Italian and 
the French version, and that they can be explained, on a general level, by Sorel’s desire to 
transform the Reflections into a book capable of entering a greater number of French debates. 
More precisely, the French versions are characterized by a greater emphasis of 
epistemological questions. This, quite naturally, does not help the readability of the book, and 
in fact, by adding a large number of centrifugal references, contributes to obscure the central 
argumentative line of the Reflections, to which we now turn. 
7.3 THE INSTRUMENTALITY OF VIOLENCE 
We begin by outlining what we believe to be the fundamental argumentative line of the 
Reflections, which we suggest is a rationale for violence closely connected to the peculiar 
conditions of early twentieth century capitalist societies that Sorel had previously examined. 
Socialism, the argument goes, becomes a chimera in a context in which the working class is 
subjected to powerful forces that try to erase its class identity: under current conditions, 
workers can aspire to a larger share of capitalist prosperity, but not to a radical transformation 
of society. The institutional development of the proletariat can only occur under an economic 
regime of a certain type, and the economic and social trends that characterized capitalism in 
Sorel’s time are not conducive to this class development. Proletarian violence is an answer to 
these challenging conditions. The functions of violence are twofold: on the one hand, it is a 
practice that fosters class identity, whereas on the other it can, potentially, break the trend 
towards assimilation and bring the bourgeoisie back to its role of capitalist innovation, 
thereby restoring the conditions fit for the institutional development of the proletariat. 
This general rationale for violence is outlined in the first two chapters of the Reflections, 
which construct the framework within which the following chapters move. In this section, 
however, we examine an additional text, which, we argue, functions as a bridge between the 
first chapters and the rest of the book. In the text, written as a preface for an Italian edition of 
the ‘Avenir socialiste des syndicats’ that never appeared, Sorel anticipates the arguments that 
he would develop more thoroughly in the rest of the Reflections, circumscribing with great 
precision the function of the general strike in his syndicalist theory. He establishes an 
important distinction between the urgent task of class formation and the long-term one of 
institutional development. He limits the role of the general strike to the former, arguing that 
proletarian institutional development cannot be expected to develop out of the practice of 
social conflict, but, instead, can only emerge out of the experience of production.  
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7.3.1 ASSIMILATION AND THE RATIONALE FOR VIOLENCE 
To understand how closely the arguments of the Reflections are connected to the reasoning 
about assimilation and class formation begun in the Insegnamenti, one has to look no further 
than the opening chapters of the book. Already in the short introduction that Sorel added in 
January 1906 to the articles in the Mouvement Socialiste, the focus on the long-term historical 
consequences of violence emerges clearly. Why is the phenomenon of proletarian violence 
important? To start with, it is a phenomenon that emerges spontaneously in strikes, and thus 
from working class practice, and, as such, it ought to claim the attention of committed 
socialists. But, more importantly, proletarian violence is described as a social phenomenon 
capable of changing what Sorel calls ‘rapports sociaux actuels’, and what Jennings translates 
as ‘present social conditions.’ 18 It is from this perspective of changing relations between 
social classes that Sorel examines violence. He cites the Insegnamenti and highlights that the 
function of violence lies in its potential ability to maintain ‘the division between the 
proletariat and the bourgeoisie’19 This potential alteration of the relations between classes is, 
in turn, capable of engendering a wider long term process of historical transformation, and it 
is with this in mind that a socialist ought to examine the phenomenon of violence. As he puts 
it: 
 ‘The socialist imagines… that he has been transported into a very distant future, 
so that he can consider current events as elements of a long and completed 
development and that he can attribute to them the colour that they might take for 
the future philosopher. Such a procedure certainly presupposes a considerable 
use of hypotheses; but there would be no social philosophy, no reflection about 
the process of evolution and even no important action without certain hypotheses 
about the future.’20 
The historicism examined in the fourth chapter of this thesis comes to the fore here: 
understanding of the social world is historical, and thus can only happen when the dust has 
settled, when a social transformation has exhausted itself. But in the absence of this 
understanding, it is still necessary to examine current social forces, and in order to do so one 
must look at them from the perspective of this hypothetical future. Proletarian violence, to 
come back to the main issue, can have a decisive influence on social development, and it is 
for this reason that it needs to be examined. The central question thus, is not that of judging 
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the permissibility of violence or of ‘awarding prizes for virtue’, 21  but that of trying to 
understand the historical role of violence, i.e. the social transformations that it is capable of 
engendering or, more modestly and more accurately, allowing to happen. 
Having established that it is the historical, long-term consequences of violence that deserve 
attention, and that the object of his enquiry will be ‘the function of the violence of the working 
classes in contemporary socialism’,22 Sorel assigns to violence a revolutionary role. But, as 
we pointed out above, this revolutionary role is indirect. Violence will not create socialism, 
but will allow the proletariat to assert its independence from the bourgeois institutions that 
increasingly encroach upon its organisations. Not all violence, to be sure, is revolutionary. 
When it is used as an instrument of negotiation, in order to obtain concessions granted by the 
existing status quo, it loses its revolutionary character: it is in this art of negotiating with the 
bourgeoisie by threatening it with violence and disorders that parliamentary socialists excel. 
Revolutionary violence is the exact opposite: it is a tool capable of breaking the corporatist 
dynamic of negotiation between classes whose interests ought to collide. It is easy to see how 
the framework within which this distinction between different uses of violence moves is the 
one laid out in the Insegnamenti. Thus, ‘we should not ask whether it [violence] is more or 
less directly advantageous… but rather… what will result from the introduction of violence 
into the relations of the proletariat with society. We are not comparing two kinds of 
reformism [i.e. violent and non-violent], but want to know what contemporary violence is in 
relation to future social revolution.’ 23  The subtext of these lines is sufficiently clear. A 
proletariat that uses violence tactically, to negotiate with the bourgeoisie, is bound to be, 
sooner or later, assimilated into bourgeois structures, and thus to lose its revolutionary 
potential. The revolutionary role of violence thus consists in its ability to break the 
assimilationist dynamic and to bring back the proletariat to its revolutionary role. 
This revolutionary role is inextricably bound to the class identity of the proletariat, i.e. to the 
working class’s consciousness of the fact that its role of producers puts its interests in 
uncompromising opposition with those of the bourgeoisie. It is significant that the Reflections 
open with a discussion about the loss of this class identity, which Sorel ascribes to the 
excessive weight of parliamentarism in contemporary French socialism. The logic of electoral 
success, by obscuring and, eventually, replacing that of class struggle, functions as a 
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mechanism of assimilation, effectively destroying the class specificity of the proletariat and 
creating a socialism that has nothing to do with Marxism.  
 ‘Parliamentary socialism speaks as many languages as it has types of clients. It 
addresses itself to workmen, to small employers, to peasants, and, in spite of 
Engels, it aims at reaching farmers; at times it is patriotic, at others it rants 
against the army. No contradiction is too great – experience having shown that it 
is possible, in the course of an electoral campaign, to group together forces 
which, according to Marxist conceptions, should normally be antagonistic. 
Besides, cannot a parliamentary deputy be of service to electors in every 
economic situation? In the end the term “proletariat” becomes synonymous with 
the oppressed; and there are oppressed in all classes.’24 
The political representation of the oppressed, the pressure exerted upon governmental 
institutions in order to further the interests of those oppressed, is alien to Marxism. The 
Marxist revolution is the high point of a conflict between purchasers and sellers of human 
labour, a clash occurring in a world in which traditional allegiances and institutions have been 
destroyed by the power of capital. Parliamentary democracy works against the constitution of 
these two opposing camps, and not only because it forces socialists to abandon the criterion of 
class. Parliamentarism, to Sorel, is the regime of compromise between conflicting interests, 
and thus it denies the existence of class antagonism at a more fundamental level: it tries to 
create ‘social peace by legislation’ and to show ‘to the poor that the government has no 
greater concern than to improve their lot… imposing the necessary sacrifices upon people 
who possess a fortune judged to be too great for the harmony of the classes.’25 
Despite this parliamentary work of class dissolution, Sorel is not completely pessimistic, and 
goes as far as saying that the policy of looking for social peace at all costs might have 
unforeseen radicalizing effects upon the proletariat. He concedes that ‘the efforts which have 
been made to remove the causes of hostility which exist in modern society have undoubtedly 
had some effect’ 26 , but he suggests that bourgeois and governmental laxity and the 
concessions that they imply can, in some cases, foster proletarian intransigence. The facility 
with which unions obtain concessions from owners desiring social peace brings workers to 
understand that there are no economic necessities behind their masters’ previous refusals to 
grant a higher salary or fewer working hours. In Sorel’s words, they ‘perceive that the activity 
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of conciliation and arbitration rests upon no economico-juridical foundation’.27 This makes 
the proletariat aware of the immense amount of wealth that capitalism can generate, and leads 
them to demand more, pushing them away from an ideology of conciliation and compromise 
that flourishes in conditions of productive scarcity, and back into the terrain of class struggle, 
which characterizes a vital capitalist economy: with the consciousness of the immense 
prosperity generated by capitalism, ‘workers think they would be dupes if they did not 
demand all that they could obtain; they look upon the employer as an adversary with whom 
one comes to terms after a war.’28 
What Sorel is highlighting here are two historical possibilities. The key question is whether 
the processes of pacification and proletarian integration into the existing system will be 
successful or not. On the one hand, the efforts of a large number of bourgeois and statist 
institutions work for the inclusion of the working classes in the existing system; on the other, 
the proletariat can refuse this integration and engage the bourgeoisie on the revolutionary 
terrain of class struggle. It is to the exploration of this latter possibility that the Reflections is 
dedicated, but the fact that Sorel presents two alternative options does not mean that he 
believes them to be equally possible. In fact, the dominant tendency is, for Sorel, the former 
one, that tending towards proletarian integration. This can be deduced, as had been 
highlighted above, by the success of parliamentary socialism and of the various ways with 
which it attempts to strike deals with the bourgeoisie, and by the control that either party or 
state exert over working class organizations. But, more fundamentally, this tendency towards 
national solidarity and assimilation has an economic base. Conciliation and concessions 
require a timid, decadent bourgeoisie, and this bourgeoisie can only flourish in conditions of 
productive stasis, in an economic policy that seeks to moderate the expansive logic of 
authentic capitalism. 
‘The ideology of a timorous, humanitarian bourgeoisie professing to have freed 
its thought from the conditions of its existence is grafted on to the degeneration 
of the capitalist economy; the race of bold captains who made the greatness of 
modern industry disappears to make way for an ultra-civilised aristocracy that 
demands to be left in peace. This degeneration fills our parliamentary socialists 
with joy. Their role would vanish if they were confronted with a bourgeoisie 
which was energetically engaged on the paths of economic progress, which 
regarded timidity with shame and which was proud in looking after its class 
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interests. In the presence of a bourgeoisie which has become almost as stupid as 
the nobility of the eighteenth century, their power is enormous.’29 
The logic of this reasoning should appear clear enough. Capitalism breeds economic and 
technological progress, it dissolves old social relations, and creates two antagonistic classes. 
This line of historical development has come to a halt, and this prevents not only economic 
progress, but also the formation of the revolutionary subject. As he had previously done, Sorel 
highlights the intimate connection between the future socialist society and a present world 
shaped by the progressive power of capital: ‘Capitalism creates: the heritage that socialism 
will receive, the men who will suppress the present regime, and the means of bringing about 
this destruction...’30 Only in these conditions will the proletariat be able to begin its work of 
construction of the new society, ‘to develop embryonic forms of its organizations of 
resistance, so that it may build institutions that… depend solely upon the position of producer 
in large-scale industry.’31 Only capitalism, in simpler words, can create the proletariat, and 
only the proletariat can construct socialism.  
‘In a society so enfevered by the passion for the success which can be obtained 
through competition, all the actors walk straight before them like veritable 
automata… they are subject to very simple forces and not one of them dreams of 
escaping from the circumstances of his condition. It is only then that the 
development of capitalism is carried out with that inevitability which struck 
Marx so strongly and which seemed to him comparable to that of a natural 
law.’32 
We are back to the analyses of capitalist evolution that had characterized the 1902 articles and 
the Insegnamenti. The capitalism of the 1850s, for Sorel, is very different from that of the 
early twentieth century. The latter is characterised by bourgeois decadence, which is the 
process by which the bourgeoisie abandons its role of economic innovation and productive 
expansion in order to concentrate on other pursuits. It is a spirit that most befits the current 
economic and social situation, in which protectionism replaces free trade, corporatism takes 
the place of internal competition, and social peace replaces class struggle. Under these 
conditions, the interests of a decadent bourgeoisie and of a proletariat dreaming of inclusion 
in the bourgeois world march in harmony. Socialist agitation can maintain the revolutionary 
spirit in the working classes, but these social and economic trends make this a Sisyphean task: 
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‘how can they [revolutionary socialists] hope to give back to the bourgeoisie an ardour which 
is extinguished?’33 
It is here that Sorel spells out the rationale for violence most clearly. The need for violence is 
dictated by very specific social and economic conditions, because violence has the power of 
opening up a new historical possibility, i.e. of reinstating the progressive historical dynamic 
that Marx had detected in the capitalism of his days, but which was now withering away. 
‘Capitalism drives the proletariat into revolt, because in daily life the bosses use 
their force in a direction opposed to the desire of their workers… Capitalist force 
is at the base of this entire process and it operates in an imperious manner. Marx 
supposed that the bourgeoisie had no need to be incited to employ force; but we 
are faced with a new and very unforeseen fact: a bourgeoisie which seeks to 
weaken its own strength. Must we believe that the Marxist conception is dead? 
By no means, because proletarian violence comes upon the scene at the very 
moment when the conception of social peace claims to moderate disputes; 
proletarian violence confines employers to their role as producers and tends to 
restore the class structure just when they seemed on the point of intermingling in 
the democratic morass.’34 
Although he will clarify in greater detail the kind of violence he has in mind, it appears 
immediately clear that the violence advocated by Sorel is not a pure, self-justifying violence, 
but an instrumental violence that tends toward a precise goal. This goal is neither the conquest 
of the state, of the existing institutions of power, nor, as we are about to see, that of 
proletarian institutional development, but instead, more modestly, the restoration of the 
separation between classes that characterizes an historically progressive capitalism. If, on the 
one hand, violence can prevent the proletariat from being absorbed into bourgeois institutions, 
on the other, ‘in an indirect manner’, proletarian violence ‘can operate on the bourgeoisie so 
as to reawaken a sense of their own class interests.’ 35 Sorel’s encouragements to ‘repay with 
black ingratitude the benevolence of those who wish to protect the workers, to meet with 
insults the homilies of the defenders of human fraternity, and to respond by blows to the 
advances of the propagators of social peace’36 are pronounced with a precise intention, that of 
bringing back the bourgeoisie to its economic role and of preventing the conciliation of 
interests, which a progressive historical dynamic puts in opposition: acts of violence, to sum 
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up in a formula, ‘can only have historical value if the are the brutal and clear expression of 
class struggle’.37 
7.3.2 FUNCTION AND LIMITS OF THE GENERAL STRIKE 
The first two essays of the Reflections outline the rationale for violence and constitute the 
widest framework of the book. Within this general rationale for violence, required to prevent 
assimilation and to bring back the bourgeoisie to its progressive role of capitalist production, 
move the arguments outlined in the rest of the book. It is not a coincidence that the first two 
chapters remained virtually unchanged throughout the rewritings: this has to do with the fact 
that they constitute the argumentative backbone of the Reflections. The work which Sorel 
attempts in the following chapters is a work of finesse: he tries to provide answers to a 
number of more specific questions that arise from the general rationale for violence, as 
outlined at the beginning of the book. Of what does proletarian violence consist exactly? In 
what ways does it invigorate the class-consciousness of producers? What are the 
consequences, for the society to come, of a proletariat fully emancipated from bourgeois 
traditions? And finally, but most importantly, what is the line of demarcation between the 
topical, temporary, task of resistance to assimilation and the development of institutions based 
in the experience of production? 
The clearest answer to the last question comes from a text not included in the Reflections. 
After having published the first two essays of the Reflections in the Divenire Sociale, Sorel 
wrote a short preface for a proposed Italian edition of the ‘Avenir Socialiste des Syndicats’ 
entitled ‘Le syndicalisme révolutionnaire’, which was printed in the Mouvement Socialiste in 
November 1905. 38  The importance of this text is that, aside from being a rather clear 
anticipation of the arguments that will be developed in the remaining essays of the 
Reflections, it establishes a crucial distinction between the two tasks that await the proletariat 
in its progress towards socialism and circumscribes the role of the general strike to only one 
of them. On the one hand, there is the immediate task of resistance to assimilation, whereas 
looming ahead on the historical horizon is that of institutional development. In the first two 
chapters of the Reflection, the role of violence is described in a general way, and it is that of 
preventing assimilation and returning the bourgeoisie to its progressive historical role. Here 
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Sorel becomes more precise, and argues that the practice of social conflict through the general 
strike can only perform the first task, whereas the institutional development of the proletariat, 
i.e. the process of institution building that will yield the fundamental social, juridical, and 
political structures of the socialist society, can only emerge from the experience of 
production, rather than from that of social conflict. This distinction, as we shall see, is crucial 
to a correct understanding of the Reflections. Conflict creates class identity, which in turn 
might restore the class oppositions typical of a progressive capitalism. Only then, in a 
capitalist society structured around these oppositions, can the work of institutional 
development begin, and the historical source of these new institutions will be, more than 
social conflict, the experience of production. 
Moving from the general to the particular, Sorel looks for a proletarian practice that is capable 
of performing the functions and roles that he had cast as essential in the opening two essays of 
the Reflections. This practice is what he calls the general strike. In describing the processes of 
assimilation typical of capitalist societies of the early twentieth century, Sorel had repeatedly 
identified the political realm as the terrain in which practices of compromise and social peace 
were most successful, whereas the fundamental opposition between workers and capitalists 
remained more or less in place in the economic sphere. Despite the powerful mechanisms of 
assimilation at work, Sorel had argued that ‘as long as the work contract is a sale… in a free 
market… classes remain independent from each other.’ 39  Strikes, Sorel remarks, are 
essentially economic conflicts, occurring when, despite the best efforts of conservatives and 
parliamentary socialists, the interests of employers and workers collide: the practice of 
struggle in strikes can thus have the effect of consolidating the class identity of the proletariat 
by reminding to workers the irreducible opposition between their interests and those of their 
employers. ‘The general strike’ he underlines ‘was not born out of profound reflections on the 
philosophy of history; it issues from practice.’40 That the general strike has the power to 
cement class identity, thus, derives from the fact that it is a form of struggle that emerges 
from the quintessentially proletarian experience, i.e. that of economic conflict in a free labour 
market. It emerges from those aspects of proletarian life which are still shaped by the power 
of capital, and thus are somewhat insulated and protected from the practice of social 
conciliation. Because it is based in persisting economic conflict between owners and workers, 
the general strike brings to the fore the specifically proletarian elements of socialism: workers 
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engaged in strikes are people and groups predominantly defined by their role in the capitalist 
economy.  
Precisely because it is based in the basic conflict of capitalism, the general strike is a form of 
social struggle that does not require excessive involvement in bourgeois institutions, and thus 
can avoid the assimilationist traps that these institutions conceal. Once again, Sorel underlines 
the magnitude of the socialist transformation, which amounts to nothing less than a 
completely transformed society, and that thus requires the overcoming of the institutions and 
ideas that characterize the current one. This is why he underlines that the general strike is 
completely separated from parliamentary practice and that, more radically, it ‘expresses, with 
infinite clarity, that the time of politicians’ revolutions is over’.41 Parliamentary politics, as 
Sorel has repeatedly asserted, and continues to assert in this essay, are one of the strongest 
factors of proletarian dissolution, for they foster a practice of negotiation and conciliation. No 
revolutionary transformation can emerge from this conciliation. A revolution carried on 
through existing political institutions will certainly produce a new ruling class, but not a new 
society, since the latter can only arise out of institutions emerging from a substantially new 
historical experience. What this implies is the necessity of a clean break from the bourgeois 
political and ideological tradition, and thus minimal involvement with the institutions that 
harbour and replicate this tradition. From this perspective, the general strike appears as a step 
in the right direction. 
‘This formula [of the general strike] ignores human rights, absolute justice, 
political constitutions and parliaments; it denies not only the government of the 
capitalist bourgeoisie, but also all hierarchy more or less analogous to bourgeois 
hierarchy.’42 
These political ideals, which are absent from the revolutionary practice of the general strike, 
are the values and notions that animate bourgeois institutions and that have arisen out of a 
bourgeois historical experience. They are thus irrelevant to the socialist society, which, to 
repeat, can only emerge from the historical maturation of institutions and social relations 
grounded in the historical experience of the working class.  
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It is important to underline that the proletarian historical experience from which the socialist 
society will emerge is twofold. On the one hand, it is the experience of economic and social 
conflict with employers, a conflict that is intrinsic to capitalism, or at least to its historically 
progressive variants; on the other, however, it is also the experience of organized, large-scale 
production. Now, in the ‘Préface de 1905’ Sorel outlines very clearly a fundamental feature of 
his syndicalism, which is the division of labour between these two aspects of the historical 
experience of the working class. A certain practice of social conflict is what gives to the 
revolutionary class its self-consciousness – its subjectivity – whereas the experience of 
production is what will provide the basis for the future organization of society. Class struggle, 
in other words, prevents assimilation, whereas industrial organization creates the new society. 
These two tasks, moreover, have different temporalities. The practice of conflict, and the 
class-formation that derives from it, is the short-term, urgent task, whereas the social relations 
and institutions that will shape the socialist society, to be looked for in the experience of 
production, will emerge at a later stage. This tension between the immediate task of class 
formation and the longer term one of institutional development is a fundamental distinction of 
the Reflections, and we can detect it rather clearly in the text we are examining now.  
When socialists stigmatize the revolutionary strike as ‘anarchist madness’, and wonder ‘what 
could follow the general strike’, they are giving evidence of their ideological submission to 
bourgeois models, and displaying their inability to imagine radically new institutions. 43 But 
these radically new institutions will emerge out of the experience of production more than out 
of the experience of struggle. After the general strike, argues Sorel, ‘there would only be only 
one possibility: a society structured on the model of the organization of production, that is, a 
truly socialist society.’44 Contrary to the received interpretation, we can see, and shall see 
more clearly later, that Sorel is very aware of the necessity of a new social organization, of 
structures capable of organizing the post-revolutionary society. He is conscious of the fact 
that ‘previous revolutions were not purely and merely wars [i.e. instances of social conflict] 
but… they served to realize new juridical systems.’45 It is in the experience of production 
under capitalism that one has to look for the seeds of the future socialist organization of 
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society. ‘The source of the laws of tomorrow is evidently in the good practices of the 
workshop; socialism will not only inherit the machinery created by capitalism and the science 
that emerged of technological development, but also procedures of cooperation that will have 
slowly consolidated themselves in factories…’46 
What this means is that the general strike, because it is a practice of social conflict, generates 
neither new juridical relations, nor new institutions and is essentially incapable of bringing 
about the socialist society. This society will emerge from industrial organization, which will 
provide models and practices to budding proletarian institutions. But in the present the task at 
hand is a different one, because the very concrete present risk is that of never seeing the 
development of these institutions. Under conditions of national, corporatist capitalism ‘the 
proletariat finds itself dragged into a sphere alien to its nature; it becomes the collaborator of 
capitalism; social peace thus appears very close to becoming the normality.’47 This is why the 
more urgent task, the task to whose examination the Reflections are dedicated, is that of class 
formation, of separating the proletariat from the rest of society, and it is here that the role of 
the general strike, in virtue of it being a practice of conflict, emerges most clearly. ‘Preserving 
the idea of war’ he writes ‘appears more necessary now than ever, when so many efforts are 
attempted to oppose social peace to socialism.’48 
The central aspect of the general strike is that it is a practice of struggle that emerges from the 
economic conflicts characterizing the relations of workers to their employers in a capitalist 
economy. It does not require resources and ideas that are alien to the proletarian experience, it 
can be carried on without parliamentary representation and without the consequent adoption 
of bourgeois ideals in the socialist struggle. But, in order to fulfil its revolutionary potential, 
the struggle of strikers must be carried on in a particular way. Individual strikes ‘would only 
be economic incidents of small social importance if revolutionaries did not alter their 
character and transform them into episodes of a social war. Each strike… is a skirmish in the 
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great struggle which we call the general strike.’49 If the practice of the general strike is to be 
successful, it requires a specific narration, a particular way of being understood and lived by 
those who practice it: it must be seen as an episode in an historical clash between bourgeoisie 
and proletariat. Only in this way can the general strike play its revolutionary role, which is not 
that of creating socialism, but the more urgent one of preserving and strengthening the 
ideological and historical identity of the proletariat. On this, Sorel is unequivocally clear: 
‘By operating in a capillary manner it [revolutionary syndicalism] can sustain 
strike actions everywhere; long wars have developed the idea of fatherland 
[patrie]; local and frequent strikes continuously rejuvenate the socialist idea in 
the proletariat, reinforce feelings of heroism, of sacrifice and of union, and 
maintain alive the hope of the revolution.’50 
The ‘Préface de 1905’ is an extremely important text for a number of reasons. To start with, it 
introduces the general strike as the model of social conflict advocated by Sorel. It is a model 
of conflict characterized by the preference of diffused, small or medium-scale instances of 
conflict over the presence of large centralized unions (‘defenders of social peace’ he writes 
‘wish that proletarian organizations become sufficiently powerful to be condemned to 
prudence’51) and that takes as the basic instance of conflict the clash of interests between 
employers and workers that,  despite everything, still characterize contemporary capitalism. 
Secondly, Sorel assigns a limited and precise role to the practice of conflict through the 
general strike: this role is that of class formation, of developing a revolutionary class-
consciousness, and not that of establishing the proletarian institutions that will regulate the 
future society. Finally, Sorel begins to sketch an idea that will be central to the rest of the 
Reflections, namely that social conflict, when narrated, understood, and practiced in a certain 
manner, generates identity. 
7.4 CONFLICT AS CLASS FORMATION 
With the exception of chapter three and the final chapter, the Reflections on violence explore 
the questions put forward by the ‘Préface de 1905’. Though Sorel makes constant references 
to issues that we have already examined, such as the dangers of assimilation and the 
                                                 
49
 Ibid., pp. 60-1. ‘Les grèves ne seraient que des incidents économiques d’une assez faible portée sociale, si les 
révolutionnaires n’intervenaient pour en changer le caractère et en faire des épisodes de la lutte sociale. Chaque 
grève, si locale qu’elle soit, est une escarmouche dans la grande bataille qu’on nomme la grève générale.’ 
50
 Ibid., p. 69. ‘En opérant d’une manière diffuse, il peut maintenir partout l’agitation gréviste ; les longues 
guerres ont engendré l’idée de patrie ; la grève locale et fréquente ne cesse de rajeunir les sentiments d’héroïsme, 
de sacrifice et d’union, de maintenir toujours vivante l’espérance de la révolution.’ 
51
 Ibid. ‘…les défenseurs de la paix sociale ont émis le vœu que les organisations ouvrières deviennent assez 
puissantes pour être condamnées à la sagesse.’ 
 384 
progressive role that the restoration of an expansive capitalism can play, the bulk of the book 
is dedicated to understanding how the practice of the general strike can reinforce the class-
identity of the proletariat, and in exploring, through a vast array of historical examples, the 
more general idea that a certain practice of conflict creates identity. This means, as we had 
previously highlighted, that the vast majority of the Reflections is dedicated to the 
examination of a very circumscribed problem, that of class formation, whose urgency is 
dictated by exceptional and unforeseen circumstances. The urgency of maintaining the 
proletarian identity is dictated by the fact that the conflictual but progressive logic of 
capitalism has been replaced by a corporatist economy and by the pursuit of social peace. If 
the proletariat operated in the conditions which characterized the capitalism of Marx’s time, 
there would be no need for a practice of social conflict capable of separating the proletariat 
from the rest of society: economic conditions would establish this separation. Not only the 
urgency, but also the modalities of the practice of conflict that Sorel calls the general strike 
are thus the response to unforeseen and unfavourable conditions in which the proletariat of the 
early twentieth century finds itself. 
In this section we shall begin by examining the third chapter of the Reflections, in which Sorel 
specifies with some precision what proletarian violence does not consist in, by outlining a 
genealogy of the French state and highlighting how proletarian violence is something rather 
different from what French history has accustomed its observers to understand as violence. 
We then deal with Sorel’s comparison between the two kinds of strike: the political strike and 
the proletarian strike. We interpret the distinction as one between two different aims of social 
conflict. Under the political conception, social conflict is a tool of negotiation, whereas the 
syndicalist conception sees social conflict as a tool of class formation, and thus requires 
intransigence. We then conclude by examining the core of the Reflections, i.e. Sorel’s account 
on how a certain practice of social conflict is able to generate class identity: it is here that we 
shall examine in depth what kind of violence Sorel has in mind as well as the role of myth in 
the general strike.  
7.4.1 A NEW KIND OF VIOLENCE 
Before venturing into a detailed examination of the practice of the general strike, Sorel 
attempts to dispel what he believes are the mistaken associations that the French public has 
with violence. In other words, before spelling out what the general strike is, he spells out what 
it is not, and, more precisely, how the revolutionary violence of socialists is different from the 
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violence that has characterised French history up to this point. In doing so, Sorel takes the 
occasion to further underline a central point of his revolutionary conception, namely the 
complete break that socialism will represent vis à vis the bourgeois political tradition. 
‘The ideas current among the general public on the subject of proletarian violence’, he begins 
‘are not based on… contemporary facts nor on a rational interpretation of the present 
syndicalist movement.’52 Instead, they are based on ‘an infinitely simpler mental process’, i.e. 
on the historical memory of past revolutionary experiences, on the ‘memories that the word 
revolution evokes almost automatically.’53 This, in France, means something very specific, 
namely the understanding of the socialist transformation as a new 1789, and the association of 
revolutionary violence with the experience of 1793. But for Sorel this past is ‘mille fois mort’, 
and the analogies are thus misleading.54 To start with, Sorel argues that until 1870, a proper 
historiographical reflection on the revolutionary and Napoleonic period was impossible 
because the institutions and practices that had resulted from this moment of French history 
had been sheltered from critique, and sacralised by the memory of the revolutionary wars: 
‘Protected by the prestige of the wars of Liberty, the new institutions had become inviolable 
[intangibles] and the ideology that was built to explain them became a faith which seemed for 
a long time to have for the French the value which the revelation of Jesus has for the 
Catholics.’55 It should be noticed, as an aside, how Sorel is implicitly making a point about 
the identity-creating power both of conflict and of the memory of conflict. 
At any rate, the historical power of the revolutionary wars waned around 1870: ‘The disasters 
of 1870 brought the country back to practical, prudent and ordinary conditions; the first result 
of these disasters was the development of… the idea of opportunism, which has now been 
introduced even into socialism.’ 56  For Sorel, the post-1870 period is characterized by a 
lessening of the moral energies of France57, and the attempts by Le Play, Taine, and Renan to 
‘search for the most appropriate means of setting the country on its feet again’ were doomed 
to the failure that awaits all who ‘wish to found an intellectual and moral reform on 
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investigations, on scientific syntheses and on demonstrations.’58  Again, it is important to 
underline the secondary line of reasoning that Sorel is developing here, disconnecting moral 
renewal from social scientific writing. But disenchantment about the revolutionary period also 
brought a more sober appreciation of the events of the time. ‘What remains’ however ‘is not 
very savoury: police operations, proscriptions and the sittings of servile courts of law’.59  This 
is where Sorel’s argument enters its central phase: the memory of revolutionary violence 
nowadays, without the revolutionary epic, is automatically associated with the revolutionary 
excesses, with the unfortunate consequence that, in hearing about revolutionary syndicalism 
‘instinctively people think of the committees of revolutionary inspection, of the brutalities of 
suspicious agents, coarsened and frightened by fear, of the tragedies of the guillotine.’60 This 
explains well the ambivalent stance of parliamentary socialists towards violence, their efforts 
to reassure the bourgeois public of their good intentions, and the maxim pronounced by 
Millerand recommending party members to ‘be afraid to frighten’.61 But these connections 
between the past and the present require care: thus, Sorel invites the reader to ‘examine the 
violence of 93… and endeavour to see whether it can be identified with that of contemporary 
socialism.’62 
The difference between the bourgeois violence of the past and the proletarian one of the 
present is, for Sorel, an historical one, ‘depending on the past history of the bourgeoisie’, and 
one so great that it gives to the word ‘revolutionary’ no less than ‘two perfectly distinct 
meanings’. 63  Here Sorel traces a genealogy of the republican regime that, following 
Tocqueville’s Ancien Régime et la Révolution, postulates a hidden continuity between 
monarchy and republic, a continuity that is most clearly visible in the centrality of the state in 
both regimes. He underlines the overrepresentation of legal professionals in the Convention, 
and suggests that, though ‘this class brought to the Revolution a great deal of administrative 
capacity’, it also coloured the new institutions with the legal ideology of the monarchy and of 
the ancien régime.64 Now, this understanding of law is essentially a statist one in which law is 
an instrument of the arbitrary will of the monarch, first, and the republic later: ‘one of the 
fundamental ideas of the ancien régime had been the employment of the penal procedure to 
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ruin any power which was an obstacle to the monarchy.’65 This understanding of law, which 
Sorel calls ‘archaic’ and medieval, sees courts ‘primarily as instruments of royal greatness’, 
and has important historical examples in the Catholic inquisition.66 It is, of course, the idea of 
law as an instrument of raison d’état that Sorel is stigmatizing here, and, as we shall see in a 
short while, the experience of the affaire Dreyfus colours his most scathing judgments of this 
practice. 
Now, the key point is that the ‘Revolution piously inherited this tradition’, and thus poisoned 
the nascent republican regime with an understanding of law whose ‘essential aim was not the 
administration of justice but the welfare of the State.’67 Various other factors, amongst which 
Sorel lists the ‘philosophy of the eighteenth century’68 and the importance of the economic 
agency of the state in the first half of the nineteenth century, contributed to this development. 
As we have seen, Sorel had highlighted the fact that the historical period of the revolutionary 
wars had come to a close in 1870. He thus insists on the fact that the present era is different 
from the previous one, and that the importance of the state is now being challenged. ‘The 
capitalist economic system’ for example ‘has thrown full light on the extraordinary power of 
the individual; the confidence which the men of the eighteenth century had in the industrial 
capacities of the State appear puerile to everybody who has studied production…’.69 It is 
important to underline the progressive role that Sorel assigns to capitalism here and 
elsewhere, and this connection gives a preliminary hint on why the proletariat – the class that 
is most shaped by the logic of capital –cannot cling to antiquated conceptions of the state. 
Sorel concedes that despite the historical break that has occurred, ‘it would be strange if the 
old ideas were completely dead’70 and, to illustrate that the idea of law as an instrument of 
power is still alive, he proceeds to an examination of the affaire Dreyfus and the affaire des 
fiches. 
But despite this, the proletariat, precisely because it is the product of a different historical era, 
is still impermeable to the old statist conception. Sorel goes as far as making the general 
statement that his contemporaries ‘are no longer dominated to the same extent that our fathers 
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were by this superstition of the God-State, to which they sacrificed so many victims.’71 This, 
of course, is the crucial point that Sorel needs to establish in order to draw a line between the 
statist revolutionary violence of the past and the proletarian violence of the present. Anyone 
who still holds to the bourgeois political tradition, which harks back to the monarchy and to 
its statism, is bound to replicate the revolutionary horrors of the past: ‘if… our parliamentary 
socialists come to power they will prove themselves worthy successors of the Inquisition, of 
the ancien régime and of Robespierre; political courts will be at work on a large scale and we 
may even suppose that the unfortunate law of 1848 which abolished the death penalty for 
political matters will be repealed.’72 But because the proletariat belongs to a different era, it 
can no longer hold on to the bourgeois tradition. Consequently, proletarian violence is 
different from the violence of the past: ‘proletarian acts of violence have no resemblance to 
these proscriptions; they are purely and simply acts of war; they have the value of military 
manoeuvres and serve to mark the separation of classes.’73 This point is of crucial importance, 
and reinforces what has been stated above about the role of violence, which is mainly one of 
class-formation rather than one of social transformation. 
Socialism, Sorel continues, is internationalist, and this means that it is committed to the 
destruction of the state. He remarks that socialists in France are antimilitarists, but underlines 
that this opposition to the army is not ‘a protest against the harshness of discipline… or the 
presence, in the higher ranks, of officers hostile to existing political institutions’. 74 
Antimilitarism and internationalism are, instead, forms of opposition to the state:  
‘The army is the clearest and the most tangible of all the possible manifestations 
of the State and the one which is most firmly connected to its origins. The 
syndicalists do not propose to reform the State… they want to destroy it, because 
they wish to realize this idea of Marx’s: the socialist revolution ought not to 
culminate in the replacement of one governing minority by another. The 
syndicalists outline their doctrine still more clearly when they… declare 
themselves antipatriotic – following the example of the Communist 
Manifesto.’75 
Despite the vehemence with which Sorel attacks the state, one should not be side tracked by 
this. As we have stated before, here Sorel indicates what proletarian violence is not: it is not a 
tool of government, it is not an instrument in the hands of the any state, present or future. 
                                                 
71
 Ibid. 
72
 Ibid., p. 105. 
73
 Ibid., pp. 105-6. Underlining mine.  
74
 Ibid., p. 106. 
75
 Ibid., p. 107. 
 389 
New institutions will characterize the socialist transformation, and the state must wither away 
with the old order. Proletarian violence can thus be used neither to bring about the new order, 
nor to protect it from its future enemies. And thus we return to its original role of class-
formation, which Sorel goes on to examine in the following chapters. 
7.4.2 TWO UNDERSTANDINGS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT 
Throughout the third chapter of the book Sorel had already hinted at the capacity of conflict to 
generate group identity, and, even more radically, he had suggested that even the mere 
memory of past conflicts was a powerful engine of legitimation of the institutions that had 
emerged out of them. The relationship between class identity and a certain practice of social 
conflict is the question at the heart of the Reflections, and it is articulated most thoroughly in 
the three central chapters of the Reflections. These chapters are dedicated to, respectively, the 
revolutionary practice of social conflict, the conservative, or assimilationist, practices of 
social conflict and, finally, to the ways in which revolutionary social conflict – the proletarian 
general strike – fosters class identity. What Sorel does in those chapters are essentially two 
things. To start, he underlines that while the general strike aims at class separation and the 
restoration of a progressive historical dynamic capable of leading to the development of 
proletarian institutions, the practice of social conflict typical of political socialism is an 
assimilationist, and hence conservative one. Secondly, Sorel explores in great depth in what 
way the general strike creates class identity, and in doing so he elaborates at length on the 
mythical status of the general strike. These two conceptual lines are continuously intertwined 
in the three chapters of the reflections, and thus we shall separate them analytically. In this 
section, we deal with the comparison between revolutionary and assimilationist practices of 
social conflict, whereas in the next section we examine the function of the general strike and 
its status as a myth. 
Before beginning, it is necessary to insist a little more on the function of the general strike, 
which is not that of creating socialism but, instead, that of creating socialists. The general 
strike is a practice of social conflict whose goal is that of class formation. Thus it is a practice 
of mobilization that aims at creating a group identity of a specific type, i.e. a group identity 
based on the position of the group in a capitalist economy. It is important to stress that Sorel 
is not concerned with group identity per se, but with proletarian class-consciousness. How the 
general strike achieves this will be examined in the next section. Here it is more important to 
remind the reader of the context within which Sorel wrote the Reflections, which is that 
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characterized by the processes of working class assimilation that he had been examining since 
1902. Now, the fundamental difference between the proletarian strike and the political strike 
lies in the fact that while the former engenders resistance to these assimilationist processes, 
the latter is a symptom of such processes, and thus essentially accelerates them. The 
distinction between these two understanding and practices of social conflict, it must be 
underlined, is not one of methods, i.e. it is not a distinction between violent and peaceful 
means. Though violence of a particular kind is essential to the proletarian strike, it can also be 
important in the political strike: the latter, Sorel concedes, ‘might be peaceful and of short 
duration’, but it ‘might also be the first act of a series of bloody riots’ without ipso facto 
changing its political and non-revolutionary nature. 76 The difference between the two kinds 
of strike, instead, must be looked for in the measure in which they resist or accelerate the 
tendencies towards proletarian assimilation that characterize the current context. 
It is important, for example, to dwell a little bit on the effects that the two different practices 
have on the idea of class as conceived by Marx. Sorel is acutely aware that the Marxian 
notion of class is in crisis. He knows that the current social structure is characterized 
increasingly less by the opposition between wage earners and employers that is fundamental 
to socialism. ‘Marx’ he writes ‘speaks of society as if it were divided into two fundamentally 
antagonistic groups; observation, it has often been argued, does not justify this thesis of 
dichotomy and it is true that a certain effort of the will is necessary before we can find it 
verified in the phenomena of everyday life.’ 77 New economic conditions have complicated 
the class structure of society, and, for example, have allowed for the emergence of white-
collar workers, those whom Sorel calls ‘a little aristocracy’ amongst wage earners, i.e. a group 
‘possessing the confidence of the employer and not belonging to the world of the proletariat.’ 
78
 Here the practice of the general strike can be of help, since it is a practice which forces 
groups to take sides, and thus in which ‘oppositions [between classes] become extraordinarily 
clear’.79 The general strike ‘separates the interests and the different ways of thinking of the 
two groups of wage-earners much better than do the daily circumstances of life.’80 But if the 
practice of the general strike leads to a sharper awareness of the still existing conflicts of 
interests between different classes, the political strike does exactly the opposite. Because the 
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necessities of parliamentary politics lead socialists to look for the largest possible 
constituency, it follows that the Marxian class structure has to be abandoned, that ‘the 
division of society into two antagonistic armies disappears’ since the upheaval envisaged by 
reformists ‘is possible with any kind of social structure.’81 Under parliamentary socialism it is 
‘no longer possible to distinguish the classes by the place occupied by their members in 
capitalist production; we go back to the old distinction between rich groups and poor 
groups’.82 Thus, whereas the revolutionary strike fosters the proletarian identity, the political 
strike tends to assimilation. 
Context is crucial, and we must remember that the arguments of the Reflections outline 
emergency measures for exceptional circumstances. The most basic way in which the practice 
of the general strike can fight the processes of proletarian assimilation is by being a self-
consciously revolutionary understanding of social conflict, an understanding that sees no 
possibility of compromise with the existing status quo. Sorel compares the general strike to 
the decisive Napoleonic battle, and casts it as a series of incidents in which revolutionary 
syndicalists ‘see in each strike a model, a test, a preparation for the great final upheaval.’ 83 
This refusal to compromise, and we shall see precisely how in the next section, has an 
extraordinary power, for it reduces to zero the space of conciliation and thus infuses an 
increasingly resigned working class with revolutionary consciousness: 
‘…the day when the slightest incidents of daily life become symptoms of the 
state of struggle between the classes, when every conflict is an incident in the 
social war, when every strike engenders the perspective of a total catastrophe, on 
that day there is no longer any possibility of social peace, of resignation to 
routine, or of enthusiasm for philanthropic or successful employers. The idea of 
the general strike… drags into the revolutionary track everything it touches. In 
virtue of this idea, socialism remains ever young; all attempts to bring about 
social peace seem childish; desertions of comrades into the ranks of the 
bourgeoisie, far from discouraging the masses, only excite them still more to 
rebellion; in a word, the line of cleavage [la scission] is never in danger of 
disappearing.’84 
This incredibly dense passage already anticipates a number of key features of how general 
strikes function, most notably highlighting their being an educational practice far more than a 
practice leading to the seizure of power. But it is important to underline how the function of 
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the general strike is defined by the processes of assimilation occurring in society, how it 
represents an answer to the dangerous conservative appeal of ‘philanthropic employers’, and 
to ideologies of national and social solidarity. This is why intransigence is key, because 
without it the general strike becomes something else, namely a tool of negotiation. It is the 
fact that the proletarian strike is animated by the vision of a radically transformed society that 
allows it to perform its vital role of class formation, and it is also what marks its most 
profound difference with the political strike. ‘Politicians’ writes Sorel ‘… argue about social 
conflicts in exactly the same manner as diplomats argue about international affairs… they see 
in the combatants nothing but instruments. The proletariat is their army…’.85 The point here 
is not merely the instrumentality with which political leaders treat the masses, but, more 
decisively, that international conflicts end with peace treaties. This turns the political strike, 
no matter how bloody and violent, into a weapon of negotiation with the existing order and 
thus into an aspect of the assimilationist dynamic which Sorel attempts to reject. This 
negotiation is impossible with the proletarian strike, for how is it possible to negotiate with 
people that demand nothing short of the complete surrender of their foe? The general strike 
cannot be functional to the dynamic of compromise between classes that characterizes the 
current regime, and this is why parliamentary socialists – being essentially mediators – find it 
unpalatable. They ‘detest the general strike because all the propaganda surrounding it is too 
socialistic to please philanthropists.’86 
It is clear that the practice of social compromise and negotiation in which parliamentary 
socialists excel and which gives to the political strike its intrinsic logic is a practice that is not 
conducive to the restoration of the conditions necessary for the socialist transformation. Quite 
on the contrary, it is the expression of that historical tendency that makes the advent of 
socialism an increasingly unrealistic possibility. A historically progressive capitalism creates, 
along with economic growth and technological innovations, class divisions. But the political 
practice of parliamentary socialists tends to ignore or downplay the importance of economic 
conflicts in society. As such, it is a political practice that can only flourish in the context of a 
corporatist and decadent capitalism: ‘experience shows us that it is by seeking to stop the 
progress of capitalism and to preserve the forms of existence of classes who are in the decline 
that the prophets of social peace endeavour to capture popular favour.’ 87  Parliamentary 
socialism, and its understanding of social conflicts, are thus expressions of those historical 
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tendencies that tame capitalist development and militate against the emergence of the 
proletariat as a self-conscious revolutionary subject. It is because of the fact that their deepest 
nature is a conservative one that they have enormous trouble in balancing their revolutionary 
ideology with their daily political practice: 
‘In the mouths of these would-be representatives of the proletariat all socialist 
formulas lose their sense. The class struggle still remains the great principle, but 
it must be subordinated to national solidarity. Internationalism is an article of 
faith… but patriotism also imposes sacred duties. The emancipation of the 
workers must be the work of the workers themselves… but real emancipation 
consists in voting for a professional politician. In the end the State must 
disappear… but this disappearance will take place only in a future so distant that 
one must prepare oneself for it by using the State… and the best means of 
bringing about the disappearance of the State consists in strengthening 
temporarily the governmental machine.’88 
The passage points to another key feature that Sorel ascribes to parliamentary socialism and, 
by extension, to its understanding of social conflict as negotiation: its intimate connection 
with that most powerful of existing institutions, the state. This connection should immediately 
result from the fact that the political strike is a weapon of negotiation: negotiation 
presupposes the permanence of existing institutions and merely seeks a more satisfying 
accommodation of the demands of workers within such institutions. Institutional continuity is, 
for Sorel, the great indicator of conservative movements. Whereas a revolution might 
legitimately preserve the economic conquests of the old order, institutions – and consequently 
social relations – must change, and when a movement operates within the bounds of existing 
institutions, it is the surest signs of its conservative, non-revolutionary nature. Sorel cites the 
Russian experience of 1905, and the Belgian one of 1893, in support of this thesis, arguing 
that, in the Belgian case, ‘the workers served the ends of the State and of the capitalists.’89 
More generally, a few pages later, Sorel argues that ‘the political general strike presupposes 
that very diverse social groups shall possess the same faith in the magical force of the State’, 
and that this faith is typical of ‘groups in the decline’, i.e. of classes without any capacity of 
renewing society through the development of new institutions.90 
Now, if the dependency of the political strike upon the state signals its conservative nature, it 
also means something else, namely that parliamentary socialism still views the political and 
social world through bourgeois categories. But the future cannot be thought through the 
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categories of the past. ‘Socialists’ writes Sorel ‘have for a long time been dominated by the 
idea that capitalist society must be likened to the feudal system. I scarcely know any idea 
more false and more dangerous; they imagine that the new feudalism would disappear 
beneath the influence of forces analogous to those which ruined the old feudal system.’91 This 
force is the state, ‘a strong and centralized power, imbued with the conviction that it had 
received a mandate from God to employ exceptional measures against evil’, a state whose 
genealogy, as we have seen in the previous section, Sorel traced back to medieval 
monarchy.92 This dependency on bourgeois models is problematic not only because it reveals 
the unwillingness, or inability, of parliamentary socialists of conceiving a socialist society 
governed by genuinely new institutions, but also because it condemns them to replicate the 
repressive and centralizing practices typical of statism. Once again, Sorel’s main historical 
example is 1789: 
‘…we always find a supernumerary State (an artificial State, to use an 
expression of that time) which is organized in advance by the side of the legal 
State, which considers itself a legitimate power before it becomes a legal power, 
and which profits by some slight incident to take up the reins of government as 
they slip from the feeble hands of the constituted authorities.’93 
The revolution is not the organization of a shadow cabinet ready to step in and exercise power 
through the existing models and institutions, it is not ‘a simple transmutation in the personnel 
of the State.’94 Socialism is a society structured around institutions and organizations having 
arisen from a substantially new historical experience, and thus requires an institutional break, 
which Sorel calls  a ‘break in the system of domination.’95 Without it, any change is bound to 
replicate existing models, with the result of seeing the ‘social revolution culminate in a 
wonderful system of slavery.’96  Revolutionary syndicalism ‘cannot accept the idea that the 
historic mission of the proletariat is to imitate the bourgeoisie; it cannot conceive that a 
revolution as vast as that which would abolish capitalism could be attempted… [merely to 
achieve] a change of masters’.97 
This brings Sorel to a crucial distinction of the Reflections, that between bourgeois force and 
proletarian violence. The distinction is straightforwardly formulated: ‘the object of force is to 
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impose a certain social order in which the minority governs, while violence tends to the 
destruction of that order.’98 How should this be interpreted? Force is a statist concept: it is the 
use of violent means to ensure the survival and reproduction of a form of social organization 
centred on a specific historical institution, the state. The crucial aspect of violence, on the 
other hand, is not so much that it tends to the destruction of existing institutions, including the 
state, but that it tends to destruction. This is a crucial argumentative step, which, when 
correctly understood, sheds great light on the Reflections. A socialist society will not be an 
anarchic utopia: it will be structured around new institutions that are still inexistent. Violence 
does not generate these new institutions, it merely fights the existing ones. As we have 
pointed out repeatedly, the role of violence, and of the general strike, in bringing about the 
new society is a very indirect one, and here Sorel clarifies once more its mostly destructive 
character. But if violence and the general strike cannot create institutions, they still have a 
positive, constructive role to play in that they can create a revolutionary subject. It is here that 
we enter the core of the Reflections. 
7.4.3 MYTH AND THE GENERAL STRIKE AS REVOLUTIONARY EDUCATION 
The role of the general strike and of violence is, as we have just seen, a destructive one 
insofar as it is not a practice of institution building. As Sorel had clarified in the ‘Préface de 
1905’, the institutional framework of the new society will arise out of the productive 
experience of the proletariat. But the general strike is not merely destructive, it also serves an 
important positive function, which is that of creating class-consciousness in a context in 
which class tends to disappear from the socialist horizon.  In other words, the general strike is 
not exclusively a practice of resistance to assimilation, but it is a practice of resistance that 
creates class-consciousness. We have seen before how, for Sorel, the conservative politics of 
parliamentary socialists had created confusion in Marxist language. One of the advantages of 
syndicalism is that it remedies this confusion, and that it uses ‘methods of expression’ capable 
of clearly outlining the conflict of interests that, despite everything, still remains in capitalist 
societies.99 Through the practice of the general strike, ‘the movements of the revolting masses 
are presented so as to make a deep and lasting impression on the souls of the rebels.’100 It 
should be noticed how Sorel is, as a matter of fact, speaking about revolutionary education: 
the contradictory Marxism of reformists is contrasted with the clearer one of the syndicalists, 
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and the emphasis is firmly on the ‘impression on the souls of the rebels.’ Throughout the 
Reflections Sorel makes constant references to what he alternatively calls the ‘ideological’ or 
‘educational’ function of the general strike, but the scattered nature of these references means 
that their importance is easily overlooked. These references point to the central idea of the 
Reflections, which is that the general strike is an instrument of class formation, or, more 
accurately, a practice capable of educating the proletariat to its revolutionary role. In other 
words, the greatest function performed by the general strike is the impression it leaves ‘on the 
souls of the rebels’, and though it cannot aspire to transform society, it can transform the 
working class. 
This leads to a clearer understanding of what the general strike is. It is not merely a series of 
clashes with the bourgeoisie, but an articulated and highly ideological practice of social 
conflict capable of reinforcing the revolutionary instincts of the working class. But how is this 
revolutionary education through social conflict achieved? We had seen, in examining the 
‘Préface de 1905’, how Sorel had insisted that strikes, in themselves, were ‘economic 
incidents of small social importance’, and that, in order to foster the revolutionary 
consciousness of the proletariat, they required a specific way of being understood by 
workers. 101  The general strike thus is a series of episodes that need to be experienced, 
understood, and narrated in a particular manner if it is to leave the desired impression ‘on the 
souls of the rebels’: this way of experiencing social conflict requires what Sorel calls the 
‘revolutionary myth’. It is only by underlining forcefully the ‘ideological’ or ‘educative’ 
function of the general strike that we understand not only the necessity of myth, but also the 
features which Sorel ascribes to it. The mythical dimension of the general strike, in other 
words, is essential to its educational function, for only when social conflict is conducted 
through the lenses of the revolutionary myth can it effectively cement the class identity of the 
proletariat and counter processes of class dissolution. 
In discussing the extremely complex notion of myth, it is necessary to separate the historical 
role, or function, that Sorel ascribes to it from the epistemic status that he assigns to this 
notion. We shall deal in the next section with the latter question, and limit ourselves here to 
highlighting the role that myth has in the practice of social conflict that Sorel calls the general 
strike. Of course, the two questions cannot be completely separated, but for the sake of clarity 
we shall try to do so. The function of myth is that of conferring to the practice of the general 
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strike its greatest possible educative, or ideological, effectiveness. To say that myth, and the 
general strike, have an educational function means that they aim at a transformation of those 
who engage in the general strike more than at the transformation of society. It means, in other 
words, that those who engage in the general strike will be able to resist the assimilationist 
tendencies that characterize current capitalism, and that, in the longer run, this intransigence 
towards social conciliation will be capable of restoring the conflictual dynamic proper to an 
historically progressive capitalism. The general strike, as we have seen before, must be able to 
drag ‘into the revolutionary track everything it touches’, to preserve and reinforce the 
cleavage between employers and workers, to destroy the ‘possibility of social peace’. This 
can only be done when it is informed by the revolutionary myth.102 This sheds much light on 
a number of key features that Sorel ascribes to myth. 
It explains, for example, why myth cannot be broken down into its various constituent parts, 
but ‘must be taken as an undivided whole’103: the analytical breakdown would take away 
most of its heuristic and educational value. ‘Ordinary language’, writes Sorel, ‘could not 
produce these results’, and this is why ‘appeal must be made to collections of images which, 
taken together and through intuition alone… are capable of evoking the mass of sentiments 
which correspond to the different manifestations of the war undertaken by socialism against 
modern society’.104 The results about which Sorel speaks can only be obtained when instances 
of social conflict are lived through the framework of a coming revolution that leads to the 
collapse of the capitalist order. To break this apocalyptic image into its various individual 
components would nullify the educative power of the general strike and render it useless. 
Myth, as had been underlined at the beginning of this section, is a ‘method of expression’ of 
Marxism. It is, to be more precise, the manner in which the revolutionary ideology is 
apprehended and lived by the revolutionary class, and this is why Sorel insists that ‘there is a 
fundamental identity between the chief tenets of Marxism and the coordinated aspects 
furnished by the picture of the general strike.’105 This explains why it is essential that it 
contains references to the total collapse of capitalism, for without this the practice of the 
general strike would not be able to perform its educative function, and would transform itself 
into a conservative, political, practice of social conflict. When dealing with the socialist 
revolution, it is important that ‘its character of absolute and irrevocable transformation should 
                                                 
102
 Sorel, Reflections, p. 124-5. 
103
 Ibid., p. 140. 
104
 Ibid., p. 113. 
105
 Ibid., 120. 
 398 
be preserved, because it contributes powerfully to giving socialism its high educational 
value.’106 These two characteristics of myth are necessary to the fulfilment of its function, 
which is the educational one of strengthening proletarian class-consciousness and fighting 
assimilation. A question clearly arises as to whether anything which galvanizes the working 
class can qualify as a revolutionary myth, i.e. whether deliberate lies are in order, but we shall 
answer it in the next section as we deal with the epistemic status of myths. 
The educational, ideological, or identity-forming role of the general strike further clarifies, 
and greatly circumscribes, the function of violence and myth in the general strike. Regarding 
violence, it appears clear that what Sorel is speaking of here is a demonstrative violence, a 
violence that will not bring down the capitalist order but that will reinforce the intransigence 
of the proletariat towards the offers of conciliation that come to it on behalf of a decadent 
bourgeoisie. Contrary to common opinion, Sorel is not a worshipper of violence. He concedes 
that ‘violence may hamper economic progress and even, when it goes beyond a certain limit, 
that it may be a danger to morality.’107 The rejoinder he adds to these concessions is however 
extremely illuminating. He writes that ‘this concession cannot be used as an argument against 
the doctrine set forth here, because I consider violence only from the point of view of its 
ideological consequences.’108  In other words, because the myth frames violence so as to 
produce a strong impression of class solidarity and of hostility towards the bourgeoisie, there 
is no need for a great deal of it: ‘a great development of brutality accompanied by much 
blood-letting is quite unnecessary in order to induce the workers to look upon economic 
conflicts as the reduced facsimiles of the great battle which will decide the future.’ 109 
Moreover, the role of violence is bound to become even less important if the general strike 
achieves its second, indirect, but incredibly important aim of the mobilisation of the 
bourgeoisie to the defence of its class interests: ‘If a capitalist class is energetic… its frank 
and consistently reactionary attitude contributes at least as greatly as proletarian violence 
towards keeping distinct that cleavage between the classes which is the basis of all 
socialism.’110 
The most striking historical parallel that Sorel draws in the Reflections is that between 
proletarian violence and Christian martyrdom in the Roman Empire. In discussing this ‘great 
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historical example’, Sorel further clarifies important aspects of the role of violence and myth 
in the formation of an historical identity. The central question is the separation of the 
historically declining social formations from historically emerging ones: ‘without this 
cleavage [between the pagan and the Christian worlds] the latter would never have acquired 
all its characteristic features.’111 Violence helps in maintain this cleavage, even when it is 
suffered. However, Sorel quickly rejects the idea that the persecutions of Christians occurred 
on a very large scale. Citing the Protestant historian Adolph von Harnack, he minimizes the 
extent of these persecutions, and, by underlining that Christianity had mostly spread to the 
Roman aristocracy, he creates an historical puzzle: ‘there is something paradoxical… in the 
situation of the Church which had its followers in the upper classes, who were obliged to 
make many concessions to custom in order to live, and who could yet hold beliefs based on 
the idea of absolute cleavage.’112 The puzzle can be solved by bringing up the historical force 
of ideology: ‘if the Christian system of ideas had been rigorously determined by material 
facts, such a paradox would have been impossible.’ 113  Thus, it was the Christian’s 
consciousness of their identity as a group that avoided their dissolution into the Roman world. 
This identity was preserved also thanks to the violence suffered; however, because this 
violence was experienced through the lenses of a myth, a very limited amount of instances of 
persecution could nonetheless have a very profound effect. What allowed Christianity to 
preserve and strengthen its historical identity was not the frequency of persecutions, but their 
ideological effects upon the Christian community. 
‘The statistics of persecutions therefore play no great part in this question; what 
was of much greater importance than the frequency of the punishments were the 
remarkable occurrences which took place during the scenes of martyrdom. It was 
through these rather rare but very heroic events that the ideology was 
constructed: there was no necessity for the martyrdom to be numerous in order 
to prove, by the test of experience, the absolute truth of the new religion and the 
absolute error of the old, to establish thus that there were two incompatible ways 
and to make it clear that the reign of evil would come to an end.’114 
The capacity of myth of colouring individual instances of violence so as to produce an 
ideological reinforcement could hardly be articulated more clearly. Sorel stresses the 
influence of the apocalyptic texts of early Christianity in giving to acts of martyrdom their 
ideological function. It was thanks to the influence of these various apocalypses that a given 
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instance of Roman repression ‘instead of being valued on its actual importance as a 
misfortune that had befallen a few individuals… became an incident of the war carried by 
Satan, prince of this world, who was soon to reveal his Antichrist.’115 In his treatment of 
Christian martyrdom Sorel is also careful to underline that the necessity for this, as it were, 
ideological practice of social conflict, is typical of historical movements either in their infancy 
or faced by the threat of extinction. Movements in their maturity acquire their ideological 
identity from something else, namely institutions, and when this occurs the importance of 
myth and violence decrease: when ‘Christianity had developed sufficiently, the apocalyptic 
literature ceased to be cultivated to any great extent’.116 If it is correct to read the digression as 
an historical parallel, we are allowed to think that this point reinforces what we have called 
the topical nature of the measures advocated by Sorel in the Reflections. Their great goal is 
that of helping the return to an historical dynamic in which the economic conflicts intrinsic to 
capitalism are allowed to fully develop. In that context, the only one that can lead to 
socialism, myth and violence would still play a role in shaping the consciousness of the 
working class. But they would not have the importance that they have in the current context in 
which the proletariat finds itself in a situation somewhat akin to that of the Christian Roman 
aristocrats, i.e. dangerously on the verge of being assimilated into the system. 
7.5 MYTH, MARXISM, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 
Before concluding, it is necessary to address the question regarding the epistemic status of 
myth. The issue is complex, but answering this question takes us to the heart of Sorel’s 
philosophical and epistemological conceptions, and illuminates them in a satisfying manner. 
We have seen before how Sorel had insisted that the tenets of Marxism, especially the 
‘catastrophic’ notion of the socialist revolution, be part of the revolutionary myth through 
which the working class practice social conflict. We have also seen how the function of the 
general strike is an educative one. Does this mean that Sorel reduces Marxism to myth, i.e. to 
an educative catechism? There are a number of considerations that would seem to warrant this 
conclusion. To start with, it must be noticed that Sorel had begun using the concept of myth 
before the Reflections on Violence and, more importantly, that he had used it in connection 
with the tenets of orthodox Marxism that had been questioned by Bernstein. Sorel had 
learned, though somewhat belatedly, the lesson of Bernstein. He had understood that the 
economic and social conditions that characterized early twentieth century capitalism were 
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substantially different from those that characterized the capitalist societies about which Marx 
was writing. It is at this point that he had begun to reflect about myth, as a way of 
conceptualizing a number of key Marxist theses. In the Insegnamenti, for example, he had 
written that ‘the catastrophic conception [of the revolution] can be preserved as a social myth, 
to which the idea of the general strike is added.’117  
The impression that myth is just fantasy Marxism is made stronger by a number of Sorelian 
statements in the Reflections, in which he adopts a casual attitude towards the truth of myths. 
He writes, for example, that a ‘myth cannot be refuted since it is, at bottom, identical to the 
convictions of a group, being the expression of these convictions in the language of 
movement’118 Further on, he states that people ‘who are living in this world of myths are 
secure from all refutation’119, giving the impression that myth is something similar to blind 
conviction in the face of contrary evidence. More strikingly perhaps, he explicitly states that 
‘it matters little whether the general strike is a partial reality or simply a product of the 
popular imagination’. 120  In discussing a number of historical examples of myths, Sorel 
accepts that many of the elements that constituted such myths have not gone on to become 
features of the new societies, and goes as far as conceding that, in some cases, it is even 
possible that ‘nothing which they contain will come to pass’.121 But he insists that all this can 
be conceded unproblematically because myths are not ‘astrological almanacs’, but instead 
‘must be judged as a means of acting on the present; all discussion of the method of applying 
them as future history is devoid of sense.’122  
It is easy to see where the established image of an irrationalist obsessed with action for 
action’s sake has been derived, especially in the light of passages such as the following, taken 
from the introductory letter to Halévy, in which he confesses that ‘By employing the term 
myth I… [thought I] put myself in a position of refusing all discussion with the people who 
wish to subject the general strike to detailed criticism and who accumulate objections against 
its practical possibility’.123 On the one hand, Sorel insists that the practical realization of 
myths is unimportant, while on the other he underlines that they are instruments of action, 
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more precisely instruments of mobilization. This seems to suggest that in the face of adverse 
social and economic conditions the revolutionary proletariat should, in the face of all 
evidence, take up arms against the existing order because this generates a morality of the 
sublime.124 It would thus appear as if myth is a convenient way of reintroducing into social 
science what has been conclusively falsified by history, and that when Sorel speaks of the 
mobilizing power of myth upon the revolutionary class, he is effectively suggesting the use of 
a Platonic noble lie in order to produce desired social outcomes. But this conclusion, despite 
its superficial appeal, is both rushed and substantially incorrect. 
To show this, it is necessary to go back to the fourth chapter of the thesis, and to Sorel’s 
understanding of Marxism, and consequently of the historical process and of the ways in 
which it can be understood. We had seen how, to start with, Sorel held that social scientific 
understanding is historical, and thus it is only possible retroactively, when a given historical 
movement has exhausted itself. As we had pointed out, this means that the predictive failures 
of Marx do not invalidate Marxism in any way, i.e. that Sorel could learn Bernstein’s lesson 
without having to consequently reject Marxism. Secondly, this impossibility of understanding 
scientifically not only the future, but also the present, is connected to Sorel’s understanding of 
the historical world as essentially a product of collective agency. Here we return to the first 
chapter, and to the fundamental irreconcilability between science and agency. Only when the 
creative process has come to completion will it be possible to understand how it occurred. 
This understanding is justified by the Vichian epistemological principle of verum ipsum 
factum: before agency has exhausted itself, it is possible to guess, to identify correlations, but 
it is not possible to understand society scientifically. This principle is repeated at the 
beginning of the Reflections, when Sorel states that current developments have to be studied 
in light of a hypothetical future.125  
With this in mind, the fact that the notion of myth in the Reflections, but also elsewhere, is 
constantly accompanied by the language of action should alert us to the fact that myth is not a 
Platonic noble lie, but, instead, is an expression of an historical movement. In the Reflections, 
for example, Sorel not only repeatedly insists that myths are ‘not descriptions of things but 
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expressions of a will to act’126 , but also frames the notion of myth through continuous 
references to Bergson. Now, it should be noticed that the Bergson that is being referred to 
here is not that of the Evolution Créatrice, but instead that of the Données, through whom 
Sorel had first engaged with the problem of freedom and determinism. The conceptual 
structures that Sorel summons to help him explain the idea of myth are those discussed in the 
first chapter of the thesis: freedom understood as creative agency, and arising from inner 
depths that are inaccessible to scientific analysis. ‘When we act’ explains Sorel ‘we are 
creating a completely artificial world placed ahead of the present world and composed of 
movements which depend entirely on us. In this way our freedom becomes perfectly 
intelligible.’127 When Sorel refers to Bergson, then, he is essentially arguing that myth is the 
product of the willing, and thus creative, activity of a subject, with the difference that whereas 
for Bergson the subject is an individual self, for Sorel it is collective and historical. It is in the 
fourth chapter of the Reflections that Sorel discusses this question in depth, by examining the 
shortcomings of what he calls la petite science. The greatest limitation of this understanding 
of science is its inability to go beyond what Sorel calls the ‘superficial regions’ of social 
phenomena.128 This is not a general critique to scientism, but a very precise one: what lies 
beneath these superficial regions, as should be clear, is (collective) agency, the ability of 
social groups to act upon present conditions and to change them. Hence, the shortcomings of 
the petite science consist essentially in its inability to deal with human agency in history. 
Myth is, then, essentially an expression of this historical agency, and the language and 
categories through which it must be examined are those of (historical) subjectivity. This is 
why it is impossible to assess the epistemic credentials of myth by confronting its elements 
with present or future historical reality: both present and future, in virtue of the creativity of 
human agency, are illegitimate fields of social scientific enquiry. However, contrary to what a 
superficial reading might suggest, myths can be tested empirically. This verification must 
however make reference to the collective subject that expresses the myth. This is why Sorel 
argues that this procedure of verification does not imply discussions about future 
developments, avoids ‘lofty reflections about philosophy, history or economics’ and remains 
on what he calls ‘the level of observable facts’. 129  These facts, as should be clear, are 
psychological ones, and the relevant empirical data will be the testimony of revolutionary 
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workers. Thus, to assess the credentials of the myth informing the general strike ‘we have to 
question men who take a very active part in the real revolutionary movement among the 
proletariat, who do not aspire to climb into the bourgeoisie and whose mind is not dominated 
by corporative prejudices.’130 Though Sorel concedes that they ‘may be deceived about an 
infinite number of political, economic or moral questions’, the fact remains that ‘their 
testimony is decisive, sovereign and irrefutable when it is a question of knowing what are the 
ideas which most powerfully move them and their comrades’.131 In other words, since myths 
are expressive of the agency of a given historical subject, their empirical verification must 
adopt the language of authenticity. 
What this implies is that, contrary to what Sorel appears to assert at various points in the 
Reflections, myths can be refuted. They cannot be arbitrary constructions imposed on a 
collective subject, but, on the contrary, because they are expressive of the historical agency of 
a collective subject, they must emerge from below.  A myth is not what Sorel colourfully 
mocks as ‘a work of pure reason manufactured by armchair experts attempting to solve the 
social problem according to the rules of logic’ but instead is ‘a spontaneous product 
analogous to those others which students of history come across in periods of action’.132 In 
other words, we can say that myths possess an historical truth, in the sense that they must 
correspond to the expectations and conditions of a collective historical subject. A myth then is 
not arbitrary, but it is the expression of the conception of the future that a social group 
elaborates in order to deploy its historical agency. It is, so to speak, a working hypothesis 
about the future which animates the activity of historical agents, i.e. those who will create the 
future. As underlined before, the criteria to adopt in order to understand myth are those of 
subjectivity and, more precisely, those of purposive action and of willing. It makes little sense 
to ask whether an intention to perform an action in the future is true or false: an act of the 
will, which requires an imaginative activity, opens up a space of possibility. And, far from 
advocating action for the sake of action, Sorel articulated at length the range of the historical 
possibility that could have been opened by revolutionary syndicalism. 
A further consideration must be added in order to protect Sorel from the accusation of 
advocating a blind and self-justifying mobilization, namely that this historical space of 
possibility was, at the time in which he was writing, an open one. With the benefit of over a 
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century of hindsight, the possibility advocated by Sorel, i.e. that a conflictual and self-
consciously revolutionary working class might have altered the course of history by taking the 
bourgeoisie away from the path of national, welfarist, capitalism, might appear as helplessly 
unrealistic. Looking backwards generates an unconscious tendency towards determinism.  We 
might thus tend to agree much more with Bernstein, and believe that the real historical 
opportunity for the proletariat of the early twentieth century consisted in securing all the 
advantages it could from the redistributive action of a state increasingly involved in the 
running of large scale capitalism. We might thus come to see Sorel’s vision as a something 
fundamentally outside of the historical reality of his time, and this could lead to the usual 
accusations. We would condemn Sorel as a thinker who, having understood that the social 
polarization which Marx had argued was intrinsic to capitalism was not occurring, still 
insisted on trying to make it happen, possibly in virtue of his insatiable appetite for conflict, 
or in virtue of his being in the words of Cole, ‘a pessimist moaning for blood.’  
But the revolutionary tendencies of which Sorel speaks in the Reflections on violence were 
not the fruit of his imagination, nor where they invented ad hoc in order to write a pamphlet 
capable of mobilizing workers against the republic. They were very real tendencies of the 
French – and Italian – proletariat. Throughout this chapter, especially in our insistence in 
describing the Reflections as a manual written for exceptional circumstances, we have likely 
been guilty of that unconscious determinism mentioned above. But it must be forcefully 
stated that the space of historical possibility outlined by Sorel in the Reflections was 
constructed with materials taken from the historical reality of the workers’ movement of the 
time. 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
Socialism is the society resulting from the triumph of proletarian institutions, but these 
institutions require precise social and economic structural conditions in order to flourish. 
They require a world shaped by the power of capital, a world characterized by economic 
development, thunderous technological innovation, and, most importantly, the dissolution of 
antiquated identities and social relations, and their substitution with a single, increasingly 
severe, economic cleavage between sellers and purchasers of human labour. As early as in 
1902, Sorel had begun thinking that these conditions were not ripening; in particular, the 
processes of class formation that would have characterized that historical dynamic were being 
replaced by a tendency towards the assimilation of the proletariat in the bourgeois world. In 
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these conditions, socialism became a matter of exerting, through democratic institutions, 
pressure upon the bourgeoisie to obtain concessions. This, for Sorel, meant abdicating the 
revolutionary character of socialism, and would lead to the dissolution of the proletariat as a 
revolutionary subject.  
The Reflections on violence explore the historical possibility of subverting this path of 
historical development by responding to the concessions of the bourgeoisie with a practice of 
social conflict animated by two principal objectives. The first, most immediate one, was that 
of creating the revolutionary class, of fostering the class identity of the proletariat and thus of 
fighting the dangerous tendency towards assimilation. The second, probably more important 
but less urgent, is that of returning the capitalist bourgeoisie to its historically progressive 
mission of capitalist production. Though most of the pages of the Reflections explored deal 
with the first task, it is clear that without the second the possibility of socialism remains 
chimerical. As Enrico Leone wrote, introducing the book version of the Reflections to the 
Italian public:  
‘In this epoch it seems to Sorel… that proletarian violence performs the useful 
task of bringing the bourgeoisie back to its productive activity, leading it away 
from the attempts of conciliation and paternalism to which it holds on in a 
desperate attempt to preserve itself. But, only because he assigns this temporary 
task to violence, Sorel must not be confused for an exponent of the antiquated 
Blanquist conception. Despite superficial similarities, syndicalism is the exact 
opposite of Blanquism: the latter holds… that violence is the source of all rights, 
the former instead believes, in conformity to the Marxist spirit, in a process of 
economic development of which right is the automatic product.’133 
Of course, Sorel was not very inclined to believe in the automatism of which Leone speaks. 
But apart from this, the passage highlights well the topical nature of the measures described 
by Sorel in the Reflections. It highlights, in particular, how the socialist society requires a 
certain kind of capitalist development, and how proletarian violence can, indirectly, bring it 
about. Only in such conditions can the institutional development of the proletariat occur, and 
only from this development can Sorel’s society of tomorrow arise. In describing, in the 
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second chapter of the Reflections, the historical process through which socialism will impose 
itself, Sorel had written that ‘capitalist force is at the base of this entire process and it operates 
in an imperious manner.’134 The possibility explored by the Reflections is, in some way, the 
opposite of this, insofar as it is the possibility that proletarian violence, by reawakening 
capitalist force, might be a decisive factor in the process that leads to the civilisation of 
producers. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
With the examination of the Reflections on violence the thesis comes to an end, consequently 
leaving Sorel’s intellectual activity between 1908 and his death in 1922 unexamined.  Despite 
the noticeable drop in output that characterized Sorel’s writings after 1914, the period with 
which we do not deal contains a number of interesting issues which would be worth a closer 
examination, from Sorel’s sporadic contacts with the Action Française to the reaction to the 
Great War, from the examinations of Soviet Russia to the philosophical turn to pragmatism, 
from the change in tone that comes from having the consciousness of being a relatively 
authoritative writer to his last years as a regular commentator on current affairs for Il Resto 
del Carlino. And yet, despite the interest that these questions clearly have, the last 15 years of 
Sorel’s life constitute an appendix to the more vital period going from 1890 until 1908. It is in 
this latter period that Sorel elaborated his most important ideas, that he dealt with the central 
problems of his work, and that, in short, constitute the core of his thinking. Though, then, it is 
possible to examine the last years through the categories and interpretative keys developed in 
the study of the period between 1890 and 1908, the opposite does not hold. In other words, 
the defining traits of Sorel’s thought were amply established before 1908, and did not change 
afterwards, which means that the most interesting aspects of his post-Reflections writings 
have to be looked in Sorel’s analysis of new historical phenomena, most notably the Great 
War and the Russian revolution. 
The story that we have told in this thesis is one that begins in philosophy and ends in 
socialism. It is a story that begins with Sorel’s attempts to conceptualize human agency in 
history and that understands Sorel’s engagement with Marxism through the lens of this 
concern for agency, showing how it led him, with the assistance of Labriola, to reject both 
historical and economic determinism and to embrace an understanding of Marxism as the 
ideological production of an emerging social force, as the consciousness of a budding 
historical subjectivity. The Marxism to which Sorel subscribed, characterized by the centrality 
of class, determined a precise political strategy for the realization of socialism: proletarian 
institutional development. The second part of the thesis, on the other hand, is dedicated to 
showing how this political strategy played out in a precise historical context characterized by 
important transformations in European capitalist societies. Sorel, I try to suggest, lived at the 
dawn of an era of mass production and social organisation, and understood rather well that 
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this called for a rethinking of the Marxian scheme of capitalist development in terms of 
increasing social polarization and class conflict. The national and welfarist capitalisms that 
were taking shape at the beginning of the century did not contribute to the development of the 
proletariat as a revolutionary class but, on the contrary, tended to incorporate this class into 
existing social and economic institutions. What Sorel was observing, in short, was the 
dissolution of the proletarian subjectivity, and revolutionary syndicalism was his antidote to 
this unexpected development. 
By way of conclusion, we shall attempt to widen some of the issues explored in this thesis 
and to explore the significance of the Sorel that we have sketched. This means reflecting on 
two different Sorels. On the one hand, a wider interpretation of the most philosophical aspects 
of Sorel’s thought is needed, in order to clarify that, far from proclaiming the bankruptcy of 
reason, Sorel dealt with some of the classical problems of philosophical modernity, and that, 
far from being the expression of an irrationalist philosophy confined to the dust of history, he 
gave solutions to such problems that fully belong to the philosophical horizon which we still 
inhabit. On the other hand, it is necessary reflect on Sorel’s status as a Marxist theorist in an 
important moment of capitalist transformation. What has been suggested through the thesis is 
that the tendencies that Sorel had begun to detect in the opening years of the twentieth century 
– tendencies towards economic and social organization and productive expansion developing 
along national lines – were those that dominated the following fifty years of European history 
and that greatly contributed to the intensity of the two European conflicts. To offer a broader 
reflection on how Sorel saw these transformations serves not only to illuminate the stakes of 
the debate, but also can shed light on the significance of his syndicalist solution. 
SOREL AS PHILOSOPHER: PRACTICE, HISTORY, CONTINGENCY 
The fundamental philosophical theme of Sorel’s oeuvre is the tension between historicism 
and the need for substantial standards of truth and rationality. This tension is a classical one, 
and it accompanies virtually every epistemological stance that abandons the 
representationalist paradigm of knowledge in terms of enquiring subject and object of 
knowledge. According to the representationalist view, knowledge is a question of correctly 
mapping out a reality that is fundamentally external and independent from our cognitive 
processes and from our efforts to grasp it. The standard problem of such epistemologies is the 
ease with which they lead to scepticism, insofar as they create the problem of matching 
subjective representations with objective states of affairs to which we have no independent 
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and unproblematic access. This, at least since Descartes, creates the epistemological problem 
of, in Habermas’ words, ‘bridging a chasm’ between inner impressions and outer reality and 
offers a fertile terrain for scepticism to develop. One of the canonical answers to the sceptical 
problems engendered by the representationalist paradigm is what we can call the Hegelian 
solution. This solution, which is the one pursued by Sorel, consists in radically altering the 
terms in which the problem is framed. Rather than positing the problem as one of access to an 
external reality, Hegelian, activist epistemologies seek to examine the ways in which the 
enquiring subject acquires knowledge, thereby abandoning the question as to the possibility of 
knowledge and concentrating on what could be called the practice of knowledge. It is 
important to stress that this stance does not imply a renunciation of the traditional 
philosophical pursuit of truth; on the contrary, it is a stance that holds that the pursuit of truth 
should be examined in the concrete, by looking at how reason functions. This is why it takes 
the form of a phenomenology in Hegel and why it can reasonably be called a ‘reason in 
action’ model. 
But the Hegelian solution, too, comes at a cost. To concentrate on the agency of the enquiring 
mind means opening up the question of truth to a potentially endless list of contingencies. 
However one chooses to interpret the imperative to examine reason in action, one will be 
faced by pluralism. To focus on the activities of enquiring subjects and to argue that truth is to 
be found in these activities means essentially giving up on the idea of an external and stable 
criterion of truth. Activism, in other words, implies pluralism, and pluralism easily becomes 
relativism, whether it be historical relativism or some other form of it. Thus, very generally 
speaking, the challenge that activist, Hegelian epistemologies face is that of finding a way to 
contain the relativism that they necessarily engender. As Richard Rorty put it, the crucial 
question is ‘whether one can be a pragmatist without being an irrationalist, without 
abandoning one’s loyalty to Socrates’: in other words, whether rational argumentation, be it 
philosophical or pertaining to other forms of thought, is sustainable in the absence the strong 
– though problematic – standard of external truth that the representationalist paradigm 
guarantees.1  
As should be clear, one of the claims of this thesis is that Sorel’s philosophical trajectory is 
essentially defined by this attempt to embrace an activist epistemology without falling into 
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relativism. On the one hand, this is of some importance, because it suggests that Sorel, when 
examined from a philosophical perspective, does not belong to a philosophical tradition of 
irrationalism, but instead to a Hegelian tradition of the philosophy of action. Sorel does not 
proclaim the bankruptcy of reason, but tries to develop an account of human rationality based 
on practice, arguing that reasoned thought can not be understood in isolation from the agency 
which characterizes human experience more in general. It is clear that that this inscription of 
Sorel into a Hegelian philosophical tradition requires greater elaboration.2 Despite this, it 
seems to me that there are sufficient hints to believe that it is substantially correct. Not only 
Sorel engages with thinkers such as Vico, Labriola, Croce, and Marx, who all belong to this 
tradition, but, more fundamentally, he makes the relevant philosophical moves at the right 
moments.3 Thus, when, in the late 1880s, he becomes aware of the limitations of the ageing 
positivism that surrounds him, he refuses to embrace conventionalism and to accord to 
science the epistemic status of a useful fiction, but instead forcefully argues that standards of 
truth and rationality have to be looked for in the concrete, historical, practices of scientists, 
and insists that ‘science must not prove its possibility; this is the very starting point of all 
reasoning’.4 
It is true that, when he wrote those words, Sorel still believed in the possibility of, as it were, 
anchoring science in reality, i.e. in the possibility that science could faithfully represent the 
deterministic causal relations that characterized the natural world. What could guarantee the 
connection between artificially created scientific concepts and the world of nature were, as we 
have shown in the first three chapters, experiments. But with the reading of Vico this 
representationalist conception of knowledge gradually faded away and the later developments 
of his epistemology consisted in a radicalization of the activist and historicist tendencies. This 
emerges not only in the kind of Marxism that Sorel elaborated and defended, but also, though 
we have not dealt with it, in the pragmatism that he came to develop later in his life. Now, the 
peculiarity of specifically philosophical problems is that they are problems that pertain to 
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very general habits of reasoning, and that thus emerge in a wide variety of more specific 
concerns. This means that, as Sorel progressively abandoned the representationalist 
conception of knowledge in order to embrace the Vichian one, he was continuously 
confronted by the risks of excessive pluralism, relativism, and irrationalism on a variety of 
issues. Whether on questions of morality or of the epistemic status of scientific assertions, the 
tension between free agency and truth resurfaces continuously all through Sorel’s vast oeuvre. 
The following constitutes perhaps the clearest expression of this leit motiv: 
‘Morality, like historical epochs, is a changing thing – like everything; the 
difficulty lies in knowing how this fact of change can be reconciled with the idea 
of truth. At bottom, it is with the fundamental problem of pragmatism that we 
are faced today; it is a problem that must be re-examined by being more 
sympathetic to Hegel than we tend to be nowadays. His solution, it is true, is too 
simple. [According to Hegel] The idea is revealed to us in each epoch according 
to the degree of its development; but if we abandon idealism, the difficulty 
becomes enormous and metaphysics has not yet begun to deal with it; yet, this is 
the modern problem.’5  
Should there be any doubts left, the extract should reinforce the point that it is quite simply 
mistaken to see Sorel as belonging to a tradition of irrationalism. What this extract shows is 
not only how aware Sorel was of the relativistic potential of his epistemological stance, but 
also, more importantly, how he saw this as a yet unsolved problem. There is no embracement 
of a joyous relativism, and the tension between historical sensibility and standards of truth is 
described as a ‘difficulté’ and as ‘le problème moderne.’ It is significant, moreover, not only 
that Sorel kept engaging with this tension between agency and truth, but that he refused the 
solution, which he here attributes to Hegel, of a secularized historical theodicy. 
This last point deserves closer examination, if only because the idea of history as process 
through which contingency is gradually overcome constitutes a standard answer to the 
relativism engendered by historicism. The historicization of human knowledge leads to 
relativism, but this problem can be resolved if history is a progressive narrative tending 
towards an end. Though we shall not, both for reasons of complexity and for the difference in 
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philosophical magnitude between the two thinkers, develop a comparison between Hegel and 
Sorel on this question, it is illuminating to juxtapose Sorel to Gramsci. The two belonged to 
contiguous generations, shared a commitment to revolutionary Marxism and, most 
importantly, through a shared background in Italian idealism grounded in Labriola and Croce, 
had similar understandings of the philosophical content of Marxism. In fact, a closer 
examination of the similarities and differences between Sorel’s and Gramsci’s Marxisms 
would be worth developing, because they share so many of the basic philosophical premises, 
most notably the idea of the historicity of philosophy, which they both see as an articulation 
of the ideas implicit in social practices. 
For Gramsci, for example, it is necessary to abandon the idea of philosophy as the 
‘intellectual activity of a precise category of specialized scientists or professional 
philosophers’6, because philosophical assumptions are hidden beneath every social practice: 
‘even in the slightest manifestation of intellectual activity, “language”, is contained a precise 
conception of the world.’7 What Gramsci calls the ‘philosophy of intellectuals’ is but a more 
articulated and crystallized version of ideas that are already present, in an unarticulated 
manner, in the social practices of a given historical period. It is, moreover, the part of 
philosophy which is more expressive of an historically situated ‘common sense’ [senso 
comune] that is most valuable: 
‘But accomplished and perfect systems of thought are always the work of 
individual philosophers and in them, beyond the historically relevant part, the 
part corresponding to contemporary conditions of life, there is always an 
abstract, “ahistorical” part, in the sense that it is linked to previous philosophies 
and either responds to external and pedantic necessities of architecture of the 
system or expresses individual traits of the philosopher; thus, the philosophy of 
an era cannot be found in any individual system…’8 
The similarity not only of issues treated, but also of arguments and of judgments, with this 
passage from Sorel’s Saggi di critica del Marxismo is striking: 
                                                 
6
 Gramsci, Quaderni, p. 1375. ‘Occorre distruggere il pregiudizio molto diffuso che la filosofia sia un alcunché 
di molto difficile per il fatto che essa è l’attività intellettuale propria di una determinate categoria di scienziati 
specialisti o filosofi professionali e sistematici.’ 
7
 Ibid. ‘…anche solo nella minima manifestazione di una qualsiasi attività intellettuale, il “linguaggio”, è 
contenuta una determinata concezione del mondo…’ 
8
 Ibid., pp. 1409-10. ‘Ma i sistemi compiuti e perfetti sono sempre opera di singoli filosofi, e in essi, accanto alla 
parte storicamente attuale, cioè corrispondente alle contemporanee condizioni di vita, esiste sempre una parte 
astratta, “astorica”, nel senso che è legata alle precedenti filosofie e risponde a necessità esteriori o è dovuta a 
idiosincrasie personali; perciò la filosofia di un’epoca non può essere nessun sistema individuale o di 
tendenza…’ 
 415 
‘The formulas that resumed entire systems do not tell us why a system 
triumphed in a given era, nor the reason as to why it was able to influence 
institutions... Doctrines crumble, one after the other, like sand castles and the 
history of philosophy resembles the narration of successive failures; but this 
vanity of philosophy only belongs to the dogmatic part, that which presented 
itself as scientifically superior. But there was something that was not in vain: the 
light shed upon their own epoch by the creators of philosophical schools, which 
allows posterity to understand it.’ 9 
Both Sorel and Gramsci then share this idea of the essential historicity of human thought and 
the idea that more systematized forms of knowledge emerge from social practice. Beyond 
sharing this commitment to the historicity of philosophy, and of human knowledge more in 
general, Sorel and Gramsci also share the worry about the relativistic implications of their 
stance: ‘To think’ writes the Italian ‘a philosophical claim as true in a given historical period, 
that is, as a necessary and inseparable expression of a given historical agency, of a given 
praxis, but overcome and “made obsolete” in a successive period without falling into 
scepticism and moral and ideological relativism, in other words, to conceive philosophy as 
historicity, is a rather difficult mental operation.’10 
But though they share this burden of historicity, Sorel and Gramsci, importantly, differ in 
their willingness to keep carrying it. Addressing directly the question of truth, Gramsci denies 
that this truth can be conceived in terms of an ‘extra-historical and extra-human objectivity’, 
suggesting that these conceptions are religious residues.11 But then how should truth and 
objectivity be accommodated in a historicist conception of knowledge? Gramsci’s answer is 
historically and teleologically: ‘Man knows objectively when knowledge is real for a 
humankind historically unified in a unitary cultural system; but this process of historical 
unification occurs through the overcoming of the contradictions that tear human society apart, 
contradictions that give rise to social groups and to their partisan ideologies…’ 12  The 
progressive movement of mankind through history, thus, constitutes what Gramsci calls a 
‘struggle for objectivity’, which consists in the ‘struggle for the cultural unification of 
                                                 
9
 Sorel, Saggi di Critica del Marxismo, pp. 9-10. 
10
 Gramsci, Quaderni, p. 1402. ‘Pensare un’affermazione filosofica come vera in un determinato periodo storico, 
cioè come espressione necessaria e inscindibile di una determinata azione storica, di una determinata praxis, ma 
superata e “vanificata” in un periodo successivo, senza però cadere nello scetticismo e nel relativismo morale e 
ideologico, cioè concepire la filosofia come storicità, è operazione mentale un po’ ardua e difficile. 
11
 Ibid., p. 1415. ‘…analizzando questa concezione, non è poi tanto facile giustificare un punto di vista di 
oggettività esteriore così meccanicamente intesa. Pare che possa esistere una oggettività extrastorica ed 
extraumana?’ 
12
 Ibid., p. 1416. ‘L’uomo conosce oggettivamente in quanto la conoscenza è reale per tutto il genere umano 
storicamente unificato in un sistema culturale unitario; ma questo processo di unificazione storica avviene con la 
sparizione delle contraddizioni che sono la condizione della formazione dei gruppi e della nascita delle ideologie 
non universali concrete ma rese caduche dall’origine pratica della loro sostanza.’ 
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humankind.’13 Significantly, Gramsci adds that ‘what idealists call “spirit” is not a starting 
point, but an end point’.14 In other words, though Gramsci rejects the idea of history as a 
process of actualization of the potentialities of consciousness, he keeps the same basic 
teleological scheme. Though knowledge derives from practical engagement with the world, 
and this engagement changes historically, the overall movement of history is a progressive 
one, meaning that it implies a widening of human knowledge until the end point, i.e. the 
‘cultural unification of mankind’, is reached and objective knowledge finally attained. 
Readers of the thesis will be aware of how distant we are from Sorel’s position on the 
problem. Sorel was, indeed, aware of the possibility of the teleological solution, but always 
dismissed it, sometimes forcefully and sometimes, like in the citation above, with a certain 
regret. But he never accepted the legitimacy of this recourse to historical teleology. In 
rejecting Vico’s notion of storia ideale, let us recall, Sorel had been sympathetic to the 
necessities that had brought Vico to formulate it, and understood how it would have solved 
the problems of historical relativism. But he had also added that ‘the difficulties which result 
from the new principles’ were not a good reason to ‘go back to doctrines which we know to 
be false… It is precisely because we recognize its importance [of the problem of ethical and 
juridical relativism] that we do not want to accept illusory solutions.’15 This refusal to endorse 
teleology means that Sorel’s epistemological system remains essentially unstable, always 
subject to the charge of relativism and irrationalism. But this is a risk that Sorel is conscious 
of, one that he chooses to run, and one that he would, if he could, avoid taking. Far from 
irrationalism, this refusal to endorse teleology, though it condemns his philosophy to a degree 
of instability, places him in a philosophical world close to the one we inhabit. ‘This kind of 
historicism, unlike Hegel’s, involves a form of fallibilism: it s a kind of historicism which 
excludes all claims to absolute knowledge’: what MacIntyre predicates of his own philosophy 
could very well describe Sorel’s thought.16 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Ibid. ‘C’è quindi una lotta per l’oggettività… e questa lotta è la stessa lotta per l’unificazione culturale del 
genere umano.’ 
14
 Ibid. Ciò che gli idealisti chiamano “spirito” non è un punto di partenza, ma di arrivo, l’insieme delle 
soprastrutture in divenire verso l’unificazione concreta ed oggettivamente universale e non già un presupposto 
unitario…’ 
15
 Sorel, ‘Étude sur Vico’, p. 809. 
16
 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. A study in moral theory, 2nd ed. (London, Duckworth: 1985), p. 270.  
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THINKING THE REVOLUTION IN THE ABSENCE OF CAPITALISM  
A few additional words have to be spent also on Sorel’s syndicalist vision and on the 
circumstances in which it developed. One of the claims that I have tried to develop through 
the second part of the thesis is that Sorel was living at the very beginning of an era of national 
capitalism, of mass social organization, of nationalism, and of managed economies. It was the 
Great War that inaugurated this era, and thus Sorel’s observations were developed in a sort of 
prehistory of this phase of European history. The transformation of European societies was of 
considerable magnitude, and we can see the importance of the shift by noticing how it 
completely destroyed Marxist doctrine as it was generally understood and practiced during the 
Second International. Beyond questions of historical and economic determinism, the mood 
had been one of optimism, of the ripening of social conditions that would lead to socialism. 
But conditions had begun to alter. Parliamentarism did not lead to the triumphant march to 
socialism that Engels had outlined in 1895. The Bernstein crisis opened the debate; the fiasco 
of 1914, when international proletarian solidarity succumbed to nationalism, sealed the fate of 
the practices and ideas of that International; the Bolshevik victory in 1917 introduced a new 
paradigm of socialist theory and practice. Capitalism had shown that, with the help of 
nationalism and of a greater management of economic phenomena, it was capable of dealing 
rather well with the class cleavages that it generated, and that national states could secure the 
allegiance of the working class. Commenting, in 1935, upon the period in question, Karl 
Kautsky wrote: 
‘Indeed, we expected much more from the crisis at that time… Not only the 
revival of the socialist movement in Britain, but the breakdown of capitalism 
throughout the world. This hope proved illusory. Capitalism survived the 
crisis… A new phase of capitalist prosperity ensued. But what emerged was an 
entirely altered capitalism. The older form of capitalism had been eclipsed.’17 
What the second part of the thesis has been concerned with demonstrating is that Sorel, unlike 
Kautsky, was acutely aware of the transformations that capitalist societies were undergoing. 
He had identified the trends towards the nationalisation of the working class; he had seen that 
the new capitalism, the capitalism of the welfare state and of social peace, had found ways of 
dealing with the rise of a contentious proletariat. The centrality of the problem of class 
formation in his work derives, as has been argued, from the awareness of these circumstances. 
How does one create a revolutionary subjectivity in the absence of its structural conditions? 
                                                 
17
 Karl Kautsky, 1935, cited in Colletti, ‘Bernstein’, p. 58. 
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This was the question that animated most profoundly his syndicalism. The understanding of 
revolution that underscored his thought was a canonical Marxist one, and socialism was seen 
as the process of historical coming of age of the proletariat. But new conditions forced Sorel 
to ask himself the question of how to turn the tide of an historical development that pushed 
the advent of the proletariat further and further away. 
In 1922, Carl Schmitt commented on Sorel’s notion of myth and, though he heaped praise on 
it, remarked that Sorel’s mistake was that of rooting this myth in Marxian economic concepts, 
i.e. in an idea of class. Nation, argued Schmitt, would have been a better option: 
‘Sorel’s other examples of myth also prove that when they occur in the modern 
period, the stronger myth is national. The revolutionary wars of the French 
nation and the Spanish and German wars of liberation against Napoleon are 
symptoms of a national energy. In national feeling, various elements are at work 
in the most diverse ways, in very different peoples. The more naturalistic 
conceptions of race and descent, the apparently more typical terrisme of the 
celtic and romance peoples, the speech, tradition, and consciousness of a shared 
culture and education, the awareness of being different from other nations – all 
of that tends towards a national rather than a class consciousness today.’18 
To write these sentences, in the aftermath of the Great War and of the breakdown of the 
Second International, was easy. Moreover, despite Schmitt’s claim to simply describe a state 
of affairs in which nation had overcome class as the source of political legitimation, it is 
perhaps not incorrect to read, between the lines, a subtle endorsement of this state of affairs. 
The passage offers a perfect occasion for reflecting on the historical possibility that Sorel 
thought could be opened up by proletarian violence at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Sorel’s vision was, as we have tried to argue, and as Schmitt also admits, a Marxian one. It is 
a vision of proletarian emancipation that presupposes a world in which human sociability is 
shaped by economic considerations. This means, inter alia, a world in which ‘naturalistic 
conceptions of race and descent’, ‘consciousness of a shared culture and education’, and ‘the 
awareness of being different from other nations’ are relegated to the dustbin of history and 
looked upon with puzzlement and condescension. The world in which Sorel’s proletarian 
institutions could have flourished, and that Sorel hoped could be reinstated by proletarian 
violence, is a world fully shaped by capital. 
                                                 
18
 Schmitt, Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, p. 75. 
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In this, Sorel shares what Pierre Rosanvallon has called Marx’s ‘fascination for the power of 
capitalism.’19 The progressive work of emancipation of humankind from antiquated forms of 
sociability and politics, in other words, is largely attributed to the devastating forces of market 
interactions, which, as Sorel repeatedly points out, end up having to do most of the historical 
work required for the realization of socialism. Markets, and the interactions that they 
generate, have the capability of fully transforming human sociability, and thus constitute, in 
Marx, ‘the sole true revolution that has ever occurred in human history.’20 In Sorel, moreover, 
this momentous progressive force of capitalism, it is important to stress, manifests itself even 
in the movement of proletarian reaction that it engenders. One of the fundamental tasks that 
the budding proletarian institutions will have to learn to perform, in fact, is the administration 
of production, i.e. the capacity to maintain and further the economic abundance that 
capitalism has generated. All other forms of antagonism to capitalism are reactionary ones. In 
describing, in a letter to Jean Bourdeau, the specificity of the Marxist conception of class 
struggle Sorel could not be clearer in highlighting the intimate relationship that connects 
insurgent proletarians to the progressive forces of market capitalism against which they 
revolt: 
‘There are, moreover, a lot of distinctions that must be established between 
different social struggles: what is specific to Marx and Engels is that struggle to 
them derives from an economic division, whereas for A. Thierry it is military 
conquest, and the separation between victors and vanquished it creates, that is 
fundamental. The capitalist workshop has no historical or ethnic cleavages: it 
functions under the regime of human rights; it is a technological distinction [la 
differenciation technique] that engenders class struggle in the Marxist sense. 
Andler does not understand this, and he has remained stuck in Thierry’s 
conception; he confuses a feudal baron and a capitalist. The prince of Sagan has 
immense holdings in Soleure, never goes there, and is content with collecting his 
feudal rent. But Schneider goes to Creusot, and he is respected in the Creusot. It 
is against the Schneiders that Marxist class struggle establishes itself.’21  
                                                 
19
 Pierre Rosanvallon, Le libéralisme économique (Paris, Seuil : 1989), p. 200. 
20
 Ibid., p. 211. ‘Si Marx pense le développement du capitalisme et des forces productives, ce n’est donc pas 
parce qu’il part de la présupposition… que le mouvement du capitalisme ne peut être ni freiné, ni contrôlé et que 
son émergence constitue la seule véritable révolution qui ait jamais eu lieu dans l’histoire de l’humanité.’ 
21
 Sorel, letter to Jean Bourdeau, 2/10/1906, in ‘Lettres de Sorel à Bourdeau. 1re partie’, pp. 171-2. ‘Il y a aussi 
beaucoup de distinctions à établir entre les diverses luttes sociales : ce qui est tout à fait spécial dans Marx et 
dans Engels, c’est que la lutte leur apparaît comme étant dérivée d’une division économique tandis que pour A. 
Thierry c’est la conquête et la séparation des vainqueurs et des vaincus qui est fondamentale. L’atelier capitaliste 
n’a point de différenciation historique ou ethnique ; il fonctionne sous le régime des droits de l’homme ; c’est 
cependant la différenciation technique qui engendre la lutte de classe marxiste. Andler ne parvient pas à 
comprendre et il en est encore à A. Thierry ; il confond un capitaliste et un baron féodal. Le prince de Sagan a 
d’immenses domaines à Soleure, il n’y met pas les pieds et se borne à percevoir des redevances d’origine 
féodale. Mais Schneider est au Creusot et même il est une grande chose dans le Creusot. C’est contre les 
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It is true that here Sorel adds an additional element to the specificity of the Marxist class 
struggle, that of technological and scientific development. Nonetheless, the main point 
remains: in the historical process that leads to socialism, ‘capitalist force is at the base… and 
it operates in an imperious manner.’22 
This intimate connection between the progressive force of capitalism and the progressive 
character of the proletarian revolt that it ought to engender goes quite far in explaining both 
the language used by Sorel to condemn the new statist and welfarist tendencies and the 
violence with which he condemns them. After all, Sorel rejected historical teleology, so 
should not have been excessively shocked in seeing that capitalism had evolved in unexpected 
ways. But though his understanding of history could account for unexpected developments, 
the character of those developments struck him as profoundly regressive. Tendencies towards 
statism and protectionism were not only damaging to the prospect of proletarian institutional 
development, but were a betrayal of the bourgeoisie’s own historical mission. Hence, the 
recurring accusations of ‘feudalism’, the employment of a language of historical progress and 
regress, the tendency to see in economic planning the road to productive and technological 
decadence23, and the condemnation of the French bourgeoisie as a spent historical force to be 
compared unfavourably with its progressive American counterpart. What shocked Sorel was 
the realization that capitalism, far from being the progressive force capable of assuring 
technological advances and economic prosperity, was merely, to use again Rosanvallon’s 
words, a ‘class pragmatism’, that could embrace protectionism or laissez faire, seek social 
conflict or social peace, according to what best served its interests in different situations.24 
This, Sorel could not pardon to the bourgeoisie. 
This, I believe, sheds light on the profoundly progressive nature of Sorel’s syndicalist vision. 
It is a vision that requires a world fully shaped by capital: a world without ethnic or national 
allegiances, without borders, without all social relations that are not a result of market 
interactions. A world in which social and political formations are grounded in the only 
                                                                                                                                                        
Schneider que se forme la lutte de classe Marxiste.’ The Schneider family owned one of France’s largest 
metallurgical establishments in Le Creusot.   
22
 Sorel, Reflections, p. 78. 
23
 Whereas, in fact, it was quite the opposite, in that managerial capitalism was accompanied by a remarkable 
productive expansion. 
24
 Rosanvallon, Libéralisme économique, p. 211. ‘Cela n’a donc aucun sens de critiquer le capitalisme en tant 
qu’il ne se conforme pas fidèlement aux principes du libéralisme économique et qu’il ne réalise pas le 
programme de l’utopie libérale. La seule liberté qu’il revendique est celle du capital, il est indifféremment libre-
échangiste ou protectionniste selon que l’un ou l’autre favorise cette liberté. Il est d’abord un pragmatisme de 
classe.’ 
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cleavage that capitalism has not eliminated, that between owners of the means of productions 
and sellers of human labour. The elimination of this cleavage is the task of socialism and of 
proletarian institutions. Needless to say that, even beyond the transformations in capitalist 
production that occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century, this world was far from 
being actualized in Sorel’s lifetime. But when the new economic and social tendencies began 
to arise, it further receded from the horizon of historical possibility. The collaboration 
between governmental organization and capital whose birth Sorel observed produced two 
world wars, increased production and prosperity, and a social configuration that, by 
redistributing that prosperity and by completing that process of proletarian assimilation which 
Sorel denounced, precluded any realistic possibility of revolutionary transformations in 
twentieth century Western European societies. 
The work of this thesis could be expanded in many ways. It could include the last years of 
Sorel’s life, in order to investigate the development of his anti-bourgeois positions and shed 
light on the rightist sympathies which he did, however marginal they might be, entertain in 
that period. More interestingly, a substantial work on Sorel’s reception in the 1920s and 
1930s, focussing on Italy and France, would rescue this thesis from the contextualist excesses 
in which it might have fallen. The exploration of the relevance of Sorel’s ideas to a number of 
current debates might also have the same effect. This relevance of Sorelian ideas could be 
pursued, most obviously, in the sphere of post-Marxist theory and, most interestingly, in 
Anglo-American post-analytic philosophy and in its interest in questions of historicism. This 
task would also show that the significance of a thinker or of an idea is neither exhausted by 
the explication of their historical meaning nor by studies of their reception and diffusion. A 
thinker or an idea remain significant and can avoid being of mere antiquarian interest as long 
as the same problems to which they responded keep arising in the historical experience of 
new generations. At the beginning of this conclusion, I have argued that, philosophically, 
Sorel still fully belongs to our horizon, by which I mean that, despite the change in 
philosophical languages, we face some of the same problems that Sorel faced. But philosophy 
is a longue durée activity, and the timings of its paradigm shifts are slow ones.  
I want to end the thesis with a suggestion. The beginning of the twenty-first century has been 
characterized by developments that seem to suggest that the era of fruitful collaboration 
between state and capital is all but over. Social democratic politics based on the paradigm of 
redistribution of wealth appears to have exhausted its historical force. In Southern Europe, 
 422 
increasingly large sections of society are partially or totally cut off from the enjoyment of 
social prosperity and fail to find meaningful political representation in ageing and 
increasingly confused social democratic parties. Protections from market excesses, capable of 
guaranteeing the stability of the Keynesian model, are under attack – sometimes by the same 
social democratic parties that had fought for them and implemented them. The ability of 
capitalism to operate beyond and in spite of national borders and state powers is evident 
anew. History does not repeat itself, but the fading of the state as a meaningful economic and 
social actor does put us in a context more similar to Sorel’s one than anything seen in the past 
ninety years. Generations have lived and died under the social democratic consensus of 
redistributive prosperity. Those who will not, however, might find the ideas of Georges Sorel 
interesting. 
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APPENDIX: EDITORIAL CHRONOLOGY OF THE REFLECTIONS ON 
VIOLENCE 
 
 
1) ‘La lotta di classe e la violenza’, Il Divenire Sociale 1, 1 and 16 October 1905, pp. 
294-8 and 313-15. 
2) ‘La decadenza borghese e la violenza, Il Divenire Sociale 1, 1 and 16 November 1905, 
pp. 331-33 and 343-8. 
3) ‘I pregiudizi contro la violenza’, Il Divenire Sociale 1, 1 December 1905, pp. 359-66. 
4) ‘Lo sciopero generale’, Il Divenire Sociale 1, 16 December 1905, pp. 374-8. 
5) ‘Réflexions sur la violence – Avant-propos’, Le Mouvement Socialiste 18, 15 January 
1906, pp. 5-12. 
6) ‘Réflexions sur la violence – Lutte de classe et violence’, Le Mouvement Socialiste 18, 
15 January 1906, pp. 12-32. [Slightly adjusted French version of 1] 
7) ‘Réflexions sur la violence – Decadence bourgeoise et violence’, Le Mouvement 
Socialiste 18, 15 January 1906, pp. 32-56. [Slightly adjusted French version of 2] 
8) ‘Lo sciopero generale politico’, Il Divenire Sociale 2, 16 January 1906, pp. 22-5 and 1 
February 1906, pp. 35-7. 
9) ‘Réflexions sur la violence – Préjugés contre la violence’, Le Mouvement Socialiste 
18, 15 February 1906, pp. 140-64. [Slightly adjusted French version of 3] 
10) ‘Morale e violenza’, Il Divenire Sociale 2, 16 February 1906, pp. 51-5. 
11) ‘Réflexions sur la violence – La grève prolétarienne’, Le Mouvement Socialiste 18, 15 
March 1906, pp. 256-93. [Substantially enlarged French version of 4] 
12) ‘Lo sciopero generale e la morale’, Il Divenire Sociale 2, 16 March 1906, pp. 86-9. 
13) ‘La morale dei produttori’, Il Divenire Sociale 2, 1 April 1906, pp. 100-103. 
14) Lo sciopero generale e la violenza, trans. by Salvatore Piroddi and preface by Enrico 
Leone (Roma, Tipografia Industria e Lavoro : 1906), xii + 128 pp. [Contains 1, 2, 3, 4, 
8, 10, 12, 13] 
15) ‘Réflexions sur la violence – La grève générale politique’, Le Mouvement Socialiste 
18, 15 April 1906, pp. 390-427. [Substantially enlarged French version of 8] 
16) ‘Réflexions sur la violence – La moralité de la violence’, Le Mouvement Socialiste 19, 
May-June 1906, pp. 33-81. [Substantially enlarged French version of 10 and 12] 
17) ‘Réflexions sur la violence – La morale des producteurs’  Le Mouvement Socialiste 
19, May-June 1906, pp. 81-124. [Substantially enlarged French version of 13] 
18) ‘Lettre à M.Daniel Halévy’, Le Mouvement Socialiste 22, August-September 1907, pp. 
137-75.  
19) Réflexions sur la violence (Paris, Pages Libres : 1908). [Contains slightly altered 
versions of 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 15, 16, 17 and, by way of introduction, 18] 
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